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Ref. Paul Muskett's English Smugling in the Eighteenth Century.
Dear Margaret,
Thankyou for offering to make the amendments to
my footnotes. I'm working on errors and interpretations in
constructing historical narratives at the moment, using an
episode in Manx smuggling, so it was ironic to find I couldn't
even get a numerical sequence right. (I blame the
teachers/parents/government etc. etc.)
The mistakes are to be found: i) on page 112. The footnotes
are numbered 43, 44, and 45. They should read 106, 107 and
108.
ii) On page 114. Numbers 48 and 49 should be 111 and 112.
iii) On p. 116. There are two number ll7s. Could you eliminate
the second, after 'Britain'?
My thanks again, and I would appreciate your letting me
know when the corrections have been done.
Yours sincerely,'O..4.( t3\&1&-.
PS. Since the Notes are correct, I suspect that pages 112 and
114 were redone, but whereas the original copies had my new
footnotes stuck on, I hadn't altered the original disc. Well,
thats my story anyway.
Abstract
Three main areas are addressed: smuggling as a commercial
activity; as a form of social crime; and as a problem of
policing. The claim that the violence of the Sussex smugglers
in the 1740s was atypical is scrutinised, adopting a
comparative approach between regions and over time, and
it is argued that force was a rational response adopted
by many smugglers when their interests were threatened.
The contrabanders extended their penetration of legal markets
and distribution networks in the second half of the
eighteenth century, but this was accompanied by increasing
levels of violence. Studying the confrontations between
the smugglers and the preventive forces raises the question
of how violent a society England was. The discussion is
moved away from the homicide statistics to armed defence
and calculated intimidation. The use of violence as a
business stratagem raises questions concerning the smugglers'
status as 'social criminals.' Illicit importation enjoyed
high levels of popular support, but whether contemporaries
saw the pursuit of the contraband trade as legitimising
murder and mayhem, remains debatable. The adversarial
model, in which smugglers are pitted against the forces
of the revenue, and represented as the defenders of the
local economies	 against	 commercial monopolists, is an
i[complete picture. Smugglers and revenue officers had
to establish a modus vivandi, Collectors and Comptrollers
were often leaders in their local communities and active
in local politics, and some smugglers were themselves men
of standing and influence.
The intention is to focus on continuity; in terms of
attitudes, methods, and the problems presented to the
authorities. The involvement of the continental East India
companies indicates that the smuggling trade in the first
half ot the eighteenth century should be seen as more than
a number of locally based, small-scale enterprises The
problem for government was that smuggling was more of a
business tharL a form of social protest. Members of the
political nation were conscious of the need to compromise
for the sake of stability, and the use of the state's
coercive machinery against smuggling, the army, navy and
the law, is perhaps better seen as an exercise in containment
rather than an attempt at repression.
Forward
This thesis began as a study of smuggling in East Anglia,
with the intention of providing a basis for comparison
with studies whose main focus was on Kent and Sussex,
and the Wealden gangs active in the 1730s and l740s.
Preliminary investigations of south coast smuggling indicated
that the third and fourth decades of the eighteenth century
were a time of considerable violence associated with the
contraband trade, but also suggested that the use of main
force was an integral part of the business and not peculiar
to mid-century Sussex. Extending the geographical, as well
as the temporal boundaries, was designed to test the validity
of this proposal. A second objective was to consider whether
smuggling was the archetypical social crime, condemned
by the law but condoned by the community. Was generalization
justified, or should there be differentiation within and
between communities?
East Anglia had certain advantages with regard to the
availabilty of sources. None of the Sussex Customs ou.tport
records have survived from before 1826, and the letters
from the Kent Collectors to the Commissioners provide a
limited coverage, Sandwich in the 1740s, and Dover in
the last quarter of the century. By contrast, there are
continuous series for Yarmouth and Harwich. The letters
from the Board to the outports contain numerous directives
dealing with general Customs administration, but they are
also a source of information on smuggling and the
Commissioners efforts to co-ordinate preventive measures.
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They merit a more systematic examination than I have been
able to give them, and could be the basis for detailed
studies on individual ports and the work of the Customs
officers.
If their methods were determined by the nature of the
trade, the similarities in the stratagems and tactics adopted
by east coast and south coast smugglers were to be
anticipated. Less predictable was the scope of the
smugglers' operations. Not only were the same smuggling
cutters landing goods in both regions, but members of the
Kent and Sussex gangs were identified running goods off
beaches in Suffolk, and riding in company with their East
Anglian counterparts up into Lincolnshire.
This was interesting in itself, but brought into question
the validity of the regional comparison. Extending the
study to include Cornwall meant that any conclusions
concerning the smugglers' violence would not be derived
from the behavioural characteristics of the same individuals
active in different areas. Bringing in aspects of French
smuggling, Mandrin's career in particular, served to provide
further evidence that violence was a common feature of
the contraband business. Establishing a rationale for
the use of force and intimidation meant looking at the
confrontations arising from the authorities' efforts to
suppress, or at least contain, the traffic in illicit goods.
This led to a wider investigation of policing, looking
at the roles of revenue officers, magistrates, and the
army and navy.
	 It became apparent that a number of
assumptions regarding law enforcement needed scrutiny.
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The more senior outport officials were often men of local
standing, sitting as magistrates and involved in both local
and parliamentary politics. This made for a certain degree
of ambiguity, but the divide between local and central
government has been overstated. The War Office received
frequent appeals for military detachments to be assigned
to coastal duties, and there is little evidence that the
civil powers in the maritime counties objected to the army's
presence.
The underlying problem seemed to be a dependence on an
adversarial model of policing, represented as an attempt
by the agencies of central government to eradicate a practice
enjoying considerable support from the local communities.
Drawing the lines of demarcation proved more difficult
than that. Not only did the Collectors and Comptrollers
have to reconcile the demands of the Commissioners and
local notables, but those occupying high political office
were well aware of the need to maintain their reputations,
with both their peers and their clients. Not only was
patronage a means of building support, but the effective
implementation of policy might rest on the work of those
who helped organize the patrons' political campaigns.
There were instances of conflict between the different
bodies entrusted with prevention; charges and countercharges
were exchanged between soldiers and revenuemen, officers
in the Customs and Excise accused each other of negligence
and corruption, and officials questioned the commitment
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of magistrates to the repression of the contraband trade.
This raised further problems for the depiction of the anti-
-smuggling campaign as the cause of antagonism between
central government and the provinces. The disputes which
arose often involved different branches of central
government, rather than conflicts between central and local
authorities, and at the same time, there were plenty of
examples of joint operations linking both revenue services
and the army or navy.
The nature of the source materials, with so much of
the documentary evidence to be found in official and legal
records, made it difficult to separate smuggling from the
attempts to control it. Again, the adversarial model provides
only a partial analysis. There were fierce encounters between
smugglers and preventive forces on land and at sea, and
these have attracted the most attention, bandits and pirates
conforming to the model for social criminals, engaged in
a form of class war against the owners of capital and their
agents. Yet this was only one part of the trade, and while
armed gangs were a feature throughout the century,
concentrating on their role, to the exclusion of the
suppliers and major purchasers, is to delineate smuggling
in such a way as to accentuate its nature as a form of
proletarian protest.
Smugglers charged with assault, obstruction or assembling
in armed parties were tried at the county assizes and the
Old Bailey. These hearings provide insights into the
composition and methods of the gangs, and allow for some
tentative conclusions concerning public opinion regarding
the criminality of the contraband trade. They do not provide
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a great deal of material on other organizational aspects
of the business. Customs and Treasury records, the State
Papers, reports from Parliamentary Committees, and the
documentation relating to their enquiries, all contain
information about the entrepots where the smugglers acquired
their cargoes, and the distribution networks in Britain,
but two sources were not searched, and both could be valuable
in constructing a more complete picture of the commercial
side of smuggling. These are the records of the Exchequer
Court, dealing with seizures, and the Excise records,
including the Excise trials from 1778. The series CUST
48, entry books of correspondence with the Treasury, consists
of 142 volumes in all, but the period to 1788 is covered
by 23 books, making this a useful starting point for a
study of the Excise department in the eighteenth century.
John Brewer's references from this series, in The Sinews
of Power, suggest there is also material on the smuggling
gangs, the 'lawless banditti' who remain central to any
general studies of the contraband trade.
The seizure returns, contained in CUST 21, could provide
the basis for a quantitative assessment of the contraband
trade from the beginning of George I's reign to the end
of the century. The returns give details of the quantities
of different goods taken, and which ports they were seized
in. Changes in the levels of military and naval support
afforded the revenue officers, the smugglers' willingness
to resort to violence, their problems in securing supplies,
and variations in the diligence of the preventive forces,
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all indicate the need for caution when trying to assess
the scale of smuggling from the seizure figures. At the
same time, it is reasonable to suppose some correlation
and there is sufficient information to provide comparisons
between areas and over time.
Peter Linebaugh maintains that the history of crime
has been 'increasingly transferred into the history of
administration or "the machinery of justice.t This could
be a reflection of the evidential sources the historian
is faced with. Many of the records were produced by the
administrators, and their perspectives will almost certainly
shape our own. Yet other sources, such as the newspapers
and the Newgate Calendars, provide no more accurate a guide
to the motives and actions of offenders against the criminal
law. 'History from below' is more about the interests of
historians who concentrate on the ruled, instead of the
rulers. Since the two cannot be dissentangled it is perhaps
better to make use of the evidence we have, rather than
regretting that which we do not.
vi
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Introduction
Aspects of Smuggling.
1
The state of the debate.
Richard Cobb suggested that 'the deserter, the mutineer,
the primitive rebel, the rural bandit, the market rioter,
the urban criminal and the village prophet' had become
alarmingly respectable subjects for historical research.1
The study of crime, deviancy, and protest is well
established, stimulating new approaches to the issue of
social control and a vigorous debate on the role of the
courts.2 The legal system has been presented as an aspect
of ruling class hegemony, transmitting the values and
perpetuating the power of a propertied elite, and as a
'resource available to and used by almost every layer in
eighteenth-century society.'3 Smuggling, 'the greatest
illegal business of all,' while providing material for
exciting narratives, has received little attention in recent
studies of eighteenth-century crime.4 Writing in 1985,
Christian Pfister-Langanay noted that while the contraband
trade had left an indelible impression on the character
of the maritime population of England, it had yet to be
studied in depth, 'c'est tout un immense champ d'enquete
qui reste a explorer.'4
Surveying developments in social history from the 1960s,
Joanna Innes and John Styles refer to 'an explosion of
interest in eighteenth-century crime.. . a demand for a "new"
social history that would transcend the antiquarian and
anecdotal approach of much previous work. '5 Even the most
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austere analyst can be tempted from the path of virtue
by the tales of intrigue and the clash of arms provided
by the contraband trade, which might explain its comparative
neglect by professional historians. Cal Winslow ventured
into the field in his detailed study of Sussex smugglers
in the 1740s, presenting them as social rebels engaged
in 'an aspect of the class struggle of the eighteenth
century' and defending the local economy 'as against the
development of commercial capitalism.'6 Frank McLynn raises
some pertinent questions regarding the classification of
smuggling as a form of social crime, but his own account
lacks a sound evidential base, tends to the episodic, and,
for want of an alternative explanatory framework, relies
too much on retelling familiar stories.7 John Beattie's
very thorough study, Crime and the Courts in England, does
not discuss the way the criminal courts dealt with smuggling,
while his earlier paper, based on data from Surrey and
Sussex, acknowledges the likely importance of the subject,
but does not develop its argument:
The coves and inlets of the long Sussex coast
provided shelter and encouragement to smugglers,
many of whom doubtless carried on their
activities with the more than passive support
of the populace of the coastal plain. Smuggling
is not a "crime" that we shall be much concerned
with. . .but it clearly had a direct effect on
forms of criminal activity that we will deal
with, on the level of offences that were defined
by the authorities as unlawful or riotous
assembly, for example, and perhaps on assault
charges too, arising from encounters with customs
officers.8
2
This is a very tentative excursion into the subject, given
the number of assaults and affrays involving Sussex smugglers
and the fact that the contraband routes from the south
coast to London traversed Surrey as well as Sussex, with
violent confrontations if the revenuemen attempted to
intercept the trains of loaded packhorses.
J.S.Cockburn has called himself an 'academic-powder
monkey, providing ammunition for the heavy guns,' of Lawrence
Stone and J.A.Sharpe in their skirmishing over levels of
of violence in English society.9 Discussing homicide rates
in Kent, Cockburn suggests that smuggling may well have
'complicated the pattern of fatal violence there in the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.'-° Finding little
information in the assize records for the county, he does
not extend his enquiry to try and discover just how many
fatalities resulted from clashes between smugglers and
the preventive forces on land and sea; including free-traders
as victims, as well as perpetrators of homicide, could
mean readjusting the murder rate in some maritime counties.
Eighteenth-century smuggling has yet to be studied
comprehensively within a social and legal analytic framework,
nor have the problems of policing areas occupied by large
gangs of armed men been addressed in depth, though
J.A.Houlding has identified the significant part that coastal
duties played for the army, particularly the dragoon
regiments.11 By contrast, smuggling as a commercial activity
has attracted considerable attention, but not from British
historians .
 Pfister-Langanay portrays the contraband trade
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at Dunkirk as a major commercial enterprise, and Louis
Dermigny has investigated the
	 ramifications of the
eighteenth-century trade in illicit tea, including the
acquisition of leaf intended for sale in Britain, and the
networks linking original importation, purchase at auction,
storage in continental ports, and shipment across to the
British and Irish mainlands or the off-shore bases on the
Shetlands, the Isle of Man, and the Channel IslandsJ2
Studies of the contraband trade as part of the international
commodities market provide a different framework of reference
for an assessment of English smuggling. The workings of
commercial networks, and the penetration of the legal market
by illicit traders, do not entail a higher level of
historical explanation than the activities of the smuggling
gangs, but the riders and the cutter crews should be set
within the wider business context. The extent of the tea
trade has also been investigated by W.A.Cole, while Hoh
Cheung and Lorna Mui discern a radical change during the
eighteenth century: 13
By developing more efficient means of transportation,
by taking advantage of international facilities for
capital and credit, and by invading established
channels of legal distribution, the illicit trade
was able to engross a large share of the market.'14
In the earlier period, tea smuggling into England 'was
mostly dominated by many small scale local importers with
little capital or credit. . . Once landed the illegal tea
was primarily traded by local retailers, whose market was
necessarily restricted. '15
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Winslow is critical of the Muis for omitting 'any mention
of the bloody conflict' associated with smuggling but accepts
their claim for a significant organisational change during
the second half of the century.16 Referring to his own
area of study, he lapses into ambiguity, stating in
consecutive paragraphs that 'It was only later in the century
that smuggling became the business of the real "men of
substance", the London merchants,' but in in the 1740s
it was already 'becoming "big business"'	 in Sussex,
'particularly through the activities of the large gangs."7
The Muis cite a variety of sources from the 1770s and 1780s
but do not substantiate their claims respecting the relative
lack of development in the earlier period. Witnesses
appearing before Sir John Cope's committee in 1733 testified
to an already well developed network linking the continental
ports, the East Anglian and south coast smugglers, and
the London apothecaries, grocers and innkeepers eager to
acquire a low-cost product; 2000 lbs of tea might be sold
out of a contraband warehouse in a single transaction.--8
John Collier, Surveyor General of the Kent Customs service,
is quoted by Winslow as criticising the 1746 Act of Indemnity
for hitting the Sussex smugglers hard while it 'pardoned
those that are in the country thought to deserve as great
a punishment at least, the merchants and tradesmen in London
that employed them and received their smuggled goods.'-9
Just as there were substantial businessmen concerned
in contraband dealings, so the rewards from successful
5
runs were such that a competent smuggler, starting his
working life as a labourer, artisan, or seaman, could
accumulate wealth and become a man of standing in the
community. In France and the Low Countries the export of
contraband tea was grafted on to an established trade in
wines and spirits; many of the English smugglers were small
scale operatives: fishermen and boatmen alert to the profits
to be made from a few hundredweight of tea and some half-
anker casks of brandy and gin, colliers benefiting from
visiting foreign ports, and the crews on the packet boats.2°
Cutters carrying cannon and swivel guns, sailing together
out of Boulogne or Dunkirk for better defence, and hundreds
of men assembled on English beaches, show more ambitious
operations were taking place from the 1720s on. Smuggling
was a promising field for both the occasional opportunist,
and the serious entrepreneur. In the years immediately
after the Treaty of Utrecht considerable quantities of
contraband were shipped aboard unarmed vessels displacing
less than two tons, but other contemporary accounts belie
the notion that the smugglers relied on evasion and 'the
undercover assistance of local inhabitants.' 2 -
There were significant changes in the way the trade was
conducted in the second part of the century. The quantity
of tea being smuggled into Britain increased markedly after
the Seven Years War, especially in the early 1770s. The
ships employed in illicit shipments were twice and three
6
times tI.ie tonnage o. the larger cutters and luggers used
in the l740s and carried sufficient men and cannon to take
on most of the revenue cruisers and some of the Royal Navy
ships sent to support them.22 Even so, there is need for
some caution in drawing contrasts between the two eras:
Even if very large entrepreneurs were not
characteristic of the English smuggling
until after 1760, considerable sums had
to be invested at any time for purchasing
or hiring a vessel, paying for its crew,
providing the large number of men needed
to transport the landed cargo, and making
the initial purchase of tea, brandy or
tobacco.23
There is no disputing the greater size and armaments of
the smuggling vessels in the later years, but the use of
boats and smaller ships should not be interpreted as evidence
of small scale operations. There was the risk of
interception, seizure and confiscation, and vessels and
cargo were in greater danger 'because the smuggler had
necessarily to forego the use of proper port facilities
in landing his cargo. Such circumstances resulted in vessels
being much smaller than in legal trade as a form of insurance
against the risks and dangers involved.'24
Cal Winslow and the Muis, though focusing on different
periods and sectors within the smuggling trade, concentrate
on the situation in Britain. Winslow conceives of the
smuggler as a rebel, in arms against the authority of the
state and the burgeoning influence of commercial capitalism.
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The Muis argue the interdependence of the illegal and the
legitimate markets and are more interested in the efforts
of government to contain and defeat the illicit trader
than in the smugglers themselves. Their study of the 1784
Commutation Act stresses the importance of the continental
auctions and shows how the attempt to regulate the price
of tea through purchases abroad was a matter of high policy
for William Pitt, but they do not investigate the role
of the European companies trading to China.25
Winslow's avoidance of the wider dimensions of the
contraband trade subject is understandable. The class-war
model can be applied with some validity if a study of
smuggling is confined to the conflicts involving the armed
gangs in the maritime counties and the preventive forces,
represented as agents of the ruling elite. Extending the
field to encompass the chartered companies trading in the
Far East and the financiers and merchants investing in
various types of contraband, would have strained 'Sussex
Smugglers' conceptual framework. If the contraband trade
is seen as a series of interlocking networks linking a
range of interests and individuals, the essential polarity
of Winslow's approach is lost. The investors and managers
of a continental East Indies company, and a party of casual
labourers waiting to assist in landing a cargo on a Sussex
beach, shared a common interest, but not in upsetting the
social order. Peter Raban and A.G. Jamieson have produced
perceptive essays on the Channel Islands' contraband trade,
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identifying the leading merchant families concerned, locating
the agents based in England and Wales, and tracing the
distribution networks for goods and monies, confirming
the involvement of London finance houses in illicit
trading, if only through the provision of services. These
studies, and John Bromley's work on privateering, show
how smuggling could be an integral part of the local economy
and David Starkey opens up the prospect for a broader
approach to the interlocking relationships between legal
and illegal commerce.26
Frances Wilkins has collected copious material on
Manx and Scottish smuggling, and the letters of George
Moore, an eighteenth-century Manx merchant, provide evidence
of symbiosis between smuggling and respectable trading.27
The intricacy of these arrangements, inspired by the
quest for profit, merited more attention from Paul Monod,
intent on connecting the rapid growth of smuggling from
the 1690s with the Jacobite diaspora:
Jacobitism contributed to a major change in
smuggling practices, through the lure of new
commercial opportunities, and through the
advantages of association with a broadly based
political movement. As a result, a substantial
portion of the smuggling trade was transformed
from a loosely structured local pursuit into
a widespread network of relatively coordinated
enterprise. 28
Jacobites certainly took up residence in continental Europe
and engaged in a range of maritime enterprises. Needing
to maintain correspondence and move agents into and out
of Britain, the politically motivated exiles recognised
9
the smugglers' potential as carriers, while the trade itself
could provide good cover for the transfer of monies raised
for the cause. There was evidence of support for the
Pretender among the smuggling gangs on the south coast,
but the Stuarts threatened the political settlement and
the Hanoverian succession, not the unequal distribution
of wealth and power among the social orders. Monod is well
aware that his analysis conflicts with Winslow's, and that:
The commercial world of Jacobite smuggling,
saturated as it was with high Toryism and Roman
Catholicism, may puzzle those who insist on simple
ideological distinctions, but it helps to explain
how hierarchy and paternalism survived amid the
hurly-burly of the so called consumer revolution.
It offers an example of an alternative pattern
of commercialization, in which spreading luxury
could be reconciled with social conservatism
and with crime.29
Cal Winslow, notes the possible Jacobite connection in
Sussex, and suggests the Duke of Richmond's detestation
of smuggling was in part a reflection of his fanatical
anti-Jacobitism. The conservatism and traditionalism
associated with support for the Pretenders might be
contrasted with the advance of commercial capitalism under
Whig and Hanoverian auspices, and recognising the difficulty
of reconciling the idea of the smuggler as social rebel
with the., picture of him as Jacobite devotee,
	 Winslow
retreats into uncharacteristic caution.3°
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A problem for both Winslow and Monod is that the smugglers
were more interested in making money than redressing social
injustice or reversing the accidents of political history.
Dermigny, discussing the Scottish and Irish merchant houses
in France, the Netherlands and Scandinavia, notes that
not all of them were involuntary exiles; business
opportunities provided the incentive, while professions
of loyalty to St Germaine cost nothing and could have helped
win customers.31 L.M.Cullen's study of Irish smuggling
and the French connection describ?s how merchant houses
of Irish origin, such as the Gaiways, Guillaume Clancy,
Jacques Maculloh and the Parks, established branches at
L'Orient, Nantes and Belleisle and arranged for contraband
tea, brandy and gin to be brought to Roscoff for sale to
the smugglers operating out of Port Rush.32 Much of the
traffic Cullen describes was taking place in the third
quarter of the eighteenth century, when Jacobitism was
little more than a sentimental attachment to a lost cause.
Monod discusses the role played by the exiles in helping
set up the Ostend Company and its 'successors' in Sweden,
Denmark and Prussia. He also identifies Jacobite merchant
houses in Spain, France, the Austrian Netherlands and
Scandinavia.33 Effective commercial networks depend on
trust, repeated successful transactions, reciprocity,
personal contacts and reliable information. A case can
be made for shared religious and political convictions
facilitating collaboration between companies in different
countries, but a difficulty with Monod's case, as with
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Winslow's, is its narrow regional focus when examining
English smuggling. Recording the movement of contraband
across, or near the estates of known Stuart sympathisers,
and identifying some Jacobites directly concerned in running
goods in Hampshire and Sussex, does not substantiate the
claim that Jacobitism provided the organisational
infrastructure needed if smuggling was to flourish in the
first half of the eighteenth century.
A survey of the existing academic literature reveals
significant differences in approach and wide areas of
disagreement, but no true debate. Limiting his field of
enquiry to the Sussex gangs in the 1730s and l740s, Cal
Winslow readily accepts the Muis's case for smuggling
'promoting the international and domestic trade of the
kingdom.' The freetraders 'both resisted and enhanced the
development of capitalism.'34 If the contraband trade
underwent an organisational transformation over the mid-
century years, Winslow would have a defence against the
charge of obfuscation, but just as the Muis neglect the
perpetuation of violence associated with the smuggling
runs, so Winslow avoids any in-depth discussion of how
the contraband trade was managed in continental Europe.
Broadening the geographical and chronological scope of
investigation will provide a basis for a less impressionistic
assessment of changes and continuities. It will also provide
the evidence needed to evaluate Frank McClynn's assertion
that:
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sanguinary crusade against them was atypical of elite
response. 35
McLynn could be right, but while he is ready to question
the smugglers' credentials as social criminals, he remains
dependent on Winslow as the one historian who has conducted
detailed research on English smuggling gangs in the first
half of the eighteenth century. Whether Winslow's smugglers
were 'atypical' or not, can only be decided through
comparative studies, focused on other regions and different
times. The same is true of social crime; unless based
on some awareness of contemporary attitudes and norms,
discussion of this phenomenum is likely to revolve around
semantics and the modern observers' ideological perceptions.
Peter Linebaugh stresses the importance of remaining alert
to contemporary perceptions, and to exercise care when
using analytical frameworks; they are not codes of practice
for previous societies:
If we categorize them too quickly as social
criminals taking from the rich, or
criminal-criminals stealing from the poor, in
the process of making these judgements we cloud
our attentiveness to theirs.36
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II
Smuggling and Social Crime
Having noted the involvement of the gentry and
aristocracy, the smugglers' transition into other types
of crime, and contraband's 'ambivalent relationship to
capitalism,' McLynn decides that 'all in all it is safe
to conclude that there are better candidates for the title
of social criminal than the "gentlemen" of the English
coast.' Linebaugh has recently reiterated the view expressed
in Albion's Fatal Tree that there is no 'tidy distinction
between "social crime" and "crime without qualification,"
where the former receives popular support and the latter
is merely deplored.'37 The financial imperatives which
shaped the contraband trade do create difficulties for
Winslow's portrayal of the smugglers as defenders of their
local economies against the development of commercial
capitalism, but the smuggler as social criminal is not
to be dismissed so easily if John Styles's delineation
is used:
The eighteenth-century criminal law purported
to classify man's actions as good or evil. Yet
the didactic morality of the legislators was
not necessarily shared by those subject to their
laws. Many practices which were defined in law
as criminal were considered legitimate by various,
broad sections of the public. Smuggling, poaching
and wrecking were all forms of illegal
appropriation which were redefined as legitimate,
both by men of middling rank andby the poor.38
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John Rule uses the same definition; a social crime is 'a
criminal action which is legitimised by popular opinion.'
Whatever reservations there might be in classifying other
offences, such as rural arson and cattle maiming, 'smuggling,
wrecking, poaching and related activities were not held
to be crimes in the popular view, no matter by whom committed
or in what circumstances.' The problem of deciding the
reference group is acknowledged, and the need for it to
correspond to 'something much larger than deviant
sub-cultures,' but Rule's resolution of the dilemma is
disappointingly vague, 'the basis of the reference group
in all cases is simply the lower orders, "the people."'39
The concept of social crime provides another framework
for the examination of smuggling. The freetrader, bringing
duty-free goods at affordable prices, was a popular figure,
in some quarters. There were towns and villages in which
smuggling was practised by a significant proportion of
the population, as at Dover and Harwich, where the packet
boat crews made the most of their opportunities, or Deal,
the last anchorage for returning East Indiamen before they
entered the Thames. Yet attitudes towards the smugglers
could be varied, even within a small community. Those
benefiting from illicit trade did not sanction everything
the smugglers did, while others might well have had cause
for resentment. Rule's reference group would include the
porters, boatmen, extra-tidesmen and other casual workers
taken on by the revenue services, and permanent employees,
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such as the crews of the revenue cutters. There was
corruption and collaboration, but this could be due to
intimidation, or fear of disclosure of past indiscretions,
or financial need. Normally law-abiding innkeepers were
forced to buy smuggled spirits simply to remain competitive,
then found they were compromised and could not risk refusing
the use of their premises for storing contraband. Customs
officers felt that the magistrates in Kent and Sussex were
reluctant to enforce the revenue laws, but the justices
were influenced more by fear of retaliation and an
appreciation of the problems of effective policing, than
by any real sympathy for the smugglers. County magistrates,
gentry and squarsons for the most part, were not of the
lower orders, but correctly identifying the social status
of some of the boat owners and fishermen who became jurats
in the Cinque Ports and burgesses in the Suffolk and Norfolk
coastal towns, is no simple matter. The authors of Albions
Fatal Tree focus on popular opposition based on tradition
and customary rights, threatened by new statutes designed
to enhance the position and control of the propertied ruling
elite. John Styles argues that in the case of the Yorkshire
counterfeiters, there was no tradition to uphold, but the
government's failure to address the problem of a shortage
of specie meant the local money makers were seen as providing
an essential service.40
The same was true of smuggling.. It had been practised ever
since the imposition of duties and prohibitions made it
worthwhile, and the Kentish owlers engaged in the
clandestine export of wool, formed armed gangs in the second
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half of the seventeenth century, but it was the increases
in rates to help fund the wars against Louis XIV which
made smuggling a major activity, pursued in all the maritime
counties.41 Aware of the capitalist features of the trade,
and the limitatations of customary usage as a legitimating
formula, Winslow concentrates on the authorities' actions
against 'the poor smugglers who ended up on the gallows.'
These were the men concerned in 'the traditions of resistance
carried on by the poor, to the laws and institutions of
their rulers.'42
Eric Hobsbawm characterises bandits as 'Men who are
unwilling to accept the meek and passive social role of
the subject peasant; the stiffnecked and recalcitrant,
the individual rebels. They are men who make themselves
respected.' Winslow ascribes the same attributes to his
smugglers, men striving to escape from 'everything that
defined the life of the rural labourer or village artisan.'43
The prospect of an enforced return to dependency and social
subservience could explain why some smugglers risked hanging
or transportation rather than simply fading from the scene
as the government stepped up its policy of repression in
the mid-century years.
Sussex Smugglers draws attention to the rage which
lay behind some of the smugglers' actions. A substantial
cut in the excise on tea in 1745 raised demand for the
legal product and complicated life for the smugglers,
yet the intensity with which the Sussex men defended their
interests testifies to more than economic self-preservation.
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The attack on Goudhurst, breaking into the King's warehouse
at Poole to recover a cargo, and the subsequent murder
of a potential informant and his escort, were sure to provoke
a response from the authorities sufficient to jeopardise
future contraband operations.44
According to Rule, smuggling should not be correlated
with banditry, where 'popular acceptance rests on the man
and not on the action itself':
Armed robbery and kidnapping can not in themselves
be always acceptable. They are justified by the
fact of their being committed by certain persons
against certain persons or institutions. It is
for this reason that elaborate mythologies of
the Robin Hood kind grow up: they are intended
to put their hero in the right, irrespective
of the crimes committed. The bandit is seen as
the victim of oppression and a justified rebel
against authority. '5
Other offences 'smuggling, wrecking, poaching and related
activities were not held to be crimes in the popular view,
no matter by whom committed or in what circumstances.'46
Yet when it comes to looking at particular smugglers and
their crimes, Rule wonders about the limits of popular
exculpation, the torture and killing of William Galley
and Daniel Chater in the aftermath of the raid on Poole
warehouse, producing doubts. 'Violence of this kind raises
questions. Galley was a customs officer but Chater was
not. Were the populace of the coastal districts acquiescent
to smuggling only from fear?' Answering his own question,
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Rule suggests the Hawkhurst gang's violence was extreme,
and they were the only smugglers to have a 'citizens'
vigilante band' set up to resist them.'Violence may have
been used more as a deterrent against locally deviant
behaviour such as informing for money. It does not therefore
follow that popular support rested on fear.'47 There is
no disputing the rigour with which the Hawkhurst smugglers
plied their trade, but the evidence cited by Rule is
inconclusive; the 'East countrymen' as they were called,
made up only a quarter of those present at Poole, and William
Jackson and William Carter, instrumental in the deaths
of Galley and Chater, were Hampshire men. 48
There were contemporary accounts which referred to
the smugglers in terms of 'gangs' and 'companies' with
a clear command structure. More detailed reports submitted
by revenue officers suggest less formal arrangements and
a network linking professional smugglers across eastern
and southern England, from the Lincoinshire coast to the
Isle of Purbeck. McClynn insists 'the plebeian social origins
of the Sussex smugglers of the l740s have been definitively
established,' but Winslow is less positive in his
conclusions, recognising the over-use of the term 'labourer'
in the legal records, and the superior status accorded
to wealth and property, whatever the origins of the
possessors.49 Arthur Gray, a prominent Hawkhurst based
smuggler, was thought to be worth £10,000 while his brother
William and James 'Trip' Stanford, another 'gang leader'
active on Romney Marsh in the 1740s, owned houses worth
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£1,200. David Boys and John Hatch, Crown debtors in the
Fleet for a brief period, owed £25,515 and £10,500
respectively, a reflection of the scale of their illicit
dealings 50
Confining the debate to Winslow's chosen time and area,
and devising a critique of his ideas on social crime derived
from other, broadly sympathetic historians, it becomes
clear there is still much to be studied. All definitions
of social crime involve assessment of communal sentiments,
particularly those of the 'lower orders,' but Winslow
was reduced to quoting Richmond and Sir Cecil Bishop as
evidence of popular attitudes towards smuggling. 51 Extending
the scope of enquiry, and regarding elite responses as
a legitimate field of study in their own right, will be
a step towards- a more securely based assessment of
eighteenthcentury norms and mores. Rule's plenary indulgence
for all crimes committed under the imprimatur of smuggling,
'no matter by whom committed or in what circumstances,'
requires careful scrutiny.
Raising revenue and protecting economic interests
were not the only reasons for commercial controls: munitions
of war were denied to potential enemies, embargoes were
used in support of diplomatic pressure, and food exports
were prohibited at times of dearth in an effort to avert
riots. Grain, livestock and dairy produce had been exported
since the sixteenth century, despite royal prohibitions.
Port officials participated in, or connived at these
transactions, issuing clearances for coastal shipments
while knowing full well that the cargoes were destined
20
f or the Netherlands, France or Spain. 52 Local people,
incensed by the sight of food leaving the ports when they
faced the prospect of hunger, resisted attempts to load
vessels, boarded them to requisition cereals, or blockaded
harbour entrances. William Owen, a Welsh smuggler, described
how he opened fire on a crowd when they came aboard his
ship at Cardigan, searching for grain, and William Frost,
active in the contraband trade on the Kent and East Anglian
coasts, had sacks of meal taken out of his vessel as it
lay alongside the quay at Colchester. 53 Controls had been
relaxed in 1728 to help speed up shipments to areas of
need and it was not long before the Customs Commissioners
were receiving reports that 'great quantities of tea and
brandy are put on board several vessels laden with corn
at Rotterdam, having concealments made on purpose, in order
to run their goods on the coasts of this kingdom.' 54 During
the food crises of 1757 and 1758, when demand for war
supplies worsened the shortages caused by bad harvests,
it was believed grain was being exported in defiance of
the embargo, confirmed by the toll registers for ships
passing through the Danish Sound which show that English
cereals were being sent to Scandinavia.55
It is unlikely these examples of entreprenerial
initiative would have won general approval. Other forms
of contraband were integral to local economies and would
have commanded popular support. Salt was essential to the
fishing industry, but given the vagaries of the catches
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there was not always • enough on hand. In those circumstances
the fishermen and fish packers could not always afford
to wait until an approved consignment arrived. Richard
Cunnack and three of the Oxman family from Penzance found
themselves in this situation in August 1780. A Danzig ship
had put into the port carrying a cargo of French salt,
and the local fishermen were keen to buy. They were concerned
to learn it was illegal:
there was such Quantities of Fish then inclosed
in the netts in the Water, a large Quantity lying
on the Beach & in the Fishermens Cellars Perishing
for want of Salt to cure them and none to be got
even at any Price in this Port, St Ives or any
other place in this neighbourhood.
They went ahead and bought £70 worth, all of which was
used in curing pilchards. The Crown would have lost at
most, £7, and the fishermen 'had hoped the Necessity was
so very Great no notice would have been taken of it.' The
costs of landing the salt clandestinely came to more than
they would have paid in duties. The mayor and eighteen
other fishermen certified that no salt had been available
before the Danziger came into Penzance, and now Cunnack
and the Oxmans faced prosecutions by the Customs
Commissioners and the Salt Office.56
This particular case could be an instance where smuggling
proved vital to the well-being of the local economy, and
was certainly approved by a significant sector of the
community. At the same time the revenue off icials were
not being totally unreasonable in refusing to overlook
this infringement. Salt smuggling was not a major aspect
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of the contraband trade in Britain, but it was a profitable
sideline. In May 1789 John Phillips, master of the Success
was given permission to unload a cargo of salt 'designed
for the use of the Pilchard Fishery.' The Penzance Collector
then received information the salt was not foreign, but
'Fine British,' intended for the table, and this was a
way of avoiding the salt tax. When the revenue officers
tried to board the Success they were 'ordered to leave.. .on
pain of their lives, and having quit the sloop, watched
Phillips take her out to sea.' The salt already landed
was deposited in Charles Carter's cellar; the Carter family
ran a major smuggling business bringing contraband into
Cornwall from Brittany and the Channel Isles. Efforts to
seize the salt were 'violently obstructed' and it was later
taken away by the smugglers. The Penzance Collector described
Prussia Cove, the site of the Carters' operations as:
a most notorious place for Smugling[sic] and
Surrounded by a very numerous set of daring and
abandoned Fellows who we are well convinced would
take the greatest pleasure in knocking out the
Brains of any Officer or Officers that should venture
to come near them, unless protected by a Military
Force.57
The Carters provided employment,, fitted out privateers
during the American War of Independence, and supplied the
Cornish tinners with cheap brandy. It could be argued that
they too were defending the local economy but what is evident
is the distinctions which existed within one type of supposed
social crime. A survey of attitudes towards smuggling
during the eighteenth century indicates that public opinion
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was volatile. A brutal assault on the revenue officers
might result in outrage or indifference; one jury could
send a proclaimed smuggler to the gallows, as long as the
procedures laid down in the 1746 Act were strictly followed,
while another would acquit a proven killer, seemingly
because he was a 'freetrader.' Local circumstances can
help explain these very different responses, but having
to attend to such detail complicates arriving at a
satisfactory definition of social crime.
III
Intentions and Directions.
Whether members of an organised gang, pursuing
a business and satisfying a large market, can
be adequately described as social criminals,
is, to say the least, a moot point.58
Clive Emsley's caution concerning poaching for profit is
equally appropriate when dealing with smuggling. It has
been presented as a commercial enterprise, involving
merchants, financiers and the great continental companies
trading to the Far East, and as an armed conflict, with
gangs of contrabanders on the one side, and the forces
of the revenue on the other, part of the class war in which
rebellious rural proletarians
	 challenged the authority
of government and the hegemony of a propertied elite.
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One purpose of this study is to examine the validity
of the distinction between smuggling as a commercial
enterprise and as a criminal conspiracy. Changes in scale
do not necessarily entail changes in kind; developments
and continuities in illicit trade need to be identified
before agreeing there was the mid-century divide claimed
by the Muis and accepted by Winslow.
The activities of the Dutch and French East India
Companies in the eighteenth century, and the creation of
new maritime enterprises in the Austrian Netherlands,
Scandinavia and Prussia, were linked with the insatiable
British thirst for tea and the instinctive reluctance to
pay for a heavily taxed commodity. Illegal importation
and exportation into and out of the British Isles needs
to be located within an international market. Tracing the
origins of the different types of contraband, and how it
came to be lodged in continental ports and Britain's offshore
islands, shows the interdependence of the different sectors
of the trade, and focusing on the wider commercial and
financial dimensions in the period between the Treaty of
Utrecht and the outbreak of the Seven Years War exposes
the fragility of the Muis's position, for even if 'smuggling
into Britain before the 1760s was mostly dominated by many
small-scale local importers with little capital or credit,'
that stage in the proceedings needs to be located within
the wider network linking the different agents concerned
in the acquisition, transportation and distribution of
illicit goods.59
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Comparin the Parliamentary reports of 1733, 1744 and
1783, certain common concerns and suggested remedies emerge:
fears for the revenue and the breakdown of public order
in the maritime counties, and proposals to reduce duties,
strengthen the preventive forces, and increase penalties
for offenders. Following the 1784 Commutation Act, Pitt
put governmental authority behind a scheme to deny the
smugglers their supplies through purchases at the continental
auctions, and the same stratagem was employed by the East
India Company in the late 1740s. Schemes to defeat the
smugglers by cornering the market went back to 1729 when
the Company's supercargoes were instructed to corner the
market by buying all the green teas available at Canton,
a ploy which left its London warehouses overstocked in
the early 1730s.6°
Another step urged on government was the extension
of effective Treasury control to the Isle of Man and the
Channel Isles, major entrepots for the contraband trade,
providing repositories for wines, spirits, tobacco and
tea. Smuggling was integral to these islands' economies
and they present something of a dilemma for the concept
of social crime. Condoned by the island authorities and
promoted by the local elites, the contraband trade would
appear to lose its status as either social crime or criminal-
crime when practised in Britain's offshore havens. The
reference group in these instances was not 'the lower
orders', or 'the people', but the whole society. The islands
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were different, enjoying considerable independence from
the national government, but the complexities of the links
between governmental bodies merit close attention, whether
dealing with Man, the Channel Isles, the vestigial
privileges of the Cinque Ports, or the relationships between
magistrates and government offices, often complicated by
contrasting views on the most effective ways of applying
the laws.
This theme is taken up in chapter three, where the revenue
services, the Customs in particular, are placed under
scrutiny. Charges of corruption and collusion were
frequently levelled against their personnel, and with some
justice. Yet before rushing to judgement, it is as well
to look at the issues of recruitment and appointment, and
to ask what incentives there were to honesty and diligence.
Just as illegal trade penetrated the legal market, until
a state of interdependence prevailed, so smugglers and
revenuemen needed each other.
	 The importance of the
informant to the business of law enforcement is hard to
exaggerate, and the smuggler prepared to peach on his
associates was the mirror-image of the revenueman bent
on maximising the perks of office.
Officials could find themselves concerned in a number
of social networks and trying to meet the requirements
of different institutions. John Brewer takes issue with
those historians who suggest that 'the raison d'etre of
the executive was to provide outdoor relief for the political
classes.' 61 It is easier to unearth examples of malfeasance
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than to reconstruct the workings of the administration,
but the fact remains that appointments to the revenue
services were made to secure votes, satisfy clients,
strengthen ties within the social elite, and build trust
between the different tiers of government. The ideal of
the impartial, incorruptible bureaucrat is evident in
contemporary criticisms, but the prospects of extensive
reform were limited. Fraud, bribery, time-servers and
sinecurists were all to be found in eighteenth-century
adminstration; there were areas of inefficency and
incompetence within the Custom houses needing to be
addressed, but structural changes and procedural advances
would have had little impact on the problem of smuggling,
as perceived by the Riding Officers, and the crews of the
revenue cruisers. Their concerns had more to do with loaded
whips and loaded carbines than with the intricacies of
double-entry book-keeping. The shootings, beatings,
kidnappings and af frays associated with smuggling merit
close attention, given the claim by Lawrence Stone that
the homicide rate in any society is an accurate indication
of overall levels of violence in society and the lack of
attention to its other manifestations.62
Neville Williams's broad survey of the contraband trade,
in which he shows just how pervasive was the use of violence,
might have given McLynn pause for thought before asserting
the uniqueness of the Sussex smugglers in the 1740s. Levels
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of violence were greater in the 1770s and l780s than in
the earlier period, and if it was 'purposive', it could
not have been 'atypical.' The objective was to resist
seizures and arrests, and impress or intimidate local
communities. There would have been men with a predilection
for mayhem, but if violence is seen as a rational response
to the situation the smugglers found themselves in, it
was probable similar patterns would be repeated whenever
and wherever the contrabanders felt threatened by the
authorities.
The concluding chapters address the issues of policing
and application of the law. The army's part in the
suppression and containment of riots has been studied in
some depth, but the focus has been on its occasional use
as a policing body, and the inference has been that general
hostility to a standing army, extending from the governing
elite to the populous at large, inhibited any development
of the the military's policing role.63 J.A.Houlding has
drawn attention to the long spells on coastal duty suffered
by some regiments.64 'Aid to the revenue' included regular
patrolling, providing support for searches and seizures,
escorting captured smugglers to the county gaols, and of
course, engaging the gangs in firefights. John Brewer has
found evidence of more covert operations; 'Soldiers disguised
themselves as traders to catch the sellers of smuggled
goods and spent long hours tracing smugglers in order to
win the financial rewards offered for their apprehension.'65
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To be effective, the army needed the co-operation of the
revenue officers, who were themselves often active in local
politics. There was friction, mutual suspicion, and
recriminations when operations went wrong, but the fact
that the army was providing something approaching a permanent
police force, as opposed to performing riot duty as and
when called upon, is what deserves attention. How successful
they were as a deterrent, or even in a combatant role,
is open to question.
Peter Linebaugh has expressed regret that since the
opening up of the debate in Albion's Fatal Tree and
E.P.Thompson's Whigs and Hunters, the history of crime
has been 'increasingly transformed into the history of
administration or 'the machinery of justice.'66 Yet Linebaugh
himself says that 'for London, there are fewer sources
of information better than the vast documentation left
by the criminal courts.'67 Why these records should be
distanced from the administrative organization which brought
them into being is unclear, and the London hanged are
certainly located securely in Newgate, the Old Bailey and
the tumbrels on the road to Tyburn, all stages in the
institutional process. Eighteenth-century law and the
workings of the courts can be a morass for the inexperienced.
J.A.Sharpe has suggested that an effective working definition
of crime is 'behaviour which is regarded as illegal and
which, if detected, would lead to prosecution in a court
of law or summarily before an accredited agent of law
enforcement.' Yet even when we understand how 'crime was
defined by the relevant institutions of the society
experiencing it,' there remain great tracts of uncertainty.68
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Were the revenue officials justified in their complaints
of prejudiced juries in maritime counties, or can the
verdicts in cases involving smugglers be explained by
reference to the trials themselves, the nature of the
evidence, the way it was presented, the quality of witnesses,
and the guidance of the judges? What does emerge is the
danger of generalisation, and acceptance of the notion
that smugglers were folk-heros, shielded from the gallows
by juries ready to excuse any offence, provided it was
committed in furtherance of free trade. Convicted smugglers
would appeal for clemency, protesting their innocence,
promising future good behaviour, and demonstrating a shrewd
awareness of the workings of the system, where notions
of 'good lordship' still informed the networks of clients
and patrons. There were clear divisions in the smuggling
'war. ' Law enforcers and law breakers were in conflict,
and pitched battles were fought between smugglers and
preventive forces on land and at sea, but the history of
the contraband trade needs rescuing from the
over-simplification of the adversarial model. John Harvey
was a prominent Suffolk smuggler, a member of the Hadleigh
gang, active all along the East Anglian coast and suspected
of killing a dragoon during an affray. After a career
stretching over fifteen years, Harvey was tried at the
Old Bailey in October 1747 and sentenced to seven years
transportation.
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According to his story, the ship carrying him to America
was captured by a privateer and he was taken first to Spain,
and then to Jamaica, in an exchange of prisoners-of-war.
The ship's captain then offered him a passage back to England
and, thinking of his wife and seven children, Harvey
returned, only to be taken up again and confined in Yarmouth
gaol. 'Resolved to make all possible Attonement', and
to save his own life, Harvey betrayed his former associates.
He provided information enabling the excisemen to bring
in Robert Clark, James Arlington and Robert Baldry, then:
having further received Intelligence of several
Outlawed Srnuglers who had actually been • concerned
in committing divers Burglaries and Robberies and
other Acts of Violence in the. . .Counties of Norfolk
and Suffolk acquainted Mr Robert Flamwell an Officer
of his Majestys Revenue of Excise therewith and
proposed that. . .Flamwell should go to Hadleigh
in Suffolk where he might apprehend them or some
of them, who accordingly went thither for that
purpose; And your Petitioner also sent his Wife
thither in order to get more particular Intelligence
of them in order to inform . . .Flamwell thereof.69
Francis Mayhew, one of the outlaws, was arrested and
afterwards tried and executed at the Suffolk assizes. It
was not 'their compatriots' who turned King's evidence
against the smugglers, but their associates. If 'In normal
circumstances.. .the solidarity of the smuggling communities
was remarkable,' it might be asked why it was necessary
f or that solidarity to be 'buttressed by systematic
intimidation. '70
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2The difficulty for those intent on portraying the smuggler
as folk-hero, is that so many of them had well developed
survival instincts. 'Devil take the hindmost',' was the
only general guide to conduct once a smuggler was arrested
on felony charges. John Harvey evidently felt that putting
his wife at risk, as part of a scheme of systematic betrayal,
was a cornniendable course of action, and expected the
authorities to regard the matter in the same light. As
Linebaugh says, we need to be careful to distinguish our
perceptions from those of past societies.
Iv
The Statutory Framework.
Governmental effectiveness is not to be measured by a
propensity for enacting new legislation, but the various
Acts of Parliament introduced in an attempt to contain
illegal trade provide a guide to the intentions and anxieties
of the administrators and may also indicate the relative
importance attached to particular problems at different
times. The principal areas for concern were fraud,
corruption, the clandestine landing of contraband, and
the assaults and obstructions experienced by the revenue
officers.The statutes were designed to define the nature
of the offence, deter offenders, encourage officers and
informants, and assign cases arising from the revenue laws
to the most appropriate courts. Whether intentionally
or not, the passing of new laws, while leaving existing
ones in place, afforded the revenue commissioners and the
officers a considerable degree of choice as to just how
a smuggler might be punished.
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The legislation was descriptive as well as prescriptive,
including explanations for measures advancing the policing
role of government and impinging on individual rights.71"
In justifying the laws, the legislators draw attention
to the continuities in the smuggling trade. Violence,
and the supposed uniqueness of the Sussex smugglers in
the l740s, are the subject of detailed discussion in chapter
three, but a study of the Acts of Parliament alone should
lead to the Wealden gangs being placed in better perspective.
In an Act passed in 1662 reference was made to the Customs
officers being:
hiridred affronted abused beaten and wounded
to the hazard of their lives in the due execution
of their several trusts and services in their
respective places by armed companies and
multitudes of men and goods prohibited and
uncustomed have by force and violence as well
by land as by water been forcibly carried and
conveyed away.
Justices of the Peace were empowered to commit offenders
to the nearest gaol, to await trial at the next quarter
sessions. The court could impose a fine of up to £100,
and the culprit was to remain in prison until the fine
was paid and the Exchequer discharged them, or they should
'discover the person that set him on work and he may be
legally proceeded against.'72
An Act in 1722 was directed against the armed gangs,
so much a feature of south coast smuggling in the years
after the end of the War of Spanish Succession. All those
found within 20 miles of the sea, in company with five
or more, bearing arms and carrying contraband, were to
be 'deemed and taken to be runners of foreign goods and
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L.unLLlLoalties'. Resisting the Customs and Excise officers'
attempts at seizure was made a felony, and conviction at
the assizes entailed seven years transportation to America,
those returning before expiry of sentence 'to suffer as
felons without benefit of clergy.' By contrast, individuals
resisting or recovering seizures of contraband spirits
were to face a fine of £4O.
Sir John Cope's Commons Committee, reporting on the
state of smuggling in 1733, stressed the 'insolence' of
the parties of riders who:
carry on their wicked practices by force and
violence, not only in the country and remote
parts of the kingdom, but even in the city of
London itself, going in gangs, armed with swords,
pistols and other weapons, even to the number
of forty or fifty, by which means they have been
too strong, not only for the officers of the
revenue, but for the civil magistrates themselves,
who have not been able to put a stop to these
pernicious practices, even by the assistance
of such regular forces as have been sent to their
aid and dispersed along the cost at the request
of the gentlemen of the county.
The Customs and Excise cruisers and patrol boats had found
it impossible to effect boardings on the heavily manned
smuggling cutters, nor had the naval sloops 'been hitherto
able to deter them.'74 The 1736 Indemnity Act developed
these themes, noting the 'divers dissolute and disorderly
persons' operating in large gangs 'carrying firearms or
other offensive weapons to the great terror of His Majesty's
subjects and the hindrance of the civil officers and the
officers of Customs and Excise.' The act of being assembled
and armed, whether in possession of contraband or not,
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was made a felony, punishable by seven years transportation
to America. Any justice of the peace, given information
on oath that three or more armed smugglers were out together,
could grant a warrant for their arrest, to be executed
by posses raised by the officers of the peace, and commit
the suspects to the county gaol until the next assizes.
There were magistrates prepared to act on informations
laid against smugglers, but the arrests were usually carried
out by the revenue officers, often acting with military
support.75 The Crown's legal officers were ambiguous in
the advice they gave respecting the use of force in any
encounters with smuggling gangs, and the legislature tried
to clarify the position. Outnumbered by the gangs running
their goods 'in a public and avowed manner, and with an
armed force,' the revenue officers were either deterred
from doing their duty, 'or in doing it are beat, wounded,
maimed and frequently murdered.' In future, if the smugglers
offered armed resistance to seizures:
it shall and may be lawful for all Officers of
His Majesty's Customs or Excise and all persons
by them called to their assistance, who are so
resisted, to oppose force by force, and to endeavour
by the same methods that are violently used against
them, and by which their lives are endangered,
to defend themselves and execute the duty of their
office.
If	 anyone was killed or injured as a consequence of
officers defending themselves, and the outcome was a
prosecution or a civil action, ' such officer and officers
and persons acting in their assistance shall and may plead
the general issue' and cite the 1736 Act in their defence.
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In an ambitious attempt to restrict the roles of judge
and jury, Parliament instructed jurymen presented with
such a defence 'to find for the defendant or defendants.'
The trial could be conducted at the assizes in any county,
the choice lying with the revenue commissioners.76 The
rationale behind the 1746 Act was similar; armed gangs
were riding about the country at will and the revenuemen
went out on duty in fear for their lives. The smugglers
were undermining the fair traders, depriving the Exchequer
of its dues, and terrorising 'His majesty's peacable
subjects, in defiance of the laws, and to the utter
subversion of all civil authority and power whatsoever.'77
Cal Winslow compares the 1746 Act with the Black Act, passed
in 1723 against the poaching gangs taking game in the royal
parks and forests.78 The scale of the 'Blacks' activities,
and the challenge they presented to the established order,
were considered sufficient grounds for the severity of
the 1723 statute.
The measures were identical in the way they dispensed
with the need for juries to assess the evidence relating
to the initial felonies, whether related to smuggling or
the various offences linked with stealing the royal deer.
Anyone guilty of an offence under the Black Act was supposed
to surrender themselves to a justice of the court of Kings
Bench, or one of the justices of the peace for the county
in which the crime was committed. Those failing to surrender,
confess, and inform on their associates 'being thereof
lawfully convicted, shall be adjudged guilty of felony,
and shall suffer death, as in cases of felony, without
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benefit of clergy.' Those complying in full with the terms
of the Act could expect a pardon and a discharge, but those
declining the opportunity of turning King's evidence were
to be denied a hearing. If an informant went before two
JPs and accused someone of contravening the Black Act,
they were to send the statements to the Secretary of State,
who would present them to the Privy Council, who were
authorised to issue an order requiring the culprits to
surrender to a King's Bench judge or a JP. The order was
to be published in the London Gazette, and sent to the
sheriff of the county where the offence was committed.
It was to be proclaimed in two market towns near the
location of the crime, and a copy displayed in a prominent
position. Those failing to surrender within forty days
of proclamation:
shall from the day appointed for his or their
surrender. . .be adjudged, deemed and taken
to be convicted and attainted of felony,
and shall suffer the pains of death as in
case of a person convicted and attainted
by verdict and judgement of felony, without
benefit of clergy.
On production of the Order in Council, the King's Bench,
or the judges on assize in the county could 'award execution
against such... offenders, in such manner, as if. . .they
had been convicted and attainted in the... court of kings
bench, or before such justices of oyer and terminer, or
general gaol delivery respectively.'79
The identical formula was used in the 1746 Act. Smugglers
accused of any of actions defined as felonies in the various
statutes, could be proclaimed, arrested, brought before
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the court, convicted and hanged on the basis of an
information sworn by a single witness. 8 ° There were other
common features; anyone harbouring a proclaimed Black after
the period of forty days was liable to a charge of felony,
as were those protecting smugglers failing to surrender
themselves. Those suffering from the depredations of the
Blacks could claim compensation from the inhabitants of
the hundred in which the damage was done, while revenue
officers, or their executors, were empowered to seek redress
for injuries inflicted on them in the course of seizures,
and for the loss of the goods.81
The 1746 Act was passed in wartime, and the manpower
needs of the navy were reflected in its provisions. If
no proceedings had been commenced against a smuggler before
June 2 that year, either for running goods or assaulting
the officers, then they would be 'acquitted, indemnified,
released and discharged' on condition they enlisted before
the end of September and served for at least two years.
Desertion or early discharge would incur the penalties
for previous offences, while any naval officer aiding a
pardoned smuggler to avoid service was threatened with
a fine of £500.
The 1779 Act was another wartime measure and it repeated
the provisions of 1746; indemnities were granted to those
who had belonged to armed smuggling gangs, or resisted
the officers in any way. The term of enlistment was extended
to three years, in either the army or the royal navy, while
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the courts of quarter session were authorised to direct
offenders into the armed services.	 Customs and Excise
officers were empowered to arrest anyone helping to unship
smuggled goods, any party of two or more 'travelling together
armed or in disguise' and carrying more than 6lbs of tea
or five gallons of spirits without a permit, and anyone
resisting or rescuing a seizure. The culprits were to
be taken before a justice of the peace and committed to
gaol to await trial at the following quarter sessions.
The court would hear and determine the case and in the
event of a conviction, impose a sentence of hard labour
in the house of correction for between one and three years:
But if such convict shall be deemed a proper
person to serve His Majesty by land or sea, the
Justices shall deliver him over to the proper
officer.	 Persons adjudged to serve His Majesty
by virtue of this Act shall not be discharged
within five years nor suffered to avoid service.82
The references to violence were less extensive than in
previous legislation,	 but the situation was the same.
Goods were being brought in, unloaded, and:
run, carried, and conveyed from the sea coasts
through the country, as well by secret frauds
and clandestine practices as by open force, and
by gangs of daring and dissolute persons, armed
with offensive weapons, and associated and
assembled to carry into execution their evil
and pernicious purposes in subversion of all
civil authority and power whatsoever.83
Five years later, when the Commutation Act was introduced,
it was admitted that the existing laws against smuggling
had not ' been sufficient to answer the good purposes thereby
intended, that pernicious Trade having of late been greatly
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increased.' Particular note was made of the size and strength
of the smugglers ships, as well as the 'numerous
gangs. . .endangering the lives of the officers of the
Revenue...by their great violence.' Much of the detail
of the Act was drafted in response to the specific
difficulties being met by the commanders and crews of the
cruisers, who were coming under attack from small arms
and cannon on shore, deployed to cover the smuggling runs.
From September 1, 1784, anyone firing at 'any ship, vessel
or boat belonging to his Majesty's navy, or in the service
of the Customs or Excise' was to be charged with felony
and sentenced to death if convicted. Resisting the officers,
wounding, beating, or shooting at them, 'in attempting
to go on board, or being on board any ship or vessel' within
the limits of a port, or four leagues of the British coast,
was also made a felony, punishable by death, and any master,
refusing to surrender a suspect, was to incur same kind
of punishment as if the offence had been by him committed.'84
The 1736 Act had tried to legitimise the use of deadly
force by revenue officers confronted by armed and aggressive
smugglers determined to keep their contraband. The clauses
relating to the deaths of smugglers cut across the work
of the coroner's court, where a verdict of murder or
manslaughter provided the basis for indictment before the
grand jury, and instructed the assize judge how he should
direct the trial jury. The opposition to armed policing
may not have been absolute, but it was a highly sensitive
area, and executive intervention in the workings of the
judicial system was better achieved through the network
linking personnel in the various governmental institutions.
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The Customs Commissioners sought clarification in 1771,
prompted by incidents when smugglers had been shot at sea,
and by the violence employed by the Irish wherry crews
working along the Cornish coast. They were advised that
it was permissible to pursue a suspect craft if it was
sailing out of the limits of a port, but Edward Thurlow
and Alexander Wedderburn declined answering the question
as to the legality of firing into a smuggling vessel until
it came to, or sank. The Commissioners pressed the legal
officers for a firm ruling; if the smuggler not only refused
to come to and allow a search, but engaged the revenue
cruiser, killed some of the crew, and then attempted an
escape, was the commander authorised to use his cannon,
'and will the Officers be justified in such Firing, tho'
it be attended with killing any of the smugglers, or sinking
their vessel?' They received no clear guidance and were
told the question was 'so complicated that it can receive
no answer that would not be as indefinite as the
Question.. .We cannot help observing that it is not for
the service of the Crown to state Questions of such moment
with so much latitude.'85 Unless Parliament was prepared
to remove revenue service personnel and their assistants
from the courts' jurisdiction, the problems associated
with the use of armed force would remain. Nevertheless,
the 1784 Act did attempt to give some protection to those
on board the cruisers. If any ship should not bring to
on being required to do so, or should be pursued by a revenue
cutter flying its pendant and ensign, then the commander
of the cruiser was legally empowered:
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to fire at or into such ship or vessel, which
shall not bring to after such flag shall be so
hoisted... and such captain or other officer,
and every person acting in his aid and assistance,
and by his direction, shall be, and is hereby
indemnified and discharged from any penalties
or actions for damages for so doing.
If, as a result of firing, someone on board the suspected
smuggler was killed or wounded, and the person firing the
shot should be 'sued, molested or prosecuted, or brought
before any of His Majesty's Justices of the Peace', then
they were to be admitted to bail.
Seizures were so often accompanied by fierce resistance,
that it would be artificial to separate these two aspects
of the contraband business. Nor did the legislation
consistently distinguish between illegal trading and the
violence associated with it. The 1662 Act against the owling
of wool and products linked with cloth manufacture, made
it a felony to be 'aiding and assisting' in their illicit
export, and anyone concerned could be prosecuted either
at the county assizes where the offence was committed,
or where the suspect was arrested.The owners, masters and
seamen who turned informant, confessing to the Barons of
the Exchequer or the nearest Collector of Customs, were
to escape felony charges, but remained subject to the
penalties imposed by the Act of 1660, including the loss
of the vessels involved, and imprisonment for three months.
Cases could be heard at the courts of record at Westminster,
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the county assizes or the quarter sessions.
	 Measures
introduced in the reign of William and Mary imposed fines
and confiscations on those carrying wool anywhere near
the coast outside of permitted hours. The goods, carriages
and vessels involved were all forfeit, and penalties of
three times the value of the contraband wool could be levied.
Owners and masters suffered financial losses, while those
'aiding and assisting' in taking wool out of the country
faced a prison term of up to three years. Cases could be
heard at Westminster, where the verdict would be given
by a jury 'of good and lawfull freeholders, to be summoned
out of any other county' than that in which the offence
was committed.86 The 1688 Act also anticipated the later
provisions whereby the inhabitants of a hundred could be
penalised for offences against the revenue laws committed
within their districts, and Parliament was determined to
check any informal arrangements. Informants who agreed
to accept less than the full penalties from the hundred
could be gaoled for five years, and the inhabitants could
be sued again.
The various Acts established procedures to be followed
by masters owners and merchants; defined the circumstances
in which the officers could board, search and confiscate
goods; stipulated where cases arising from seizures could
be tried, and laid down the penalties for offenders and
the rewards for informants. By the terms of the 1662 Act,
masters were to report to the Custom house as soon as they
berthed, there to declare their cargoes and register the
details of their vessels, crews, voyages and owners. Failure
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to do so meant the Collector could order the cargo brought
ashore and stored in the King's warehouse. Transfer of
goods from incoming ships to boats and barges, without
a warrant and two officers being present, exposed the
vessels concerned to confiscation and prosecution. The
owners of seized goods could either pay the duties within
the time limit, provide adequate security that payment
would be made, provide evidence the goods had been previously
condemned and acquired at auction, or reach an accommodation
with the Commissioners and the Treasury. 	 If the Board
was not satisfied, they ordered that the goods be prosecuted
in the Exchequer. In cases where the owners failed to
appear, or the plaintiffs were unsuccessful in contesting
the seizure, the goods were sold at public auction. The
proceeds were used to meet the costs of prosecution, to
reward informants, and augment the revenues.87
The same Act empowered JP5 to issue warrants for the
arrest of 'any carman, porter, or waterman concerned in
running goods', the culprits to be imprisoned until they
found 'sufficient surety to be of good behaviour for so
long time until.., they shall be thereof discharged by
the Lord Treasurer, Chancellor, Under Treasurer or Barons
of the Exchequer.' A second offence meant a £5 fine, or
two months in gaol 'without bail or mainprize.'88 The 1736
Act increased the penalties; fines up to three times the
value of the goods could be imposed, to be raised by a
distraint warrant on the offender's property. If the sum
raised proved insufficient, the justices were to order
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the culprit be whipped and sent to the house of correction
for up to three months hard labour. They could also commit
to gaol anyone found lurking within five miles of the coast
or a navigable river and suspected of being in some way
concerned in a smuggling run. If the persons arrested could
not give a good account of themselves and convince the
justice they were 'not to be imployed or concerned in
the carrying on any fraudulent or clandestine trade', they
to were to be whipped and could be set to hard labour for
one year.89
The role of the JPs was expanded throughout the eighteenth
century. They were given increased powers in dealing with
the members of smuggling gangs and wider jurisdiction over
seizures. Excisemen had been prosecuting seizures of foreign
spirits before the magistrates since 1662; the same facility
was extended to Customs officers in 1719, and warrants
for levying penalties and forfeitures could 'be executed
in any county, city town or place' . Four years later, tea,
coffee and chocolate were placed under the jurisdiction
of the magistrates.9° Other measures were needed because
of the practical problems faced by the officers prosecuting
seizures in the Exchequer. Horses impounded for carrying
contraband had to be kept until the hearing, and 'the charges
of keeping seized horses, and of condemning. . .vessels,
boats and horses was very great, whereby officers are
discouraged from making such seizures and the smugglers
encouraged in their illegal practices. So from March 25,
1722, all seizures of horses, carts, and ships under 15
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tons, were to be tried before two justices of the peace;
subsequent Acts raised the limit for forfeiture to 30 and
then 40 tons.9' These provisions created the need for further
legislation in 1725, when the justices were instructed
to appoint valuers who would appraise the seizures.
Condemned goods, carriages and ships furnishings were sold
at public auction, but the hulls were to be sawn up and
burned. 92
The strategy was to contain illicit trade by confiscating
the smugglers's means of conveyance if a court could be
convinced they had been used for running contraband. In
1722 the preventive principle was extended when the Customs
officers were empowered to seize all boats 'designed to
be rowed with more than four oarst found in the ports of
London, Ipswich, and Sandwich, and anywhere else on the
Kent and Essex coasts or the river Thames.93 There was
no requirement to prove the craft had been used to carry
contraband, and the owners lost their boats and up to
£40 in fines. The requirement that the boats be destroyed
was removed in 1736, if they were considered suitable for
use by the revenue service, a provision which applied to
all forfeited smuggling craft under 40 tons. The anomaly
of a prohibition which only operated in three of the maritime
counties remained in place until 1779, when the ban was
made general, but only for boats rigged to carry six or
more oars.94 The Commutation Act brought in further
restrictions, banning:
all boats, wherries, pinnaces, barges, gallies
and other vessels which shall exceed twenty eight
feet in length, from the fore part of the stem
to the after side of the stern post aloft, and
the extreme breadth of which shall measure less
than eight feet.95
The 1779 Act further strengthened the position of the revenue
services by stating that no writ of delivery was to be
granted out of the Exchequer for any vessel seized and
forfeit under the law, unless the officer delayed proceeding
to trial for three terms, 'and in that case, not without
good security being given, in double the value of such
ship, vessel or boat, to return the same upon condemnation,
in order to be broken up, or used in HMs service' •96
The problem was that the smuggling vessels were often
larger, better armed, and more heavily armed than the revenue
cruisers. With the American War of Independence over,
there was no longer a compelling reason to maintain a
substantial naval presence in the Channel and North Sea,
while Pitt's fiscal reforms, aimed at undermining the
smuggling trade by ending the profits to be made from
contraband tea, were not going to produce immediate
results.97 As with the measures directed against fast-moving
rowing boats and galleys, the objective was to deny the
smugglers the use of vessels built for speed and
manoeuvrability. Cutters, luggers, shallops and wherries,
if clench built and fitted with running bowsprits, were
forfeit. The ban included any vessel whose length was
greater than three and a half times its breadth, those
carrying any guns, other than a pair of muskets, 'or manned
with a greater number of persons navigating the same, than
ten for every hundred tons burthen by admeasurement.' The
masters or mates in charge of ships armed with cannon and
swivel guns could be committed to the county gaol for a
year by any two justices of the peace, acting on a single
information. 98
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The re-enactment of existing statutes, and the increased
penalties indicated a divide between legislation and law
enforcement. This was evident when the authorities decided
to move against the Deal smugglers late in 1784. Legal
advice was sought on whether it would be lawful to seize
a number of sloops, shallops and luggers, all of them clench-
built, with running bowsprits. The problem was that there
were 13 tunlawfulI vessels drawn up on the beach:
The greatest part are kept in the Premises of Mr.
J. Oakley, who is in the Commission of the Peace
for the Town of Deal and in the Store Rooms belonging
to the Boats and Vessels (which are also on the same
Gentleman's Premises) are Carriage Guns and Chests
of Small Arms, with which the People of Deal declare
they will defend their Property that is the Vessels
in question.
There were another 30 vessels, with the same clench work
construction and rigging; they were about 30 ft long and
very narrow, equipped to be rowed with four oars, and clearly
designed to escape interception by the revenue patrols:
There are also a great number from 20 to 25 feet
in length, in the same proportion, built and rigging,
made to row as the above. Besides these there are
not less than 40 to 50 long Galleys from 30 to 50
feet in length made to row with 6 and some with 8
Oars: these last are kept in private places with
the greatest care and that many of these Boats have
been used since the 1st October, the Officer says
he has no doubt, aitho' it is not in his power to
prove it.99
The Act did not state that vessels on shore and unrigged
could be taken, but the boats there were forfeit under
the 1722 Act. A combined naval and military operation was
organised, and many of the Deal craft were destroyed, but
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the smugglers along the rest of the Kent coast were alerted.
When a search was conducted at Dover and its member ports
only one boat was found 'which we judged could be deemed
liable to seizure' under the 1784 Act:
We attribute our not being somewhat more successful
in this business to the Owners of Clench built
Vessels here having taken out Licenses for their
Protection or having altered them in conformity
to the Act and such Boats as were liable to
forfeiture, were either disposed of or conveyed
away to France and other parts to evade any seizure,
and we have been informed the night after the
performance of this service at Deal, which was
immediately communicated to the Smugglers along
the Coast, some few Boats in our Districts were
secretly taken away before We received your Honours
Orders 100
The Act described the banned vessels in some detail, but
failed to take into account the smugglers' adaptability,
or the different usage of shipping terms from one area
to another. Further legislation was introduced intended
to clarify the position by stipulating the legal length
for a fixed bowspritJ01 William Arnold, the Collector
at Cowes, described the kind of problem facing the Customs
officers. William Wenham's vessel, a 125 ton former
privateer was suspected of running goods on the Isle of
Wight and the Hampshire coast:
No person who has seen the vessel in question,
altho' her bowsprit is fixed and of the legal
length. . .has ever thought of calling her anything
but a cutter, and we believe a more handsome
cutter, or one apparently better calculated for
fast sailing, never went to sea. That she is
intended for smuggling there is no doubt.101
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In 1792 the King's Bench had to adjudicate on differing
interpretations of marine terminology. The Goodwill had
a license from a Rye revenue officer, a former shoemaker
who admitted 'he did not understand the distinctions between
vessels of different sorts.' The vessel was clench-built,
and had a running bowsprit, but was licensed as a sloop,
and although used as a collier, was seized by Captain Barlow,
a naval officer with a deputation from the Commissioners
of Customs. Barlow argued that sloops were square-rigged,
carvel-built, and had fixed bowsprits:
On the other side many witnesses, ship builders
and others, swore that the distinction between
a cutter and a sloop was that the latter, being
intended to carry burthen, is more round in the
body, carried the full burthen she measures, as
the vessel in question, whereas a cutter being
more pointed and acute in the shape of her body,
in order to gain speed, does not carry so much
as she measures, that the distinction in the rigging,
and in being clench or carvel built, are often
used indiscriminately by cutters and sloops.l02
The judge in the Exchequer court favoured the plaintiff,
maintaining that the license made out by the Rye officer,
though issued in error, should have protected the Goodwill
against seizure, but the jury found for Captain Barlow.
The Kings Bench decided there were grounds for a retrial,
accepting the argument that licenses had to be drawn up
accurately, otherwise the revenue officers would be subject
to constant litigation, and that the Goodwill's owners
should not suffer through the error of the Rye cobbler.103
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The vagaries of weather, and the vigilance of the
preventive forces, meant that the smuggling cutters could
not always deliver their cargoes at the agreed landing
sites. The masters would then hover off the land, waiting
on the winds and tides, and anticipating a signal from
the shore once the coast was clear.
	 In 1662, masters
commanding incoming vessels were instructed to sail directly
to the unloading quays in the outports, and not to take
more than three days on their passage up the Thames from
Gravesend to London.
	 The penalty for non-compliance was
a £100 fine. 1 04 The 1719 Act was directed against the spirit
smugglers who sold their wares to fishermen, colliers and
coastal shipping, as well as landing casks on the beaches.
The revenue officers were authorised to board and search
hovering vessels, and masters had to enter into a bond
for treble the value of any brandy found on board. This
would only be discharged when the master produced a
certificate 'under the Common Seal of the Chief Magistrate
in any place or places beyond the sea or under the hands
and seals of two known British merchants' to the effect
that the cargo had been delivered to a foreign port, 'taken
by enemies or perished in the seas.' The revenue
commissioners would decide whether or not to return the
bond. French ships carrying coffee, tea, cocoanuts, pepper,
spices, French silks and East India Goods, were known
to be bringing in goods, ' And by reason of the said Vessels
so Hovering Frequent Opportunities are found for Carrying
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on the Clandestine Trade of Exporting Wool'. Again, the
master had to enter into bonds, and if he did not proceed
on his voyage within 20 days, weather and state of repair
permitting, the officers could have the goods taken out
and stored until the duties were paid.105 The next piece
of legislation, the 1736 Indemnity Act, was more draconian;
masters of vessels found hovering within two leagues of
the shore, carrying more than 6 lbs of tea on board, or
brandy in casks holding less than 60 gallons, were to forfeit
the tea and spirits. 'Foreign goods, taken in or put out
of any vessel within four leagues of the coast, when the
duties had not been paid,' were subject to seizure, with
a fine of three times the value of the contraband and
confiscation of ships under 100 tons. 106 In 1779 the
legislature took into account the increased size of the
smuggling cutters; any ship under 200 tons, bringing
contraband into a British port, or lying within two leagues
of the coast, was liable to forfeiture, along with its
guns, 'furniture, tackle and apparel'. Masters of vessels
with more than 100 lbs of tea or 100 gallons of spirits
in unlawful containers, could be fined £300 . The boarding
officers were authorised to arrest whoever had charge of
the vessel, take them before a JP, and insist they enter
into a recognizance 'with condition to enter an appearance
in the Courts of Exchequer.'107 The 1784 Act re-enacted
these terms, but made any vessel suspected of hovering
within four leagues of the coast liable to seizure and
confiscation, irrespective of its tonnage.108
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Smuggling is rightly perceived as a form of violent
organized crime, and it was the threat to order presented
by armed gangs on land and at sea which inspired much of
the legislation of the period. The smuggler as bandit
or sea-dog, refusing to conform and challenging the
authorities, is the model accorded the status of social
criminal and potential folk hero. At the same time, the
Treasury and the Commissioners were aware of the loss of
revenue arising from frauds perpetrated by merchants, owners,
officers, and crews, and furthered by the collusion of
the employees of the Customs and Excise. If the emphasis
is on 'organized', rather than 'violent', then the
proletarian credentials of the contraband trade are again
brought into question. The legislation provides a guide
to the concerns of senior officials, and sometimes detailed
accounts of the mechanics of deception, while the penalties
indicate the seriousness with which the offences were viewed.
In 1720, as a quality-control measure, importers of
wine which was found to be sour or contaminated, were
offered compensation for freight of £4 per tun for French
and German wines, and £8 for Iberian. l09 Wine merchants,
shippers, and other entrepreneurs were quick to respond,
and further legislation was needed:
great quantities of mean and corrupt wines have
been imported from the Isle of Man, the freight
whereof was inconsiderable, and staved for the
benefit of the.. .allowances for freight and charges,
contrary to the true intent and meaning of the. . .Act.
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Wine u'tfit for sale, was being brought across from Ireland,
the Channel Isles, and from abroad. Allowances were now
only to be paid on wines coming directly from their country
of origin, or salvaged out of wrecks and brought into
a port.- 10 Opportunities for defrauding the revenue were
further reduced in 1725, when the law was changed permitting
the sale of damaged wine for distillation or vinegar making,
the proceeds paying freight charges 	 and other costs
'attending the keeping and selling the said wines.'-11
Just as the original concession to the wine importers
had encouraged a new form of fraud, so the change in the
law could have encouraged an existing one. Dealers in French
brandy, living on or near the coast:
have or may have opportunities of furnishing
themselves with. . .brandy.. .either by running the
same themselves or procuring it from others who
have or shall run it: And whereas many of the said
dealers are gotten into a practice of receiving
into their custody great quantities of spirits
made in this country, which for the most part are
brought to them from London, with permit or
certificate that the duties of the same have been
paid.
This domestic product was of such low proof, or so diluted,
as to be worth little, but the dealers had a good cover
for increases in their stocks, claiming they had mixed
foreign and British brandies. The inferior spirits were
in fact destroyed, and had only been purchased to confound
the Excise officers. 112
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Traffickers in contraband were familiar with the workings
of the revenue laws, and took steps to protect their
investments through legal stratagems. Merchants securing
drawback on re-exports took the precaution of having
informations, 'entred and filed against themselves in some
of the courts at Westminster or Edinburgh, in the name
of some person or persons, on his, her or their behalf'
No prosecution was undertaken, but if the officers were
to find evidence of deception at a later date, 'a plea
of priority of suit is. . .pleaded in bar of such real
iriformations prosecuted by the officers of the revenue,
whereby the said offenders evade the several penalties
inflicted by law'. In 1725 it was enacted that all
informations for the recovery of penalties had to be
'entred, filed, and prosecuted in the name of the Attorney
General' or the revenue officers.113
Paralleling the efforts to deter frauds on the part of
the merchants were the attempts to check the corrupt
practices of the officers. In 1662, issuing false
certificates to cover contraband unloaded from coasters
was made punishable by a £50 fine, dismissal, and 'such
Corporal punishment as the Court of Exchequer shall think
fitt,' while accepting a bribe or conniving at a false
entry incurred a £100 penalty. Compositions were a more
complex matter. Allowing offenders to escape prosecution
or gain release from the debtors' gaol through paying a
reduced penalty, had the advantages of recovering revenues
and clearing the prisons, but it also provided opportunities
for collusion. The 1662 Act stipulated that only duly
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appointed officers, and those holding Treasury warrants
or royal commissions were authorized to make seizures.
Any composition had to be worth at least one third the
value of the goods forfeited, and provision was made for
pursuing prosecutions if the original informant declined
taking further action.1]-4
In 1725 the Commissioners were empowered to proceed
against forfeited goods and to order seizures of tea and
coffee condemned in the Exchequer Courts, to be auctioned
in London or Edinburgh. If the seizures were made elsewhere,
the goods could be brought to the respective capitals,
while confiscated spirits were to be sold wherever the
Boards decided. The intention was to prevent officers and
importers conspiring to exploit the existing arrangements
in the outports whereby the original owners were able to
regain their property through rigged auctions. As a safeguard
against seizures being embezzled, no Customs officer was
to receive reward for seizure of exciseable goods unless
they notified the nearest Excise Officer or the Supervisor
of the district; failure to do so would make the goods
liable to reseizure.1]-5
Collusive seizures continued throughout the century,
enabling smugglers and preventive men to reach compromises,
so reducing the risk of violent resistance. The government
and the Commissioners persisted in their efforts to suppress
the practice. The 1784 Commutation Act made revenue and
naval officers concerned 'in any collusise seizure or
agreement not to seize or deliver up any ship or vessel
or any goods', liable to fines of £5OO.]]6
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The 1779 Act empowered justices of the peace to examine
complaints of negligence brought against an officer for
failing 'to exert himself in the seizure of contraband,
or arrest those concerned in running goods. ' The
Commissioners could decide whether or not to dismiss an
employee on the basis of a justice's report.1-1-7 Yet the
statutes indicate that central government felt the local
officials were lax in their enforcement of the revenue
laws. The 1736 Indemnity Act recorded that:
the bailiffs and other officers having the
execution of process... often hold correspondence
with the persons guilty of the several illegal
practices.. .and give them notice when any writ
or process issues against them, whereby they
escape from justice.
For the future, sheriffs and mayors were instructed to
grant special warrants for taking up suspects' upon the
request or application of any one of the known solicitors
for the Customs or Excise' or anyone acting on their
authorization. 11- 8 Penalties could be imposed on peace
of icers refusing to accompany revenuemen executing search
warrants, and after 1779 gaolers could be fined for allowing
the escape of smugglers from custody.1-19 The difficulty
was that the justices of the peace were responsible for
law enforcement within their districts, and while they
could be encouraged, they could not be coerced. Frustrated
by non-co-operation, the revenue officers sought legal
advice as to the possibility of initiating proceedings
against obstructive justices, but the Customs solicitors
usually advised restraint.120
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The validity of the adversarial model of social relations
is a recurrent theme in this study. Investigating the
situation in the outports, where the boatmen and cutter
in the Customs and Excise were drawn from the same sector
of the community as the smugglers they were supposed to
control, it is evident that compromise was as common as
conflict and much of the violence was ritualized. The
supposed divide between the institutions of central
government and the social and governing elite in the counties
comes under scrutiny when discussing the armyts role, but
policing and the maintenance of social order were complex
processes. According to Stanley Palmer,
the chief merit of the highly localized system in place
in the eighteenth century was that it operated through
'bonds of kinship, friendship and neighbourliness'.
Constables preferred to admonish or counsel rather than
arrest and prosecute. Law enforcement was highly
individualistic and discretionary, not bureaucratic and
rigid, and peace officers had to be responsive to the values
of the 'moral communities' of which they were a part, and
the needs of the law, which they were charged to enforce.12°
The implication is that central government, through use
of the military and an armed preventive force, stood outside
of these arrangements. In practice, hierarchical and
bureaucratic chains of command could only function through
a number of networks linking ministers and magnates,
landlords and tenants, politicians and voters, officials
magistrates. Networks could either advance or frustrate
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the intentions of central government, but such was the
overlap in personnel, and the number of different roles
assumed by those in public life, that separating the centre
and the regions could bring confusion rather than
illumination. Legal structures and the statutes provide
a necessary framework for the study of law enforcement,
but they tell us more about contemporary perceptions of
the problem of smuggling, and the aspirations of those
shaping the legislation, than they do about the tasks of
policing and prevention, on land and at sea, over the course
of the eighteenth century.
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Chapter One
Commerce and Contraband.
I
Interlopers, Chartered Companies, and Smugglers.
Ostend
The duration and scale of the wars between 1688 and
1714 brought about a 'radical transformation';Britain
acquired tall of the main features of a powerful fiscal
military state: high taxes, a growing and well organized
civil administration, a standing army and the determination
to act as a major European power.'' A comprehensive revision
of tariffs and trade policy was part of this transformation
and from 1690 to 1704 'the general level of duties on import
trade was roughly quadrupled.' Wines, spirits and tobacco
were already heavily taxed, duties accounting for half
their price at the London wholesalers before 1685, when
additional duties were imposed. Two further duties of 25%
were added to all French imports in 1693, and these
prohibitively high levels were to remain until the Eden
Treaty of 1786. Other Acts, in 1690 and 1693, placed extra
duties on a range of commodities, ranging from 5% to 20%,
while the general import tax on all goods was increased
from 5% to 10% in 1697 and by another 5% in 1704_5.2
These measures benefited domestic producers as imports
of French silks, linen and white paper fell away, but the
smugglers were able to take advantage from the continuing
demand for French brandy. Building on their existing export
business, shipping packs of wool aboard French ships off
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the Kent afld Sussex coasts, the 'owlers' began handling
cargoes of spirits, wines and textiles. By the end of the
seventeenth century there was a sophisticated network in
place in Kent, centred on the Huguenot community in
Canterbury who were able to exploit their connections with
France. 3
These developments merit attention for two reasons.
They can be seen to be laying the basis for a distribution
network which was to serve the interests of continental
challengers to the United East India Company, and they
raise doubts regarding Monod's arguments for the importance
of the Jacobites as the power behind the expansion of
smuggling.4 The coincidence of the new tariff regime and
an exodus of Jacobites, makes it impossible to advance
a single cause for the development of superior organisational
skills and structures within the contraband trade. Many
of the first emigrants were Irish, and illicit trade between
Ireland and France flourished in the eighteenth century,
but the growth in illegal exports to the south and east
coasts of England was to a degree independent of the Irish
connection. Wines and spirits were transported from centres
of production to the principal contraband ports, and merchant
houses such as the Gaiways, Hennessys, Coppingers and
MacCarthys were concerned in these movements, but this
does not show that an 'international network of Jacobite
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business' was 'the motive force behind a great deal of
smuggling.' The role of the Jacobite emigre's does become
more clear cut after the War of Spanish Succession, though
as Dermigny notes, not every Irishman and Scot gifted with
financial acumen and sound business instincts was bound
to be an avid supporter of the Stuart cause.
The closure of the River Scheldt by the terms of the
Treaty of Munster in 1648 further undermined Antwerp's
position as the commercial centre of north western Europe.
During the remaining years of Spanish rule there was no
concerted effort to develop a major alternative port in
the Southern Netherlands and no encouragement for mariners
and merchants to engage in trade with the Spanish overseas
empire. When the southern provinces were transferred from
Spanish to Austrian control, Dutch and English insistence
meant the Scheldt remained closed. This was not enough
to stifle the aspirations of groups of merchants and
financiers in Bruges, Brussels, Ghent and Antwerp, prepared
to invest in mercantile ventures based at Ostend. The
first expeditions were made by interlopers, invading the
monopolies of the United East India Company and the Dutch
East India Company. In 1714 and 1715 the authorities in
the Austrian Netherlands issued patents for five ships;
the Emperor Charles III, the St Matthew and the Imperial
Flanders were to sail to Surat and the East Indies and
thePrince Eugene set out for Bengal. TheCharles of Flanders
was intended to be the first Ostender to trade with the
Chinese at Canton. 5 Much of the backing for these ventures
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came from England and Holland. Thomas Ray, an Irish merchant
with Flemish nationality and based at Ostend, headed the
consortium of Jacobite exiles which funded the Emperor
Charles III, while Xavier Sarsfield, another Irishman,
captained the St Matthew.6
These voyages were bitterly opposed by the Dutch and
English companies. Attempts were made to intercept them
and the Dutch Governors at Batavia and the Cape were
instructed to assist in any scheme to check the interlopers.
When Sarsfield tried to take the St Matthew into St Helena
for supplies, she came under fire from the shore battery.
Sarsfield reached Ostend in August 1716, followed soon
afterwards by the Prince Eugene . Dutch buyers, anxious
to keep control over the import of textiles from India
and the Far East, bought heavily when the cargoes came
up for sale and the investors doubled their money, before
payment of port dues and duties.7 This success encouraged
more expeditions; in 1717 twelve ships were being fitted
out, commissioned in the Austrian Netherlands but English
built and prepared in shipyards on the Thames.8
Circumstances favoured Ostend at that time. The
interloping trade attracted the enemies of the House of
Hanover and the opponents of the great monopoly companies.
A ban on the importation of textiles from the Far East
forced the French East India Company to divert its ships
to Ostend, and a Dutch move to acquire tea more cheaply
had had the opposite effect.9 Instead of dealing directly
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with the Cninese at Canton, the Dutch bought from the fleet
of junks which came to Batavia every year. In 1717, knowing
the Chinese would find no alternative buyers, the Dutch
forced down the price. The following year the junks failed
to arrive and the Dutch were excluded from Canton. They
were forced to buy supplies from the Portuguese at Macao,
which meant paying twice as much for an inferior product.lO
Profits were to be made trading in China and the Prince
Eugene left Ostend bound for Canton in January 1718,
commanded by John Tobin, an experienced captain who had
already accumulated a fortune in the service of the East
India Company. The voyage was very successful; English
efforts to keep Tobin out of Canton failed, and when the
Prince Eugene returned in July 1719 the proceeds from the
sale of its cargo brought a l00%profit." Diplomatic pressure
from the British government brought an end to the practice
of granting naturalisatjon, and new legislation increased
the penalties for taking service with, or participating
in the ventures of foreign •concerns, but it was proving
difficult to check the interlopers.12
The East India Company was becoming increasingly anxious
as competition increased. Four ships were commissioned
in 1720, with instructions to keep together for protection
in pirate infested waters, then, once clear, the supercargoes
were to 'hasten away such best sailing Ship before you
in hopes she may get to Canton before the Ostenders. On
her arrival there, We direct that her Supra Cargoes do
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secure or contract for all the Tea procurable.' If supplies
were still available after buying sufficient to load the
three vessels sailing back directly to England, the
supercargoes should contract for enough leaf to fill the
hold of the Bridgewater, sailing for Madras.
We give this order thus large, that the
Ostenders may be disappointed of Tea, and
if they are we shall esteem it an excellent
piece of service done the Company, for which
you shall not want our encouragement. . .Cost
what it will we must try to make these
Interlopers sick of their voyages for Tea.1-3
The scheme to thwart the Ostenders failed. The Carnavon
was delayed in the English Channel and arrived a month
after the rest, by which time they had filled their holds,
as had the two interlopers. There was a demand for tea
in continental Europe, and the difficulties encountered
by the Dutch provided an opportunity to the Ostenders,
but they were also supplying the English and Irish smugglers.
From the Company's viewpoint,the situation worsened
in 1722 and 1723. The Emperor Charles VI was at last
persuaded to grant a charter for an Ostend Company, and
Parliament agreed to change the law with respect to tea
exports. Customs duties were collected on importation and
could be claimed back when tea was exported.-4 The outcome
was a great deal of fraud: merchants would claim drawback
but the tea was later brought back clandestinely into Britain
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Walpole's excise scheme
	 removed the incentive for the
fictitious export of tea by ending the drawback system.
This opened up new prospects for direct shipment of
contraband from continental Europe and encouraged more
expeditions to Canton. The 1723 Act had been anticipated
and the chances for profit were fully appreciated. ]- 5 Prices
varied for the different types of leaf, but some tea could
be sold at Ostend for ten times its cost at Canton. 16 Nine
ships were sent out to Bengal and Canton between 1724 and
1727 producing a gross profit of seven million florins;
most of it from the sale of silks and tea. Each ship
discharged 350,000 lbs of tea on average, more than the
East India Company brought back to London in 1720-21 and
1723_4.17 The general belief was that much of this was
finding its way to England, where the smugglers sold it
at half the price being asked for legal importations.
As soon as the Ostend Company was set up, the
contraband trade was encouraged by our merchants
and our people, and large boats, with ten or
twelve rowers, came from Ostend to the River
Thames, reaching as far as London Bridge on the
high tide, right under the noses of the customs
officers; it was this which gave rise to an Act
of Parliament which prohibited entry to the river
in any boat with more than four oars, putting
paid to that method. Since that time, they have
found another way of carrying out their business,
sending ships out to sea to meet up with the
sloops putting into and leaving Ostend and later
unloading contraband at sites along the creeks
running into our river.-8
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Reports from Ostend confirmed that the first smugglers
had come over in small open boats, but it was possible
to build a flourishing business making frequent crossings
and avoiding the preventive services.1-9 Edward Roots put
into Ostend nine times between February 1727 and June 1728,
taking in less than 500 lbs of tea each time. One cargo
was jettisoned when Roots was pursued by a cruiser off
the Kent coast, and he lost his first ship on the seventh
voyage, seized on their return. Roots had sufficient funds
to acquire another vessel and continue trading. 2 ° Robert
Large and Benjamin Wackling operated along the coasts of
Norfolk and Suffolk on a far larger scale, bringing in
45,000 lbs in fifteen months. 2 -
Smugglers were sailing to Ostend from Coichester, Chatham,
Rochester, Margate, Ramsgate, Hastings, Poole, Weymouth
and Plymouth. In January 1725 there were eleven Irish brigs
and sloops in port, thought to be running contraband along
the south coast and Ireland. Nicholas La yers, from Alderney,
was reputed to have bought more than enough tea to meet
the combined thirsts of the Channel Islanders for several
years.22 The Ostend Company's charter was revoked in 1727,
when Charles VI gave way to British and Dutch pressure.
The company continued to function officially for a few
more years and the last authorised expeditions brought
back 2,628,586 lbs of tea, four times the quantity secured
by the London company in 1727-8. 23 Ostend remained a thriving
centre for the contraband trade and the developments arising
from the demise of the Company illustrate the extent to
which smuggling was the creature of international capital.
Denied the opportunity of employing their resources in
the Austrian Netherlands, investors, agents entrepreneurs
and men of the sea looked for alternative outlets.
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II
The Danish and Swedish Companies and the Commutation Act
The initial response to the withdrawal of the Ostend
Company's charter was to seek protection under flags of
convenience.24 The rulers of Prussia and Poland were co-
operative, but the English and Dutch had no hesitation
in attacking any interlopers. The Apollo was at Canton
for the 1730-31 season, a four hundred ton vessel carrying
a hundred men and twenty-eight guns. Sailing under the
Prussian flag, the Apollo was the former Archduchess, an
Ostender. When the East India Company ships set off for
China Charles VI had not yet acceded to the 1729 peace
between England and Spain. James Naish, the senior supercargo
with the East India Company's expedition, planned to seize
the Apollo once she was outside Chinese waters; the project
failed, but twenty-three British seamen were taken off
her.25 As theApollo sailed through the Malacca Straits
five Dutch ships tried to stop her, but, 'the Wind was
fair & she sailed thro' them, receiving some Single Shot
from several of the Ships, which did them no great damage.'26
The final destination was Hamburg, where the cargo was
sold, despite protests from Britain. Other expeditions
setting out from Ostend were thought to have been organized
with the connivance of the imperial government and the
fear was that the Ostend Company had been abolished 'but
by Name.' 7 The Company was perpetuated in the sense that
capital, entrepreneurial skills, and personnel moved to
the new Swedish East Indies Company and the Danish Asiatic
Company.28 An important object for both concerns was to
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obtain tea f or the contraband trade . Auctioned at Gothenberg
and Copenhagen, it could then be shipped directly to the
Scottish east coast and the north east of England, or sent
to the Faroes, Shetlands and the Isle of Man for later
transfer to the mainland. The economic dominance of Holland
and the city of Amsterdam could not be translated into
effective political control over the other provinces. The
Zeeland ports ignored the Dutch East India Company's monopoly
and stocks of contraband tea were stored at Flushing,
Middleburg and Veere. 29 Ostend was still much frequented
by smugglers, and just over the border, the free port of
Dunkirk supplied duty free goods to buyers from all over
Europe.
As French trade in China extended, the Compagnie
Francaise des Indes was able to supply the peacetime needs
of the French smuggling ports. Before that, Dunkirk had
met the requirements of the merchants of Calais, Boulogne,
St Malo and St Valery, providing teas from the sales in
Sweden and Denmark, and Holland. 31 The English smugglers
went originally in search of wines and spirits, but the
cheaper Bohea tea was an ideal space-filler. It could
be kept in oilskin bags, did not have to be handled with
any great care, and carried a disproportionately heavy
duty, compared with Hyson, Singlo, and other varieties,
both green and black.32 Calais, St Malo and Morlaix had
petitioned successfully for exemption from import duties,
provided the tea was intended for sale to the smugglers.
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Other towns on the Normandy and Brittany coasts saw the
advantages of free trade, and local authorities did not
insist on strict adherence to the regulations. When the
Compagnie des Indes found it impossible to meet demand
during the War of Austrian Succession, merchants in the
Channel ports made good the deficit from the stocks held
in neutral countries. English smugglers were employed
in bringing Dutch and Scandinavian tea into France, and
would very likely run the same cargoes into Britain at
a later date.33 Brandy and wines intended for the contraband
trade were moved in the opposite direction, being held
in northern ports for the convenience of those carrying
timber, naval stores, cereals and textiles across the North
34.
Any satisfaction felt by the East India Company over
the ending of the Ostenders' voyages to the Far East, was
short lived. A Swedish attempt to establish a factory at
Porto Novo was defeated by the forcible opposition of the
East India Company, but they could not prevent the Danes
re-establishing their station at Tranqueba 35' Both Danes
and Swedes sent ships to Canton, and the China trade ensured
healthy returns for the investors. The first Danish
expedition in 1733 brought back twice as much tea as the
two East India Company vessels sent out that year. 36 Andrew
Reid, supercargo on the Normanton East Indiaman, arrived
at Canton late in 1736 and found it impossible to buy tea
at the prices agreed by his colleagues, who had already
filled their holds. The French, Danes, Swedes and Dutch,
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now dealing directly in China, were all prepared to pay
above Reid's limit.'There was not at market a sufficient
quantity of Bohea to supply the extraordinary demand for
it,' and the supercargoes from the continental companies,
'began to buy up Green Teas, well knowing that the Smugglers
would pay handsomely for them at home, if the English were
not provided by the Company.
The tea trade operated within an international market
and participants had to be aware of what was occurring
both in Europe and China. Effective competition from the
Ostenders, and the ready response to increased demand on
the part of the Chinese, more than halved the price in
London between 1714-18 and 1720_24 . 38 The East India Company
was forced to reduce its annual dividend from ten to eight
per cent and to cut back on quantities put up for sale
in an effort to push up the price. The Dutch had resolved
their problems with China by 1723, but prices at Batavia
were higher than at Canton.39 This was not reflected at
the Amsterdam auctions where bidders were well aware of
the situation regarding current stocks and .future supplies.
By the early 1730s, the growing number of expeditions,
increased production in China, and a slackening of demand
in Europe, combined to bring	 prices down.4° Directors
of chartered companies, supercargoes negotiating contracts
with the merchant guild at Canton, and the ships officers
intent on making their fortunes by private trade, had to
be knowledgeable about the state of the markets, both in
Europe and the Far East. The same was true of the tea
dealers, operating in the legal or the contraband sectors.
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Speculative dealers, who supplied the smugglers, would
search out information concerning the number of ships at
Canton, the companies they belonged to, their probable
cargoes and sailing dates, and the maritime traffic at
Batavia, the Cape and St Helena:
Again, news went round from one town to another
of preparations for auction sales, either by the
companies or by private firms; of stocks in hand,
quantities likely to be offered for sales, prices
current, and seeing that international trade was
involved, of the course of foreign exchanges.41
The wars between the major maritime powers disrupted
established trade patterns, both legal and illegal.
British smugglers were still welcome in France for the
gold and silver coin they brought in, but the Compagnie
des Indes could no longer meet demand. The Dutch and
Scandinavians made good the deficit, increasing their
ventures to China, but this meant a reorganization of the
distribution networks in Europe as contraband intended
for Britain had often to be shipped to the main smuggling
entrepots first. The Danish and Swedish companies flourished
when the major maritime powers were at war, the frequent
and protracted conflicts involving Britain and France
disrupted French commerce the more seriously and their
trade with China was particularly hard hit. The Scandinavians
were able to benefit from this, bringing back tea for legal
and illegal consumption.42
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The East India Company's fortunes improved during the
Seven Years War and its imports doubled over the following
decade. £14,000,000 of tea were imported in 1771, an
unprecedented amount. The smugglers' response was to redouble
their efforts, and, in Dermigny's words, 'a veritable
avalanche descended on England, an estimated 9,500,000
lbs' of tea.'43 The reduction in duties for the years 1768-
72 restricted the profits to be made from running Bohea
and the Swedes concentrated on the more expensive Congous
and Souchongs for disposal in Scotland and the north of
England. The Hyson and 'common green' tea they loaded at
Canton were mainly for British use, 'shipped off immediately
after the sales for Dunkerque, Ostend, Guernsey, Jersey
etc. where the proximity meant it could be easily shipped
over and landed in Britain.'44 The Company reduced its
purchases the following year, but there was now a glut
and only four ships were sent to Canton for the 1774-75
season. 45
Sales of tea at the 1767 auctions realised £8,000,000
for the East India Company; by 1784 this had fallen to
£5,500,000, despite a growing population and per capita
consumption. The Company had the resources, personnel and
experience to take on its continental competitors in an
equal contest, but it could not overcome customs and excise
duties that more than doubled the price.From the time the
rival East Indiamen entered the English Channel the dealers
began their speculations:
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• . . some employs their own stocks, others join
in companys and sends abroad their commissions
from five hundred to £1000, from those sums up
to 5, 10, 20, 25, even to the amount of 30 thousand
pounds to be laid out in buying teas at their
August or September sales.46
It was claimed the Danish Asiatic Company 'would be very
insignificant was it not supported by British commissions
at their sales' and the practice of using the Danes to
remit funds to Europe from India. Smuggling was a major
enterprise; dealers in contraband could insure their ships
and goods against seizure, had access to credit, and could
even seek legal redress in cases of breach of contract47
However, if there was a clear distinction between small-
scale, clandestine smuggling in the first half of the
century, and a significant, capitalistic, commercial
enterprise in the second, then the lines of demarcation
ought to be discernible. Illicit dealings in tea were a
very important aspect of the contraband trade from the
1740s to the mid-1780s, but those smugglers who ran cargoes
into this country seldom relied on one commodity. One
well-informed observer of smuggling predicted its rapid
collapse if tea was removed from the list of high duty
goods in popular demand. There would he insufficient capital
to support a trade in illict spirits on anything like the
same scale. 'Desperate adventurers, using smaller ships
and employing fewer men would attempt it, but such traffic
would be 'within the power of the revenue officers and
cruisers to suppress it. 48 The Commutation Act destroyed
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the prof[ts to be made from smuggled tea, and eliminated
the East India Company's European competitors for the China
trade, but it did not lead to the overall collapse of
smuggling. Wines, spirits and tobacco had sustained a healthy
business in the ealier period, and casks of gin and brandy
frequently accompanied cargoes of illicit tea before 1784.
If the discussion on the size of the contraband trade
is confined to comparing the volume of tea brought in at
different times, it is still difficult to establish a marked
divide during the eighteenth century. Allowing for over
estimates, there was still rapid acceleration in illegal
importation over the period from the mid 1730s to the mid
1740s. The East India Company reckoned 460,000 lbs were
brought over in 1737, while evidence submitted to the 1745
Parliamentary enquiry suggested a figure of 3,000,000 lbs
per annnum, three times more than the East India Comany
brought in, and almost certainly an eXaggeration. The
same figure was at the lower end of the estimates advanced
for the peak smuggling period in the late l770s and 1780s.49
This was probably too small a figure, but given the increase
in population and the spread of tea drinking through all
social classes, it does seem that tea smuggling had developed
into a major undertaking by the 1740s.
In his recent assessment of the smuggling trade, John
Brewer sees new developments within the merchant community:
83
'Towards the end of the century more and
more merchants were willing to help fight
against the illicit trader. They collaborated
with revenue officers and formed associations
to prosecute smugglers. Yet their success
was only limited. In the l770s and l780s
smuggling firms were using larger, swifter
vessels, carried more and more weapons and
were as willing to use violence as the
notorious Sussex smugglers of the 1730s.
In short, though the pattern of smuggling
may have changed, it remained a serious problem
for government throughout the period.'50
As evidence for change, and a growing division between
smugglers and fair traders, Brewer cites William Stout,
writing in the l750s. By his account fraud was on the
decline, ' nor is there now much attempt made by any
merchants of reputation and good conscience.'51 Winslow
accepts Charles Fleet's argument that the escalation of
violence among Sussex smugglers in the l740s was
attributable to changes in the social composition of the
gangs; farm labourers rather than lesser landowners, yeomen
farmers, and small businessmen came to make up the majority
of participants 52
Brewer sees the later withdrawal of 'merchants of reputation
and good conscience,' as in some way significant, but setting
aside the lower orders' lack of civility, there is the
matter of just who was concerned in the contraband trade.
The investors, directors ,agents, supercargoes and ships
officers of the various continental East Indies companies
were men of consequence. 53 William Richardson, working
on behalf of the British concern, met with 'great difficulty'
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when he tried to persuade a number of prominent tea dealers
'to consider forming an Association against smuggling and
adulteration of Tea.' Meeting little encouragement from
government 'and the want of Military to assist the few
Officers of Revenue who were inclined to do their duty,
the Society discontinued their Meetings.'54 Richard Twining
reported the growing irritation of the dealers as the revenue
commissioners failed to follow up on the association's
initiatives. 55 Observing a minority of dealers handling
contraband with impunity, the rest were left to sacrifice
their principles or their livelihoods. By the early 1780s
the trade in smuggled tea, moved under cover of Excise
permits, was no longer, 'confined to persons in small way
of business or of doubtful character in the world: it was
carried on by the most extensive dealers and by those who
possessed the fairest reputation.'56
The East India Company's position improved decisively
as a result of the 1784 Act. Duty was cut to 12½% and the
tea put up at the London auctions was at last competitively
priced. The continental companies could no longer depend
on the contraband trade in to keep them in business.
The smugglers fought a determined rearguard action,
testimony to the wealth and organizational strength of
those involved. Pitt and the fair traders were disappointed
by the initial impact of the reduction in duties. It was
anticipated that the lower cost of the Company's product
would undermine the smugglers market. The Directors were
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at the Company's sales. Twining was informed that, 'Persons
on the other side of the water, who were possessed of Twenty
or Thirty thousand pounds each, were determined to keep
up the Prices of Tea, and that they could do so
notwithstanding any opposition which they might meet with.'61
When the first sales were held after the Commutation Act
the smugglers present deliberately drove up the price of
Congou and Souchong. It was anticipated they would sell
at 3s 4d and 5s 8d respectively, exclusive of duty; they
went at 6s 5^d and 6s gd.62 These varieties were selected
by the smugglers in the knowledge that the Company's existing
stocks were low, and they were in no position to frustrate
the free traders by putting more tea on sale. Dealers who
had bought at the previous auction had successfully persuaded
the Company to take back their purchases. Otherwise they
might have left the smugglers to raise the price until
they were, 'buried like Samson under the cumbrous load
which he had heaped upon himself.'63
The Act was having some effect; in June 1784 'very good
Souchong' was selling in Devon at nine shillings a pound.'64
Those dealers buying at the September auctions that year
could have undercut the earlier prices being asked by the
smugglers and still have made a profit. The increase in
the quantities sold indicated that revenue lost through
the reduction in duty would eventually be made good by
greater consumption of the legitimate article.
	 In the
interim, Pitt was faced with a very real problem.
	 The
Window Tax, introduced to compensate for the immediate
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shortfall in revenue, was unpopular among the property
owning classes,and it was politically necessary to fulfil
the promises of cheaper tea as quickly as possible.5
The East India Company were assured of Parliamentary
authorisation if tea had to be acquired at the continental
sales. Maintaining good stocks would provide the means
of keeping prices down while buying abroad would deny the
smugglers their usual supplies. In the face of opposition
from some of the directors, Pitt supported the formation
of a consortium of merchants and tea dealers prepared to
import tea from Europe and compete with the Company. Robert
Voute, head of the Dutch firm J.J.Voute & Co, then offered
to supply the East India Company with tea at prices below
those they would have had to pay at auction. When there
were further objections, Pitt threatened to open the ports
and end the Company t s monopoly.Voute's Dutch associates
supplied 1,360,000 lbs to Britain in 1785, and 7,190,000
lbs the following year, a quantity in keeping with the
more pessimistic estimates of the smuggling trade.66 Buying
on such a scale made it difficult for the smugglers to
continue and by the end of the decade the East India Company
was able to meet the rising domestic demand. The decline
of the Swedish, Danish and French companies' Chinese trade
over the last years of the century testified to their
dependence on the contraband trade with Britain.
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III
Unlicensed Victuallers:French Brandy Smuggling,
and Britain's Off-Shore Territories.
The trade in contraband tea involved chartered companies,
large capital investments, and the penetration of legal
markets and distribution systems by the smugglers. The
activities of the seamen, porters and riders who ran the
contraband should be located within a network of financiers,
merchants, dealers and retailers who brought the tea to
Europe,	 purchased	 it	 at	 the	 continental	 auctions,
commissioned the smuggling vessels, and organized
distribution in Britain. The same men who planned and carried
out the runs were capable of making their own investments
and looking after the storage and disposal of contraband.
The smuggling network
	 provided opportunities for the
exercise of individual initiative and the adoption of
different roles. The various participants, whether
distinguished men of affairs or armed outlaws, were linked
by a common purpose and ties of interdependence.
Other sectors of the contraband trade were less complex,
but still entailed much organisation and planning. Evading
the revenue cruisers and the riding officers when running
the occasional cargo was no major problem. To make smuggling
a full-time, profitable business required attention to
detail and accurate assessment of the risks. Seizure by
the preventive forces was an obvious danger; losses arising
because of time spent waiting for a chance to come inshore,
or from having to disperse the land gangs if a ship failed
to appear, could be just as damaging. Successful smugglers
needed the same acumen as legitimate dealers, though
undertaking additional risks.
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High duties and ineffective enforcement of the revenue
laws helped make smuggling a paying business, but so did
attention to costs, precautionary measures to minimize
seizures, and a plentiful supply of customers. Potential
buyers were to be found concentrated in the cities and
larger towns, but the smugglers' mobility not only enabled
them to escape capture, it meant they could sell goods
over a wide area. This was demonstrated by the brandy
dealers in the twenty years after the War of the Spanish
Succession. A wartime ban on French produce, extortionate
levels of duty, an established export trade in raw wool,
and the exploits of privateers, all fostered this enterprise.
In June 1688 the Collector of Customs at Dover told
the Commissioners that the sloops Enquiry and Observator,
appointed to prevent the export of wool, were carrying
eight and twenty additional crewmen respectively, 'by reason
of the great number of French privateers upon the coast
whose chief trade was the bringing over uncustomed goods,
and to carry back wool, especially fron the coast of Kent
and Sussex.'67 The threat from these smuggling privateers
caused the withdrawal of the two sioops from service and
the setting up of the first Customs Riding Officers,
appointed to patrol the coast and the routes leading down
to the sea.68
It was not only the French privateers who combined commerce
raiding and smuggling. The Channel Islanders ended a long
tradition of neutrality in 1689 and began to invest in
privateering ventures while maintaining their commercial
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Links with France. 'The Treasury retained a deep-rooted
suspicion that not all the prize goods exported to England
from the Islands had been procured by legitimate seizure.'
Godoiphin proposed that all the prizes be brought to London
with their cargoes intact, 'as being a better markett for
sale of them, and would be a means to prevent such collusive
Importations from these Islands as were apprehended to
have been practised during the last war.' The tax exemptions
for prize wines and brandy were removed in 1704 but this
most likely boosted smuggling on the English side of the
Channel. New regulations were introduced in 1708 'the better
to prevent French goods being exported. . .under cover of
Prize Goods,'but the States of Guernsey and Jersey protested
vigorously, Jersey refusing to register the new measures.
Aware of the Islands strategic importance, and the
contribution of its privateers, Godoiphin ordered the rules
be relaxed and promised minimum interference with trade.
Enforcement of the Navigation Acts and the prohibition
against trade with France would be left to the discretion
of the governors and bai1iffs69 In a position to satisfy
the English taste for French brandy, and the French penchant
for Virginia tobacco, acquired through the capture of cargoes
from America, the Island authorities were not going to
hurt the local economy.
When the war ended it seemed that every boatman and
fisherman with a vessel capable of making the Channel
crossing was calling at the French ports in search of casks
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of brandy and gin. By 1715 smugglers outnumbered lawful
trading vessels at Calais, as was the case in most years
until the l72os.70 Over that decade the French expanded
their own operations along the south and east coasts, selling
to the collier fleets and to the local population.71 Samuel
Jacombe, the Yarmouth Collector, described the activities
of the Calais based brandy sellers in 1729. Their principal
agent was Peter Live, and through him they commissioned
ten snows each year, from 40 to 60 tons displacement:
They provide the snows with good number of
men and ammunition of war to make a vigorous
defence in case they are attacked by the officers
of the customs or any small force; when they
are fit for the sea, then the distillers and
other traders put in what brandy they please,
some 40, some 50, some 100 casks; these snows
take, one with another, about 400 casks each
when loaded, then come on the coast and assist
each other in case of danger; the first that
has sold his cargoes speaks with all the rest
and takes from them what monies have been
received and goes for Calais and loads again
and comes again on the coast, so they keep
a constant round of coming with money and going
with brandy.
Crews were paid according to the number of casks sold,
and 'no purchase no pay, was thought to stiffen their
resistance to seizures.' One of the partnerships concerned
in the business provided for a brandy issue, 'to make them
more desperate,' and anyone failing to defend the cargo
against the attentions of the revenue cruisers, 'was turned
out of all employment for the future.'72 Reports from
the commanders of the Customs cruisers and the Royal Naval
92
ships on revenue duty support Jacombe's claims. The French
were sighted frequently and fiercely resisted any attempts
at seizure. Between March 1730 and December 1734, H.M.S
Fly and H.M.S Weazle detained eighteen vessels and
confiscated 11,012 gallons of brandy. Most of the ships
were sailing out of Calais, with the occasional one from
Boulogne, but some of the captains' names seem more English
than French; James Laurence commanded the New Subtile,
Peter Pallet the Russee and Francis Lewis theDragon. The
law did not provide for the confiscation of vessels used
for smuggling if they were more than forty tons, and the
same Calais snows were brought in more than once. Captain
Oates of the Fly seized the Old Subtile twice, and before
that she had been brought in by four different navy cruisers
patrolling the east coast between the Tyne and the HumberY
Such was the extent smuggling in the early 1730s that an
informantdescribing a supposed invasion plan, claimed
that TFrance had no occasion to employ one Ship in the
designe... for said he if 300 Smuglers being bold fellows
and used to hazard could be got between St Malo and dunkirk'
they would be the means of bringing over 6000 troops from
the Channel portsY It was unlikely England would be invaded
by an armada of smuggling sloops but the informant clearly
thought it worth submitting this re port, and it gives
an idea of the scale of activity on both sides of the
Channel.
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A French account from 1734 stated that the merchants
of Calais had not sent any barques to the English coast
for two years, fearing interception by a much improved
waterguard. The same explanation was advanced for the decline
in the number of English ships putting into Breton ports
to purchase consignments of tea for running into Cornwall
and Devon.75 The number of reported runs, the size of the
smuggling gangs, and the estimates of the quantities of
illicit goods being brought in, do not suggest more
effective prevention. As the trade became more complex,
so those ports offering a range of goods and services secured
more of the smuggling business. The Kent and Sussex smugglers
acquiring spirits at Boulogne were able to insist on
discounts from the dealers. They would then adulterate
the brandy, first diluting it, and then adding lime and
soap to provide, 'heat and head.' The brandy trade was
so profitable that a number of those engaged in it had,
'raised 'emselves[Sic] from common fishermen to estates
in ready money of about 14 to 15,000 pounds sterling.'76
The 1745 Committee was told there were five cutters plying
a regular trade between Boulogne and the Kent and Sussex
coasts, bringing back at least six tons of tea and 2000
half-anchor casks of brandy every week at a cost of £3000.
Dunkirk's status as a free port ensured it was also a
smuggling centre with much of its prosperity based on
tobacco. Imported leaf was processed and packed for sale
within the territory of the French ferme and brought to
Britain illegally.	 Brandy, gin, rum , tea, coffee and
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textiles were added to the list of commodities available
at Dunkirk and it continued as a main smuggling entrepot
despite the interruptions of War.78 The damage inflicted
on tea smuggling by the Commutation Act did not undermine
Dunkirk's position, which depended more on the illicit
trade in spirits than it ever did on tea.
The local authorities in Dunkirk were aware of how
important smuggling was to the town. In 1777 the Receiver
of the ferme at Calais arrested Thomas Kyte, captain of
La Libert, for having two sets of papers, one clearing
the ship's cargo for Lisbon, and the other for Calais.
The official believed Kyte planned to run goods on some
other part of the French coast. Messrs Gamba and Archdeacon,
a well established company, petitioned the Dunkirk Chamber
of Commerce on Kyte's behalf,explaining the nature of their
business as suppliers to the smugglers.High duties and
prohibitions had led to illicit importation into England,
and contraband was brought to Dunkirk for loading aboard
the smugglers. Once cargoes had left Dunkirk, they were
shipped along the coast to Calais road, where an English
ship took on the goods. Captains like Kyte had to carry
two sets of papers, one to avoid complications with the
French authorities, and the other to produce if they were
boarded by the British revenue cruisers.79
When an American privateer, the Surprise, sailed out
of Dunkirk in the guise of a smuggler, it caused serious
embarrassment. Britain and France were not yet at war,
and the French were still considering how best to respond
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to the American war. Gustavus Conyngham, commander of
the Surprise, returned with a prize, the Prince of Orange
packet, much to the annoyance of the freetraders:
The smugglers at Dunkirk were exceedingly
offended with the bringing of the packet into
that port. They said it would occasion some
English frigate or armed vessels to be stationed
off that port, which would greatly obstruct
their trade; and a desperate quarrel ensued
between them and the crew of the American
privateer which had brought in the packet.
Conyngham and his crew were briefly imprisoned and after
that the Dunkirk merchants provided passports for the
smugglers to facilitate their operations.8° In October
1778 the French Admiralty issued an edict intended to bring
the English and Irish seaman under stricter control.
Smuggling ships were to be stripped of all armaments, crews
were not to number more than 15, and there was to be no
attempt to disguise their ports of origin. Only the captains
and mates would be allowed ashore and French officials
were to inspect the vessels as they lay in the harbour.
The Prince de Robecq questioned the new regulations on
humanitarian and practical grounds. The smugglers had
nowhere to cook or sleep on board, and the guard on the
town gate, reduced from 40 to 12, was too small to prevent
them entering the town as they pleased. There was a real
fear that if too many impediments were placed in the way
of the contraband traders both smugglers and their suppliers
would leave Dunkirk and operate from Ostend and Flushing.81
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There were already 30 smuggling ships using Flushing,
mounting between 12 and 24 cannon.82 The earlier French
brandy selling expeditions were successful because the
commanders backed each other up and had the weapons and
manpower needed to confront the Customs cruisers. Their
English counterparts soon adopted similar tactics; cutters
would sail out of harbours on the south coast carrying
enough crew to go fishing and then hover off the coast,
waiting to take on extra men to provide a defence against
boarding parties if the ship was intercepted. These
additional crewmen were put off before entry into port
on the return crossing.83
By mid-century the smugglers were commissioning vessels
which were larger and more heavily armed than most of those
in the employ of the revenue services. Robert Martin's
Princess Mary, stationed at Coichester, had six carriage
guns and two swivels. After some extension work in 1747,
she displaced 81 tons. Within a few months of the
modifications, Martin reported a smuggling sloop launched
at Folkestone, 'which according to the Dimensions I have
had of her, She is full as big as the Princess Mary. . .and
is Mounted with Six Carriage and Thirty two Swivell Guns.'
Another sloop, still under construction at the Folkestone
yard, was thought to be even bigger, and its completion
would mean there were 12 armed smugglers working along
the Kent and Sussex coasts, 'against which force all the
Sloops your Honours have in the Service will not be able
to Contend.' 84
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Brandy, gin and tea were the main items brought back
from the continental warehouses, but there was also a
thriving trade in tobacco, a feature of both the French
and British	 contraband trades. Merchants could deprive
the revenue in two ways, fraud at the ports of entry, and
fictitious exportation, enabling them to claim drawback.
Prior to the Acts of Parliament of 1699 and 1713 there
were no checks as to what happened to tobacco condemned
as unfit for use. It was a simple strategem to bribe the
officials to reject it, in which case no duties were paid,
and then have the consignment taken away for future sale.
The 1713 Act specified that all condemned tobacco had to
be burnedd85 Underweighing, another practice requiring
official collaboration, required strict surveillance of
the landwaiters, assuming there were honest supervisors
available. Fictitious exports were an equally intractable
problem, the legitimate and fraudulent trades being so
closely intertwined. It was unusual for the original
importers to attempt relandings themselves, instead, once
the drawback was paid, the hogsheads of tobacco were sold
off to smaller dealers who secured clearances for export
to Ostend, Dunkirk, the Channel Isles and the Isle of Man.
Exports to Dunkirk and Ostend increased fourfold in the
first half of the century, reaching a peak of 3,700,000
lbs per annum in the 1740s.86
Much of this tobacco was afterwards smuggled into the
rest of France, where their was a monopoly exercised by
the Ferme. It was either moved overland, or shipped to
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the manufacturies at Morlaix and St Omer. Dunkir]c was a
convenient centre for preparing tobacco brought over from
Britain and then sent back. Factories at Both Dunkirk
and Ostend used implements and machines sent over from
England to ensure their packets resembled those on sale
here; they even carried the imprints of well known London
tobacconists.	 The port	 was also frequented by 60 ton
Irish cutters, their arrival timed to coincide with imports
from London.	 Each vessel would load between 30 and 50
hogsheads, broken down into 100 lb packages. Provided
with false bills of lading, naming Bilbao merchants as
the recipients, the smugglers sailed down the Channel,
selling some of their contraband along the English coast.
Bantry Bay was the eventual destination, where the tobacco
was unloaded and dispersed. Every seaman traded a hogshead
or two on his own account, making it a profitable form
of employment. The ships' superstructures were altered
frequently, reducing the chances of recognition by the
revenue cruisers, and when it was thought a cutter had
been used too long, 'they insure them for the full value
and run them ashore when light and so wrong the insurers.'87
Such was Dunkirk's importance as a smuggling emporium,
it retained its status as a free port throughout the ancien
r 'gime, even though this broke the tobacco monopoly in
France. A 600% duty on all foreign leaf coming into the
territory of the Ferme, imposed in 1749, had serious
repercussions for the port. Virginia leaf could still be
brought in duty free, but it became prohibitively expensive
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in the adjoining regions and more effective checks were
in place to restrict illicit sales in France. A number
of manufacturers moved to Ostend and Nieuport, while those
who remained concentrated on building up Dunkirk's share
of the contraband trade with Britain.88
Running tobacco from Guernsey and Jersey into France
was in progess as early as 1677. The Bretons and Normans
further developed their taste for Virginia tobacco when
privateers brought in English merchantmen on their return
from the Chesapeake. In the same period, cadet branches
of noble families in Brittany organised expeditions to
the Channel Islands trading wines and brandy for tobacco
and by the end of the century the Intendant at Caen was
complaining about smuggled leaf entering Normandy.89
The British government's effort to install more revenue
officers in 1708 collapsed before the Islanders' threat
to abandon privateering if there was any more interference
in their other commercial ventures. The Riding Officers
and boatmen already appointed by the Board of Customs,
had to be removed. When the war ended, the quantities of
tobacco coming into the Islands were stepped up until the
warehouses there were reckoned to hold sufficient stocks
to meet local needs more than ten times over.90 By 1732
there were 25 vessels running wines, spirits, tea, soap
and textiles from Guernsey, Jersey and Alderney across
to England. Tobacco, wool and cash were sent in exchange
and to satisfy French requirements. One observer noted
how, 'the Islanders in General, from a very mean Originall,
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are grown very Wealthy, and on a Modest compilation have
200 Vessels engaged in the Contraband Trade, twenty or
thirty setting out at a time.' As young men came into their
estates, so they were promptly selling land to raise the
capital needed for building new warehouses for wines and
spirits, 'and they look upon everyone who has it in his
power and does not - follow this Method of Trade to be
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Slothfull and Stupid.
When they reached the English coast, the smuggling ships
were met by gangs of up to a hundred men, waiting to assist
in running the goods. Smuggling out of the Channel Islands
was already extensive and becoming more complex by the
l730s. Along the coasts of Dorset, Devon and Cornwall
the masters of barques and sloops bided their time at the
village 'Tipling Houses' waiting to hire out to 'the Gangs
of Smugglers from the Inland Counties.' The object was
to acquire contraband cargoes from Guernsey and Alderney.
Tea was brought in from Ostend, Holland, Zealand and London,
where it was purchased at the East India Company auctions
and fictitiously exported. Brandy was bought at Bordeaux,
Nantes and Charante, some of it originating from as far
away as Provence. An estimated 630,000 gallons were smuggled
into England each year and the Islands' coopers could not
keep up with the demand so that casks and barrels had
to be imported from St Malo. 92
The Islands were also a centre for the illicit wine
trade. Ships masters would obtain permits allowing them
to transport wine along the coast from one English port
to another. Once out of harbour they would set course for
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Guernsey, take on a cargo of French wine and bring it in
under cover of the original coastal clearance. Another
stratagem was to use barrels 'with double heads and
partitions in the middle.' A normal inspection would have
indicated the barrels were full of wine, but the inner
container was filled with water, later to be replaced either
in Guernsey or when the smuggler rendezvoused with another
ship in the Channel. Since the documentation was in order,
the contraband wine could be imported without complications;
port officials were often encouraged to expedite the
proceedings. An Act passed in 1720 provided compensation
for importers who surrendered spoilt wines to the revenue
officers. The merchant would receive whatever he had paid
for the cargo and the cost of freight. The outcome was
predictable. Soured wines were stored in warehouses in
Ireland, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands so that
enterprising traders might take advantage of the Crown's
generosity, there being no means of authenticating the
figures presented by the merchants.93
Since the abandonment of neutrality in 1689, Anglo-French
conflicts had brought both opportunities and complications
for the Islands. Peter Raban maintains that 'trade,
privateering and smuggling cannot be separated. . .the leading
Guernsey merchant families were deeply involved in all
three activities.' The contraband trade helped provide
the capital needed for 'the pump-priming capital required
for an aggressive war against French commerce' while at
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the same time, in order to acquire goods for the English
market, 'the Islanders had of necessity to trade directly
or indirectly with the enemy and thus sustain the very
economy which their own privateers were intent on damaging.'
War did not entail severance of business contacts. Banking,
mercantile and insurance business continued throughout
the Seven Years War, and in the previous conflict the
Islands' fishermen had kept the Spaniards supplied with
dry salted cod, much preferrred to the green fish available
fron St Malo and Brest.94 Increased vigilance on both sides,
and the prize-hunting proclivities of navy commanders and
privateersmen certainly made life more difficult for the
smugglers, but war brought readjustments rather than retreat.
In October 1757, Francis de la Combe reminded Thomas Priaulx,
a leading merchant and smuggler on Guernsey, that as yet
there was no Act of Parliament forbidding the entry of
French goods into the Channel Islands, and that if they
were certified as prize goods, they could be sold to
merchants from the British mainland. Joint privateering
ventures with merchants from Falmouth, Plymouth, Topsham
and Dartmouth, and the sale of prizes there, enabled Priaulx
to consolidate his smuggling enterprise in that area,
recruiting local agents to collect orders and gather up
debts. Priaulx's family ties with the Le Merchants and
Le Rays meant there was a commercial network with agents
established in the Channel Isles, the West Country, London,
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Rotterdam, and the East India houses in the Baltic. Direct
contacts with France being more hazardous, neutral ships
were employed in bringing in consignments of tea, wines
and brandy, while the capture of cargoes being carried
for the French contributed to the stocks held in the
warehouses on Guernsey and Alderney. Instructions for
the acquisition and shipment of these consignments could
be very specific. One order for Bohea tea, to be bought
at the Copenhagen auction by John and David Brown, included
details on the means of payment, insurance arrangements,
and how the revenue authorities might be dealt with. The
cargo was to be divided between two ships and, 'it will
be proper to fill them up with Deal Boards, and have a
Charter Party drawn for San Sebastian or Bilboa, with Liberty
to the Captain to put in at Alderney, Guernsey or St Malo
to Sell his Deal Boards.' If at all possible, the landing
would be made on Alderney, where there was less prospect
of interception. 95
The Islands' contraband trade was investigated in 1764
and the enquiries revealed a strong element of continuity.
Tea, India goods, rum, brandy, gin and currants were
imported into Guernsey and Alderney, while Jersey provided
the French with wool, molasses, textiles from the Far East,
and wines from Iberia. Between 40 and 45 ships sailed every
year to the Newfoundland fishing banks, taking with them
tea, silks, muslins, calicoes, India goods, linens, woolens,
molasses and 'all sorts of wines.' English ships bound
for New England and Quebec would stop off in the Islands
to load goods.96 Profiting from French wartime difficulties
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the Da'nes, Swedes and Dutch were supplying the Channel
Isles with tea, while ruin was brought directly from the
West Indies.9 In 1767 Thomas Bates assessed the extent
of the smuggling trade and the cost to the Crown in terms
of lost revenue. 600 tons of tea were brought in from France,
Holland and Scandinava for illicit sales in Britain and
Ireland, and 600,000 gallons of assorted spirits, originating
from France, Spain, Holland and Guadeloupe:
The Balance of Trade in favour of France from Jersey
only, respecting the Illicit Trade from that Island
to Newfoundland by carrying from thence the Produce
and Manufactory of France and what is made use
of in the said Island cannot Amount to less than
One Hundred Thousand pounds Sterling which is paid
out of the next proceeds of the Fish they bring
from Newfoundland to Europe.
400-500 tons of tobacco were brought into Guernsey and
Alderney each year having been taken into ports on the
mainland and drawback secured before re-exportation.
Bates reckoned the Crown was losing nearly £600,000 a year
as a consequence of the contraband trade, failing to grasp
the fact that effective prevention would simply have
displaced the smugglers' activities to locations where
the authorities were more accommodating. His proposed
solution anticipated the government's response, but lacked
any real appreciation of the difficulties of prevention.
Bates suggested one Customs Riding Officer for Guernsey
and another for Jersey. There should be four patrol boats,
two on Jersey to keep observation on the two piers, and
one each for Guernsey and Alderney. Surveyors and Inspectors
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should be appointed on all three main islands, and the
Guernsey officials were to exercise supervision over the
smaller islands, Sark, Herm and Jethro, where the Guernsey
smugglers planned to transfer their operations, 'should
the Government Omitt. . . ordering them to be Surveyed.'
Particular attention had to be paid to Alderney, 'for there
is above Two thirds as much Smuggling carried on from the
said Island as from Guernsey to Great Britain.' Governor
Le Messurier was Alderney's chief purveyor of contraband
and had claimed he had negotiated a special dispensation
from the attentions of the British Treasury.
Realising that twenty-three men and four boats were
not going to be a sufficient deterrent, Bates revived
a proposal for a revenue cruiser to be be stationed there,
and, 'as dccasion may require, Cruise off of Cherburgh
which wou'd in a great Measure shut up that Port the only
convenient Port in France for the Smugglers from Devonshire,
Dorsetshire & Hampshire to resort to after the Illicit
Trade of the said Islands is Suppressed.'98
The Treasury and the Commissioners of Customs tried
to establish an effective presence in the Islands but met
with popular hostility and constant obstruction from the
authorities on Jersey and Guernsey. When Customs officers
were appointed, no one could be found prepared to administer
the oath of office. On July 15, 1767, Mr Coddington, Register
of Certificates on Guernsey, notified the Board:
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that the Officers of the Customs sent there were
not permitted to Act in any respect, that they
were forcibly hindered from going on board any
Ship or Vessel, Inward or Outward bound, and
obstructed from giving him any Assistance whatsoever
under pretence of their not having taken the Oath
of Office, and that the Royal Court refused, as
well as the Commanding Officer there, to Administer
any Oath except those of Allegiance.99
Food shortages on Jersey served to increase tension and
a crowd forced their way into the Court and obliged the
Governor to approve a list of articles, including the
expulsion of all Customs officers from the Island. The
decrees were posted on every church door, and with a garrison
of 'only about 200 feeble Invalids' , there was no way
of restoring order.' OO Cruisers were sent to the Islands,
but to little effect; the Exeter Collector recommended
'a Sloop of War or Cutters,' be deployed, rather than the
single vessel proposed by Bates, but only two were sent.
TheLord North and the Duke of Graf ton were instructed
to patrol the routes between Guernsey, Alderney and England,
but every attempt to operate in Guernsey itself met with
frustration.	 TheLord North was deliberately rammed by
a local sloop as she entered St Peter Port. Captain James
Major, commander of the Duke of Grafton, was mobbed when
he came ashore, and his life threatened by a crowd numbering
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more than 1000. Major and his crew were later held in the
Castle, accused of pilfering bottles of wine and gin when
they rummaged the Merry Ann. Released from confinement,
Major returned to his ship, but was again mobbed and taken
into custody, having to pay bail to win his release. This
time he went to his Guernsey home, where he was besieged
by a crowd, 'raised by the famous Mr John Brock, a great
Merchant in the Smuggling Way.' The men from the The Duke
of Grafton were brought before the Court, their hands tied
as if they were dangerous felons, but no charges were brought
against them.10'
Major seemed determined
	 on confrontation with the
Guernsey authorities. He seized two French vessels, the
Theresa and the St John de Coursel as they entered St Peter
Port. The Theresa had a cargo of leather, which Major
insisted was from Morocco, and thus contraband, but he
had no means of proving the skins' provenance and the Court
not only ruled the seizure unlawful, but refused any appeal
to the King and awarded damages to Claude Perigaux, the
French master, when he sued. Major was imprisoned 'for
Damages incurred by his Obstinacy and Profligacy in turning
Perigaux and his Crew out of their Bark, and suffering
the Provisions on Board to be wasted, spoiled or plundered
by his People.'	 John Vermont, master of the St John
admitted he was a smuggler and had been chartered to
take a consignment of vinegar from •Caen to Dunkirk and
return with a cargo of tobacco to be delivered in the Bay
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of Caen. There was one bill of lading for delivery at Caen,
'And there was likewise produced another Bill of Lading
Dated the same Day filled up for 61 Bales of Merchandize
to be delivered at Guernsey to the Bearer of the Bill of
Lading.' There were only twenty-six bales left on board
when the St John was boarded, and Vermont produced receipts
for the rest, duly delivered on the French coast. A French
Customs smack had stopped Vermont from disposing of nearly
half his cargo, and he had come to Guernsey to escape
seizure. The Court found this a quite reasonable explanation
and criticised Major for failing to elicit these facts
before confiscating theSt John and its goods. As to their
having treated Captain Major harshly, 'the only hard
Punishment he was condemned to.. .was to Beg Pardon of the
Court And to be put in the Close Cage, not that with Barrs,
for an hour, in the Execution of which, far from escaping
with his Life, he did not receive the least Insult, of
which the most irrefragable[SicJ proof can be Given.' The
Court made it appear that this was linked in with theSt
John episode, but they were deliberately ponfusing different
incidents to minimise their lack of co-operation. Major
was caught between governmental bodies in conflict. His
errors of judgement and tactless efforts to achieve some
kind of recompense gave the Court an opportunity to assert
their independent jurisdiction and to remind London that
central government depended on local administrators to
implement and legitimize policies. The Court acted
voluntarily, and its members were respected figures in
the Guernsey community:
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The Bailiff and Jurats have. . .hitherto served without
Fee, Salary or Reward... they Administer his Majestys
and the publicke Business merely from Loyal and
Patriotick Principles, being Gentlemen whose Families
have long been in the possession of the Publick
Confidence and Esteem and which they have themselves
preserved by their Just, upright and equal
Administration. His Majestys Service and the Public
Weal are equally interested with themselves in the
preservation of their Honor and the Dignity of their
Office, without which it is impossible for them to
Keep and Maintain that Degree of consideration and
influence so necessary to promote Order, reverence
for the Laws and a due Obedience to His Majestys
just Authority vested in their Hands by this
Constitution, 102
Faced with the possibility of renewed war with France,
and the strategic significance of the Channel Isles, the
government abandoned its second attempt to extend the
jurisdiction of the Treasury. The relationship between
central government and local communities was complex and
shifting. Co-operation rested on common interests, shared
social values, and networks of kinship and patronage.
Those in authority had to attend to a range of conflicting
interests and endeavour to maintain social peace. The jurats
of Guernsey and Jersey were themselves interested parties
in the contraband business which had wide popular support.
Withdrawal was more practicable than occupation and
coercion 103
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The Isle of Man was also beyond the jurisdiction of
the British Treasury, and Manx commerce provided
	 parallels
with the Channel Islands. The first Crown officials were
appointed in 1682, encountering irnnuriediate opposition.
Local customs duties, levied on behalf of the Lord of Man,
were a fraction of those collected on the mainland, which
combined with the Island's location made it an ideal entrepot
for the smuggling trade. Efforts to check the movements
of ships and cargoes were vigorously resisted by the
communities whose livelihoods depended on the Island
retaining its privileges. Threatened with arrest if they
tried to search ships in Manx ports, the officers installed
by the Board of Customs could do little more than observe
proceedings, sometimes unable even to report back when
there were only smuggling vessels sailing for the mainland.
Runs on the Lancashire and Cumbrian coasts were so numerous
it was reckoned the preventive men would have needed to
have lined the shore,each man in sight of the next, before
104the landings would be reduced. -
An apologist for the Manxmen maintained it was the
actions of the British government which had made the Island
a smuggling centre. Legitimate merchants had used the
warehousing facilities available at Douglas, Peel, Ramsey,
and Port Erin to avoid the costs of storage on the mainland
and the interest charges amounting when payment of duties
had to await disposal of cargoes. Then the prospect of
cheap liquor and an escape from creditors brought an influx
of 'Broken Merchants and others of Desperate or Low
Fortunes. ,105
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These asylum seekers recognised the Island's potential
as a contraband base, and when new regulations imposed
a ban on exports, except for local produce, fair traders
were driven to smuggling.-43 Reluctant or not, their
businesses prospered; individual dealers bought up entire
shiploads at a time, confident they could dispose of the
goods through their contacts in Britain and Ireland. Tea,
spirits and India goods landed along the Soiway Firth were
carried inland as far as Yorkshire, the armed escorts too
strong for the combined strength of the revenue officers.
Half-anchor casks of wine were unloaded on the Welsh coast
and moved out by strings of pack horses into Cheshire,
Shropshire, Hereford and Gloucester. If the Customs men
did risk boarding the incoming cutters, they were detained
and handed over to the land gangs waiting in the night
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time to receive the shipments.
By 1750 it was estimated that the Duke of Atholl was
receiving £25,000 a year from Customs duties, ten times
as much as his predecessor thirty years before. The Treasury
was thought to be losing £200,000 a year in the 1730s,
£330,000 in 1750, and £500,000 by 1760, when war was
disturbing the contraband routes across the English Channel
and the North Sea. 45 102 S with the Channel Isles, the Isle
of Man drew its supplies from a wide field, and the overall
picture is one of thriving commercial capitalism. Nathan
Carrington, a King's Messenger, visited the Island in 1759.
His main object was to locate munitions of war which might
have ended up in enemy hands, but his report gives a vivid
picture of commercial life in Douglas, Ramsay, Castletown
and Peel:
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The above four Towns are inhabited by people
of all Nations, all of whom have left their
own country for Debt or some other
prosecution & are fal'n into someway of
Trade - with serving of Smuglers with Liquors
or dry India Goods - as everything enters
there Custom free and goes out the same
During the time I was a Douglas I saw four
Dutch Ships come in in two days & landed
there 2300 pipes of Brandy, which they
said were Spanish from Barcelona but a
nice palate could not distinguish it from
French -The Key and the streets were so
crowded with these pipes that it was with
great difficulty that people could get
in at their Doors, All their warehouses
being full before & not having room to
receive them - Many small Vessels from
Ireland, Liverpool, Wales & Scotland came
successively night and day to reduce them-09
A second observer, writing a few months later, held the
Isle of Man responsible for undermining the economies of
the American colonies, promoting the consumption of foreign
brandy instead of 'our own Wholesorn Rum, ' weakening the
British merchant fleet, and financing the French war effort.
At the same time as invasion threatened, French ships were
discharging their cargoes at the Manx ports, followed by
'Cargoes upon Cargoes, brought in by Swedes, Portuguese
& Dutch; the ready Cash, English Money, remitted to
France. 110
Just as James Major ended up imprisoned in the Castle
at St Peter Port, so Captain Dow commander of the Sincerity
revenue cruiser, ran foul of the Manx authorities when
he tried to interfere with smugglers operating in and around
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their island. Dow had taken his ship into Douglas harbour
without incident, but when he tried to leave, in pursuit
of a suspected Dutch smuggler, a crowd gathered on the
pier to prevent his sailing. Urged on by the deemsters,
the Island's chief justices, and local customs officials,
the people held on to the cruiser's mooring ropes until
the Dutchman had moved off. Dow later caught up with the
Hope dogger off Ramsay, but when a boarding party was sent
over they were met by forty armed Manxmen, concealed in
the hold when the Hope was in Douglas. Matthew Christian,
Captain of Ramsay, sent out two boats carrying more armed
men to help the smugglers. Six of Dow's crew were arrested
and four of them spent months in confinement at Castletownr'1
The Hope was carrying a cargo of tea, silks, chintzes,
pepper and India goods worth in the region of £12,000.
The loss of so rich a seizure must have been as painful
for Dow as the incarceration of part of his crew. He later
described Man as the last resort of 'Bankrupts, Thieves,
Rebels and Murtherers. . .late arriv'd to the greatest pitch
of Disaffection to his Majesty and Contempt of the English
Nation.' Captain Foley, visiting the Island the same year,
agreed with Dow. Secure in the protection of the deemsters,
'the smugglers Often assemble themselves together, caballing
and forming Schemes against his Majesty & Government, and
drink his damnation, and all his Royal Issue, and such
like healths; and prosperity and success to the Pretender. 9
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centres at the end of the war, convinced Grenville there
was a need for new measures. Buying out the Duke of Atholl
and bringing the Isle of Man within the jurisdiction of
the Treasury was considered essential. 1 16 £50,000 worth
of contraband was said to be sold in the Island each week
and neither the cruisers patrolling off Man nor the
landguards on the mainlands were proving effective. Setting
up new patrol boats to operate on the Scottish side of
the Soiway Firth was justified by the extent of the trade
from Man.
When it is not proposed that any of the present
Officers or Guards against Smuggling should be
dismissed or reduced, this additional Charge to
the Revenue may appear High, but when the present
State of the Isle of Man, the Wealth and Riches
of the Inhabitants, Their Spirit for Carrying on
the Old, and trying New Branches of Illicit Trade,
the Situation of the Island with respect to Great
Britain, the Great Extent and Nature of our Coasts,
so favourable for Smuggling and the immense loss
the Nation Sustains, are all considered, It is
hoped the Expence will not be thought too Great.117
The Revestment Act was agreed in 1765, the British
government paying £70,000 to the third Duke of Atholl.
A number of smuggling entrepreneurs left Man and settled
in the Channel Isles, developing new links between Guernsey
and the north western coasts of Britain.- The Isle of
Man lost its position as a major entrepot for the smuggling
trade, but the Manxmen continued to hire out their vessels,
transferring goods from larger cutters sailing out of the
continental ports and running them ashore on the mainland.
Before the Act, importing and warehousing the staples of
116
the contraband trade was a legitimate business enterprise.
Eliminating smuggling itself depended on the effectiveness
of prevention. The Manx themselves had developed a taste
for duty-free liquor and local demand provided the stimulus
for illicit importation, then, in the early 1780s, there
were moves towards a more substantial revival of the Island's
role as a smuggling base, described by the Customs officials
in Douglas:
You know Sir, in what audacious manner the Scotch
Smugglers for more than this Year past, have infested
this Island, sometimes landing sometimes transhipping
their Goods within its Ports in order to run them
more easily & safely into Great Britain. The Galloway
Company have their Partners & their Agents settled
here for carrying on this villanous Trade. By these
the Fishermen of the Island are seduced from their
proper Occupation and a great Part have turned
Smuglers as formerly. The Merchants who have engaged
successfully in the Herring Trade complain that
the Fishery is injured by these Smugglers, the
Shop Keepers that they can't find vent for the
Goods they lawfully import & must turn Smugglers
themselves in order to subsist. In short, this
little Commmunity, which was beginning to flourish
in legal Trade & Industry is in danger of Relapsing
into its Pristine State and the Object of Government
in purchasing the Island likely to be frustrated.
The Officers on the Island were themselves thwarted in
an attempt to prosecute the Jane, a suspected smuggler,
and her cargo of wine. Since they were prepared to undertake
the case at their own charge, the opposition of the Board
of Customs was hard to understand.ilB
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Focusing attention on the chartered companies, the sale
and transportation of contraband in Europe, and the principle
smuggling entrepots, brings out the fact that smuggling
was an organised business. Population growth, an improved
standard of living, changing patterns of consumption, and
the government's continuing dependence on duties, all served
to underpin the contraband trade. Bigger ships, heavier
armaments, more men and larger cargoes, meant higher initial
expenditure in the later period, but Cal Winslow's definition
of smuggling as 'a defence of the local economy, as against
the development of commercial capitalism', becomes harder
to accept the more closely the free trade is examined.
There were not many 'good and worthy "social criminals"
hermetically sealed off from other kinds of crime, and
even fewer smugglers operating outside the network of
commercial enterprises and personal contacts through which
the illicit market was coordinated.119
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Chapter Two
Criminality, Corruption and Collusion.
The eighteenth-century preventive services.
I
Positions and Promotions; Patronage and the Revenue Services.
Customs were collected as goods were brought into or
taken out of the country, while excise duties were imposed
on both domestic produce and certain specified imports,
such as tea, coffee and chocolate. Walpole's Excise Bill,
proposed in 1733, was for an extension of the existing scheme
to include tobacco and wines. The tax was paid when goods
were removed from bonded warehouses, but both Customs and
Excise officers had a responsibility to prevent smuggling.
Excise procedures were less complex, and there were fewer
opportunites for officials to exact additional fees and
gratuities, but it was high duties which provided the main
incentive to smuggle, not the methods of assessment and
collection.
Reporting to the Parliamentary Committee in 1783, the
Revenue Commissioners expressed the view that their 'Inland
Establishment' was 'calculated rather to detect Frauds than
to resist Violence' and could manage little 'beyond the
detection of small illicit Importations and Exportations
attempted by Merchant Vessels or by the Coasting Trade.'-
The Customs were taken out of farm in 1671 and the Excise
in 1683; both branches were supervised by central Boards
whose Commissioners were subject to the authority of the
Treasury. Positions in the	 revenue services were often
the only government appointments in the outports and officials
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were entrusted with a range of administrative tasks, including
their policing role against the smugglers, but the collection
of duties and the regulation of trade remained the priorities.
A system of dual control was established in every port,
the Collector received the duties while the Comptroller
kept an account of all monies; neither had independent access
to the King's chest, where all payments were kept. The cocket,
an official seal providing clearance for outward cargoes,
was also made up of two halves, each in the charge of one
of the chief officers. The Searcher was the third patent
officer in a port, checking loadings and that cargoes on
board corresponded with the goods listed on the manifest.
The Collector was also responsible for the other officers
in the port, the Tide Surveyors, Tidewaiters, Coastwaiters,
Landwaiters and Riding Officers. Tidewaiters, or Tidesmen,
were boarded on inward and outward bound vessels to prevent
goods being run ashore; the number varied between two and
eight, according to the nature and value of the cargo. The
Tide Surveyors decided which men should go aboard and
inspected the ships to make sure they were still on duty.
The Landwaiters supervised the unloading of cargoes from
overseas, and the Coastwaiters dealt with goods shipped
from one home port to another. Riding Officers patrolled
the coasts, reported sightings of smuggling gangs, and liaised
with the military detatchments sent in aid of the revenue.
They came under the authority of the Collectors and the
Surveyors-General, men like John Collier and Major Battine,
given overall charge of the Riding Officers for Kent and
Sussex respectively.
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There were also the coal-meters, appointed to collect duties
from the colliers delivering cargoes in London and the
outports, boatmen, providing a waterguard along the shore,the
crews of the revenue cruisers, and casual workers taken
on as tidesmen or weighers during busy periods.2
There was a clear hierarchical structure and established
bureaucratic procedures; Collectors answered to the Board,
directed the other officers working in the port, and liaised
between the Commissioners and the cruiser commanders. Aware
of the structure and objectives of the system, Elizabeth
Hoon is highly critical of departures from codes of practice
and departmental regulation, in particular, the interference
with the Commissioners' powers of appointment and the survival
of patent offices which had become simple sinecures.3 These
were impediments to departmental efficiency but the eighteenth
century was a period of transition as the machinery of central
government was distanced from the workings of aristocratic
patronage. John Brewer challenges claims that the primary
purpose of the executive branch was, 'to provide outdoor
relief for the political classes' and that the civil service
was undermined by ' a political culture which subordinated
administrative skill to the operation of a thriving system
of clientage and graft.'4 Even so, networks facilitate the
workings of modern bureaucracies, overcoming departmental
isolation and linking the political and administrative
sectors of government; in the eighteenth century patronage,
clientism and nepotism provided the means of coordinating
the various branches of government, maintaining the essential
connections between the centre and the provinces. Rulers
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and ruled were aware of how the system operated. Without
exchanges of favours, practical support for clients and
kin, and a pragmatic approach to laws and regulations,
administration would have broken down. There was no large
pool of literate and numerate persons available to staff
the growing bureaucracy and no means of enforcing provisions
for training and qualification. Newer departments, such
as the Excise, provided clearer career structures for their
employees but they still had to try and reconcile the needs
of the service with the availability of suitable recruits
and the pressures of patrons.5 Criticisms of the Customs
can assume a greater potential for bureaucratic order than
was in fact the case. The rule against appointing local
men and the requirement that officers be regularly removed
as a safeguard against familiarity with smugglers and other
traders, proved impracticable.
When vacancies arose, candidates sought to enlist the
support of appropriate patrons. Direct approaches to those
in high office were unusual, but applicants were well aware
of the existence and functioning of elite networks; which
of the neighbouring gentry had connections with county and
regional magnates, the influence wielded by government
ministers, and the extent of the authority exercised by
local officials. There was also a keen appreciation of
the power of the vote in a constituency with a restricted
franchise.
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Securing a position in the revenue service could well
depend on chosing the right intermediaries. Learning one
of the Riding Officers was terminally ill, Richard Huntley
wrote to John Fuller, a major landowner in West Sussex,
asking to be recommended to Newcastle as a suitable
applicant, 'as I am inform'd tis in his Gift I Dont Dout
but I shall stand a very good Chance for the place.' Huntley
reminded Fuller of his support at the last election, and
pledged his family's votes to Stephen Fuller at the next.9
The problem for Huntley was that the Fullers saw themselves
as commanding their own political power base, and there
were underlying tensions between them and the Pelhams and
'Mad Jack' Fuller had lead the Tory opposition against
Newcastle in the Sussex elections of 1734.10
As Lord Treasurer, Newcastle could issue Treasury
Commissions appointing officials over the heads of the
revenue Boards, but there were understandings between the
magnates regarding their respective spheres of influence.
The Duke of Dorset, as Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports,
appointed his own port officials and was also consulted
over positions in the Kent Customs service. William Solly,
Collector at Sandwich, was fearful his backing for Sir
Robert Walpole's preferred candidates in the general election
would lose him his office when the Peihams took control.
He wrote to John Collier, Newcastle's political agent at
Hastings as well as Surveyor-General, desiring his
intercession. Collier informed 5o1iy that following a recent
'remarkable' appointment of one of 'their interest' to
131
a Customs post in Romney Marsh, the Pelhams 'had made
assurance to the Duke of Dorset not to interfere in Kent.' 11-
Dorset took a close interest in the administration of his
patronage. In November 1733, Solomon Sparkes the younger
was supposed to take over from his father as Riding Officer
at Hythe, but Sir George Oxenden the Sandwich MP and himself
in Treasury employ, refused to sign the warrant, insisting
the position was reserved for John Redsole. The matter
was submitted to Dorset, rather than the Board, and Sparkes
the elder was superannuated, his son appointed to Hythe,
and Redsole found a place at Folkestone.12 The same year,
Dorset was being advised to assert his influence with the
Sandwich Custom House if he wanted to retrieve his political
position in the Isle of Thanet. The loss of trading
privileges at Margate and Ramsgate 'had given the other
party an opportunity of gaining ground very considerably.'
If the Sandwich officials were to come over to Thanet,
then foreign goods could again be landed, to the benefit
of local merchants and tradesmenJ3
It was in the period leading up to the 1741 elections
that Solly felt he had put his position at risk, particularly
through his opposition to Oxenden's election. Those employed
in the Customs were banned from participating in election
campaigns but the rule was unrealistic, since the employees
of the revenue services could be a substantial proportion
of the electorate in the outports. Events in East Kent
showed just how active was the involvement of some of the
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officials. Oxenden had dismissed Thomas Paramour from his
position as a Riding Officer and a relative was so incensed
he was threatening to spend £3000 to deny Oxenden the
Sandwich seat.'4 A fortnight later Oxenden was reported
treating the freemen of Deal:
Mr Hayton the Surveyor & Dan 1 Brown, Boatman,
got a Rabble of Seamen with abt 20 Musketts
& went at the Head to Meet Sir George. Rails
like a Devil at the Ministry & wou'd (had not
Mr Carr, Collector hindred him) have displayed
the Customhouse Flags.15
Solly felt that if some means could be found to remove
Oxenden from his office, it would achieve far more than
'a riding officers Employ For Mr Tho 5 Paramour.' Sir George
had convinced the Deal officers he had the authority to
appoint and dismiss, and the prospects were that the Customs
establishment in the port would support him.16
Carteret Leathes, MP for Harwich, was also concerned
with the balance of power within his constituency. A leader
of the Post Office group, he was keen to extend his interest
to the Custom house. His failure to reinstate two of the
Tide Surveyors had 'occasioned a very cold greeting from
my friends here' and a third Harwich officer had been
superannuated to make room for a nominee of John Cornelius,
the General Surveyor at Ipswich. 'If the Collector and
Mr Cornelius succeed, the figure I shall make here will
be so contemptible that I must leave the whole management
of the Corporation to them.'-7
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The deferential forms of address, and the extent of
the patronage wielded by the great magnates, can sometimes
obscure the reciprocal nature of relationships within the
networks of interest. John Collier's standing within the
Hastings elite was such that he could promise 'to keep
every thing quiet in the Town and to discourage any
opposition' to the Duke of Newcastle's candidates. Provided
Collier was assured of an office in the Customs bringing
in £100, 'you will have him entirely in your Interest at
Hastings and everywhere else. ' Forty years later, Newcastle
was reminded of the practicalities of clientage when he
tried to exert pressure on Edward M±lward, Collier's son-
in-law and the dominant figure in Hastings affairs. The
Duke had resigned from the Treasury and Milward was not
prepared to support Newcastle's nominee against Bute's
in the elections. Customs officers made up the majority
of voters and Milward was both Collector and Surveyor-
General. When Newcastle considered the creation of an
opposition group among the jurats he was reminded that
Milward had 'a clear majority of Interest in the Corporation
and no publick Corporation affairs can be done without
his approbation. '18
Constructing	 and	 consolidating	 political	 alliances,
establishing reputations, saving face and winning votes
all played a part in filling vacancies. So did simple
humanity. Thomas Washer was recommended as a Riding Officer
for Seaford in 1719. Thirty years later Washer requested
Newcastle that he might resign in favour of his son, his
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daughter-in--law being 'very sickly and not Able to go through
the farming business.' Nicholas Russell was 'out of all
business' with a family to support and Nicholas Tanner,
a former ships master, of good repute was 'reduced to low
Circumstances and being more than fifty years of Age is
hardly able to endure the hardships of the Seas any Longer
But very fitt for a Riding Officer' or any post in the
service 19
According to Hoon,
	
'Any survey of the system of
appointment leads to only one conclusion: it was open to
abuse at every turn, and efficiency suffered accordingly.'2°
The implication is that extensive organizational reform
was both desirable and feasible. Measured against ideal
models of administrative structures, eighteenth-century
governmental institutions had their shortcomings. 21 The
weaknesses of the Customs service were apparent to
contemporary observers, but they also realised that patronage
and clientage were an important part of the social fabric.
Interference with the established and legitimate exercise
of influence in one area could well have provoked a wider
withdrawal from public life by members of the propertied
elite. Nor was it only members of the upper echelons who
had clienteles; there were 200 Tidesmen in the Port of
London and another 1100 'glutmen' taken on as needed; this
reserve of casual labour was described as the patronage
of the 'Inspectors of the River and Surveyors of Customs.'22
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As one of the Customs Commissioners, Sir William Musgrave
could write with authority on the deficiencies of revenue
officers, but he failed to acknowledge that the Collectors'
disciplinary powers were limited; even the dismissal of
a crewman from a Customs cutter required the Board's
approval. 23 Neither were the Collectors and other officials
in the outports necessarily dependent on their salaries
and fees as government officials. John Collier was unusual
in the range of his activities but his close involvement
in local affairs was not. These men would not have denied
the importance of computational skills and knowledge of
the relevant statutes and regulations, but they had to
apply the laws with discretion. Accepting a composition
made far better sense than leaving a smuggler in a debtors'
prison while his family went on the parish, and smugglers
themselves were voters, dependents, employees and partners.
Loss of reputation is seen as the strongest safeguard against
abuse of trust and opportunism in modern business networks.
Similar considerations would have applied in the eighteenth
century, where legitimate and illicit trade were interlocked.
For the smugglers, broken promises and unpaid debts meant
loss of business; for influential patrons and local
dignitaries, withdrawal of support in time of need meant
loss of face. In Newcastle's papers, smugglers seeking
pardons feature almost as often as frequently as candidates
for office. In both instances, intervention was seen as
a way of creating and sustaining goodwill in local
communities, the key to effective government.
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II
Community Policing; Accommodating the Smugglers
Peter King cautions against any approach to eighteenth-century
government which assumes a general respect for the law:
Attitudes to the law were complex, and in any
specific situation they were contingent upon the
degree to which legal sanctions and the methods
used to enforce them coincided with notions of what
was acceptable, or at least tolerable to the interest
group concerned. Individuals and communities were
highly selective in their approach to the law and
its institutions, taking advantage of, assenting
to or revering certain parts, while attempting to
ignore, flaunt, or oppose others.24
Those responsible for law enforcement also exercised their
discretion; policing by consent may stem from communitarian
ideals or the inability to apply systematic coercion. Either
way, it is not the simple implementation of the criminal
code. Douglas Hay's portrayal of the ruling elite using
the law to consolidate the interests of property through
a carefully balanced diet of retribution and
magnanimity,requires that offenders appear before the courts
in the first place.25
Collusive seizure, whereby smugglers and revenuemen
reached an arrangement as to what goods were to be
surrendered, and which sections of the law were to be applied,
was strictly forbidden by the Commissioners. The officers
were more pragmatic. In 1783 new contracts were drawn up
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for the Customs cruisers which included a ban on collusion.
Captain Fisher of the Yarmouth based Hunter protested at
this slight on the reputation of the service, but added
that their purpose was to prevent illicit trade, and this
was managed as well when the smugglers gave up their cargoes
peaceably. Fisher's crew had earlier refused an engagement
with a smuggling lugger on the grounds that there was no
provision for them or thcir families if they were killed
or crippled.26
Seizures could be very profitable, and after 1783 the
cruisers were supposed to be funded from the proceeds, but
there were often complications. The Exchequer Court had
to rule on the legality of the arrest, aggrieved merchants
might sue for redress, and the Commissioners could be slow
in meeting the costs of prosecution. The Board paid for
the replacement of masts, rigging and cables, if they had
been cut free to save the ship, but damages sustained in
the pursuit of smugglers were the responsibility of the
contractors. 27 Keeping a large revenue cutter in a seaworthy
state was expensive in itself; John Sharp, a former commander,
maintained that repairs to three cruisers had cost £5000,
'a Sum sufficient for the Completion of Six New Cutters'
of the design he favoured. Before risking harm to his ship,
a commander had to be sure his quarry was a smuggler, that
it was sailing within the limits of a port, and that he
could effect capture. As Captain Fisher made clear, a partial
seizure managed peacably was preferable to loss of life
sustained trying to bring in the contraband, the cutters
and their crews.28
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Warren Lisle was a former commander of the Weymouth sloop
and his duties included the inspection of the Customs vessels
from Portsmouth to Lands End. He was convinced that corruption
and collusion was occurring along much of the south coast.
The commanders and mates on the four cutters patrolling
from St Alban's Point to Berry Head, 'agree with the smugglers
and content themselves with a small share' of the
contraband. 29 Thomas Wellard, Isaac Pearce and Peter Vellack,
the captain and owners of the Happy-Go-Lucky, told the
Governor of Guernsey the reason Wellard had opened fire
on the Hawk, was that Captain Douglas 'had refused to accept
the terms that had been offered him for suffering the said
Thomas Wellard to smuggle goods.'3° A resident in Boulogne
in the l730s stated it was well known that whenever a cruiser
caught a smuggler:
he takes only about two thirds of the cargo
and leaves the other one third to go on with
that trade; and never seizes the vessel, wisely
considering for himself that if the vessels
were all confiscated the owlers would lose their
commission as their being no occasion for them.31
The same point was made in 1783, when it was noted that
despite a fleet of 56 cruisers, seizures were 'of an
inconsiderable Amount and there is too much Reason to believe
that a Proportion even of that small Amount arises from
Collusion between the Smugglers and Revenue Officers'.32
Five years later one of Pitt's correspondents, considering
the failure to bring in the smuggling cutters, while managing
to take their goods, asked whether it was to be expected
'they should wish to put a stop to that from which they
draw such an yearly benefit?'33
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The outporc records from East Anglia confirm that collusive
seizures were a regular practice. Cyprian Bridge, commanding
the Argus out of Harwich, made two seizures off Southwold
in 1775. The masters of the smuggling vessels, a 50 ton
lugger and a 75 ton cutter, told Bridge they were prepared
to surrender their goods provided no attempt was made to
take the ships. Bridge did not feel it was necessary to
try and conceal the fact that he had reached an accommodation
with the smugglers.34 Later in the year a boarding party
from the Bee was forced to quit a smuggling cutter, leaving
their weapons behind. These were returned five days later
by the master of a fishing smack who had met up with George
Campbell, the cutter's captain, at Dunkirk. Campbell had
declared it was the intention of all the smugglers landing
goods on the east coast to destroy the Bee and her crew
at the earliest opportunity. They did not believe the Bee's
captain had a deputation to stop and seize, and the Harwich
Collector had been informed:
the Commanders and Mates of some of the Revenue
Vesels upon this coast, jealous of the Bee, have
taken this Method to render her unsuccessful.
We have made Captain Bridge acquainted with this,
but he strnuously denies having ever mentioned
her to the Smugglers but as having equal authority
to seize as his own vessel.
Yet Campbell had said he would have surrendered immediately
if a party from the Argus had boarded his cutter. Reporting
this episode, the Collector stressed the need to confiscate
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the carriers as well as the contraband 'for all the smugglers
confess they would rather lose three cargoes than one vessel.
We always insist officers do seize the vessels and boats.
The contrary practice is the way some officers get money.'35
Faced with the new form of contract in 1783 Cyprian Bridge
left the service of the Customs and took command of the
Prince of Orange packet.36
Bridge was not alone in making collusive seizures and
the smugglers expected to arrive at such compromises. When
the Aldeburgh Customs cruiser rammed and boarded a cutter,
the crew ' earnestly entreated the mate of the smack to
take the goods on condition he would not seize the cutter'
even offering to transfer the tea themselves. The master
of a wherry stopped on the River Orwell offered to hand
over half his spirits to the Customs boatmen and faced
with having to fight for the lot, they agreed.37
William Haggis, mate and later commander of the Argus,
exposed the corruption among the Bawdsey officers, stationed
at the mouth of the Deben. Harris had taken a boat ashore
and encountered a party of fifty smugglers loading cup a
consignment of contraband:
As they advanced towards them, the Bawdsey
Officers came from amongst the Smugglers and
went down to the Boat which part of the Argus's
crew were unloading, and endeavoured to prevent
them, telling them that they had seized her
and the goods in her before the landing of the
Argus ' S people.
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Haggis was 'much wounded in the head and face' in the ensuing
fracas, but it was night time and the blows could have come
from the smugglers, the Bawdsey officers, or his own men.
Henry Davies, the Harwich Collector, considered it strange
that the same smugglers who had fought off 'sixteen stout
fellows of the Argus well armed,' should have tamely
surrendered their goods to five unarmed Bawdsey boatmen.38
Paul Rock describes the law as two-faceted. 'Gallows
confessions, legal statutes, jurisprudence and judicial
pronouncements emphasised the magnitude of the divide which
separated the wicked from the good' but the process of law
enforcement, and	 the adaptations necessitated by the
practicalities of policing, made for a murkier reality:
The consequences of law were eminently negotiable.
Legal penalties and inducements combined to
create an equivocal, malleable scheme which
could be exploited by the knowing. . .Justice
came to resemble a market place in which an
elaborate trading economy developed. The moral
and the immoral, the regulated and the regulator,
came to be utterly entangled in one another.39
The practice of collusive seizure might be used to illustrate
the entanglement of regulators and regulated, but the process
was not necessarily amoral. Fiscal and economic policy
objectives could be partially achieved through co-operation
and reciprocal arrangements between officers and smugglers;
lives might even have been saved as a result. Kingts emphasis
on the element of choice, whether to obey the law or to
ignore it, to apply it fully or selectively, should be set
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alongside Rock's picture of law-breakers and law-enforcers
so enmeshed in each others activities as to lose all sense
of distinction. This could happen, and former smugglers
employed by the revenue services were sometimes alert to
the opportunities open to them. But for many officials it
was a matter of attaining the best outcomes possible within
the framework of regulations, statutes, customary usages
and available resources.
This was the case with compositions. The penalty for
running contraband, provided the culprits were unarmed and
offered no resistance to the officers, was a penalty three
times the duty and a fine, imposed by the magistrates or
the Court of the Exchequer. In the event of a substantial
seizure where there were few arrests, those caught could
find themselves owing thousands of pounds to the Crown with
no prospect of ever paying off the debt. Detaining an
impoverished smuggler for an indefinite period in a debtors'
prison was in no ones interests, unless the prisoner's
associates were to come forward with the money. The man's
family would have to seek parish relief, he had to be provided
for, and the Crown had to be content with its share of the
proceeds arising from the auction of the seizure. Allowing
compositions, reduced penalties paid to the officers, had
several advantages: court appearances could be avoided,
prisoners released to support their families and remove
a burden from the poor rates, and Collectors enhanced their
local standing if they supported applications to compound.
The system was open to abuse, offenders falsely pleading
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dire poverty and officers using the threat of proceedings
• to extort further payments for the same offence.40 However,
the reports sent to the Commissioners and the Treasury show
the revenue authorities were generally well informed as
to the extent of the prisoners' involvement in the trade
and how much they or their associates could afford as a
composition. The lists of smugglers imprisoned for debt
in 1729 show that many of them were poor, with no prospect
of finding the hundreds, and sometimes thousands of pounds
they owed. William King's debt was in excess of £10,000,
but he was described as 'very poor.' The families of Richard
Poorman and George Carter were on the parish. Peter King,
John Hill, Richard Chapman, Thomas Vaughn and Richard Roots
were all reckoned to be without means of payment, but were
considered potential informants. Yet among the farm servants
and mariners appear some men of substance. There were ship's
captains, farmers 'worth £500', a Customs officer and James
Carent, 'A Surgeon & Man midwife and a Maister, tis believed
he is worth money.' John Maltus, held in Norwich Castle,
owed £5,000 for owling wool and the Barons of the Exchequer
were considering transportation if there was no effort to
pay. Joseph Vaines, a prisoner in the Fleet, held a number
of houses by copyhold, none of which could be taken to pay
his debts.41 John Carbold was to end his smuggling career
on the gallows, but at one stage he was negotiating with
the Yarmouth Collector through an intermediary:
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Mr Forster. . .who is a man of fair character
having been with us on behalf of Carbold, he
alledges that he is an industrious fellow &
that he is fully satisfyed if this affair is
made up that the man can return to his family
he will entirely forsake the gang as he has
a prospect of a competent maintenance by the
public house, but if he has not the good fortune
to succeed therein, he must return to smuggling
for a support, as he cannot publickly appear
to follow any other employment.
Forster offered to pay ten pounds composition and Samuel
Jacombe reckoned it was as much as Carbold could afford;
'if the man sincerely intends to forsake smuggling (if
he can secure his freedom) it will lessen the number of
smuglers.' 42 Joseph Jarey claimed his wife and children
'were in a starving naked condition' following his
confinement in Bury gaol. The vicar, churchwardens and
overseers of his parish all confirmed this, but the Collector
was opposed to accepting a small composition. Mr Baker
suggested that the same friends who had set Jarey up as
a publican could come up with a sum sufficient to satisfy
the Revenue and secure his release. Jane Meadows eked out
a living from a parish house, selling small parcels of
contraband delivered by Solomon Rolfe and William Breame.
Rolfe was new to the business, but his associate had been
handling illicit goods for some years, 'and tho his
circumstances are thought to be very indifferent we believe
he can, or will be enabled to pay twenty pounds.' James
Frances, a journeyman boatman and labourer, had to sell
a pig and his only cow to meet a debt to the Crown.'43
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III
The SDoils of Office
In September, 1776, the Speedwell Customs cutter was at
anchor in Studland Bay when the lugger Good Intent was
sighted standing for the north shore. The Speedwell's boat
was sent to investigate, but the lugger was boarded first
by a party from the Laurel, a second Customs cruiser. The
men from the Speedwell could see bags of tea and casks
of spirits on the deck of the lugger and 'in the Smugglers
boat alongside. ' No one from the Laurel asked for any
assistance and before the Speedwell's commander could
react,the smugglers landed one boatload of goods and passed
them over to the waiting riders. According to a crewman
from the Good Intent, her commander, Brabell Friend, and
the captain of the smuggling lugger, William Rogers, had
arranged a joint venture. Rogers was to pick up eight
hundredweight of tea and 60 casks of brandy from Alderney
and deliver them on board the Laurel. John Bolton, the
mate, and three of the Laurel's crew sailed with Rogers
across to the Channel Isles. When the lugger was boarded
by the Speedwell, Bolton claimed prior seizure. The
remainder of the contraband was taken out of the Laurel
at Poole the next day but none of it was delivered to the
King' s warehouse. '5
The Laurel was supposed to patrol the coast from Beachy
Head to St Alban's Point but Friend never took her east
of the Isle of Wight. Most of the time the Laurel was tied
up at Weymouth or 'interfering with the Speedwell Cutter',
while 'the famous Gulliver' was landing £50,000 worth of
contraband a year within the limits of Poole. Warren Lisle
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reckoned that twenty waggon loads of goods were run at
a time on the Hampshire and Dorset coasts and attributed
the smugglers' success to the corruption of the master,
mate and men of the Laurel. When Brabell Friend gave up
his command he continued as a contractor to the Customs
Commissioners, with no share in any seizures. William Lander,
the new captain, found it impossible to carry out his
preventive role; Friend kept giving him orders to remain
in harbour, and he had strict instructions never to cruise
to the east of the Isle of Wight.46
Another instance of active participation was reported
on the Yorkshire coast. Having left their Supervisor in
a drunken stupor, three Redcar tidewaiters went down to
the shore to keep watch for an expected run. They saw three
boats, one bringing in some casks, the second from the
Eagle cruiser, and the third from the Trial schooner, 'lately
fitted out at Shields to Cruize against the Smugglers by
Mr Richard Armstrong, first Clerk to the Collector of the
Customs at Newcastle on Tyne.' John Terry, one of the
tidewaiters, reported the smugglers taking casks from the
Eagle's boat, and encountering no resistance. When the
Redcar officers tried to seize some of the spirits they
received no help from either of the revenue boats.47
The Redcar Collector later complained of the cruiser
commanders' 'inattention', and the North East was poorly
served in the 1770s.48 James Major, the commander who
grounded the Lord North on the Castle Rocks off Guernsey,
and wrecked the Duke of Graf ton off the Isle of Wight,
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was given command of the Ferret in 1775, based at Stockton-
on-Tees. The vessel was rat infested and the crew deserted.
Unhinged by his experiences, Major wrote a letter to Sir
William Musgrave, threatening to kill him; the Board decided
to dispense with the commander's services.49
Collaboration of the kind described at Redcar and
suspected on the part of Brabell Friend, was not a matter
of expediency or role confusion; the participants were
fully aware they were in breach of trust. Yet there were
grey areas and reformers found their work hampered by
customary practices, sanctioned by long usage and common
interests. In 1787 the Parliamentary Commissioners concluded
that more than one sixth of the money spent on the Customs
organization in the outports was paid either for useless
service or to sinecurists. Those holding the sinecures
appointed poorly paid deputies, making for inefficiency
and encouraging corruption.50
The system of fees, whereby merchants paid for the
services of the officials, was only partially standardized
and there were some which had come about as the result
of a series of understandings between merchants and officers.
The distinction between collecting legitimate fees and
requiring additional payments to expedite Customs clearance,
was not always clear cut. Those in the employ of the Customs
had no assurance of regular wages some had to live on a
pittance. The boatmen at Weymouth received £20 a year,
thought to be the reason for 'the many frauds that have
been committed in that Port,' but they were £5 better off
than their colleagues at Sunderland while the Sandwich
tidesmen received an annual retainer of £10 and two shillings
a day when they were working. 5 -
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Regular pay at realistic levels, greater certainty of
detection, and lower duties would all have contributed
to a reduction in maipractices but would not have ended
the frauds. Merchants often went to great lengths to avoid
low duties, concerned by the procedural delays and the
short working days of the Custom houses. Capital tied up
in cargoes could not be recovered and creditors satisfied
until the goods were cleared. Excise duties were simpler
to calculate and collect, while the bonded warehousing
of goods meant those imposts did not have to be paid at
the time of importation. Debenture goods, intended for
re-export, could be kept in store until no shipment had
been arranged; with such a system there was no need for
drawback payments, the return of monies collected at
imporation and the source of numerous abuses. Tea was subject
to excise duty from 1724, so any link betwen the scale
of smuggling and the type of duties imposed was very tenuous.
The intention of the excise scheme was to encourage more
careful observance of the revenue laws by legitimate traders;
different strategies were needed to cope with the
professional smugglers. The failure to extend the excise
to wines and tobacco in 1733 checked the process of
substantial fiscal reform until the l780s. Blatant examples
of corruption were punished by fines and dismissal but
occassional purges made
	
the remaining officers more
circumspect rather than more honest.
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From the time of the 1688 Revolution to the consolidation
of the Hanoverian dynasty, attempts were frequently made
to establish a connection between official corruption and
Jacobite sympathies. Proven cases were few, and the
Commissioners were unwilling to penalise their employees
for finding themselves caught up in the vagaries of political
life.52 Any officer identified as a dedicated supporter
of the Stuarts faced instant dismissal, but anyone could
lodge an accusation. Disgruntled subordinates, dissatisfied
superiors, and disappointed seekers after office, all had
reason to wish to see an officer removed. Henry Baker's
proposals for a landguard of Riding Officers, backed up
by small military detachments on the Kent coast, was
preferred to the scheme put forward by Walter Devereux,
suggesting a fleet of fast, lightly armed patrol boats,
easily launched from the beaches.53 Not content with the
merits of his own project, Devereux denigrated Baker,
charging him with collusion, sale of offices and vexatious
prosecutions, 'His greediness for gain.. .will render him
unfit for so great an undertaking as the general surveyorship
of the customs service in Kent and Sussex.'54 Baker responded
by accusing Devereux of harbouring a known Jacobite. The
Treasury conducted an enquiry but the outcome was
inconclusive; the only charge against Baker which could
be substantiated was his accepting compositions without
specific Treasury authorisation.55
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The Customs were subject to more criticisms than the
Excise, but malfeasance occurred in both services. John
Warren, serving at Sandwich, was awarded £50 in 1710 for
exposing 'very great frauds carried on between officers
and brewers and maltsters about Sandwich, Dover, Deal and
other parts of Kent.'56 Regulation of the brewers and
distillers was a matter for the Excise, as was the assessment
of bounties paid to cereal exporters. Barley frauds
flourished in Norfolk; grain was left to sprout on the
floor, or taken from the kiln before drying was complete,
so making for greater weight on which to claim payment.
It was estimated that the various frauds perpetrated in
the county cost the revenue £64,710 from 1715 and 1719.
The officers blamed the merchants for bribing the corn
meters, and Norfolk MPs for interfering on behalf of the
exporters . 57
Sir John Cope's committee, investigating fraud and
smuggling in 1733, reported at some length on the activities
of David Boys and John Hatch, specialists in the importation
of contraband wines and suspected of aiding Jacobite agents
entering and leaving the country by way of the Hampshire
coast. The pair employed a variety of stratagems, including
straightforward bribery. When a ship lay off the coast,
waiting an opportunity to run its cargo, the smugglers
'would give a hint to some leading officer, and he would
pretend he had an information at a distant place: so would
take all those inferior officers with him as were likely
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to cause any interruption.' Most employees in the Customs
service 'wished more for the success of the smugglers than
for the interest of the Crown, or else those frauds could
never have been carried on in so public a manner.'58 ut
offices were regarded in the same light as property and
when Walpole moved against corrupt officials in London
and Southampton the view was expressed that dismissal was
a harsh penalty for only 'taking Care of their Families
and making the most of their Places.'59
Fifty years on and another Parliamentary committee
identified the same failings. Smuggling was:
managed with little Risque, through the collusion
and corrupt Practices of the lower Class of Revenue
Officers, who receive ascertained and known Prices
for their Assistance in conveying the Goods to
the Shore.
The complex duties and the payment of fees, added to low
pay and 'great Temptations' had produced 'an Intimacy and
Connection between the inferior Officers and the Merchants
which is very prejudicial to the Public.'60 Warren Lisle,
with experience working on the London establishment as
well as aboard the cruisers, did not believe the problem
was confined to the lower levels of the service, stating
that bribery and corruption was 'much practis'd from the
Collectors down to the Tidesmen and Extra men.'6'
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The Harwich Collector related corruption to status and
class. Learning that the crew of one of the port's cruisers
were doing brisk business selling contraband spirits to
local publicans, Griffith Davies noted the financial
imperatives in operation. A seaman made twelve times as
much dealing in contraband liquor as he would from the
proceeds of a seizure. Cruiser commanders did not personally
search the bilges when they boarded and smugglers bought
off the rummage crews with a few bottles, 'as these sort
of people seldom have any other considerations than their
present private interest.'62
Sir William Musgrave showed the same disdain, dismissing
the Riding Officers as 'apothecaries, brewers and other
tradesmen' often related to the smugglers and acting as
agents and collectors for them. Lisle, having inspected
the Cornish ports and observed entire cargoes being landed
without Customs authorisation, maintained that the 'superior
as well as inferior officers' had to be involved and thought
it was only the backing of their patrons, anxious to retain
political control, which kept the officials in their places.
At Penzance he discovered a merchantman making two voyages
a year to Madeira in ballast and returning with wine. If
the quantities entered at the Custom house were accurate,
the sale of the cargoes would not have raised money
sufficient to meet the crew's wages. The Collector was
dismissed, but his son succeeded to the position and good
quality wines were still available at reasonable prices.63
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The officers were not simply countenancing illicit
trade, they were active participants. Asked to explain
how a cargo of Spanish wines had been landed at Penzance
with no duties collected, the Collector could only suggest
that the bulk of the shipment must have been run before
the vessel came into the harbour. The previous month, Edward
Giddy, a local magistrate and critic of the revenue officers,
had reported 20 tons of tea and up to 2000 casks of spirits
landed between Penzance and Marazion without attracting
the attention of the officers.64
In December 1781 the Falmouth officials were informed
by two of their collegues at Penzance that the Mary, a
known smuggler, had sailed with a consignment of contraband,
bound for London. The ship was searched at Falmouth and
found to be carrying twenty-six hogsheads of French and
Spanish wine, two pipes of Portuguese wine, a hogshead
of brandy, and two barrels of raisins, 'all of which was
ship'd at Penzance under Denomination of Train Oil (and
each Cask besmear'd therewith thro' Deception.') The coast
dispatches were in order, but the shippers were 'some
notorious smugglers' as was Mr Gluyas of Marazion, part-
owner of the Mary. The brandy was supposed to have been
bought at auction, but was 'very Superior in Quality' to
that usually sold at the Cornish Custom houses and quite
unlike any in Gluyas's stocks. It was possible the liquor
was substituted at sea, or the Mary had diverted to the
Channel Isles, but just as likely that the only train oil
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ever to leave Penzance was the one barrel found at
Falmouth.65 An informant described how the smugglers would
buy prize goods at Plymouth and Dartmouth, apply for export
licences, then reland the goods. 'Outdoor Officers,
particularly the tide waiters, must connive and assist
in this Business, and being People of the lowest Class
are soon overcome with a Bribe.'66
Corruption within the revenue services might appear
to meet Rock's depiction of the eighteenth-century criminal
world, in which offenders and law enforcers were inextricably
bound up in each others activities. It provided officials
with additional income and the contraband dealers with
potential leverage, as well as reducing their risks. Yet
in the same way as 'Every political actor in the eighteenth
century was fully aware of the distinction between the
justifiable and illegitimate use of influenc&, so most
of those in the service of the revenue were conscious of
the difference between establishing a modus vivendi with
the smugglers and engaging with them in lucrative
association. 67 The difficulty was in drawing the distinctions
between mutual accommodations, designed to expedite the
workings of an antiquated method of tax collection, and
systematic fraud, intended to frustrate all attempts to
collect duties. Low salaries, casual employment, and
importunate merchants all put pressure on the revenuemen,
but just as conducive to this climate of 'defalcation and
peculation' were the customs and usages of the waterfront.68•
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Iv
Criminal Collusion or Working the System?
Assessing	 the way business was conducted in the
port of London, Peter Linebaugh concludes that:
The division between legitimate and criminal
transactions was never clear at any level.
Purloining, bribery, fraud, collusion, embezzlement
wage payment, perquisites, the purchase, the
sale, taking, 'borrowing', London courtesies,
the payoff and the blind eye took forms that
were barely separable in the daily traffic of
the river. On the waterfront the hidden hand
was flesh and blood, dealing in gold and socking
tobacco. 69
Growth in maritime trade was placing a strain on existing
port facilities and the revenue services. Captains wanted
to discharge their cargoes as soon as possible but the
myriad weighings, measurings and computations required
before goods could be cleared encouraged bribery at the
different levels. There was little to distinguish the extra-
tidesmen and glutmen, taken on and laid off as required,
from the lightermen, boatmen and porters making a precarious
living on the river. None of them could afford to be
overscrupulous when it came to earning money, and they
all had to to coexist within the local community.
There was similar ambivalence in the outports. At
Harwich, Dover and Falmouth it was expected that the officers
and crews on board the packet boats would smuggle.
According to Griffith Davies, writing in the 1740s, the
'pacquet people' sailing out of Harwich, 'would stop at
nothing to injure us.' The immediate reason for this outburst
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was a suspicion that the tide surveyor had accepted bribes
to allow the crews to bring in contraband. Mr Wharry's
explanation for failing to seize some spirits was that
it was for the crew's personal consumption and the 23 gallons
of brandy were intended to make egg f lip.70 The Customs
and Post Office establishments formed two rival political
factions in Harwich, which
	 explains the bitterness of
some of the reports when contraband was found on the vesels
making regular crossings to Holland. At the same time,
in a small community reliant on the sea for a living, there
had to have been frequent changes of employment, and ties
of kinship, friendship and interdependence linked the seamen
whichever service they were in at a particular time.
Incidents were more likely to have been reported when
there was some interruption in the normal pattern. In
1737 the seamen from the Prince of Wales objected when
Thomas Shearman seized 20 pints of gin from the 60 taken
on at Sluys. The tide surveyor told them to bring back
more, 'and then I will leave you more, for I will have
my Quantity.' 71 Shearman's approach to preventive work
would not have won the approval of his superiors. The
packets were privately owned and carried the mails under
contract; regular crossings to Holland furnished
opportunities to smuggle, while the terms of engagement
encouraged it. An established seaman was paid €l-2s--6d
month, less than on a revenue cruiser and with no seizure
monies yet commanders had no difficulty attracting men.
Each vessel had a regular crew of eight, and three or
four supernumeraries:
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And there is such a value set by the commanders
on the employment of their mariners, even
on those of the supernumery mariners, that
William Farley, who is recommended for a
tidesman. . .was obliged by Capt.Smith to pay
ten shilings[SicJ for a man to take the voyage
in his stead the time he was arrested, though
he had no wages himself.
These additional hands were not needed to sail the packets
but were, 'enabled by smuggling to keep themselves and
some of them large families.' When Farley refused a second
time to pay for a substitute, Smith dismissed him. 72 John
Cornelius, the Ipswich Surveyor of Riding Officers, reckoned
he saved the revenue thousands of pounds by ending the
practice of landing brandy at Harwich 'with the connivance
of the Officers.' Seizures from on board the packets were
small, but frequent; 262 gallons of brandy and 36 gallons
of gin were confiscated over a three month period in 1725,
and if these were collusive seizures, it would indicate
substantial amounts of contraband were being run
successfully. 73
The Customs Commissioners suspected the Dover officers
were concealing the identities of local smugglers, as a
result of their idleness or complicity. John Collier was
instructed 'to excite the officers under his survey to
greater diligence' when 200 anchors of spirits were landed
in the space of two days, but there was little hope of
action since, 'not one of the officers at that port, being
related to the smugglers, will meddle with them.'74 When
an Excise boat was appointed at Dover for the first time
in 1754, 'it was thought complaints had been made by some
people of the packets bringing over large quantities of
goods. '75
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Besides the packet boats carrying mail and passengers
to Calais and Ostend, Dover had a fleet of bye boats offering
an alternative passenger service. Richard Hall, agent for
the 'packets', anticipated the effects if an Act was passed
stipulating that all vessels carrying contraband be seized:
I think all this must be a great Stroke upon our
Wine Merchants in the Bye Boats & go the farthest
towards bringing them downe for we know by the
Paquet Boats that they cannot be above one half
supported by the Passengers-their wine trade indeed
will do the rest, for I am inform'd from Calais
that the person who Coopers their wines there
Cooper'd no less than 80 hogsheads in one year
for one of them only, & pretty near as much for
each of the rest.76
Such quantities were never entered at the Custom house
and the wine traders bribed the officers put on board
their ships.77 Hall wanted to see the bye boats out of
business, arguing that the smuggling interest in Calais
did everything in their power to encourage his competitors'
passenger trade while French officials harassed the packet
boat commanders.78 Thomas Mortimer, the consul at Ostend,
with no personal interest in the packets commercial success,
described how corruption was practically institutionalised.
The mates and seamen were all married men with families,
but their wages were 'not in proportion th the Captains
salary,	 and low pay put pressure on them to smuggle.
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Passengers would assign their contraband to members of
the crew, who brought the items ashore at Dover to await
collection or conveyance on board the Dover stage. Mortimer
was sure that neither passengers nor sailors could land
any goods 'without the Connivance of the Officers' and
suggested better pay would make for improved performance.
The ships and the homes of the mates should be searched
on the evening of their return, 'as should those of the
crews on the bye boats belonging to the Dover firm of Minet
& Co. sailing into Calais, Dunkirk and Ostend.' The packets
did not carry great quantities of goods at a time, but
the regularity and frequency of their crossings, and the
involvement of the entire crew, 'from the Mate to the Cabin
boy' made it an extensive trade. When the packets sailed
to Flushing they were said to have brought back more
contraband than the smuggling cutters. Once back from France
or the Low Countries, there were few problems with the
revenuemen. 'For connivance at landing things at Dover
the packet men make an annual present to the Officers but
particular articles have their immediate premium, as for
Burgundy, Champaign & Claret, half a Guinea per dozen.79
Smugglers and revenuemen both had a vested interest in
the perpetuation of the contraband trade, a business which
depended on government regulation and where the officers
were rewarded whether they were diligent or derelict in
the performance of their duties.
Mortimer had wanted his consular powers extended to
include authorisation to search British ships before they
left Ostend, and to be able to demand information concerning
the ships' passengers and cargoes.	 Presenting himself
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as a source of information on the smuggling trade was
intended to impress Lord Grenville. Officials in the revenue
services were often acting to promote their interests when
submitting reports. The more formidable the smugglers,
the more pardonable the officers' caution, the greater
the volume of contraband, the more reason to retain a
preventive force. Those laying charges against officials
were also motivated by more than a love of honesty, propriety
and the good of the service; some of the letters sent to
the Commissioners, often anonymously, were inspired by
malice, or were designed to rid the locality of an efficient
officer. While they might be suspect as a source of
information about the revenue services, these letters can
provide insights into the local community.
Robert Smith, a Customs boatman at Cromer, was the subject
of an anonymous letter written in 1768:
This serves to inform your honours that aitho'
a great part of the inhabitants of Overstrand,
Cromer & Runton, joining Parishes on the Coast
of Norfolk, does make a common practice of smugling,
there are yet some amongst them, tho' but a few,
• that are faithful, who at length perceiving the
Fraud to be carried on in a very notorious manner,
thought it to be right & just in Committing this
to your hands, to disclose the following officer,
not doubting but you are very sensible that when
an Officer is become partial to Trade and has a
peculiar interest depending amongst the dwellers
and near his district, he can make but an indifferent
servant to his Majesty.
Smith's son had opened a shop and Smith Was letting the
local fishermen buy contraband gin from the smuggling cutters
as a way of encouraging the new business.80 John Ward,
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the Yarmouth Collector, thought the letter was a device
to remove a conscientious officer, while the awareness
of the Board's concerns suggests a colleague was the author.
John Jewell a Cromer Riding Officer, was suspect. Three
years earlier, Ward had spent some time investigating a
suspected smuggling ring involving the coal meters and
fishermen at Cromer. Nothing could be proved against Jewell,
but he had made false entries in his journal to cover the
fact that he had taken no action after Smith told him there
were Dutch cutters hovering off shore, and when waggon
tracks were found leading from the beach, Jewell declared
there were so many it would be pointless to try and follow
them.8'	 John Poihill, a Riding officer at Lydd, was
supposed to have agreed with:
William Fagg and Company to go to the Amount of
ten Voyages then Mr Polhill was to have 50 tubs
of Brandy carried about a Quarter of a mile from
the Sea side as the Company should not see hi.m
take these Contract tubs for fear of some complaints.
He protected the smugglers by claiming prior seizure when
other officers seemed likely to intervene, and warned them
to move their goods if there was a chance of discovery.
Only a fraction of any contraband taken up by Polhill ever
reached the warehouse.82 The Dover Collector maintained
the information was an unjustified attack on a conscientious
officer and John Savory, the informant, was after Polhill's
position. Polhill had an outstanding record of seizures
in the l780s, and the Dover Collector was most likely correct
in his assessment of the complainant.83
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At Mousehole in Cornwall, William Carey used the threat
of prosecution to blackmail local people who were handling
contraband. Carey's mistake was to press too hard, first
taking bribes, then seizing the goods anyway. One of his
victims was a woman with four young children and her husband
a prisoner-of-war in France. According to the Penzance
Collector, the complainants were, 'a set of most notorious
Smuglers. . .who would stop at nothing to get him removed.
An understandable desire on their part, but Carey did
little for the reputation of the Customs service.84
In May 1781, Francis Bradley, tide waiter at St Michael's
Mount, was concerned in selling some indigo stolen from
the Neptune brig by two of the crew. Bradley had confiscated
the indigo and sold it to a Penzance silversmith. He was
remanded to Bodmin gaol, but was back serving in the Customs
four years later. According to Bradley, he and two colleagues
had a seizure rescued from them after refusing a bribe
of a dozen casks of gin and brandy. The smugglers maintained
that they had ferried some spirits round from Lands End
to Perran Cove, where it was seized. As the rest of them
were walking away, John Thomas called them back, saying
'he had agreed with the Officers for a certain Number of
the Ankers and desir'd them to Assist him in Carrying off
his Part.'85 Bradley was posted to Mousehole at his own
request but was soon asking to be moved for neither he
nor any of his family dared leave the house, even in
daylight, for fear of being murdered; the Collector chose
not to believe him.86
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George Eaton, Supervisor of the Happisburgh Riding
Officers, was the subject of complaints by a Customs
colleague, an Excise officer, and the military commandant
in charge of the detachments on revenue duty on the Norfolk
coast. On May 6 1781, Francis Quincey and William Darby,
Riding Officers for the Excise and Customs respectively,
sighted a suspect cutter. They alerted the officer at
Sherringham and the nearest soldiers, then, finding no
signs of the smugglers at Beckhithe, they split up and
made their way to Bacton, Quincey arriving after the others.
They had been joined by Eaton and a party of soldiers,
who had seized a consignment of tea, spirits, and Indian
handkerchiefs. Eaton, Darby and William Crosley, the
Sherringham man, received equal shares in the seizure award,
but when the Supervisor refused to pass on anything to
Quincey, the •exciseman questioned Eaton being alone 'among
the smugglers. ' There were more than 100 of them and he
could not have been making a seizure by himself.87 Eaton's
complicity was more obvious in a later incident. He accused
Christopher Cutting of a collusive: seizure at Faston. Coming
across a run, Cutting and his two assistants were told
they could have the 30 casks still lying on the beach,
but any move towards the smugglers' boat would cost them
the seizure. While waiting for one of the assistants to
bring a cart down to the beach to take away the tribute:
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I heard a great Riot at the Boat and directly
came riding to me Mr Eaton's son & began to abuse
me in a shameful Manner, & then called his Father
who came in the like Manner & swore there was between
4 & 500 Tubs by the Boat although he have told
me since there was but 11; the Son, who is reputed
to be a notorious Smuggler, persuaded the Father
to make me go to the Boat and the Sailors came
up and swore, 'dam your Eyes Cutting, if you do,
you shall not have a Tub left;' in this Situation
was I abused, too shamefully by both Son and Father,
& seeing a Number of Smugglers surrounding me ready
to rescue the Tubbs put me in a great Passion that
I expected Nothing but losing my Seizure, as I
verily believe was what they wanted.
Cutting was left to load and move the casks himself, with
the Eatons riding along behind, claiming he intended keeping
part of the goods for himself.88 It took Eaton three months
to enter a complaint against Cutting, and he withdrew it
when Colonel Lauree informed the War Office and the
Commissioners that he did not trust Eaton and his son was
a smuggler. 89 There were many examples of malpractice,
and frequent assertions that malfeasance was ingrained,
but it is difficult to find evidence of persistent and
systematic corruption permeating the revenue services.
Warren Lisle believed the senior outport officials were
unreliable witnesses, too often involved in dubious dealings
themselves but John Collier was neither dependent on his
position as Surveyor-General of the Kent Customs nor ever
suspected of being in the smugglers' pockets.9° He was
responsible for inspecting Customs officers for fifteen
years, but neither his correspondence nor his reports confirm
there was widescale corruption.
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Thomas and John Jordan, Riding Officers at Folkestone,
were accused of purchasing seizures of tea and spirits
from the soldiers, and there was a suspicion they were
dealing with the smugglers. The Folkestone Collector of
Excise was informed that the Jordans were related 'to
several of the great smugglers, and the only reason I can
give for smuggling being brought to such a height in this
place is these officers screening the smugglers.'91 The
following year Collier had to reprimand the Jordans for
going out on duty without proper weapons, and losing most
of a seizure made at Folkestone Warren to a gang of unarmed
Irishmen. 92 Against this ineptness and possible malfeasance
was the Jordans' reèord in 1741 when they seized over a
ton of tea, well above the totals managed by their colleagues
in the rest of the county.93 In March 1745 John Jordan
wrote to the Board reporting several gangs active in the
area, demanding free drinks at the pubs, shooting through
inn signs and threatening to 'cure' any 'bad' officers.
Folkestone 'could be compared to nothing more like than
a frontier town in a state of war' and the commandant at
Dover Castle would not send troops to assist.94 The
newspapers reported that Jordan had incurred the displeasure
of the smugglers and they had attacked his house, 'destroy'd
his Goods and took what Plate they could find:'
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And one of the Smugglers observing a Man to look thro'
the Glass taking Notice of their Actions, he went into
the Room, and endeavoured to shoot him, but missing
Fire, the Man snatch'd up a Pistol and shot him dead.
They then made off to Hyde[Sic] and joined the rest
of their Companions; who, one and all, agreed to rescue
the Body of their deceased Friend, and another of their
Companions who was in Custody, but being on the Road
to Folkestone, were informed the Townsmen wer& up in
Arms against them, and had sent to Dover for a Detachment
of Soldiers, upon which they march'd off threatening
Vengeance. 95
These later reports do not exonerate the Jordans since
the Wealden smugglers were running goods along a greater
expanse of the Kent coast and, as outsiders, may not have
abided by local arrangements. Folkestone was a smuggling
town, and two years later, 'Folkestone and Hawkhurst' fought
a pitched battle in Wingham after an intercepted run near
Margate. 96
Collier tended to be charitable in his evaluations of
the men under his survey. When John Vavasour and Freebody
Dray admitted falsifying their journals, recording the
seizure of half as many bags of tea as was the case, he
accepted their story that they had left the rest for fear
of a rescue if slowed down by too heavy a load. 'It did
not appear to me that they were guilty of fraud or connivance
or that they knew any of the smugglers but am of opinion
it was cowardly fearfulness.'97 The boatmen at Kingsgate
were often drunk and disorderly. When it proved impossible
to reform them, they were replaced, only for the new boat's
sitter to tell the Sandwich Collector to take back his
deputation when he was rebuked for absence. John Crickett,
'a young sober able seaman' was recommended as the
replacement.
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Yet Collier had reported the crew of the Dover cutter
complaining of Crickett's neglect in 1736, and in 1738
he was dismissed from a position in the Customs at Sandwich
then re-employed as a Riding Officer at Dover. Whatever
his performance as a preventive officer, in 1758 John
Crickett was commander of the Antelope privateer, facing
charges for running contraband on the Kent coast.98
General Hawley maintained that the Riding Officers in
Sussex and Kent made a habit of plying the soldiers with
drink as the smugglers made their way inland, free from
the fear of pursuit, and tried to take the soldiers out
without their officers. Collier and Major Battine, wanted
specific examples of misconduct but none were produced.
Major Johnson, commanding the coast detachments at the
time, reckoned that any negligence stemmed from fear more
than corruption. 99
V
Poachers turned Gamekeepers:Recruitment Problems.
Though prepared to defend those under his survey, Collier
was well aware that some of the Customs employees were
men of dubious reputation. In November, 1736, John Ayling,
second mate of the Shoreham cutter, named a number of
smugglers who had forcibly resisted a boarding. Among them
was Thomas Young, whose more permanent position was as
a crewman on the Amelia, the Rye Customs Sloop. Neither
this incident, nor his involvement in an assault at Rye,
both known to Collier, cost Young his position.l00
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The victim at Rye was Gabriel Tomkin, a leading member
of the Mayfield gang in the 1720s, suspected of involvement
in the murder of Gerard Reeves, concerned in the release
of Bigg and Walter from custody at Lydd, and transported
for his part in a run at Bulverhythe. Escaping from New
Providence to Cuba, Tomkin gained a berth on board the
Happy man-of-war and returned to England in May 1724. As
a returned convict, he faced the death penalty and 'could
not settle in any lawfull way of business but was obliged
to sculk about the Country and carry on the Smuggling trade
to get Bread.' Captured and confined in the Surrey county
gaol, Tomkin volunteered to appear before Sir John Cope's
committee. He was afterwards recommended for government
employ 'detecting and breaking the gangs of smugglers and
in seizing goods attempted to be run.''Ol
Tomkin was given a free hand to search out information
in Kent and Sussex, and supplemented his income by acting
as a sheriffs' bailiff. It was in that capacity that he
came down to Rye in 1736, intending to serve a writ on
Thomas Moore. Young was one of those who signed Moore's
bail bond and returned later for the assault and attempted
kidnapping. It was afterwards learned that Henry Geale
was with Tomkin at Rye, but he had 'rather a worse character'
than Tomkjn, and his evidence was thought 'best left alone.'
Tomkin had the distinction of being concerned in the murder
of a revenueman when he was a smuggler, and a smuggler
when he joined the preventive service. He escaped punishment
for either offence but Geale had appeared at the Maidstone
assizes charged with killing John Bilson, a dealer in
contraband. 102
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Tomkin had no career ambitions as a revenue officer and
early in 1737, an informant signing himself 'Goring' sent
in an account of the activities of the Groombridge gang
included a mention of Tomkin, now Surveyor of the Dartford
Riding Officers:
there can be good reason given that Jacob Walter
brought him goods for three years past, and it is
likewise no dispute of that matter amongst all the
smugglers. The Bunces and Jacob fought about that
matter and parted Companys and Mr Tompkin was aliway
as most people knew a villain when a smuggler, and
likewise officer. He never was concerned with any
Body but Jacob, and now Jacob has certainly done
with smuggling. 103
At the same time as he was combining the roles of smuggler
and preventive officer, Gabriel was providing cover for
a suspected highwayman, Thomas Black, who 'rode about the
country with arms and made seizures pretending to be a
customs officer.' Black was another smuggler, an escaper
from Southwark gaol, where he was imprisoned for debt.104
Tomkin quit his position in 1741, leaving Dartford and
moving to London. He went on to become a highwayman and
a housebreaker and worked with Jeremiah Curteis and the
other master smugglers based in and around Hawkhurst.
Gabriel Tomkin was eventually executed in 1750, for holding
up the Chester mail four years earlier.105
Tomkin was not the only employee of the Customs service
previously concerned in a smugglingrelated killing. George
Walker was with a party of smugglers when a London watchman
had his skull fractured trying to seize a parcel of tea.
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John Hanning was the probable culprit, George Watson was
executed for the crime, and Robert Hanning went into exile
to escape arrest as an accomplice. George Walker turned
King's evidence and 'as a Reward for such his Information'was
made a Riding Officer, based in East Sussex.106
The rationale for the employment of former smugglers
was straightforward and pragmatic. Thomas Jeffries was
recommended to Collier as a man 'well versed in all the
arts and secrets of smuggling and now lying under the
displeasure of the smugglers' for turning informant. John
Stoddard, a smuggler in Winchester gaol, had been 'a most
notorious and daring Offender,' but Warren Lisle felt that
'from his Knowledge of the English & French Coasts by being
on board one of the Luggers he will be of great service
to the Revenue.'107 Stephen Roalfe, incarcerated in Norwich
Castle owing thousands of pounds to the Crown, had no
reservations in proposing himself as the man best fitted
to rid the east coast of smugglers:
I do not say I never did do any smuggling, but
as I have no money to make any satisfaction, I
am willing to render all the service in my power
as a Recompense and will by your Lordships granting
me a Cutter of my own Choice do more service than
any man in England in that way-Should I be so Happy
to find favour in your Lordships, I will by Gods
Leave take in hand with one Cutter only to stop
the practice of smuggling in both Countys Suffolk
and Norfolk to your Lordships full satisfaction.lOB
The revenue authorities were sure Roalfe had the means
to offer more tangible compensation, or if he did not,
then he had smuggling associates who did..109
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The Commissioners and senior outport officials were
prepared to take on former offenders in the same way as
they would purchase the services of an informant. Any
distaste was subordinated to their utilitarianism; suspected
murderers and convicted smugglers could be acommodated
within the preventive services, provided they had something
to trade.
John Brewer compares the Customs unfavourably with the
Excise, 'remarkable for the industry it was able to elicit
from its officers and for the care with which administrative
abuses were anticipated and pre-empted.'110 Yet contemporary
observers could be critical of the Excise as well, and
not just because of the powers of entry and search vested
in the officers. One critic contrasted the inland and
coastal regions. In the former, frauds were prosecuted,
and penalties severe enough to deter the contraband trade
but:
In Maritime Counties the Revenue daily suffers
through officers who were born and employed
in those Counties. These Officers always saw
their Ancestors countenance Smuggling, they
do the same as smuggling is habitual.
Rather than face the difficulties associated with prosecuting
neighbours, the officers would deny knowing the identities
of those from whom goods were taken. At Dorchester, only
twelve out of the 102 seizures made between October 1781
and July 1786 were from known men. Illicit sellers of liquor
in Weymouth outnumbered licensees by ten to one and this
state of affairs was attributed to the connivance of both
Customs and Excise officers. The two excisemen had only
been at the port for a few years, 'yet each of them have
bought him a House which brings him about a hundred a year.'
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They could not have afforded such properties out of their
salaries and the implication was that they were receiving
substantial bribes.111
Excisemen were well instructed in measurement and
computation, but clerical and mathematical skills did not
impress armed smugglers. As preventive officers, employees
of the Board of Excise faced the same dangers as their
counterparts in the Customs. 'Assistants' were recruited
to provide the physical force needed to combat the smugglers.
Thomas Walter, an officer at Horsham, formed his own posse,
sometimes difficult to distinguish from their adversaries..
The Times described them as:
'a banditti whose malpractices disgrace our laws
and society even more than smuggling. . . they go
armed in bodies, and under the sanction of their
pretended office, commit all manner of violence
and depredations to the great injury and terror
of persons living in the meighbourhood of their
haunts 112
Alexander Remington would have provided ideal evidence
for the Times's case against these 'bush officers.' Once
'a notorious Smuggler in the Neighbourhood of Maidston,'
Remington was afterwards employed as an assistant in the
Excise until he was indicted on a charge of assault and
then arrested on suspicion of highway robbery. Tried and
convicted at Maidstone in January 1786, the local magistrates
were anxious that Remington should not receive a pardon.
He had stopped and searched innocent trve1lers, seized
contraband without proper authority, stolen horse fodder
for himself and his associates and left two men and their
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families dependent on the parish, 'owing to their having
been totally disabled by Him; having been almost hack'd
to pieces. These Men were indeed Smugglers, but unarm'd
& made no resistance.'113 John Wright and Anthony Draper,
Folkestone Excise officers, wanted to arrest an outlawed
smuggler and claim the £500 reward. Denied military
assistance, they brought in
	
Christopher and Nathaniel
Barrett, a smuggler turned informant and his highwayman
ri."4 Whatever the ideals of the service, and the level
of discipline, the officers on the ground had to use the
resources available to them and the personnel of the
different services often faced similar situations. As with
the Customs, there were examples of peculation, indolence
and corruption among the excisemen, but these do not prove
the institution was irredeemably flawed. The absence of
fees and sinecures placed the Excise in a position to provide
a more professional service than the Customs, but when
it came to dealing with smugglers, and operating in
communities where contraband running was a significant
economic activity, Customs and Excise officers carried
out the same preventive role and employed similar methods
and resources; they were also subject to the same pressures
and incentives. Employees of the Excise did not enjoy
superior pay and conditions, and there is no reason to
assume a higher quality of recruit. As John Brewer says,
'No bureaucracy can entirely preclude embezzlement and
malpractice or prevent some of its employees from failing
to perform their duties properly.' 115 Any inclination to
175
condemn the preventive services en bloc should be kept
in check. The concept of office as a form of property:right
was well entrenched, with an inevitable overlap between
legitimate and illegitimate exploitation of that right.
It would be anachronistic to expect eighteenth-century
revenue officers to abide by standards of behaviour devised
at a later time to meet the requirements of a different
society. Equally important is the evidence that despite
the opportunities, the intimidation, and the poor rewards
of government employ, so many 'inferior officers,' were
prepared to risk the enmity of the smugglers. Agreeing
to collusive seizures, or having to accept token tribute,
did not mean they had been bought, nor that there was no
distinction between officers and free-traders. Too often
the criticisms of their performance were coming from those
who were themselves insulated from the dangers and
discomforts of a thankless job.
VI
Drunk and Disorderly:Disciplinary Problems
Whatever the practices of politicians and officials,
there was a clear notion of what constituted proper conduct
within government departments. Opportunism was tolerated
until it threatened the functioning of the system, then
action was taken. This was usually directed against the
'tidesmen and other inferior officers,' of the revenue
services though it was these men, denied a living wage,
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and barred from supplementing their pay through other
work, who were forced into 'breach of trust and combination
with smugglers.'116 The policy makers had to decide whether
the Treasury would benefit from draconian measures against
corruption. The sums collected in duties were the outcome
of numerous transactions: on board ships, along the wharfs,
in the long rooms, and at the bonded warehouses. Disruption
of established practices, for the sake of bureaucratic
order and control, would have achieved little without changes
in attitude and personnel. Those employed in organizations
develop their own agendas, and if the pursuit of personal
interest undermines the purposes of the institution, then
action becomes necessary. Otherwise, accepting that policy
objectives will be only partially met, may well prove the
more effective course, making for continuity within the
service. One disadvantage of this approach was that staff
were not treated consistently. Minor infringements could
result in instant dismissal, while activities bringing
the service into disrepute went unpunished. Patrons and
the workings of local political networks help explain these
variations since the appointment and dismissal of Crown
employees were not the concern of their superiors alone.
John Nodes, when a Riding Officer at Manningtree, was
described as susceptible 'to the effects of a little too
much liquor.' This was after he had knocked down and ridden
over a carter on the Dovercourt road, chased the man at
swordpoint into a nearby house and threatened to 'cleave
down' the mayor when he and Captain Phillips from the Customs
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cutter intervened. Nodes remained in the service, was
promoted to Supervisor at Ipswich, and brought in a number
of wanted smugglers in the later 1740s. Robert Liffen,
mate on the Hunter cutter, reached the stage where he was
refusing orders and putting the ship at risk by leaving
the helm unattended. On one occasion the crew had to separate
Captain Fisher and his first officer:
Robt Liffen by his own Confession is frequently
insane, at which time he put by all proceedings
& make the people so unhappy in their duty that
complaints are frequently made to me & if immediate
redress be not made to them, they quit their employ
intirely on his account, and declare it is not
possible to live with a man whose insanity at times
makes him unhappy to himself.117
Drunkenness and insubordination among the Customs boatmen
at Faversham, Sandwich, Kingsgate and Dymchurch was dealt
with by reprimands demotions and dismissals. The Sandwich
men were made to sell their fishing nets to conform with
standing orders, but frequent bouts of heavy drinking did
not cost them their positions. Collier noted the dilapidated
state of the patrol boat and the low morale of the Kingsgate
crew in 1741, yet it was two years before any action was
taken.118 The Handfleet boatmen were charged with going
out oyster dredging when they should have been on duty,
turning up too tired for work, failing to pick up Mr
Wilkinson, the chief boatman, and insulting him when he
tried to correct them. They at first apologised, but then
wrote to the Collector to give their opinion of Wilkinson.
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We cannot help repeating the frequent
aggravations and abuse we have received from
him, such as calling us Dogs, Rogues,
Scoundrels, Liars, Vilains, Rascals, Savages,
damning us for Blackguards, and useing very
approbious	 language	 much	 unbecoming	 a
Gentleman.
While prepared to try and arrive at a reconciliation, the
boatmen reckoned their officer to be too proud, 'never
thinking he has enough homage paid him.'119 Nicholas Munt,
who signed his name to this letter, was listed among the
crew of the Handfleet boat the following year but the other
men had either been dismissed, or decided there was better
money to be made from oysters.12° Munt's ability to keep
the journals might have ensured his retention, but challenges
to authority, justified or not, were normally regarded
as far more serious than inebriation or incompetence.
A Riding Officer, once he had secured appointment, could
generally anticipate a long career in the service. Faced
with an upsurge in smuggling in 1717, Philip Taylor,
Collector at Weymouth, called for more Riding Officers,
'men that are hardy, unmarryed and are well acquainted
with the country.' l2l Collier listed 53 men serving in
Kent in 1741, none under 25 and eleven over fifty. George
Herbert, stationed at Southborough, was described as 'very
active, a stout bold man and a good officer,' but since
he was 70, and patrolled a much-used smuggling route, Collier
recommended Herbert be given some support. He continued
to ride out alone until transferred to Tonbridge, where
he remained until the age of 75122 The largest cohort among
the officers was of men between 40 and 50, some of them
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appointed when middle-aged. 	 They were not necessarily
less capable, but it was demanding work, with illness and
infirmity the most common reasons for retirement.l23
Isaac Dagnett, commander of the Walpole, was feeble
of mind, not of body. Recording how he had rewarded his
crew with spirits from a seizure,the Collector noted that
Dagnett, 'had not a head capable to perceive the ill
consequences of such a precedent.' In January 1746 Dagnett
seized John Batten's Bachelors Adventure; he then allowed
a three mile gap to develop between the Walpole and its
prize as they made for Harwich and the smugglers left on
their own vessel were able to overpower the boarding party.
After another seizure Dagnett let one of his prisoners
go for treatment of a wound; the man did not come back.-24
Dagnett was at last retired in 1768, after an inspection
at Harwich showed the Walpole's seizures were not meeting
the costs of her upkeep. According to Davies, the captain's
'intellect began to fail him about five years before and
have gradually got worse ever since.'125
The revenue gained nothing if the cruiser commanders
lingered in harbour, nor were those who practised collusion
any deterrent to the smugglers. But an excess of zeal
could result in altogether different complications for
the Board.A former captain with Mascall's privateers during
the War of Spanish Succession, Nathaniel Pigrain was very
active in the Customs service, claiming to have made more
seizures than any other cruiser cornmander.l26
	 In 1725
the French ambassador complained that an Englj
	 Customs
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boat had come into Boulogne Road, 'in order to seize a
Boat laden with Brandy and hath made frequent attempts
of that kind.' The revenuemen were from Pigrarn's Amelia,
and had sailed across the Channel after a smuggler they
had first tried to intercept off New Romney. 127 Disputes
between English and French fishermen, arguments over the
searching of the packet boats and the detention of messengers
at Dover, provided the Commissioners with enough irritations.
Complaints from the French embassy, sent straight to the
Secretary of State, created additional work at the Treasury
and the Customhouse.
The officers from the cruisers justified incursions
into French territorial waters by claiming to have been
in close pursuit of known smugglers, sighted hovering off
the English coast. Captain Arnett, commanding the Dover
cruiser in the Excise service, already had one complaint
against him when a second adventure ended with some of
his men confined in a French prison. Arnett tracked a pair
of luggers from the Kent coast to Boulogne road, when he
sent a boarding party out. They went in too close to the
beach and their boat was dragged in by the smugglers and
a party of Frenchmen. Having been severely beaten, the
excisemen were held first in a dungeon in Boulogne Castle
for three weeks 'bruised and bloodied,' then taken to the
town gaol where they were handcuffed and placed in the
holes 'where the condemned Malefactors are put.' Removed
after three days, the men were living on bread and water
and sending petitions to the Excise Board, entreating action
181
to secure their release and promising 'that they will do
their utmost to suppress Smuggling when released from this
unhappy Place if your Honours think proper to continue
them in their Bread.'-28
The Assistance was on patrol in the Dover Straits when
a lug-sail boat was seen to the south of the Goodwins,
heading for the English coast. Alexander Watson, mate of
the cruiser, described how he chased the smuggler inshore:
Until those on board her finding it almost
impossible to effect their escape, ran within
half a Musket shot of Deal Beach intending to
throw her cargo on land & with the strength of
their connection & gang who are ever assembled
& ready on such occasions, either by stratagem
or force to have run the same.
The Assistance then followed the lugger over to Boulogne,
where the cruiser came under small-arms fire. According
to Watson, his men did not return fire, but discharged
their weapons into the air, as evidence of their peaceful
intentions, a gesture not appreciated by the French.129
The largest of the cruisers was the Repulse, based at
Colchester. Her commander applied for letters of marque
in 1778, but before these had been conferred, and against
orders to remain on station, Matthew Hopkins, the mate,
took her over to the French coast. There he managed to
ground his command on a sandbank near Calais. The French
recovered the ship and held the crew, agreeing to an exchange
of prisoners early in 1779. The Repulse continued as a
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privateer, but under the French flag. The Board attributed
her loss to 'wilfull misconduct and negligence' and refused
to reimburse Hopkins for any losses incurred, but he remained
in the service.'30
VII
Inter-Service Rivalries
It was deliberate policy to foster a degree of competition
between the different branches of the preventive service,
but this had its disadvantages. A report in the Sussex
Weekly Advertiser described an unusual attempted seizure.
Pankhurst and Newington, Riding Officers for the Customs,
tried to relieve the excisemen of some contraband cloth
or 'bale goods.' The soldiers escorting the seizure to
Horsham threatened to open fire if the pair persisted in
their efforts.131 In a similar incident at Sandgate, the
Customs officers, learning that a party of dragoons and
excisemen was searching houses in the town, called out
their own military escort and went to investigate. Finding
some tobacco had been confiscated they tried to have it
taken to the Customs warehouse, but the local Collector
of Excise made sure it was sent to Canterbury.132
If the land and waterguards were to perform their
preventive roles then there had to be compromises and
accommodations. The uneasiness of the relationship was
brought out when Peter Haslip, a Surveyor in charge of
an Excise patrol boat and Thomas Jenkins, a boatman were
killed in an affray to the south of Yarmouth in 1768. The
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different accounts of the Customs and Excise Collectors
indicated a degree of mutual antipathy not necessarily
shared by the tinferior oficers.' Thomas Davies, Haslip's
superior, described bow a party of smugglers was captured
at sea, then released by Haslip on their own request.
According to the version from the Yarmouth Custom house,
Haslip had given in to intimidation and set the smugglers
ashore at Hopton, where a gang of smugglers was waiting.
In the ensuing fighting, when the gang recovered their
own boat and its cargo, the two officers were fatally
injured. Much of the detailed description of this incident
came from Joseph Ames, out on patrol in the boat from the
Duke Customs smack. Ames had landed at Hapton and attempted
to rnlly the excisemen, but the smugglers attacked again
before moving off with their goods intact. Davies made
no mention of the part played by the Customs men. If the
two services had collaborated, the coast could have been
better patrolled and provision made for mutual assistance
on a regular basis.133
From its inception the collection of the revenue was
characterised by scrutiny and inspection to encourage an
accurate rendering of accounts by officials. The Treasury
would have looked sceptically at the arguments for long
term co-operation. As it was, the Commissioners had to
issue instructions on proper procedures within weeks of
the first Excise boats being stationed at Dover. Arguments
were arising over which service had the prior right to
search the packet boats.1-34 Interference with the profitable
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workings of long standiig arrangements linking Customs
officers and ships crews could have been at the root of
these disputes.
Contested seizure awards were another cause of soured
relations. Solomon Earle, when with the Excise, described
how he had searched the house of John Ford, accompanied
by three soldiers and two Customs officers from Penzance.
Sixteen casks of gin were found, and Earle went to fetch
a horse and cart to convey them to the Excise warehouse.
Once part of the load was under way, a Customs man redirected
the cart to their store. When Earle complained, the
Collector accused him of wanting all the proceeds from
the seizure for himself.' Two years later Earle had
transferred to the Customs and when this unusual move was
questioned, suggested that former colleagues were set on
tarnishing his reputation, 'by reason of my being very
Active in detecting their favourite Lady who is the largest
retail Smuggler in the west of Cornwall.'135
Whenever new supervisory structures were put in place,
the invigilators appointed to oversee the workings of the
system came to appreciate the advantages of complicity
with the merchants and smugglers, and the distance separating
them from the Board. The Excise was free of the sinecures
and patent offices, and there was less external interference
with appointments. At the same time, senior officials could
not avoid professional contacts with members of the local
elite, and the line dividing occupational and social
relationships was not obvious. For junior personnel there
185
were more pressing reasons for maintaining good relations
with the other service; they never knew when they might
need to protect each other against the smugglers, and there
were likely to have been closer ties. The men employed
by the Excise as boatmen, crew on the cutters, and Riding
Officers, were likely to be drawn from the community within
which they worked. James Bayton recorded the employment
of outsiders at Dover, and the transfer of Dover men to
Yarmouth, because such steps were unusual, despite the
regulations.1-36 Problems of recruitment and retention
would have made it difficult to operate rolling appointments
in either service. Like others concerned in administering
the law in maritime regions, the excisemen had to learn
the arts of compromise, and discover that a degree of
flexibility could work to everyone's advantage.
Officers and men of the Royal Navy, assigned to assist
the Revenue, were not so constrained by local circumstances.
Naval sloops and men-of-war were certainly effective against
the smuggling cutters, but the way the navy carried out
its duties could engender great bitterness in maritime
communities, as happened in Deal in 1764 when sailors in
the boats from the King of Prussia used their firearms
indiscriminately against Deal boatmen taking goods out
of East Indiamen anchored in the Downs.'37
The press gangs guaranteed resentment against a naval
presence in the ports, where revenue officers found
themselves in an invidious position. They were under
instructions to report known smugglers to the magistrates
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and constables, as potential naval recruits, and acted
as receiving officers in some ports, but they did not relish
the role. King's Bench upheld the legality of pressing,
but the local authorities decided how far they were prepared
to assist in the process. Customs personnel could find
themselves caught between the conflicting pressures of
central government and their obligations as local
establishment luminaries. From the navy's viewpoint, it
must have seemed at times, 'that the whole of English society
and government - politicians, merchants, justices of the
peace, customs officials - was conniving to frustrate the
seaman's would-be captors.'138 Sir John Norris, failing
in his efforts to find seamen in the Cinque Ports in 1734,
was convinced there had to be four or five hundred suitable
recruits in Dover, Deal, Folkestone, Sandwich, and the
Isle of Thanet. Norris wanted to bring them in, 'which
would not only be of great consequence for the service,
but an effectual means to destroy a great part of the
smuggling trade carried on in those parts.' Three weeks
later H.M.S Captain and H.M.S Kent were stationed off
Folkestone waiting to receive men rounded up by the press
gangs. The mayors of Folkestone and Deal, the 'Bodar of
Dover Castle,' one of the Lord Warden's officers, and the
Sergeant of the Admiralty all insisted that every seaman
in those towns carried protections; the Deal pilots even
had additional ones, which they sold or gave away.'39
At the time Sir John was encountering these difficulties,
John Jordan, the Folkestone Riding Officer, was writing
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to the Duke of Dorset, the Lord Warden, advising him that
it would greatly advance the cause of his candidate in
the coming general election if he were to use his influence
to get the press gangs removed. 140 Further along the
coast,the Brighton fishermen were assured of support from
the Duke of Newcastle when they sought protections against
impressment, a move which consolidated his political position
in the townJ 41-
The Downs anchorage was a major centre for the activities
of the press gangs, the intention being to take the crews
from merchantmen making their way to the Thames and the
Port of London. The seamen had plenty of assistance in
evading capture as vessels from the Cinque Ports came
alongside and offered to take the crews off. Substitute
seamen were available, equipped with protections. The
Customs cutters were as much concerned in this business
as anyone else so there was some irony when Philemon
Phillips, commanding the Deal sloop, had to request the
release of three of his crew, held aboard the tenders after
impressment:
and that their Lordships will please to give
a general Order to prevent the Officers of
the Customs from being Imprest for the future,
and especially at this time, when the Smugglers
are on all parts of the Coast and it is
absolutely necessary to send the Sloops in
the Service of the Customs to put a Stop to
their Proceedings 142
The only felons acceptable as naval recruits were smugglers,
so many of them accomplished seamen, but, 'Little as Customs
men liked smugglers, they hated the Navy more, and took
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pleasure in interfering with its operations as much as
they could.'143 Failing to assist the press gangs was one
way of expressing their dislike of the senior service.
On one occasion, a party of men due to be transferred from
Rochester gaol to the custody of the receiving captain,
were released by the Customs officers. 144 The press gangs
retaliated when given the opportunity, as with Phillip's
men and the removal of Sam Dyball, taken on board the Prince
of Wales tender in spite of a certificate of exemption
secured by the Yarmouth Collector to protect a key
prosecution witness in a smuggling case.l45 William Hamilton
and Richard Smith, two London officers, were detained by
the press gang on their way to Blackwall Stairs. They
had planned to go out in the Customs galley and intercept
Joshua Hill, a known smuggler, but were held long enough
to enable Hill to row past, his boat loaded with bale
goods P146
Seizures were a frequent cause of controversy; the
officers and men of the Royal Navy were enthusiastic
smugglers and resented searches by the revenuemen.When
the Admiralty detailed ships to cruise against the smugglers,
disputes arose over the distribution of the proceeds from
joint seizures. More serious were the clashes which occurred
when the services competed for the same prize. In 1768
an official stationed on Guernsey was attacked and thrown
into the sea by three men from H.M.S Fly. Captain Jones
then refused to allow the Customs men and the bailiff aboard
his ship to serve a warrant on the culprits. Jones himself
had a commission to seize contraband goods, and 'therefore
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ought to have assisted the Officers of the Customs in the
Execution of their Duty.'147 A more expensive clash occurred
when the Hawke Customs sloop and H.M.S Seaford sighted
a smuggling cutter simultaneously. Captain Caddy insisted
the Custom House colours were flying and that he had hailed
the Seaford urging her commander to 'Shear clear of him
as he was then becalmed by the Ships Sails and could not
get out of the way.' Instead of altering course, Captain
Davies 'run on board the Hawke and carried away the main
Mast and main Yard which last fell on the Boat and Stove
her.' Having disabled the revenue cruiser, Davies sent
two boats across to the smuggler to attempt a boarding,
but encountering opposition, the boats withdrew and were
hoisted back on board the Seaford, 'without taking any
further notice of the Smugler.' Davies later maintained
that he had mistaken the Hawke for a smuggler, and was
'determined to disable him to prevent his getting away.'-48
In October, 1771, a boat from HMS Wolf detained a smuggling
cutter, but none of the Wolf's complement had a Treasury
warrant or a Special Commission empowering them to make
seizures. The Cholmondley Customs cutter then attempted
to board the smuggler, but Thomas Jackett had his fingers
sliced through by a sailor from the Wolf. The Commissioners
were more concerned by the illegality of the initial seizure
than the maiming of their employee.
A few months later an attempted seizure of two forty
gallon casks of rum from HMS Venus, moored at Spithead,
resulted in another affray, instigated by John Ford, the
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first lieutenant, who himself obstructed the Customs men
as they were trying to transfer the barrels of rum into
their boat. Admitting defeat, the boarding party retreated,
abandoning the rum, and as they moved off from the side
of the Venus the sailors 'emptied the Ship's Urine Tubs
upon them into their Boat.' The Commissioners observed
how naval officers were 'too much inclined to treat the
Officers of the Revenue with Harshness and Contempt.'149
Captain Dobbin succeeded Gabriel Bray as commander
of EMS Nimble, patrolling the Dover Straits. Some of his
crew 'violently and forcibly' removed a seizure of spirits
from Richard Cornelius, a Customs boatman at Folkestone.
When Cornelius protested to Dobbin, the captain brandished
a cutlass at him, and the Folkestone Surveyor made no headway
in securing compensation for the boatman's loss. The Dover
Collector took up the case, pointing out that such behaviour
'must of course be subversive and destructive of that Union
and Harmony which ought to subsist between Officers of
the same Department. ' The fact was that naval officers
on revenue duties did not accept the Customs and Excise
personnel as colleagues.150
The Swanage officers who planned to take over a smuggling
cutter already in the hands of of a naval boarding party
were inviting confrontation. They ignored warnings and
attempted to board, but the sailors swore 'they would
blow all their Brains out & sink the Boat, having. . .receiv'd
Orders so to do from their Lieutenant.'- 53- John Sarman,
commanding the Swan cruiser, was carried on board EMS Alfred,
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his hands tied behind his back, when he refused to surrender
his prize, a United State's merchantman. Sarman attributed
this mistreatment to 'the jealousy which the naval gentlemen
are known to possess of their Honours vessels making captures
of the enemy ships and I therefore felt it as indignant
treatment. '152
Admiral Vernon detested smugglers, convinced they
were passing on useful information to the French. Gabriel
Bray's experiences made him equally hostile, but for others
the pursuit and capture of smugglers was a preferable
alternative to languishing at home on half-pay. Seizures
were a useful way of augmenting income but so was
participation in the contraband trade. When James Bowen,
formerly master of H.M.S Druid, wanted a referee to commend
his work while on revenue duty along the Cornish coast,
he named Captain Byron)- 53 A month later Byron was brought
to the Commissioners notice when a boat from H.M.S Tartar
followed a suspect lugsail boat 'under a press of sail
for Folkestone from the Coast of France.' After three shots
had been fired the boat came to. Captain Byron was aboard
and 'immediately abused the Officers in very gross language
for Obliging his Boat to bring to, alledging he was a
Gentleman and an Officer.' A third boat put out from
Folkestone and attacked the men from the Tartar, enabling
Byron to sail into shore. He afterwards sent some goods
to be entered at the Custom house, claiming the Tartar's
men were drunk and had snapped their firearms at him.154
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The difficulties arising from impressment indicated
that there were conflicting interests at work in the ports.
Sir John Norris and Edward Vernon advocated the use of
the press gangs as a means of suppressing smuggling in
Kent,	 but consideration had to be given to the local
situation. Experienced seamen could call on the support
of friends with political influence, and magistrates were
aware that impressment was an lSsue which excited strong
feeling in maritime communities,l55 If Admirals Norris
and Vernon were accurate in their assessments of the number
of seamen available in the Kent ports, then bringing in
the smugglers would also have meant disrupting much of
the legitimate business on the coast. Officials and
politicians, including those in the employ of the Board
of Customs, would consider their positions carefully before
risking local hostility and the disapproval of their peers.
The assistance of the navy in tackling the large, heavily
armed smuggling cutters was appreciated by the revenue
officers, but the more permanent naval presence established
after the Seven Years War and the American War of
Independence, was another matter. It could all too easily
upset existing arrangements for the most effective, if
not the most precise application of the laws. These were
not implemented in strict accord with the intentions of
the legislature or the instructions of the Commissioners,
but the semblance of order and authority was upheld. When
officers of the Royal Navy tried to apply the laws in a
more hierarchical way, there were no discernible advantages
for government, and a popular reaction against authoritarian
policing by outsiders.
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Chapter Three
Violence and the Smuggling Trade
1
The Scope of Enquiry
Frank McLynn's assertion about the Sussex smugglers in
the 1740s is open to challenge on grounds of historical
accuracy and methodology. He maintains that:
Much of the exaggeration of the social role of
smuggling comes from extrapolating from the special
case of the Sussex smugglers. In their purposive
violence, social composition, and their rhetoric
the Sussex smugglers were as atypical of eighteenth-
century smuggling as a whole as the Duke of
Richmond's sanguinary crusade was atypical of elite
response . 1
As a major commercial enterprise with international
ramifications, smuggling was not confined to the rural
artisans and farm workers identified by Cal Winslow, but
McLynn provides no evidence respecting the gangs in other
counties or at other times, while the juxtaposition of
'atypical,' and 'purposive violence,' presents problems
of interpretation. Were other smugglers of a more pacific
nature, or was their violence less rational? The Wealden
smugglers merit attention for reasons besides their
predisposition to violence; their activities were extensive,
linked with gangs elsewhere, and showed signs of developing
specialist expertise. However, the word 'purposive' implies
they used force and intimidation in a calculated way in
furtherance of their commercial activities, and if that
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was the case, then other smugglers might be expected to
act in the same way when faced with similar situations.
The intention here is to establish a basis for valid
comparisons by placing the Sussex smugglers of the 1740s
in context. This means investigating the state of affairs
in earlier years and in the second half of the century,
and looking at other areas, to examine the ways in which
violent smuggling might be described as the conduct of
commerce by other means. Violence may be explained by innate
aggression, or social conditioning, and it may be a desperate
attempt to escape a threatening situation. Psychological
and social theory can be deployed to achieve an understanding
of the smugglers' actions, as can awareness of the effects
of neat spirits, but if their violence was purposive, then
it must be related to the nature of the contraband trade,
and to the extent their actions were a rational strategy,
the Sussex men were not atypical.
Another advantage in extending the chronological reach
is that it opens up discussion on J.H.Beattie's claim
that the later eighteenth century brought 'some shifting
of the line dividing acceptable from unacceptable conduct,
and a strengthening of feelings of shame, guilt and
repugnance about acts that had once raised no eyebrows.'2
When an exciseman was killed in Dorset in 1723, 'the
smugglers swore they did no more matter to kill him than
they would a Tode.'3 Sixty years later, when the murdered
body of Alex Dawn, purser on board HMS Wasp, was pulled
out of Dover harbour, the local smugglers treated the event,
'with so much levity as to observe "there is no harm in
killing a wasp."'4 The absence of sensibility among the
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smugglers cannot be taken as evidence of a more general
moral inertia, but communal attitudes towards the contraband
trade merit attention. In the introduction to Albion's
Fatal Tree it is stated that 'definitions about what was,
and was not, crime. . .were not. . .based on inhibitions upon
violence.'5 Singling out the Sussex smugglers of the 1740s
as exceptional may obscure the likelihood that the club,the
carbine and the loaded whip were as much a part of the
smuggling scene as sunken casks, muffled oars, and trains
of laden packhorses.
Study of the extent of violence associated with the
smuggling trade also raises wider issues concerning the
nature of eighteenth-century society. Laurence Stone's
belief that the homicide figures derived from the assize
records are an accurate guide to overall levels of violence
cannot be left unchallenged. 6 The assumption that nearly
all deaths will feature in the court records is unwarranted,
and the fact that more encounters between smugglers and
preventive forces did not result in fatalities, was due
more to the inaccuracy of their firearms and the thickness
of their skulls than any finer feelings on either side.
Contemplating the nature of crime, E.P. Thompson argues
that:
Because we can show that offenders were subject to
economic and social oppression, and were defending
certain rights, this does not make them instantly
into good and worthy 'social criminals,' hermetically
sealed off from other kinds of crime. Offences which
may command our sympathy - poaching or smuggling
- were not conducted in especially gentlemanly ways.7
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Riding oficers and the military detachments on revenue
duty were armed with swords, pistols and muskets. The fines
imposed for handling contraband could have meant indefinite
incarceration in a debtors' prison. Membership of an armed
gang, assembled to run uncustomed goods, brought some
smugglers to the gallows and sent others into exile, while
capture at sea was often followed by impressment. Given
a sense of self-preservation and a keen awareness of the
rights of property, when their own investments were at
stake, 'purposive violence' was practically an occupational
requirement for smugglers. Every time they used force to
resist arrest, prevent a seizure, or effect a rescue, it
was t purposive. ' The Sussex smugglers analysed by Winslow
and described by McLynn, were atypical to the extent that
they strayed outside the guidelines for the socially
acceptable use of murderous violence.
II
Antecedents in Kent and Sussex
According to Charles Fleet, as the -trade in illicit
tea developed, so a lower class of smuggler came to
predominate and in the activities of these smugglers a
'brutality showed itself. ' Cal Winslow recognises that
this simplifies the issue of the gangs' social composition,
but still presents the conflicts of the 1740s as an aspect
of class war, and describes the violence of that decade
as 'Possibly the most extraordinary chapter in the entire
history of smuggling.'8
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Studying the contraband business in that period is a
rewarding exercise. Individual smugglers can be identified
and the gangs located within their communities, but the
Hawkhurst gang need to be set in historical context, and
compared with other organized professional free traders.
The owlers of Romney Marsh, particularly active in the
the last quarter of the seventeenth century,were described
as 'a militia, that in defiance of all authority, convey
their wool to the shallops with such strength that the
officers dare not oppose them.'9 William Carter, attempting
to initiate legal action against known owlers in the 1680s,
had to run for his life when the mayor of Romney refused
to commit some suspects and he was later chased out of
Lydd by fifty horsemen, 'desparate fellows, not caring
what they did.''° The Canterbury master woolcombers, many
of them Walloons inplicated in illicit exports, were accused
of employing John Plummer and Thomas Abbot, 'to save them
harmless for carrying their wool to the seaside, and have
hired John Chandler and others to kill all such persons
as should attack their wool or stop the same.' 11 In 1692
it was made an offence to transport wool escorted by
more than three men, a measure designed 'to prevent the
great mischief arising from the numbers of men travelling
armed to convey the waggons, horses and other carriages
loaden with wool.'12
The War of the Spanish Succession disrupted both legal
and illegal trade between England and France, but there
was a revival as soon as hostilities ended. Deal, within
easy reach of the French and Flemish ports, was supposed
to have had 200-300 men whose main employment was the
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smuggling trade.'3 Armed gangs were soon in evidence again
and the only effect of successive anti-smuggling Acts was
that 'the hirelings carried on the trade whilst the heads
of them acted behind the Curtain, unknown to any but one
in a Gang, who was a sort of master & paid the rest.' The
gangs grew in numbers as more 'Voluntiers' were taken on
and individual offenders against the revenue laws were
offered the protection of membership:
by the above means did they still keep up their
separate Gangs, some of which were then very
large, for still as the law pressed them more,
the more they strengthened themselves against
the Law and which the Civill power was found
not strong enough & forces were sent to assist
the Officers of the Customs, they then united
gangs to repell force by force, & some Gangs
be now as Numerous as Cartouches band of thieves
in france, do as much mischief to their Country
& more will do if not speedily suppressed.14
The gangs working the Kent and Sussex coasts showed many
of the attributes McLynn regards as distinctive of Sussex
25 years later. In January 1717 sixteen smugglers met up
at Langney Bridge near Eastbourne. Two men went down to
the coast to see if a shipment of brandy had arrived and
the rest waited their return. They were interrupted by
Gerard Reeves, a Customs officer, and Nicholas Earle, his
servant. When Reeves came up to them, Thomas Dunmall struck
out at him with a sword, then the others forced Earle away
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as his master bled to death, the rest of the smugglers
telling Dunmall to wait and see if the injuries were fatal
before fleeing the country. This was the Mayfield gang,
'that defied the laws relating to running of Goods and
the Customs Officers.' John Borer, indicted for his part
in the murder, had been smuggling for at least two years,
and this was Tomkin's first appearance in the official
records of the trade.
In 1719, 200 horsemen, armed with 'Gunns, Pistolls,
Blunderbusses, Swords or Clubbs,' ran a consignment of
brandy from Goring to Billingshurst. The revenuemen attempted
to make seizures, but were threatened with murder if they
came any nearer or persisted in following the smugglers.
Thomas Chandler told the officers that the gang were 'the
Farnham Blacks,' and Paul Monod argues a connection between
south-coast smuggling, Jacobitism and the poaching gangs
operating in Waltham Forest and Richmond Park.15
The Mayfield gang remained active into the l720s,
seeeming intent on confrontation with the authorities.
Jacob Walter and Thomas Bigg came ashore from a French
sloop near Dungeness light, collected a pair of horses
and a brace of pistols from the Three Mariners, then rode
to the house of Philip Levermore, a Riding Officer, and
challenged him to come out. Once they had ridden off,
Levermore called out his colleagues and went in pursuit.
Both smugglers were taken after an exchange of fire, in
which Walter's and Bigg's pistols flashed in the pan at
point-blank range.	 The prisoners were brought back to
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Lydd and held at the George, but a party of smugglers forced
their way in, wounded three of the officers, and freed
their associates. Nathaniel Pigram, commander of the Rye
customs sloop, wrote to John Collier stressing the urgency
of the situation in Sussex:
I Beg you would apply to the Government to send
a Company of Dragoons to take up these Vilains
or in a Short time they will rise in a Rebellion,
the Number of them is not less than 200 & every
man of them for the Pretender. Officers that
are wounded is Warwick, Foreman & Martin. Warwick
I believe will dye - two Smuglers wounded but
carried off, one we hear is dead, 3 large Callis
Sloops loaded with Brandy etc lyes now off this
Harbour abt. 30 men each Sloop watching for my
comeing out. If I have not more men or a Man
of War ordered to cruse with me I am useless
& the Rideing Officers dare not appear on the
Coast. 16
Pigram's reference to the French ships is germane to any
assessment of violence and smuggling in the years following
the Treaty of tJtrecht. Wine and spirit merchants in Calais
and Boulogne saw that there were profits to be made fitting
out vessels for the English trade, as well as in selling
to the English masters and crews coming across the Channel.
They set about strengthening existing contacts in southern
England and established new ones along the east coast,
dealing with colliers, fishermen and coasters, and building
up a network of customers and helpers on land. As early
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as 1716 the Yarmouth tradesmen, dealing legitimately in
'grocery, tobacco, brandy and strong waters and spice'
were complaining they could hardly make a living, such
was the competition from 'small vessels, French & others,
bringing goods from France and Holland, running them along
the coast, selling to colliers, which then sell goods
ashore. '17
These 'small vessels' were very quickly replaced by
shallops of up to 60 tons armed with carriage guns and
swivels, sailing in flotillas, and carrying crews of 30
and more men. In a clash with Pigram's men from the Amelia
'Nicholas Bully of Callis threw two of them over Board
and afterwards fired at them in the Water.' Other smuggling
ships from Calais and Boulogne had opened fire on the revenue
cruiser, successfully resisting attempts to interrupt their
trade.18 Having attacked the Amelia off Shoreham on September
18, 1719, Peter Collis, from Boulogne, tried to run his
cargo a few miles to the westward five days later. The
Riding Officers dispersed the English smugglers gathered
on the shore at Feipham, and the French rowed back to their
dogger, but the officers had to break up the gang again
at Climping,and in the early hours of September 24th:
the French Boat came to the Shoar & Ten Men Landed
out of her and came up the Beach & seeing the
Officers on Horseback they ran back to their
Boat & taking each of them a Gun or Pistol came
running at these Deponents & the other Officers
& persons.. .& presenting their Fire Arms told
these Deponents. . .they would Fire on them & cried
out to each several times, 'Fire, Fire, ' and
made several presentments at them.'19
The revenuemen were well armed, the English smugglers
offered no assistance, and the French retreated.
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The Mayfield gang was broken up in 1721-22 and there
was less violence reported in Kent and Sussex in the mid-
1720s. Then came an upsurge in incidents involving firearms,
and again the smugglers were operating in force. In October
1729 'vast quantities of Brandy and other goods' were brought
ashore and loaded up by a gang estimated to be 100 strong.
The Riding Officers called for military assistance and
the smugglers were intercepted near Battle. 'The smugglers
received their fire first, then the King's party fired
and killed three horses and shot one of their men through
the leg.'2° A Customs officer was shot dead in an affray
at St Margaret's Bay, five miles north of Dover. Informed
that a sloop was going to run a cargo from Ostend to the
Kent coast, the Deal Surveyor took a party of twelve armed
officers to St Margaret's, where they encountered a party
of smugglers in the night:
Between Twenty and Thirty persons with Horses armed
guarding and loading a large Quantity of Goods
which the Officers attempting to seize, the said
Smugglers drew their Pistolls and killed Richard
Hill one of the Customhouse Officers and held two
Pistolls at the Surveyors breast and very much
beat and bruised three other of the Officers and
had they not made off as fast as possible would
in all likelyhood have Murthered them all.21
The preliminary to the 1733 Report described the smugglers
conducting their business 'by force and violence, not only
in remote parts of the Kingdom, but even in the City of
London itself, going in gangs armed with swords, pistols
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and other Weapons, even to the number of 40 or 50. ' The
Groombridge gang conducted a series of runs in 1735 and
1736, concentrating on the stretch of coast between
Eastbourne and Rye. Members of the former Mayfield gang
and the Hawkhurst gang were named among those taking part,
and the same strategies were adopted. Armed parties relied
on force and speed of movement to frustrate the preventive
forces, and the smugglers took care to impress the local
communities, parading through towns and villages in
daylight, displaying their weapons and declaring their
business.22 The smugglers were presenting a deliberate
challenge to governmental authority; they intended to
intimidate the revenuemen and deter possible informants.
Widening the study of the violence associated with smuggling,
to include the years before the 1740s, provides evidence
that the Hawkhurst gang were not atypical. The long careers
of some of the smugglers, and the continuity in gang
membership, are a complicating factor; McLynn's claim might
still be valid, if it is taken to apply to Sussex smugglers,
rather than their operations in a single decade. The
'purposiveness' of the Wealden gangs deserves consideration.
'Wealden' is preferred to 'Sussex,' for while Winslow's
title is more alliterative, the mapmakers situate Hawkhurst
in the county of Kent. There were several gangs, referred
to by place of origin and supposed leadership in contemporary
reports, and there were differences as well as common
characteristics 'Sussex' and 'Hawkhurst' will be used
as terms of convenience when detailed identification would
slow development of the argument.
211
III
Sussex Smugglers at Work in the 1740s
The protracted torture, mutilation, and eventual killings
of Willam Galley and Daniel Chater, were an instance of
irrational rather than purposive violence. The murders
were followed by a mid-century purge against smuggling
in which the authorities were aided by a reversal in public
sentiment. The victims might be described as legitimate
targets, using John Rule's criteria for social crime.
One was a revenueman and the other a potential informant,
neither a natural object for sympathy in the communities
served by and serving the smugglers. Alternatively, Galley
and Chater were killed by a drunken gang, panicked by
the prospect of identification and arrest. Chater had
not actually witnessed the break-in at Poole and Galley
was an elderly Southampton tidewaiter, sent along to
accompany Chater to Chichester, where he was to be questioned
by Major Battine. Once having secured them, the smugglers
seem to have been at a loss what to do with their prisoners,
and unable to see another way out, ended up committing
murder.23 Richard Hawkin's death, over the suspected theft
of a bag of tea, was the result of a vicious beating,
intended as a punishment, rather than a deliberate killing.24
In 1744 a small party of revenuemen was attacked at
Shoreham in Kent, where they had detained a pair of wanted
smugglers. One officer escaped but the other three were
tied to their horses, 'and to strike terror to other people,
to show how dangerous it was to oppose them, they whip't
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them towards Tunbridge.' The smugglers rode to I-Iawkhurst
where the officers were stripped, beaten and held in irons.
They were then taken down to the coast at Lydd, to be placed
on board a smuggling cutter and left in France, but the
crew wanted no part in it, and fighting broke out between
them and the riders.25 While these events would have
instilled fear, it is difficult to accept them as planned
or rational. Central government was quite capable of
discomforting the smugglers by increasing the military
presence, as they did in response to the Shoreham
kidnappings •26
Direct action was not always the most intelligent course.
The attack on Goudhurst in April 1747 has been portrayed
as an example of a Wealden community standing up to the
depredations of the Hawkhurst gang, while McLynn discerns
a falling out between smugglers. 27 The smugglers who attacked
Goudhurst were unusually incompetent, giving warning of
their coming and then riding across across open ground
against well-armed opponents shooting from cover. Two of
the gang were killed, and a number wounded, bringing
an abrupt end to the conflict. The thinking behind the
attack is far from clear; if the purpose was to eliminate
local rivals, or a source of opposition, then why give
notice? If smuggling was a social crime, legitimised by
the approval of the local community, then how is the
Goudhurst militia, the body which defended the village,
to be explained? Cal Winslow maintains they were set up
by the local gentry, but provides no supporting evidence,
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and the source he quotes as an eye-witness account is a
manuscript copy from an unidentified publication. 28 A brief
reference to the militia in the Treasury correspondence
in December 1747 puts the affair in a different perspective.
A petition had been presented for the payment of the £500
reward advertised for information leading to the arrest
of Thomas Fuller, a proclaimed smuggler:
We further report that the Petitioners with
others to the number of 25 or 30 persons
have armed and associated themselves for
the apprehending those persons who have been
Advertized and have not surrendered themselves,
and are now generally known in the County
of Kent by the name of the Goudhurst Militia.29
If bounty hunting was the original reason the group was
formed, then the smugglers t
 reaction was understandable,
though their tactics were not.
A better documented instance of smugglers falling out
among themselves occurred in 1747.
	 The gangs had been
active in East Kent, running cargoes at Sandgate,
Folkestone Warren, St Margaret's Bay, and Deal. Parties
of up to 150 men were reported in Thanet and it was reckoned
there was at least one run made every week at some point
between Herne Bay and the North Foreland. The London Evening
Post claimed that 'the Kentish smugglers now begin to vye
in Villany with those of Sussex, and draw together in Bodies
on the Isle of Thanet sometimes to the amount of 300 men.'
The Riding Officers were unable to identify any of the
culprits, for 'they dare not venture near them without
the utmost hazard of their lives.'30
214
200 smugglers were sighted near Margate on March
30, and kept under observation by a party of eighteen
revenue officers. The Old Molly came inshore and her cargo
was unshipped to be loaded on the waiting pack-horses.
Gervase Cowper, the Margate Tide Surveyor, waited for some
of the smugglers to move away, then moved against the
remainder, backed up by some 'country people' better armed
than his own men.3' As the preventive force came down to
the beach, the smugglers 'drew up 12 in a rank and discharged
60 or 70 pieces,' but they were out in the open and
themselves under fire. Making the best of it, the smugglers
mounted up and rode off, two and three to a horse. Cowper
seized 3672 lbs of tea, but it was thought another eight
tons had been taken off earlier. The run was a joint venture,
with men from Folkestone, Hawkhurst, and a number of East
Kent villages involved. 'But the Folkestoners, by being
more industrious or having better Intelligence, saved their
Part of the.. .Goods.The Hawkhurst men thereupon insisted
that they should bear Part of their Loss, which was
refused.'32 Another cutter was expected on April 2nd and
the smugglers assembled at Wingham and Chislet, ready for
the run and planning a raid on the Margate warehouse, where
the tea from the Old Molly was lodged. The cutter was
taken and escorted into Dover and Customs officers were
sent to guard the warehouse; a request for military
assistance was sent to the commandant at Canterbury, and
Commodore Mitchell was asked to put a naval party ashore.33
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John Cook, one of the smugglers concerned, described
how Jeremiah Curteis and Gabriel Tomkin had sent for
reinforcements from Hawkhurst after the first failure.
They were intent on a confrontation with the Folkestone
men and ended up fighting a pitched battle through Wingham's
main street:
At last Sussex and Hawkhurst were masters of
the field and carried off 40 horses belonging
to Folkestone. The dogs were so atrociously
inclined that some inhabitants belonging to Wingham
went to the outposts thereof to prevent travellers
going through. Any horseman they see was conducted
by some sword in hand to the main army where
the prisoner left his horse.34
Successful smuggling relied on co-operation as well as
coercion, and the rationale behind the Hawkhurst gang's
actions is far from clear. The show of force at Wingham
brought no financial gain, antagonised the Folkestone
smugglers, and might well have alienated the local
population. The effectiveness of fear as an instrument
of control should not be underestimated, but that line
of explanation raises questions as to how far smuggling
was legitimised by popular assent, as John Rule recognises
but does not pursue.
Smugglers, themselves rural craftsmen, smaliholders,
tradesmen and labourers, could not depend on class solidarity
to facilitate operations in coastal towns and villages.
The Kentish men identified at Chislet and Reculver were
not themselves from Thanet, and the Hawkhust gang were
clearly operating outside of their usual territory. When
the smugglers offered well-paid work, they were welcome,
and ties of family and neighbourhood strengthened their
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position in their own localities. These runs in Thanet
add force to Winslow's call for more detailed studies.
1 As yet, very little is known about the population of the
towns and villages of the Weald and the coast, where
smuggling apparently, was the main activity.' His suggestion
that regional solidarity may have broken down in 1747 and
1748 assumes it existed before that.35
The practice of assigning smuggling gangs to particular
locations,common in newspapers and in correspondence with
the Commissioners and Treasury, sacrificed accuracy for
brevity. Reporting on the smugglers crossing Romney Marsh
and Denge Marsh in the l740s, the Lydd Riding Officers
clearly distinguished between gangs led by James 'Greep'
Standford, Thomas Powell, the Gray brothers, Jeremiah
Curteis, and 'one Barrow.'36 These 'master smugglers' were
all capable of using violence, but the more brutal episodes
which provoked the authorities into taking action, involved
the same few men. Curteis was concerned in the Shoreham
kidnappings, the fight at Wingham, and the murder of Richard
Hawkins. Thomas Kingsmill was at Goudhurst and Poole
warehouse, and John 'Smoaker' Mills was involved in the
murders of Galley and Chater and beating Hawkins to death.
Arthur and William Gray had established such a reputation
that by the later l740s the London press eagerly printed
any reports of their ill-doings, substantiated or not.
They were supposed to have carried out murders in Goudhurst
and Northiam and turned to highway robbery, Arthur Gray
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was said to be 'capable of any villainy' and Cook's
confession described Gray and his mistress cavorting with
glee when an informant was brought prisoner to his house
and they were able to torture him.37
Eighteenth-century newspapers can be an essential source
of information, reporting events which went unrecorded
in official papers, but their object was to entertain as
much as to inform. Some accounts were complete fabrications
and exaggerations were common, but another problem when
attempting to understand the smuggling gangs, is the
probability that they were aware of the press reports and
responded to them.38 Portrayed as bandits, a number of
smugglers relished the role and tried to act the part.
The Two Batchelors was wrecked on Brighton beach in January
1746, but much of its cargo of wine was saved by Thomas
Kempe, acting for the lord of the manor and 30 pipes were
stored in the King's warehouse. At eleven o'clock at night
about 100 smugglers came to the store, carrying half-anchor
casks. They broke in, held the watchman prisoner, and
proceeded to fill the tubs with wine. Having dealt with
a party of local men recruited by Kempe, the smugglers
went on working until all their containers were full, then
rode off towards Eastbourne and Hastings, promising to
return for the rest of the wine. 39 Another party rode into
Lewes at mid-day, 'pistols drawn and cock'd and their
blunderbusses in a posture for an engagement, daring the
whole town and bidding defiance to everybody,' and a gang
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in Sheerness having stolen some packs of wool from Sir
John Hale, 'threatened to strip him of all he had.' They
were riding out in the daytime, swearing to destroy 'all
who shall attempt to obstruct them, and the numerous
robberies, rapes and insults that are committed make the
people afraid to go about their business.'40
The gangs generally numbered from 30 to 40 riders equipped
with firearms, swords, clubs and loaded whips. When they
combined their efforts, and took on casual help, there
might be hundreds of men assembled on the beach. The Riding
Officers were reduced to observing and recording the
smugglers' movements; they could link up with colleagues
and call on military assistance, but the frequency of the
runs and the mobility of the gangs made it difficult to
sustain any concerted campaign against them.
John Polhill and Francis Riggs, stationed at Lydd, noted
smugglers active in their area on 145 occasions between
April 1743 and March 1744. Their colleagues at Dymnchurch,
New Romney and Scotney Barn made 86 sightings over the
same period, though the same parties were likely reported
by different officers. Only five instances of assault or
obstruction were recorded, testimony to the officers
impotence rather than the smugglers' restraint. 41 John
Clare, the Hythe Supervisor, visited New Romney in October
1743. Finding the stables at the Rose and Crown filled
with smugglers' horses, he sent word for the Riding Officers
to come to him and when they arrived, 'We lamented our
condition that such quantities of goods must be suffered
to be run before our faces, and we not able to prevent
or take any of it.' The next day 60 horses were brought
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through the town, laden with tea, and the smugglers took
over the Dolphin and the Rose and Crown, 'where they
breakfasted and fed their mounts.'42 The Sussex officers,
required to report runs which had resulted in their being
assaulted or impeded in some way, listed 49 over two years.
They had been shot at, beaten and tied up, forced to go
with the smugglers many miles inland, and detained on board
the cutters.43
Riding Officers, patrolling in ones and twos, could
not check the smugglers by themselves, but they could call
on military assistance and prepare ambushes if provided
with accurate information respecting intended runs. The
smugglers used violence instrumentally, forcing the
revenuemen away from the coasts and detaining them when
goods were landed. Officers considered to be too diligent
in their work, or who had reneged on agreements, ran the
risk of punitive beatings and having their homes ransacked.
Attacks on informants, resistance to seizures, raids
on warehouses to rescue goods, can all be seen as pragmatic,
but closer study of the gangs shows them acting irrationally,
alienating sympathy and bringing down retribution. Their
violence could be purposive, but it was not systematic,
and, to the extent it was an integral part of the contraband
trade, it should feature in other regions.
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Iv
Comparisons and Connections:East Anglian Smuggling
In the 1720s and early 1730s French brandy smugglers
were active along the east coast from the Tyne to Suffolk
and there were frequent confrontations. Edward Davies,
the Southwold Collector, met fierce opposition when he
tried to search a French vessel selling brandy to the
colliers in the bay and local people gathered on the beach.
There were forty crewmen aboard the French ship, all armed
and threatening 'the death of any officer that attempts
to board.' The Yarmouth smack being out of service, the
commander hired on some assistants and took a boat alongside
another French smuggler, only to be shot at and forced
off.44	 There were similar scenes the following summer,
when officers from Southwold and Yarmouth were prevented
from boarding the Surprenant and the Union,
	 Operating
off Sizewell.45
The commander of the Harwich Customs smack tried a
different approach, accepting an offer of some brandy from
a French captain and then telling him it was a lawful
seizure. The French trained their guns on him, sent out
a boat full of armed men and recovered their casks.46 The
first fatality was in 1720. Peter Harrold was out in the
Customs boat patrolling Lowestoft Roads, where two French
sloops were selling brandy to English shipping. The French
gave chase and armed seamen followed him on board the Unity
where a sample of spirits had been left:
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and by force and violence the. . .Frenchmen drove Peter
Harrold. . .and William Burdge, Commander of the Unity
& also five or six Men. . .down into the hold of the
Ship having first wounded two men with Muskets upon
the Deck. . .Robt. Dunn & Edward Niles both belonging
to his Majesties Smack.47
Dunn died from his wounds,and John Fryer, one of the crew
of the Unity, was seriously injured, the Yarmouth Collector
trying to secure a place for him at Guy's,recently opened
as a hospitable for the incurable.48
French smugglers were ready to take on men-of--war; the
La Mouche dagger and the snow L'Es perance were working
together off Cramer, trading with a collier fleet and running
goods ashore. When approached by HMS Spy the snow took
the dogger in tow and sailed to the north with Robinson
in pursuit. When the Spy was in range the The French masters
refused to strike their colours or allow a search:
upon which I fired a broad side and small Arms
into them which they returned, and so both
contirued till I beat them out of the Dagger
into the Snow. - - then they cut their Lashings
and put off the Snow in the Smoak, and she being
of the other side I could not presently perceive
they were doing of anything like getting away,
because they kept firing. They immediately made
Sail and run away with the Snow, left some on
board the Dogger, who all jumped overboard but
Two Boys. I could take none of them up.'49
The French seemed 'resolved to force this Trade at all
hazards' and three years later one seamen on theSpy was
killed, and three injured when they took their boat too
near to a suspected French smuggler off Yarmouth.50
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Any collier wanting assistance in crossing Tynemouth
Bar had only to purchase a few casks of brandy to be assured
of a tow, and the French boasted they would:
sail in such numbers as should enable them to
defye all the men-of-war and customs boats on
the coast, and that they would protect and assist
all English smugglers that had a design to land
goods, but will not suffer the English or Dutch
to sell brandy to the colliers, being resolved
to have that trade to themselves. 5 -
The East Anglian smugglers formed armed companies working
alongside the French, but they were quite capable of managing
runs independently. Goods were run on three successsive
nights at Sizewell in December 1719 and any efforts to
interfere were 'violently resisted, though the local
smugglers were not yet carrying firearms. Edward Davies
was worried by the size of the gangs and the murderous
threats directed against the officers.52 One gang, based
in the towns and villages of the Essex-Suffolk border,
paralleled the Sussex smugglers in their methods.
Contemporary reports referred to them as the Suffolk or
Hadleigh gang, and they were running goods on beaches as
far away as the north Norfolk coast where 40 horsemen,
'supposed to be the Suffolk gang,' ran a cargo in August
1732, 'threatening everybody they met and bidding defiance
to any authority whatsoever.'53 They were thought to have
been responsible for an attack on the crew from the Harwich
sloop, trying to make a seizure at Thorpe in 1729. Three
suspects were arrested and sent to Chelmsford gaol under
military escort in case of a rescue by the 'great gang
of armed smugglers' rumoured to be in wait along the road.54
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Most of the gang's contraband was brought ashore at
Benacre and Sizewell, then taken to Bury St Edmunds and
on to London. They were said to 'fear no numbers of officers
and bid defiance to the dragoons that are quartered on
the Suffolk coast.'55 One consignment was tracked from
Benacre to Thwaite, the officers tracing the hoofmarks
in the dark. The Southwold Collector had brought along
the boatmen and the Riding Officers from the port, and
with an additional two men from Ipswich, had a party of
fourteen, three less than the estimated number of smugglers.
Directed to the house of William Cooper, they met up with
40 horsemen who attacked the Customs officers as soon as
they entered the grounds. The smugglers fired guns and
flourished their swords and whips; those officers who did
not escape were held prisoner and their horses girths and
bridles slashed.56
The Suffolk gang ran four cargoes at Cley in June
1733, and other gangs were active on the Norfolk coast.
The stretch between Cley and Winterton was 'infested' with
smugglers and Samuel Jacombe, the Yarmouth Collector,
reckoned 20,000 lbs of tea were brought in at Waybourne,
Hemsby, Bacton, Winterton and Wrexham in June 1734. Around
Yarmouth itself the Customs officers found themselves facing
parties up to 80 strong the different gangs riding through
the country in the daytime, 'declaring on what account
they are come.'57 Nor were the east coast smugglers any
less vicious than their southern counterparts. In 1727,
Jeremiah Brandreth, a Suffolk Excise officer, was stoned,
clubbed, and had his nose cut off by his own sword, when
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he tracked a smuggling party from Snape to Blackstock.
Crawling behind a hedge, he heard one of his assailants
return, cursing that they had not finished Brandreth off
when they had the chance.58
The structures and strategies of the smuggling gangs
in Kent, Sussex and East Anglia had much in common. A core
of full-time professional smugglers provided the organization
needed to acquire, distribute, store and dispose of
contraband, and constituted the armed escorts guarding
the goods against seizure. Men like Gabriel Tomkin, Jacob
Walter and Francis Norwood were as much a feature of Suffolk
as of Sussex smuggling. John Harvey, Henry Clarke, William
Neale and the Woolward and Pixley brothers were all prominent
in the Suffolk gang, some of them enjoying lengthy smuggling
careers. 59 Harvey and James Ponder were arrested in 1735,
picked up in Mile End by John Dawgs, a sheriffs officer.
They owed the Crown £37,000 in unpaid duties and fines
and Dawgs obtained a warrant to commit them to Newgate.
Before they could be transferred from Dawgs's house in
Warren Court, 'three bold shabby fellows' came to the door
offering to put up bail. More men then arrived, the door
was forced and the prisoners rescued, riding off in a group
of 20 men, swearing 'to shoot or kill all who opposed
them.'6° Three months later the same gang was responsible
for the killing of Willam Cam, a dragoon shot near Hadleigh
when a seizure of tea was recovered from a party of soldiers
and revenuemen. The information of William Meadows showed
that some of those involved were local farm labourers,
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hired for the day, but another witness, James Goss, was
able to name thirteen smugglers who actually participated
in the rescue, including Harvey, Ponder, Neale and Henry
Clarke, said to have been the one who fired the fatal shot.
None of them was described as a labourer: there were two
yeomen, a miller, a woolcomber, a locksmith and a blacksmith,
while the rest were not ascribed any occupation. 6 -
When the occupational labels in the London Gazette and
the assize minute books can be checked against other
accounts, reflecting local knowledge, it is clear that
many of those described as 'labourers' had been rural
craftsmen, small farmers and tradesmen, often butchers
or victuallers. Gabriel Tomkin's list of his associates
in the early 1720s, offered to the authorities in an attempt
to avoid transportation, included no labourers. There were
three 'husbandmen' and some men given no occupation, but
having servants in their employ.62 This does not entirely
invalidate Charles Fleet's perception of a link between
violence and proletarian participation in the contraband
trade, but the practice of using the term 'labourer' to
distinguish those who were not 'gentlemen ' should be kept
in mind.
When it came to safeguarding their interests, the East
Anglian smugglers were fully aware of the need to deal
with any threats, especially informants. Sam Dyball, having
been released from impressment on HMS Orford on Jacombe's
request, returned home to Gorleston:
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The same evening he went into an alehouse adjoining
to where he dwells and three of the salvage men
who are reputed to be great assistants to the
smugglers and another person.. . fell on Dyball
and beat him in a most barbarous manner, stamping
on his head and body and kicking and beating
him with all their might, that unless he had
been a strong young fellow he would in all
likelihood have been killed on the spot, for
we have never seen a person more beaten and bruised
about the head and body.63
Warrants were issued against fifteen smugglers on the basis
of information supplied by Henry Nursey. The wanted men
left their homes and Nursey moved into lodgings in Beccies,
'where he thought himself most secure.' Early on a Sunday
morning armed men broke in, 'pulled Nursey out of bed,
stop't his mouth that he couldn't cry out, whipt him very
severely, then put him on a horse with only his shirt on,
the night extremely cold, and carried him away with 'em.'
He was taken to Benacre and then over to Flushing, where
he was held for three months. When he returned to Yarmouth
he told Jacombe he was still prepared to give evidence
but by that time the smugglers had had time to take advantage
of an amnesty, offered to attract smugglers into the Royal
Navy.64
Bribes, offers of support for the families of associates
facing prosecution, intimidation and rescues from custody
were all used to prevent smugglers turning informants.
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James Halt, parish clerk at Benacre, was arrested outside
the church after the Sunday morning service by Joseph
Bransden, a Riding Officer. Halt had been identified as
one of those taking part in a run at Horsey in March 1746
and his friends were anxious to retrieve him. William Denny
Fox went to the Walnut Tree, where Bransden had taken his
prisoner, and demanded his release at gun point. Bransden
was also armed and Fox backed down, but the officer thought
it best to move on to the King's Head in Kessingland.
During the evening twenty horsemen surrounded the inn and
peppered it with small arms fire for over an hour. Feeling
he could not rely on his assistants, Bransden escaped and
the smugglers broke in with a crowbar, freed Halt, and
shot every horse in the stables to stop any pursuit.65
Evidence from the l720s and 1730s shows smuggling
developing along the same lines in East Anglia and the
south east, driven by the imperatives of illicit trade,
not by regional quirks of character. At the same time,
smugglers from different areas interacted, there was a
degree of interdependence, and the smugglers were highly
mobile. McClynn describes the raid on Poole warehouse
in October 1747 as 'the Hawkhurst men's greatest exploit.'66
Numerically, members of the Wealden gang made up no more
than a quarter of those concerned, but their presence so
far west, and their involvement in a warehouse raid, deserves
attention.
Six months later there was another such break-in,
this time at Colchester. On March 2, 1748, Captain Martin
had seized theGoodhope smuggling cutter in the Deben,
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and its cargo of contraband tea was delivered to the Customs
warehouse. It was a run beset with difficulties from the
start. The smugglers assembled on the Suffolk coast had
had to disperse in the face of the military patrols, and
when some of the goods were landed at Felixstowe a severe
blizzard was blowing and one smuggler died of the cold.
To further complicate operations, there was a wanted murderer
on the beach, hoping the smugglers would help him escape.67
The quantity of tea lost was not large, 1110½ lbs of Bohea
and 403½ lbs of green tea, but the smugglers were determined
to recover it. They gained entry to the warehouse by
pretending they were bringing in a seizure, 'and that it
must be immediately lodged there or it would be rescued
by the smugglers.' John Bloys, landlord of the White Swan,
had taken two of the smugglers to the Collector's house
and the door was opened by Thomas Coker, the Collector's
servant:
Immediately upon the door being opened, the two
Men took hold of Blays and Coker by the Collar
and presenting Pistols to their breasts swore
they'd kill them that Moment if they made any
noise or resistance, and made Coker strike a
light and get a Candle, after a light was got,
near Thirty Smuglers armed with Blunderbusses
and Pistols came into the Court Yard of the
Collectors house, and seven of them Clap'd Pistols
to Thomas Cokers breasts and sides, threatening
with dreadfull Imprecations of immediate death
if he did not shew them where his Master lay,
for that they were come for their own Tea and
Brandy they had paid for and would have it.68
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They forced Coker to lead then to the warehouse and broke
in with a crowbar and a blacksmith's hammer. The goods
were removed and the riders were last seen riding towards
Hadleigh. All but two of the smugglers identified on
Felixstowe beach were local men; the exceptions were Robert
Trottman, from Wiltshire, and Jacob Pring. Pring was one
of the organisers of the Thanet runs in late March 1747,
and some Kent and Sussex smugglers had wanted to invest
in the cargo brought over by the Goodhope. According to
Pring, their agent and the money were seized on the outward
journey, and he 'staid in a friendly way' to assist in
the run at Felixstowe. Pring was no altruist and there
was another possible explanation for his presence. Jeremiah
Curteis was thought to have played a part in the warehouse
raid, and there was a close resemblance to the Hawkhurst
gang's other warehouse attacks.69 Pring's tale of a lost
investment was likely a fabrication and Curteis was acting
the same role as he had in East Kent, organising the recovery
of confiscated goods.
Pring was again active on the Suffolk coast in April
1748, when thirty hundredweight of tea was brought ashore
at Hollesly Bay and successfully run inland, the smugglers
stopping to rest at John Carbold's house at Finningham.7°
Carbold had a stake in the next venture, a cargo of three
tons of tea intended to be run on the Lincolnshjre coast.
Carbold, Pring, and thirty others went to Boston to await
the cutter, but there was a repetition of the earlier
failures in Kent and Suffolk. The cutter was seized and
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taken into Yarmouth while a party of dragoons and revenue
officers pursued the riders into Lincoinshire, forcing
them to disperse. An advance party from the gang brought
the authorities down upon them by ransacking a public
house at Wrangle when the landlady refused them lodgings.
One man was arrested at the inn, and his associates staged
a rescue, riding through Boston:
with their Fire Arms presented, and proceeded
to Wrangle. . .and at the House where their Man
was, drew themselves up in order agaanst it and
forthwith fired in at the Windows and then
dismounted, forced into the House, and after
releasing their Man, began to destroy everything
that they could lay their hands on, by letting
the Ale and Beer run into the Cellars, breaking
Tables, Chairs, Glasses etc and throwing them
into the Road, and at the same time wounded four
or five People being those who had their Man
in Custody. 7 -
The set back in Lincolnshire made no difference to the
smugglers'• method of working. Three weeks later the Boston
magistrates reported two gangs in the vicinity, 'bidding
defiance to all opposers, they pass'd unmolested, there
being no force in this part of the Country to obstruct
them. '72
Jacob Pring was taken into custody shortly afterwards,
claiming he had not been concerned in any runs since the
1746 Act came into force, 'nor was ever in Company at any
time when there was any Robbery or Murder committed.' He
also maintained that he was the first person to inform
the government in November 1745 that the French fleet had
sailed ' with the Pretender on board to invade the Kings
Dominions. '73
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Activities along the east coast in the 1740s show
there was nothing peculiarly distinctive about 'Sussex
smugglers' at that time. The Hadleigh gang could be just
as violent and contemptuous of authority, and they operated
over a wider territory. The Hawkhurst men's involvement
in the Poole incident was limited and took them away from
their usual landing sites in East Kent and East Sussex.
The links between the smugglers in the different regions
indicate that the contraband trade in the first half of
the century was not essentially localised and small scale.
Such contacts, and the practice of transferring from one
area to another, were evident in the 1730s and before.
Tomkin's confederate, Jacob Walters, saw the inside of
Chelrnsford and Norwich gaols in 1733, managing to escape
from both. While in Norwich castle he was visited by John
Bentley, an Ipswich man under sentence of transportation
after failing to surrender to bail and face trial on
smuggling -charges. He was later to set up in business at
Flushing, supplying smugglers from Kent, Sussex and East
Anglia. Walter was next seen escaping over the side of
a cutter seized at Happisburgh in 1735, and was supposed
to have given up smuggling shortly afterwards. 74 Richard
Burleigh was the master of a smuggling cutter running
goods off the Sussex coast in 1733. A Newhaven Customs
man was drowned during an attempted seizure and Burleigh
was accused of supplying his men with weapons and encouraging
their resistance.75 The following year he was reported
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off the Lincoinshire coast, in company with Richard Woodwark,
'another notorious Smugler who Sometime ago broke out of
Hull Gaol.'76 The commander of the Boston smack said that
Burleigh 'swore he would not be taken either by Sea or
Land, being resolute to Kill or be K±1l'd.'77 The revenue
cruisers at Scarborough, Boston and Kings Lynn were
instructed to look out for him and a request was submitted
for naval assistance, but he was still free in 1736 when
he went before a Yarmouth magistrate to charge Richard
Hobbin, a Riding Officer, with robbing him of forty pounds.
Three years after that a prisoner in Lincoln gaol informed
against Burleigh for 3500 lbs of contraband tea.78
Jacob Peake originated from Rowhedge on the River Caine
in Essex; his first recorded smuggling ventures were as
master of the Anne and Mary cutter, running goods in the
Wash.79 By the early 1740s he had switched to the south
coast, running contraband aboard the Jolly Boys, an armed
cutter with a crew of twenty-two men. The Newhaven cruiser
came under fire from a swivel gun and small-arms when trying
to intercept the Jolly Boys in May 1741:
which wounded two of them, Samuel Baker and Thomas
Dudden in a very terrible manner, Baker receiving
three Balls in his Head and two in his right
Arm, which fractured his Scull and shatter'd
his Arm to pieces. Dudden received three Balls
in his Head which fractured his Scull so much
that several Pieces had to be taken out.8°
The smugglers kept up their fire until the sloop was disabled
by the damage done to its sails and rigging.
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Robert Martin took Peake's vessel off Beachy Head later
that year, but in the interim it had fallen into Spanish
hands, the new owners intending to use her as a privateer. 8
-Peake himself acquired another cutter and continued smuggling
In July 1743 Mr Cadnian, the Folkestone Tide Surveyor, took
his boat in shore to inspect a boat drawn up on the beach
at Hythe. He and the boatmen were straightaway surrounded
by 'Peake's gang of pirates,' and detained until the run
was over. When released, Cadman still tried to interfere,
and was held on Peake's cutter, under threat threat of
being enlisted in the French army. The Lovell Customs
cutter approached the smuggler in the early morning but
had to bear away, believing Peake would sink them. Peake's
crew numbered 40 men, and there were thought to be another
100 smugglers on land.82
Captain Martin met up with Peake in November that year.
Having followed a smuggler across the Channel from Dymchurch
to Boulogne Roads, he was 'constrained to draw away' when
eight more smuggling cutters came out of the port and sailed
towards him. Returning to the Kent coast, Martin patrolled
off Hythe, anticipating a run.
I see two of them under Dungeness. I stood down
to them and when come within half a mile found
they were both preparing to engage me. I got
ready to receive them and they presently bore
down upon me. I perceived them to be two very
large vessels and full of men and guns, and Captain
Phillips cutter being a little way astern of
me, I bore down to her, and ordered Dominy, the
mate, to send all the men he could spare aboard
of me, which he did, and came himself.83
At this juncture, Martin's men pointed out to him that
each of the smugglers was a match for the cruiser and
the Customs service made no provision for widows and orphans.
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He had to watch as the cutters unloaded their cargoes and
200 men carried the contraband away from the beach. 'These
were Peck's and Harvey's Cutters, and there is seven more
armed in this manner. '84
Peake's vessel, the Dove, was captured by Captain Hardy
of the Duke slop-of-war in March 1744, but only nine
crewmen were taken. The seizure was brought into Dover,
but did not remain there for long; 200 armed smugglers
descended on the town, determined to recover the Dove.
They had 'pistols cocked in their hands, each having two
carbines and cutlasses, swearing and threatening destruction
to the officers of the customs and to blow out their brains
and burn their homes.'85 On April 1 John Darby and Freebody
Dray noted a large party of smugglers riding through Lydd,
'it was Greep's Gang, and they had been at Dover to Resque
Pike Cutter as we are inform'd, for Pike work for Greep
whose Ru name is James Standford.'86 The Dove was seized
again later in the year, laden with a cargo of contraband
and brandy. The Commissioners intended prosecuting Peake
for the assault on Cadman, but he was not on board when
his cutter was taken. He simplified the authorities' task
by coming to Yarmouth demanding restitution. Three Riding
Officers and a military detachment arrested him at a local
inn and Peake was escorted to Norwich Castle. His cell
became a social centre for the local smugglers and the
Commissioners feared he would obtain bail and disappear,
escaping trial at the forthcoming Kent assizes.87 His name
does not appear in the list of prisoners tried at Rochester
in 1745.
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The careers of men like Peake, Burleigh, and their
Hastings contemporaries, show that smugglers were equally
violent at sea as on land. A loaded cannon was a more lethal
weapon than a loaded whip, and they were not mounted for
effect. The French brandy traders posed a real threat to
the preventive services in the 1720s and 1730s, and English
seamen adopted the same tactics. Captain Martin had not
been able to persuade his men to fight Peake and Harvey;
Captain Spooner, commanding the Yarmouth smack, encountered
the same problem. Two men were shot trying to board Jonathon
Pixley's vessel in 1737 and the next time the schuyt was
sighted, Spooner's crew refused to try and intercept it,
'alledging they were not obliged by their duty to go in
danger of being knock't on the head.'88 Pixley was brought
in by HMS Fly soon afterwards, following a two hour chase
and 'firing 16 or 18 guns off of Hasborough.'89 Detained
in Norwich Castle, he and his crew joined another group
of smugglers brought in by Captain Southgate. 9 ° Commanders
of revenue cruisers at Rye, Dover, Harwich and Yarmouth
were arguing the case for larger cruisers and crews, and
more substantial armaments. The smuggling cutters were
carrying six to eight carriage guns and some were large
enough to simply run down the cruisers.91
Once the Sussex smugglers are set in context it is
clear their violence was far from atypical. Force and
intimidation were a means of protecting the smugglers'
livelihoods; similarities between smuggling regions were
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to be expected. The Galley and Chater killings merit close
attention for the way in which they gave a further boost
to the efforts of central government to curb the smuggling
gangs, but if smuggling is to be better understood, the
emphasis should be on financial and commercial imperatives.
Working in large armed gangs meant goods could be cleared
off the beaches quickly and the preventive forces resisted.
Having developed the organisation needed to handle large
consignments on land, it was a natural step to employ larger,
better armed vessels, so making more efficient use of the
manpower assembled on the coast. Co-operation between
gangs worked to their mutual advantage and it is quite
probable that the attention given to the 'Hawkhurst gang'
has obscured the extent to which the Grays, t Trip' Standford,
Jeremiah Curteis and other master smugglers were combining
their separate forces within a regional network.
The increasing violence of the later l740s can be seen
as a response to external and internal pressures. Excise
duty on tea was reduced from four shillings to one shilling
per pound weight and fair traders, buying at the East India
Company auctions, were better able to compete with those
who relied on the smugglers for their supplies.92 The
war with France meant a larger military presence in the
maritime counties and more naval activity in the Channel
and the North Sea. Established trade patterns between France
and the south coast were further disrupted when Commodore
Barnet captured 1,300,000 lbs of French tea and sold it
in Holland. The smugglers were having increasing difficulty
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selling tea and could no longer afford to lose one shipment
in five.93 Aware that stocks in the East India Company's
warehouses were low, smugglers or their agents, attended
the London auctions to bid up prices, trying to maintain
the cost differentials between legal and illegal teas.94
The Company responded by making massive purchases abroad,
as it was entitled to do under the 1746 Act. In the sixteen
months up to Christmas 1747, the Directors obtained licences
to bring in 2,300,000 lbs from Holland, more than a year's
total consumption according to one estimate.95 Nearly a
quarter of this was Bohea, and the object of these purchases
was to restrict the smugglers' sources of supply.96
The 1746 Act reduced the judicial process to the oversight
of administrative detail.97 The £500 reward for every
outlawed smuggler brought in was an offer which some could
not refuse. When villagers in Kent and Susex were setting
up bounty hunting posses, and their confederates were tempted
to turn informant, the smugglers' options were limited.
They could surrender, and stand trial on capital charges,
they could take flight, or they could work to promote
internal solidarity and continue relying on a combination
of fear and financial interest deterring potential informants
and witnesses. John Collier expressed the view that the
1746 Act had served to make the Sussex smugglers more
desperate, and those in other regions were subject to the
same pressures.98
Because violence had a rational basis, it does not follow
that every act committed in the furtherance of illicit
trade met with general approval, or even that all smugglers
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agreed with extreme measures. Stephen and John Tucker were
proclaimed for running goods at Sandgate Castle in November
1746; they refused to surrender and planned moving to Holland
'and get aboard some of our men of war, or enter into the
Dutch service who employ Tenders to their ships now, as
we did the Folkestone cutters.' George Oxenden proposed
the Tuckers might be pardoned on condition they served
a year in the navy.
they are Smugglers it is certain, but of the
Civiller Sort, & never that I have heard used
any fire arms nor was ever in any Fray, but traded
indeed for their Quota of Brandy as their
Neighbours did... they told me that the Western
Smuglers ( which are those of the Wild of Kent
& Sussex) designed resisting to a man, but for
their Parts they abhorred that Class & their
method of Smugling & their intentions.99
Oxenden was very ready to present their case. The previous
year the Tuckers had left of f smuggling long enough to
turn out and join the military force raised by Oxenden
and other Deputy Lieutenants in Kent as a defence against
a French invasion. 'They were very active and usefull to
us at the time. . .and went out for several Days by my
direction in quest of Lally, & I dare answer for it, would
have taken him had they found him.' Not only 'the most
innocent and inoffensive of Smugglers,' but anti-Jacobites
as well; the problem might well be finding a 'typical'
smuggler. 100
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VSnugling and Communal Violence:Later Developments
Cal Winslow argues that smuggling has generally been
left out of social history, and 'out of the traditions
of resistance, carried on by the poor, to the laws and
institutions of their rulers.' There here have been
exceptions:
But even here, they have been seen only on the
fringe of the crowd, as for example, when George
Rud4. . .writes that 'attempts to impose excise
and to stop smuggling met with stout resistance...
Rude pointed, to the hanging of Captain Porteous,
but then concluded that such physical violence
[was] quite exceptional.' This is inexplicable,
at least as a reference to smuggling.101
If a distinction is made between the violence perpetrated
by smugglers, and popular protests associated with smuggling,
Rud4s assessment remains valid for the first half of the
eighteenth century, the period under discussion by Winslow.
Informants were attacked by mobs in Hastings and Chatham,
a seizure in Kings Lynn resulted in general rioting, and
a crowd in Ipswich freed some smugglers from custody, but
there is insufficient evidence for any sustained critique
of Rud"s statement.102 The numbers taking part in some
of the landings on the east and south coasts suggest that
most of the able-bodied men in the nearest villages must
have turned out, but there is still the question of whether
or not there was any general tolerance of tne murderous
violence perpetrated by the professional smugglers.
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Popular protests in support of smuggling, as distinct
from smugglers defending themselves and their property
against the preventive forces, featured more prominently
after 1760. The situation changed after the Seven Years
War. McLynn argues there was a connection between smuggling,
economic distress, and the food riots of 1765 and 1766.103
The authorities were very ready to portray smugglers as
agents of social subversion but contemporary accounts failed
to link smuggling and popular protests against high prices
and shortages. There were, in fact, a number of riotous
outbreaks which can be more directly linked with the
contraband trade
East Kent was a well established smuggling centre and
by the later 1740s the gangs there were being compared
with their Sussex counterparts. Admiral Vernon stated
there were 200 'able young men and seafaring people,' in
Deal, 'with horse and arms to be ready at calls,' and as
many or more smugglers at Dover, Ramsgate and Folkestone,
but the communal lawlessness which was to be so striking
a feature at Deal could not have been predicted from its
previous history. The catalyst was George Grenville's
decision to deploy royal navy cruisers on permanent revenue
duties 104
The Mui's attach little importance to tea smuggling out
of East Indiamen on their way up the Channel since, 'no
regular trade could be built upon a supply that was neither
sufficiently large nor constant in amount.'1-°5 Tea was
not the only form of contraband, and much smuggling was
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conducted on a casual basis. The men who made regular
crossings to the continental and off-shore smuggling
emporiums could just as easily sail out to meet merchantmen
bound for the Thames. The quantities of tea changing hands
may not have seriously dented the East India Company's
profits, but the trade could assume considerable importance
within local economies. The revenue authorities were
certainly concerned at the extent of their possible losses,
and took special measures to try and curb these
transhipments. Masters sailing out of Dover and Deal were
suspected of illicit trading under cover of coming alongside
Indiamen and offering their services as pilots through
the Dover Straits, and when vessels came into the Downs,
officers and crews took the chance to dispose of that
part of their, 'private investments' disallowed by the
Company and the Customs.-°6
This traffic did not result in any major clashes until
1764, when- H.M.S Humber anchored in the Downs, and her
commander sent out a boat to intercept a suspected run.
Some goods were seized then rescued by the party waiting
on shore, who 'so beat the Humbers People as to oblige
the Midshipman...to jump overboard.' Not long afterwards,
a Dover Customs boat was boarded and stripped of its sails,
oars and rudder, leaving the officers, 'adrift to the mercy
of the sea.'1°7 The next encounter resulted in a full scale
riot. Forty boats were plying between the Falmouth East
Indiaman and Deal beach during the evening of August 7,
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1764. A boat from HMS King of Prussia moved in on one of
them, and a smuggler was shot in the mouth at point-blank
range. Next day another Deal man was injured when he objected
to his boat being searched. The patrol boat was then
surrounded and forced inshore, where the sailors were beaten
and stoned. The crew escaped by swimming out to sea, but
Thomas Pounteney, surgeon's mate, was made to run the
gauntlet through the streets of the town, his arm already
smashed by a blow from a tiller, and his head streaming
blood. Lieutenant Prettie, commander of the King of Prussia,
was in Deal, but when no one was willing to row him back
to his ship he decided to lay low, 'till the fury and heat
of the Mob was in some measure abated.'108 	 Eleven men
were identified in the assaults and the rioting but despite
Grenville's personal interest in the affair, there were
no prosecutions.3-°9 The only witnesses were from the King
of Prussia, no seizures had been made, and Prettie had
mistakenly assumed he might delegate his authority to stop
and search for contraband, given him by Treasury deputation.
The Deal Customs men had seen the riot, but dared not
approach, 'such a tumultuous assembly.' A letter to the
St James Chronicle asserted that the officials, 'had no
reason to complain of any Violence or Incivility of the
Smugglers against them,' and held the navy responsible
for what had happened. Sailors had fired indiscriminately
at the Deal boatmen, and by blockading the port threatened
their economic survival.111
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Living a'ongside the local boatmen, fishermen and
smugglers, revenue officers had to establish some kind
of modus vivendi with the inhabitants. Royal navy personnel
were not under the same pressure. Further shooting incidents
involving men from the King of Prussia were reported in
August and September 1764 and in November the following
year a smuggler was shot dead on Deal beach." 2 Midshipman
John Fitzgerald, in charge of one of the boats from HMS
Winchelsea, had failed to secure a seizure of brandy from,
'a large Topsail boat,' he had followed inshore.. A second
boat had put out from the beach and in endeavouring to
prevent its crew from rescuing the casks they were trying
to seize, Fitzgerald and John Henderson were captured and
left on shore. Lieutenant Atkinson, out on patrol in a
second boat, found the smugglers gathered, 'in great
numbers,' by Sandown Castle, where the topsail boat was
lying in shallow water. When he boarded and tried to make
a seizure, Atkinson was attacked, disarmed, and briefly
rendered insensible. The mob was pelting the sailors with
stones, 'and in the most imminent danger of their Lives,
a Musquet was discharged,' killing a man in the crowd.
Atkinson and his men lost no time in getting afloat and
returning to the Winchelsea, but Fitzgerald and Henderson
were stranded in Deal, lodged at the Port Arms. The inn
was surrounded in the early hours of the morning and the
two men were taken and dragged through the streets, the
mob threatening to lynch them, or cut them into small pieces.
The mayor examined and discharged them, providing a guard
to ensure they made it back to their ship alive.113
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After a melee similar to that involving Lieutenant
Atkinson, John Winder, a seaman from HNS Cruizer, found
himself facing a felony charge; he had discharged a musket
in the direction of a menacing crowd on Deal beach, and
wounded Thomas Jordan.114 The customs boatmen from St
Margaret's were chased by a flotilla of galleys when they
fired a warning shot over the heads of some smugglers on
Deal's north beach. Seeking refuge in the watchtower the
revenuemen found themselves besieged by a hundred men
brandishing clubs and threatening to kill whoever it was
had used a firearm.115
Many of the participants in these riotous assemblies
would have had a direct interest in the smuggling trade,
but the numbers involved, their evident indignation, and
the open nature of their actions, indicate something more
akin to popular protest. The Deal people's response to
the policing efforts of the navy was akin to the reactions
in the Channel Isles and the Isle of Man when the Crown
took steps to extend its authority. When Captain Dow took
his cruiser into Manx ports in 1750, and insisted on
searching foreign ships for contraband, Daniel Mylrea,
Deputy Governor and deemster on Man, charged him with
'violent and illegal proceedings, such as... were never
comitted [Sic] in every[Sic] country governed by Law.'116
Fifteen years later, when Grenvi].le considered it crucial
to end the island's fiscal independence, the inhabitants
felt they were the victims of illegality. When the Act
of Revestment was passed in 1765, Charles Lutwidge was
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in charge of the revenue cutters patrolling the Island,
and responsible for organising search parties ashore. John
Terisell, writing to George Moore, merchant and smuggler,
composed a fierce indictment of Lutwidge's proceedings:
I see Mr Lutwidge is gone to London and no doubt
but to ingratiate himself will do us as much mischief
as in his power, and really Head should be made
against him, and for my part I think his Severity
and cruel Treatment to the Inhabitants if properly
laid down would paint him so to the Ministry that
he d not well like to have the picture drawn.
He landed here the 10th of June last, the 13th
he sent 25 Men to search, ransack, terrifie &
frighten & intimidate the whole country round us
- Armed with Blunderbusses, Backswords, Pistols,
Cutlasses etc. Many have made Declarations of the
violent attacks & insults they sustained by this
Headless Banditti, and ready to swear by them too,
of their threatening them with fire & sword, Breaking
open all their doors, running their swords thro'
their beds & sacks in the Houses of Millers. They
also be constantly looking in the Streets in the
night with unlawful weapons, which so greatly alarm
the people that they in the night dare scarce go
abt their business. I may add to this the Breaking
the Country peoples Boats without either Tryal
or hearing with a multitude of other grevious
devastations wch I presume the Eng 1 Government
never desired to be committed agt us beside his
taking into his Service the Ruff ins or rather the
Issuings of the Gallows in this Island wch by their
constant going abt & breaking open Houses at will
or some pretending to look for smugled goods has
greatly encouraged House breakings and other Roberies
to be committed.117
In 1766 Lutwidge was appointed Surveyor General for Man.
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Common interests in trade, smuggling and privateering
made for greater cohesion within the commercial, landowning,
and office holding elites in Britain's off-shore islands.
Traditional practices were further legitimised when local
notables articulated community grievances. In the absence
of a written record explaining their position, much has
to be inferred from the nature of mainland riots. Events
in Deal, when the mobs administered their own rough justice
and looked to the magistrates for redress, resembled other
forms of popular protest. The same was true of a riot at
Hastings when the revenue authorities tried to take up
Stephen Bourner, alias Ruxey, the reputed leader of a crew
of piratical smugglers operating out of the port.118 The
Bourner brothers were known to be the main culprits as
early as 1765, but it was not until 1767 that Stephen was
arrested by John Buckley, a Hastings revenue officer.
Bourner was held in the excise office under military guard,
and Buckley sent to Lewes for additional assistance, but
it arrived too late:
about an hour after Mr Lidwell was gone, a Mob
of upwards of two hundred People assembled before
the Excise Office, and ten or twelve of the
Ringleaders with Pistols in their hands, swore
that they would die every man but the Prisoner
should be set at Liberty, nor a man should not
be taken out of the Town or any Bond given.119
Fearing murder would be done, Buckley let Stephen Bourner
go free, and he and his crew sailed straight for France,
allegedly taking £200 with them for the purchase of tea
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and brandy. The Bourner gang were not the only smugglers
working out of Hastings, but there were only about thirty
men concerned in acts of piracy. Allowing for a network
of kin, clients and associates, it is still unlikely the
gang could have mustered so large a crowd in such short
time unless there had been general sympathy in the town.
There were no easy ways of earning a living going to sea,
and the 1759 Privateering Act, restricting the issue of
commissions to ships displacing 100 tons and upwards, closed
off one of the remaining legal pursuits available along
the south coast. There is no record that they ever killed
anyone, but the Bourner gang were a diplomatic embarrassment
and great care went into portraying them as multiple
murderers. The disinformation devised by contemporary
journalists and politicians is still presented as historical
fact)-2° The Parliamentary reports on smuggling show that
there was as much concern over the threat posed to public
order as there was for the sums lost to the revenue. Riots
in support of smuggling were unusual, but communal
involvement in running goods on the beaches was a growing
feature of the contraband trade in the l770s and 1780s
while there was often no need for subterfuge when disposing
of goods. When the Vansittart East Indiaman put into
Falmouth in 1765, 'it was like the busiest fair we have
in this county.' At least £5000 worth of muslins, silks,
and handkerchiefs were reckoned to have been bought aboard
the ship and later hawked around Cornwall and Devon.121
If the contraband were not sold as the Indiamen came up
the Channel, it could be disposed of within the port of
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London. Smuggling on the Thames reached its height in the
1780s, when men from Deptford were operating in such numbers,
and with such effrontery, that the authorities sensed a
deliberate challenge. The Board of Customs wanted troops
stationed there, but no military assistance was available
when the Dublin arrived in October 1786. As the Indiaman
rounded Blackwall point, the south bank was lined with
people, and dozens of small craft were out. George Johnson,
in charge of one of the escorting galleys, saw about 40
boats, 'with smugglers and their assistants come from the
shore.' They made straight for the Dublin, and began taking
out bale goods through the portholes. Johnson and his
colleagues in the boats from the Defence cutter could do
nothing; they were surrounded by smugglers and under a
constant hail of missiles. On board the Dublin the crowd
was standing ten deep and the contraband was carried off,
'by means of a bridge of boats stretching from the ship
to the shore.'122 One East India Company official estimated
there were 200 craft used in this operation. When the Company
men and Customs officers on board the Dublin did try to
check the traffic the Captain ignored their requests to
close the portholes, and Mr Birch, the supervisor, had
boiling water poured over him.
The affair led to a full enquiry by the Company; Captain
Smith and the first mate of the Dublin were dismissed,
and troops stationed at Deptford to assist the revenue.123
Nevertheless,later that month the master of the cutter
guarding the Winterton East Indiaman at Blackwall had to
open fire when, 'a great number of boats made an attempt
to board the ship, and the people with horrid imprecations
insisted on having goods out.' Beaten off once, they returned
in the early hours of the morning to try again.124
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VI
Comparing Levels of Violence.
The Scottish Experience
According to one of Pitt's correspondents, the contraband
tea trade in Scotland in the l780s was in the hands of,
'the substantial tea dealers in the coast towns, who are
the most decent and respectable of inhabitants', and, 'the
principal.. .dealers at Edinburgh, Aberdeen and.. .almost
all those in our large inland towns.' Their affairs were
conducted in a, 'snug, profitable, easy way, with little
noise.'125 While the overall management of the business
may have been done quietly and efficiently, parties of
between 700 and 800 men used to assemble on the beaches
to collect and remove cargoes.
The Muis draw much on this one source to sustain their
argument that the distinctive chararacteristic of later
eighteenth-century smuggling was the way in which illicit
imports were introduced into the legal channels of sale
and distribution, and Pitt's informant maintained that
if tea smuggling could be made less lucrative, illicit
imports of brandy, gin and rum spirits would also decline
for want of sufficient capital investment. 'Desperate
adventurers', employing smaller ships and fewer men, might
have continued, but 'it would be within the power of the
revenue officers and cruizers to suppress it.''26 	 The
smugglers' levels of desperation did not depend on the
nature of the cargoes they were carrying, nor was the
interlocking of legitimate and illicit commerce an innovation
of the 1780s. A 1764 report on smuggling from the Isle
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of Man to the Scottish coast, noted how methods had changed
over 'the last few years.' Previously, goods had been run
ashore and concealed in rocks and caves while the landers
went off in search of customers. By the end of the Seven
Years War:
the smugglers, dispersed through all the different
parts of the country, have formed themselves
into societies who depute some of their number
to purchase the commodities they want in the
Island and to carry them over at their own risk,
at appointed times and places, when and where
they assemble to receive them in numbers and
with a force too formidable for the Officers
of the Revenue, with any small military parties
that can be collected in those parts, to attempt
to disturb them.127
A cargo could be cleared from the beach in a quarter
of an hour and taken off through the Galloway hills, where
only light horse had any prospect of catching up with them.
The more substantial smugglers encouraged 'the farmers,
their servants, men and women and the lower class of people
in general' to invest in the Manx trade 'as the most certain
pledge for securing their assistance upon all occasions,
the pernicious effects of which are too evident by their
conduct, being always ready to assemble, obstruct, assault
and deforce the Officers of the Revenue.'-28 Cohn Campbell
conunander of a revenue cruiser, had 40 armed men with him,
including soldiers, when he found a cache of spirits at
Old Kirk, near Greenock. The church bells were rung as
an alarm, and 'a great Mob armed with Flails, Pitchforks
and Sticks assembled and attempted to intimidate Mr Campbell
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and his Party.' They had to open fire and wound a number
in the crowd in order to get themselves and the casks back
on board the cutter.129
Smuggling was an entrepreneurial activity, sensitive
to market forces and fiscal strategies, and the contraband
trade needs to be studied in the same way as other forms
of commercial activity. The Muis' approach stresses these
aspects, but in providing a necessary corrective to more
anecdotal accounts, they minimise the smugglers continued
reliance on physical force. Smuggling was becoming more
sophisticated, but this was due to the expansion of long
established fraudulent practices. Thousands of pounds
worth of goods were moved under cover of excise permits,
bills of sale from the East India Company's auctions were
a useful screen for untaxed tea, but the contraband had
first to be brought in past the preventive forces.
VII
Smuggling Privateers
MacLynn and the Muis acknowledge the greater size and
armaments of the smuggling vessels, but do not discuss
the extent to which this greater strength was used. The
commanders of the revenue sloops had complained that they
were often out-manned and out-gunned in the 1740s, and
their situation worsened as a consequence of the Seven
Years War.	 Privateering commissions 	 might have been
designed for the smugglers' convenience. They provided
a justification for fitting out ships with cannon and signing
on extra crew. The Channel was a main hunting ground and
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the privateers would frequently be hovering off the English
coast. If searched, contraband could be passed off as goods
rescued from disabled prizes, the vessels not worth
salvaging.
In 1758 the Customs Commissioners complained that small
vessels were taking letters of marque 'under pretence
of annoying the enemy, whereas we have received information
that the only use they do, or can make thereof, is to colour
their running prohibited and uncustomed goods.'-3° The
Antelope, from Sandwich, was intercepted attempting to
bring over nine chests of tea from Flushing. Nathaniel
Pigram the younger arrested the Hastings cutter for running
brandy and the Rye Collector reported that it had
'constantly been employed in the Smuggling Trade and often
times insulted and fired at Mr Pigram's people to hinder
the boarding of her, though in the Day Time.' Warren Lisle,
had to admit failure when he tried to board the Thomas
and Mary, suspected of running tea across from Guernsey.
The smuggler carried six carriage guns, twelve swivels,
and a crew of 25. Thomas Aylesbury, the master, was later
to hang for his part in the Bourner gang's piracies.l3l
The captains of these privateers developed a new tactic
when running goods, sending the crews ashore to act as
escorts, and supplying firearms to the gangs of riders.
Thomas Green, commanding a Selsey based cutter, landed
three tons of tea at Elmer Sluice early in 1758. The Cargo
was seized by Riding Officers, who then sent for military
assistance. When the soldiers arrived the preventive force
came under attack by 60 smugglers, armed by Green. Thomas
Cole, one of the dragoons, was shot dead.132
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Smuggling and privateering were again linked during
the American War of Independence, and the integrated nature
of economic activities within the maritime counties was
evident. As early as January 1777 recruiting was underway
along the south coast for seamen to crew the American
privateers being fitted out at Bordeaux, Dunkirk and Nantes.
Eighteen months later there were reports of several large
cutters under construction at Dover and Folkestone. There
were rumours that while the commissions came from Ostend,
the vessels were intended for Dunkirk.- 33 The Dover Collector
provided more details, and a less alarming explanation:
there are nine Cutters from 100 to 200 Tons
now building at this Port & at Folkestone &
Sandgate there are Thirteen Cutters building
from 150 to 240 Tons & upwards, some of which
it is said are designed for Government, some
for Privateers and others for Smuggling, but
we apprehend chiefly for the last mentioned
service, but whether any of them are privately
intended for French account we cannot with
any certainty declare on the contrary, though
it is supposed by some that three or four Cutters
building by Henry Ladd, Thomas Allen & Griffith
Archer of this Town are designed ultimately
for some persons residing in France.134
The Americans and the French needed ships, seamen, cannon
and ammunition and it was thought that guns were being
sent over from Kent and Sussex, either direct to France,
or by way of Ostend. Large carriage guns, 12 and 18
pounders, were thought to be awaiting collection from the
shore at Sandwich, 100 had been shipped Out of Dover on
the Thomas and Mary, and 22 from Folkestone.l35
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William Arnold, Collector at Cowes, attributed the
numbers of large armed smuggling cutters operating in the
Channel to the wartime emergency when their commanders
took out commissions 'tho' in fact they followed no other
trade than smuggling.' 136 Harry Carter, one of a family
of Cornish smugglers from Prussia Cove, took out letters
of marque for a newly built cutter of 197 tons, with 16
carriage guns, 26 swivels, and 60 men. He lost his command
when he sailed into St Malo and the French confiscated
her. Returning to Cornwall, he was entrusted with the
Phoenix, equipped with 20 six-pounders. He does not appear
to have enjoyed any great success as a commerce raider,
and was probably pleased to revert to straightforward
smuggling after the war.'37
William Jef ford, master of the Active letter of margue,
seemed determined on Confrontation with the revenue cutters.
When intercepted by the Hawke off Mevagissey, he informed
her captain, Ambrose Nicholls that, 'no Custom House Vessel
in England should examine his Vessel unless by force of
Arms.' Nicholls went to Fowey for help, leaving a boat's
crew to keep observation. They came under fire from the
Active's guns loaded With, 'round and Grape or Canister
Shot.' The smuggler was eventually brought in by the
Brilliant cruiser, caryirig extra manpower from the Hawke
and the Fowey garrison; the smuggler was boarded after
an exchange of cannon fire.138
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Some of the privateers sailing out of French ports
pretended to be smugglers as a cover for their real
activities and genuine contraband carriers using Dunkirk
complained to the French authorities that allowing the
American Gustavus Conyngham to use Dunkirk was attracting
too much English interest, and trade was being hurt by
the navy's presence in Dunkirk Road.139 William Haggis,
commanding one of the Harwich Customs cutters, gave the
privateers lurking off the east coast as the reason for
him to engage more crew. There were two vessels in the
Wallet, 'filled with Men, mostly English, tho' they have
French Commissions.' Haggis reckoned they were after prizes,
and were using smuggling as a cover, carrying a few casks
of liquor in case they were stopped by cruizers 'of Superior
force,' and had to explain their presence on the English
coast. 140
As with some English letters of marque, commanders with
American and French commissions combined privateering and
smuggling.	 In February 1781, eleven men landed out of
a boat at Runton, carrying muskets, cutlasses, and a Dutch
flag. 'They greatly terrified the inhabitants,' and a press
gang was brought in from Cramer to round them up. The
gang was taken to Norwich, protesting that they were only
smugglers, 'and say they belong to a sloop with thirty
men, and came out of Flushing a month since.' The suspicion
was that	 they had sailed with Daniel Fall, a known
privateer, and
	 had not abandoned their sinking sloop,
as they claimed, but were sent, 'to plunder, or surprise
some unarmed vessel.'141
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The same party had earlier attempted a landing at Whitby,
where three of them were wounded in a clash with the local
Volunteers. Fall was identified as a smuggler in 1783,
but he still had a letter of rnarque. A deserter from HMS
Aldernay in 1779, he won notoriety in February and March
1781 when he was reckoned to have taken eighteen prizes.
In August, Sir John Warren wrote from Scarborough to the
Collector at Yarmouth, describing how two privateers had
been brought in by the Winchelsea. The master of one was
supposed to have been born in Dunkirk, but, 'his Frenchified
name was not unlike Faull. ' The other captain was 'Brown
of Deal, ' wanted for the murder of a Customs boatman some
years earlier.142
VIII
The Rationale for Violence
Establishing that there were links between smuggling,
privateering and piracy helps corrects the impression that
as illicit .nd legitimate commerce merged, and the smugglers
worked more within the regulated market, violence ceased
to be an integral part of the contraband trade. The scale
of the operations in different locales points to a more
intelligent application of force rather than its diminution.
Assembling hundreds of men on the beaches, and using heavily
armed ships as an exercise in deterrence, could be sufficient
to prevent interference by the land and waterguards.
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along the south coast. When a party from EMS Folkestone
tried to make a seizure near Poole, Midshipman Robert Wilson
was badly beaten, Eneas Atkin was shot through the leg,
and Edward Martin was assaulted, shot, and dragged into
the sea, 'and left there almost dead &. . .with a design
for the Breakers to drown him.' Robert Trotman the 'Head
of a desperate Gang of Smuglers was kill'd' in the
fighting.144 The smugglers in East Anglia were certainly
active in the mid-1760s, but there were no reports of
the large, well armed parties characteristic of the l740s.
The sudden increase in violence, including the murders
of Peter Haslip and Thomas Jenkins at Hapton, coincided
with the implementation of the new excise rates. The demand
for East India Company tea had gone up
 during the war,
but then began to fall away. With the reduction in duty,
smaller dealers and retailers, previously dependent on
the smugglers for supplies at prices working men and the
tmiddling .sort' could afford, would at least consider
acquiring future supplies of tea through legitimate channels.
The smugglers in turn would respond by taking steps to
reduce unnecessary overheads, such as allowing the revenuemen
to make substantial seizures.
From the later 1760s, 	 the revenue officers faced a
situation much like that twenty years earlier. Boston
was, 'infested with notorious smugglers.. .no officers scarce
dare appear on the sands without manifest danger of their
lives, they come in so great companies, and all so well
armed.' Anyone interfering was threatened with being taken
aboard the cutters, and the crews declared, 'they would
protect any of their chapmen ten miles into the country,
and defy all the customs vessels in these parts.'l45
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The mobility of the smugglers was even more marked than
in the earlier period. In November 1770, the Norwich Mercury
recorded,'a great many desperate smugglers lurking about
the Norfolk coast, who are fled from Kent, Sussex and
Surrey. Thomas Bean of Deal was arrested at Happisburgh
in October and taken to Norwich Castle where he was visited
by Thomas Tanner, commander of a Rye cutter running goods
in Norfolk. When Tanner himself was taken, and held at
the Swan Inn, Happisburgh, his crew surrounded the building
and exhausted their ammunition firing in through the
windows. 146 Christopher Cutting and his assistants unearthed
a cache of tea and spirits on Bacton beach, but were forced
away by Francis Artis, master of a Folkestone lugger lying
offshore. Artis's men then landed carrying firearms, and
rescued the contraband, bar twenty-one casks of gin, left
as tribute to the revenue, and one presented to the crowd
of onlookers.147
William Hart, commanding the Bee cutter out of Harwich,
would not risk an engagement with two well-armed cutters
off Orfordness, but he was able to identify one of them,
'well known upon this coast and commanded by one Cocks,
or Cox, known by the name of Homey Cock.'148 Cox's real
name was Richard Dangerfield, another Folkestone man, and
his smuggling record went back six years earlier to 1772,
when he was running cargoes from Flushing and Boulogne
into Kent and Sussex. A party from the Bee later discovered
300 casks of spirits in a cellar, having traced cart tracks
from the River Deben. Before they could get a waggon, 'a
hundred men, smugglers and others,' surrounded them and
recovered the spirits. The revenuemen were convinced the
goods had been run out of Cox's ship.149
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A year later, Hart was pursued into the Wallet; he
had approached a cutter thinking it was unarmed, 'but when
he came very near she ran out five Guns on one side, fired
into the Bee, and chased her through Goldiman's Gap.. .firing
at her till she was out of reach of her Guns.' In April
1778, William Haggis, mate of the Argus, sighted a cutter
off Dunwich and moved in to board her.
The Cutter stood for the Argus and hoisted a
blue pendant at her masthead, they also slung
their Gaff, Jibb and Foresail with Chains and
fired a Gun: my Mate hoisted his Ensign and fired
a Gun, but discovering her to be a large Cutter
with Ten Carriage Guns, besides a number of
Swivels, and full of Men, and as the Argus having
neither shelter for her Men,or Chains for the
Sails etc. nor otherwise equipp'd to risque an
engagement without a manifest hazard of having
both Officers and Men cut off, they thought in
such a case it was most prudent to put about,
and stood from her, upon which the Cutter set
a larger Jibb, and endeavoured to come up with
the Argus, but finding the Argus outsailed them,
they bore up and fired their two stern chase
Guns at the Argus.
Hart came across the same cutter off Southwold the next
day, and was harried south along the coast as far as
Orfordness 150
The revenue cruisers did enjoy some individual successes.
William Dowsett, a known smuggler, grounded the Neptune
on the sands at the entrance to Burnham river, but he refused
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to allow any officers from the Bee to come aboard. When
the incoming tide floated his ship off, Dowsett tried to
fight his way past the Bee, firing nails and pieces of
old iron from his swivel guns. Two smugglers were killed
and three injured in the exchanges and the Neptune was
taken.151 More often, the cruisers were outgunned and to
make good the deficiency, both the Bee and the Argus were
equipped with the newly invented carronades. 152 Captain
Fisher, commanding the Yarmouth based Hunter, described
beating off a smuggler after an exchange of broadsides
off Beckhithe in 1777; his adversary mounted six carriage
guns and eight swivels and like several of the smugglers
he encountered, it was of 'superior force and better mann'd
than the vessel under his command.'153 Fisher had his eye
on the Dover Customs cruiser, a 120 ton cutter carrying
eight or ten cannon. Denied a new vessel Fisher continued
lamenting the Hunter's impotence in the face of formidable
smugglers, 'all of them of great force, full of Men, &
in general sail in Concert'
on their first discovery of a Revenue Cruiser
they hoist a Jack, Fire a Gun to Leeward as
a signal to bear down to each other, and engage
her, scarce any of which singly are able to
sustain the Conflict, much less can they hope
to take them, or effectively suppress their
illegal and dangerous conduct.154
Fisher wanted a frigate or sloop-of-war stationed on the
Norfolk coast until he had a bigger and better armed cruiser.
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Sortie	 of	 the	 smuggling cutters were	 formidable
adversaries for the revenue cruisers. There was a 300
ton Folkestone cutter with 60 men and 22 guns, which put
in 'weekly when the weather permits, at or near Dunwich
to a most numerous gang of smugglers.'-55 HMS Ariadne and
ElMS Fly captured the Deception and the Three Brothers in
June 1780, with six tons of tea and more than a thousand
casks. The Three Brothers had only a few swivel guns,
but her escort carried fourteen three and four-pounders,
sufficient to deter the Customs and Excise patrols sailing
out of Harwich and Yarmouth.156
The smugglers were not going to surrender their vessels
and cargoes all the while they outmatched the revenue
cutters. In an effort to improve the odds, the cruisers
began sailing together. The Hunter and the Argus succeeded
in capturing and bringing in a smuggling cutter in March
1778 though:
The People on board were so desperately
determined to defend themselves against an
equal force that all their Guns were loaded
with Ball and Grape Shot, and other Balls were
made red, hot, in order on being fired to make
the greater destruction.'157
Crews from five cutters attacked the customs officers
when they tried to carry out searches on the River Burnham
in 1784, and Fisher lost one of his men at Bacton, attempting
to board Charles Gee's ship. When the Hunter's boat came
near, the smugglers opened fire with:
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'Cohorns, Muskets, Blunderbusses and other
Fire Arms, and mortally wounded Robert Jay. . .they
also hove into the Boat a Heavy Cohorn,
Carpenters Adz, Pistols and other Weapons and
endeavoured to sink the Boat and Destroy all
the People on Board the Boat.''58
Some of the attacks by smugglers were as much as assertion
of power as a defence of their property. James Woodward
and four of his men from the Swift were overpowered on
board John Ward's smuggling cutter. After a stormy crossing
of the North Sea they were left in Flushing, returning
on the Dolphin packet. Three years later a boarding party
from the Swift was again surprised during a search. This
time the smugglers abandoned the officers off the Essex
coast, and took the cruiser.159
Limiting the area of investigation to East Anglia,
and concentrating on the maritime aspects, it is not
difficult to contest McLynn's claim that the Wealden
smugglers of the 1740s were in some sense unique in their
use of force and terror to safeguard themselves and their
property. The violence employed by the smuggling commanders
in the 1770s and 1780s was of a different order, artillery
taking the place of small arms as the main weapons, but
the motives were the same and the evidence of rationality
more convincing. To the north, smugglers running goods
on the Yorkshire coast,took care to impress the revenue
officers with the strength of the contraband cutters. In
November 1774 the Mermaid and the Eagle were moored in
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the Tees not 'daring to stir for fear of being sunk. ' There
were five smuggling cutters in the bay, and one of the
Customs mates had been given a conducted tour of the largest
of them. Her commander pointed out the strength of his
armaments and the size of his crew, and passed on the
information that he would assist any other smuggling vessel
the revenuemen attempted to search.16°	 When anchored
in Saitburn Bay, the Eagle was approached by two armed
shallops and told to get under way or be sunk. David
'Smoaker'Browning, then opened fire, shredding the cruisers
sails and rigging and forcing her to take refuge in the
Tyne. The Mermaid had to abandon her patrol off Dunstanburgh
Castle, and when the two ships sailed together, they came
under attack from two shallops and a schooner off Robin
Hood's Bay. 'The vessels are all Armed as are all that
come upon this Coast. . . two or three of them always keep
together and are determined not to suffer any of the Cruisers
belonging to his Majestys Revenue to Cruise on the coast
whilst they have any of their Cargoes on Board.'l6l The
Ferret tried to prevent a landing in Redcar Bay but the
smuggling cutter made to run down the Customs boat, and
maintained a continuous fire for twenty minutes.162 When
a considerable seizure was made at Hartlepool, fifteen
men from William Rowles ship broke in and rescued the goods,
forcing their way into the King's warehouse at gunpoint.'63
Smuggling on the Hampshire and Dorset coasts was Carried
on by former privateers, large cutters and luggers between
200 and 300 tons:
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It is no unusual thing for them to land their
goods in open day under protection of their guns,
sometimes in sight of the Revenue cutters whom
they will not suffer to come near or board
them. . . These large vessels frequently convoy over
other smaller ones. They keep off till towards
night, when they run in and land their cargoes
at places where gangs of smugglers, sometimes to
the number of 200-300 meet them.
Prices varied according to whether the goods were sold
at sea, or landed 'under the protection of their guns'
between Hurst and Christchurch, or brought into the Isle
of Wight, Langstone or Portsmouth. 164 The smuggling cutters
mounted between 18 and 26 carriage guns, and had complements
ranging from 50 to 80; the Wasp took on a naval sloop
carrying 22 guns and 140 men and had the better of the
fighting. It was one of 'several actions with the Kings
cutters and sloops, but always got off.' 165	The Cowes
Excise cutter was forced off its station by the Doggerbank,
a smuggling cutter carrying 22 twelve-pounders and a crew
of 60, and the Chichester Customs cutter struck upon the
bar at Littlehampton, fleeing another smuggler.l66
The balance of power shifted when the Admiralty sent
HMS Expedition and HMS Orestes to back up the revenue
cruisers. Captain Ellis of he Orestes captured the John
and Susanna off the Needles in December 1783. She was
a 280 ton cutter with 22 guns and 140 men. Gunfire from
the Orestes's ninepounders destroyed the smuggler's canvas
and rigging, and forced the crew below deck, but when boarded
she was found to be
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perfectly clear for action, a vast number of
cartridges fitted, guns cast loose, primed, shotted
etc. her gaff chain'd, sails and rigging secured
as is usual with vessels when they expect to
come to action.l67
In March 1784 Lieutenant Crooke took the Expedition across
to Guernsey, following up information about two luggers
intending to run goods on the Hampshire coast. Crooke
reported seven smuggling vesels operating out of the Island,
most of them between 70 and 100 tons. A sixteen gun cutter
had also been there, and the Ranger lugger. Built at
Cawsand, and working the Cornish coasts, the Ranger was
armed with 16 eight-pounders and six six-pound cannon.168
The Orestes next seizure was the result of a combined effort
with HMS Jackal. The smuggling cutter received six broadsides
before striking her colours, and the hunt had lasted more
than four hours; there were a number of Deal men among
the crew, and the commander was Andrew Hague from
Folkestone.169
There were four fatalities among the Orestes's crew
in 1784. Three men were killed when fired on from a smuggling
cutter when out in the Oreste's boat, and the fourth in
during an affray in Christchurch harbour. Two luggers
slipped past Ellis and landed their cargoes near Christchurch
Head. Estimates of the number of horses used to shift
the goods varied from 100 to 400, along with 40 to 50
waggons. James Sarmon took the Excise cutter in, but a
landing party was driven of f by a threatening crowd. Ellis
was notified, and he organised a flotilla of seven boats
from the Orestes, the Swan Customs cutter, and the Excise.
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As this force entered Christchurch harbour, the smugglers
ran their luggers ashore, and when the boats came within
range they opened fire from the ships and a hastily
constructed earthwork. William Allen, the Orestes's master,
was hit in the leg, and almost immediately afterwards a
bullet, 'entered his right side and penetrated his liver
and stomach...of which he soon after died.'17° The gang
withdrew to the Havenhouse Inn, and no attempt was made
to dislodge them; the luggers were seized and brought out
the next morning, The Orestes was involved in more incidents
than most of the cruisers on revenue duty, having the men
and the armaments needed to take on the smugglers, but
the same patterns of intimidation and confrontation was
apparent all round the coasts. Three smuggling vessels
were reported unloading goods, 'sufficient to load three
Thousand Horses,'at Old Shoreham in Sussex, and the Lewes
Excise supervisor decided not to interfere with the 500
men seen in the vicinity. The combined effort of the Tartar,
the Wasp and the Echo, drove the LongsDlice cutter ashore
at Seaford in February 1785, and Captain Haddock was
killed aboard the Scourge Customs cutter when it was hit
by a broadside. Richard Mackie was shot dead when the
boat from the Assistance pursued a suspect vessel and
Alexander Dawn, HMS Wasp's purser, was murdered at Dover.
His corpse was found floating in the harbour some days
later. 171 Eight miles to the north there was a state of
near war between the smugglers and the navy. Lieutenant
Gabriel Bray, commanding HMS Nimble, claimed it was common
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practice for the smugglers to fire on the revenue boats;
'they have Carriage Guns at many Avenues or Streets, to
cover their large Boats, when landing Goods in the Night.'172
Bray's men were the targets for frequent attacks, and his
zeal alienated the townspeople. In April 1784 two boats
from the Nimble intercepted the Juliet lugger between Deal
and the Goodwins. The ship was boarded and three smugglers
shot dead, another died as his wounds were being tended,
a fifth held out until he reached the hospital, and a sixth,
having apparently recovered from his wounds, met his end
after transfer to the Nimble,'for greater security.' One
of the first men killed was Thomas Browne, wanted for
murdering Richard Mackie six years earlier.' 73 The parallels
between different parts of the country can be quite striking.
While he made no mention of the fact in his autobiography,
there were six smugglers killed on Henry Carter's cutter
when she was boarded by men from HMS Druid in 1788.174
Smuggling was well established in Cornwall by mid-
-century, when George Borlase claimed that the coast swarmed
'with smugglers from the Lands End to the Lizard,' who
had become 'so bold and daring that nobody can venture
to come near them with safety whilst they are at their
work.' 175 A decade later, William Rawlings estimated that
nine out of ten families in Cornwall drank tea twice a
day, but 'perhaps not one family in one hundred buys what
pays duty.'176 Violent confrontations 	 on the scale of
those in East Anglia and the south east were infrequent
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until the 1760s, when there was again the possibility of
a connection between the cut in tea duty and an increase
in violence. William Odgers was murdered by Meichiedeck
Kinsman in 1768. Odgers, a Penzance officer, was caught
by four smugglers just as he was about to remove a cache
of brandy casks found in a field. They attacked him:
inflicting several Wounds and Bruises in several
Parts of his Body, and particularly a violent
Depression upon the Brain and a Fracture in the
Left side of the Skull, and a compound Frac'ture
in his Right LegJ77
The injuries were caused by stoning and a frenzied attack
with a loaded whip by Kinsman. Odgers lingered on for
two days after the attack. Francis Drake, a debt collector
for Thomas Priaulx, the Channel Isles contraband supplier,
was killed the following year. The recipients were expected
to pay as a matter of honour, but some smugglers took the
expedient option. Kinsman was another of Priaulx's customers,
and under some pressure to pay up at the time he killed
Odgers 178
In the early 1770s, Irish smugglers bringing goods from
Dunkirk presented a danger to the revenue cruisers. There
were at least a dozen wherries to be seen at Dunkirk at
any one time, 'of about 100 tons burthen, having twenty
or thirty men, and eight or ten carriage guns, three or
six pounders.' 179 The Prince Earnest shallop, stationed
at Penzance and St Ives, was one victim. In 1772 she
was attacked by an Irish wherry and the crew had to take
to the boat to escape cannon and small arms fire. Their
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vessel was then plundered and sunk. Either she was recovered
or a new shallop was built, for in 1777 the Prince Earnest
was driven into Penzance by a 200 ton smuggling cutter,
carrying 50 to 60 men and 14 cannon. Captain Jane was
ordered aboard the cutter unless he wanted to see his ship
sunk, once they had a hostage, the cutter left, with the
shallop under orders to follow. The cruiser was later
turned adrift, bereft of a seizure made by earlier by Captain
Jane.18° The Hawke's boat was driven ashore by the gunfire
from 'a large new Irish cutter with Eight Carriage and
Seventy Swivel Guns' which continued
	 firing as the Hawke's
people scrambled up the hill at Deadman's Point. The Hawke
was then chased into Falmouth harbour by her intended
quarry.181 The same thing happened to the Excise sioop
stationed at Padstow. Having driven her into harbour under
cannon fire, an Irish wherry fired off a salute and sailed
for Newquay to unload her cargo. Another heavily armed,
well-manned wherry was reported running goods near Penzance
in January 1775, and in June two anchored half a mile off
the port and remained three days, discharging goods. They
had up to 16 cannon each, and every member of the crew
was carrying a firearm.182 Armed gangs obtructed and
intimidated the Excise officers at Porthollen and Truro,
and the want of a cutter on the Penzance station was blamed
for the extensive smuggling in Mounts Bay.183 William
Rawlings claimed 'it was no uncommon thing for 100 horse
on Sundays as well as week days to be in waiting for one
or other of the wherries and some smaller craft.'184 Other
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observers noted changes in the smugglers' tactics. As goods
were brought ashore from the cutters, there would be, '100
Men and Horses on the Beach to carry them off, 80 of which
are Loaded and the other 20 are light Horse and are an
escort for the horses and Goods, they have carried lately
in Triumph 3 or 4 Sloop loads.'185 The crews were coming
ashore with swords and pistols and providing escorts as
the goods were moved inland. Echoing Borlase nearly thirty
years earlier, Edward Giddy described the area around
Penzance as 'Inhabited by a Set of Smugglers under the
Denomination of Fishermen,' and noted the escorts from
the ships. He estimated that £100,000 was sent out of
Cornwall every year to purchase tea and spirits in France.186
Giddy's assessment makes interesting reading when set
alongside the suggestion that John Wesley's preaching had
made a significant impact on the smuggling trade.
It would be mere Pedantry to attempt to
describe. . .the shocking Effects, the moral
and political ill Consequences of Smugling
carried to such a daring Height; but I cannot
help saying that Perjury, Drunkenness, Idleness,
Poverty, Contempt of the Law & an Universal
Corruption of Manners are in this Neighbourhood
too plainly seen to accompany it.187
The Carter family installed a battery at Prussia Cove
during the American war, 'under Pretence of a Defence against
the Enemy, but which is evidently designed to Protect
themselves and other Smugglers in their unlawful Commerce.'
In 1783, excise officers, supported by soldiers, had wanted
to search Carter's premises, but came under cannon and
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Coast of Cornwall.'192 The revenue cutters could not gain
advance intelligence by visiting the Channel Isles, and
were incapable of matching the smugglers unless they could
act together. Gabriel Bray, still a lieutenant but now
commanding the Hind revenue cutter, had the galling
experience of being chased by two smugglers into Falmouth
harbour. 193
Losses suffered through seizures could soon be made
good, cutters and cargoes were insured and those who ordered
the contraband were expected to pay, whether or not the
goods arrived. Even so, the costs in terms of lost trade
and disappointed customers needed to be considered, which
helps explain the determined resistance against the Customs
and Excise cruisers and the naval sloops and men-of-war.
Whatever the smugglers' advances in business acumen, their
adoption of conventional commercial practices, and the
penetration of legal markets and distribution networks,
the contraband trade still relied on armed men and armed
cutters.
A dossier of the blood spilled over the decades in defence
and defiance of the revenue has a certain grim fascination
in its own right. It also casts doubt on McLynn's claims
respecting the atypical purposive violence of the Sussex
smugglers in the 1740s. but it is difficult to explain
some of the incidents solely in terms of the smugglers
safeguarding their interests. Some of the opposition
encountered by the revenue authorities is hard to distinguish
from other forms of popular protest. WI)en a smuggler was
shot at Deal, trying to escape the boat from HMS Scout,
the whole town was set on exacting revenge. The wounded
man was brought ashore and:
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carried through the Town in procession with his shirt
all over Blood to excite resentment and indignation
against the Scout; the cry then was, the Captain
is on shore, let us Murder him; happening to be near
the Custom house I got into the Collector's house
and sent out my friends to learn the State of the
Town, who upon their return informed me that every
avenue was regularly beset and every house guarded
where they suspected I should go to, and that they
were determined to Murder me. And those of the Scouts
Boats coming on shore to endeavour to get me off
was attacked with Stones which wounded the Officers
and others of the Crew. When they launched their
Galleys to endeavour to cut them off from the Ship,
but were prevented by the other Armed Boat who went
to her assistance, I then endeavoured to get a Custom
house Boat to carry me off, but it was impossible.'94
Captain Lindsey made his way to Dover by post chaise, and
so managed to get back to the Scout. In subsequent encounters
the Wasp and the Scout were fired on by a cannon the
smugglers had brought down to the beach, and the seizure
of a lugger was stopped by, 'a vast number of the inhabitants
of Deal assembled with firearms to oppose the officers
and men.'195 Neville Williams argued that a punitive action
against the Deal smugglers in 1785 taught them a lesson,
but there was litle evidence of any slackening in activity
at the time, and there was another major riot in 1801 when
the Tartar's boat tried to seize a lugger at North Deal.196
Explicit connections between smuggling and social protest
were rarely made at the time, but the third Duke of Richmond,
dealing with the Sussex militia riots in 1778, linked them
to the smugglers.	 There were no 'persons of consequence
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on the connections between crime and social protest certainly
raises questions about the definition of crime and the
extent to which it is a social construct. It is necessary,
as Clive Einsley says, 'to understand how crime was defined
by the relevant institutions of the society experiencing
it.' It is also useful to trace the connections between
ideology, the framework of law and regulation, and the
practical problems of policing. Defining crime as 'behaviour
violating the criminal law' has the advantage for the
histori	 of relating behaviour to laws in force at a
particular time.'199
	
But as Emsley points
	 out, such a
working definition has its limitations. It gives litle
indication of the need for those entrusted with law making
and law enforcement to be sensitive to the different
perspectives in society. Policing was far from being a
simple process of prevention, prosecution and punishment.
Eighteenth-century smuggling, linking such diverse elements
as the great companies trading in the world market and
the marginal communities of England's heaths and woodlands,
serves well to bring out the complexities of law enforcement.
What is apparent is that judgements of what made an offence
grievous or venial did not rest on the extent of the violence
which accompanied it. Nor were there clear distinctions
in attitudes and social mores between governors and governed,
prosecutors and offenders, smugglers and revenuemen. The
survival of judicial torture, in the form of 'pressing'
when the accused refused to plead, burning for petty treason,
keel-hauling and flogging in the armed services, and the
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squalid brutality of the gallows, all suggest a society
where violence was entrenched and institutionalised. The
smugglers use of the carbine, the cutlass and the club
might be seen as the continuance of trade by other means.
Commercial imperatives dictated tactics throughout the
century and in all areas where illicit importation
flourished. Against this rather detached analysis, it
is essential to reiterate some of the realities of smuggling.
Intimidation might be a calculated means of deterring the
revenue officers from interference, or it could stem from
a vicious nature, it might even be an aspect of class war.
Smugglers can be seen as protectors of their own financial
interests, defenders of the local economy against
metropolitan capitalists, or as both victims and villains
trapped in a cycle of feuds and vendettas. Not all violence
is mindless, but neither should the rationale for terror
obscure the brutality of its execution, or the fact that
some of its perpetrators were sadistic drunks. Even if
some of the smugglers' actions might be interpretated as
rebellion against a stratified society and repressive
authority, it is doubtful whether their half-hung or half-
-drowned victims would have shown any sympathy for their
attackers' problems of social adjustment.
276
Notes to Chapter Three.
1. Frank McLynn, Crime and Punishment in Eignteenth Century
England, (1989), pp.196.
2. J.M.Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England, 1660-1800,
(Oxford, 1986), p.138.
3. E.P.Thompson, Whigs and Hunters, (1975), p.193.
4. P.R.O HO 35/5, January 18, 1784.
5. D.Hay and others, Albions Fatal Tree, (1977), P.14.
6. L.Stone, 'Interpersonal Violence in English Society,
1300-1980, Past and Present, No. 101, (Nov. 1983)
J.A.Sharpe, 'The History of Violence in England: Some
Observations, Past and Present, No. 108, (Aug. 1985).
7. Thompson, 'Whigs and. Hunters', p.193.
8. Cal WInslow, 'Sussex Smugglers', in, D.Hay and others,
Albion's Fatal Tree, p.121.
9. W.D.Cooper, 'Smuggling in Sussex', Sussex Archaeological
Collections, (1858) p.11.
10. Paul Muskett, 'Military Operations against Smuggling
in Kent and Sussex, 1688-1750, Journal of the Society for
Army Historical Research, Vol. LII, No. 210, (1974) p.91.
J.Haynes, 'Great Britain's Glory: or an account of the
great numbers employed in the Woolen and Silk manufactures',
in, English Wool Trade, Select Tracts, (Farnborough, 1968)
p.24.
Cooper, 'Smuggling in Susex', pp.11-12.
11. Calendar of Treasury Books, Sept. 10, 1663. See also,
CTB, March 18, 1660/1, Aug. 5, 1662.
12. Haynes, 'Great Britain's Glory', pp. 63-4.
13. Muskett, 'Military Operations', pp. 95-6.
T1/86, June 8, 1703.
Paul Muskett, 'Deal Smugglers in the Eighteenth Century'
Southern History, Vol. 8, (1986), p. 49.
14. SP 35/78/132, The Originall Rise, Progress and present
State of (those Enemies of England) the Owlers.
15. SP 35/78/132.
East Sussex Record Office, Collier Papers, SAY, 257, 259
Paul Muskett, 'Gabriel Tomkin, Sussex Smuggler', Sussex
History, Vol.2, Nos. 2 & 3, (1981, 1982) pp. 8-17, 19-27
Paul Monod, 'Dangerous Merchandise, Smuggling, Jacobitism
and Commercial Culture in South east England, 1690-1760,
Journal of British Studies, 30, (April 1991) pp.150-182
SAY 334, Rex V Thomas Chandler et al; Monod argues that
the Mayfield gang were concerned, but none of those named
in the indictment can be tied in with incidents where the
Mayfield gang were identified. The link between the Blacks
and smuggling was suggested by Eveline Cruickshanks and
Howard Erskine-Hill, 'The Waltham Black Act and Jacobitism'
Journal_of British Studies, 24, (1985) pp.358-365.
277
16.SAY 266.
Muskett, 'Gabriel Tomkin', p.10.
17. T1/202, June 20, 1716, SP 36/161/531.
18. SP 35/19/1 Dec. 2, 1719.
19. Ibid.
20. Ipswich Journal, Oct. 4-11, 1729.
21. SP 36/26/173, March 30, 1732.
Muskett, 'Deal Smugglers', p.50.
22. The Report, with the Appendix, from the Committee of
the House of Commons appointed to enquire into the Frauds
and Abuses in the Customs to the Prejudice of Trade and
Diminution of the Revenue, 1733. p.1.
CUST 41/42, King V John Bowra, King V Thomas Gurr, King
V Isaac Pope, King V Thomas Ward.
23. Winslow, 'Sussex Smugglers' PP. 136-7, 160-65.
F.F.Nicholls, Honest Thieves, (1973) pp.88-176. Nicholls
says the authorities delayed, but see SP 36/106/121-4.
24.Nicholls, 'Honest Thieves', pp. 140-7.
25 Old Bailey Proceedings, December, 1747, trial of Peter
Tickner, pp. 19-26.
Ipswich Journal, Feb. 16, 1745, June 6, 1747. The 1745
report noted the drowning of Peter Floyd, one of the captured
officers but this was never mentioned in the trial record.
26. G.T.Wjlliams, Historical Records of the XI th Hussars,
1715-1908, (1908) p 30. A hundred men were ordered to
Shoreham.
27. McClynn, 'Crime and Punishment', p. 186.
28. Winslow, 'Sussex Smugglers', p.155, and see Notes to
the Introduction, No. 44.
29. T 11/23/302-3, Dec. 23, 1747.
30. London Gazette, Oct.24, Nov. 3, 1746, Jan. 7, Feb.11,
April 18, 1747.
CUST 51/25, Nov. 25, Dec. 22, 1746, March 29, 1747.
Sayers TS. March 7, 1746/7, Ketcherell to Collier.
31. CUST 51/25, April 7, 1747.
32. Kentish Post, Aug.l-5. 1747 contains the Ordinary of
Newgate's account of John Cook's confession.
33. CUST 51/25, April 2, 1747,
London Gazette, June 6, 1747,
34. Sayers TS, April 5, 1747.
35. Winslow, 'Sussex Smugglers' p.144
36. Collier TS, pp. 243-4.
37. The Trials of the Smugglers and other Prisoners at
the Assizes held at East Grinstead, (1749) p.4.
Kentish Post, Aug.1-5, 1747.
London Evening Post, June 18, July 14, 1747,
Sayers TS, Dec. 31, 1747.
278
38. London Evening Post, Aug. 6-8, 1747. This edition carried
report that letters had been sent to the editors of
newspapers by some Norfolk and Suffolk smugglers
'Threratening destruction if they published anything in
their newspapers reflecting in the least upon smugglers'.
39. Kentish Post, Jan. 18-22, 1746.
40. Ipswich Journal, Jan. 1, 7, 14, 1744, Feb.16. !745.
41. Collier TS, pp.233-242. This sumarises incidents from
April 1743 to March 1744. SP 36/41/136-140 provides a similar
overview for Sussex.
42.Sayers TS, Oct. 17, 1743.
43. SP 36/41/136-140.
44. CUST 97/347, May 29, June 4, 1717. Collector to Board,
Aldeburgh.
45. CUST 97/347, June 18, 1718.
46. Neville Williams, Contraband Cargoes, Seven Centuries
of Smuggling, (1959), P. 100.
47. SP 35/21/59, Information of Peter Harrold.
48. CUST 97/347 March 4, 1719/20
CUST 97/4, June 8, 1720.
49. SP 35/52/29. For other examples, see SP 35/56/11 and
Ipswich Journal, July 17-24, 1725.
50. CUST 97/5, June 16, 1727.
51. CUST 97/6, June 13, 1729. In 1731 Joseph Southgate,
commander of the Walpole Customs sloop, was ordered aboard
a French shallop in Holkham Bay, 'and swore if this Dept.
did not come on board. . .they would board the Walpole Sloop
and their Men should strip this Deponent and his Company
and use them at their pleasure.' Southgate complied, but
did not have to sacrifice his reputation.
52.CUST 97/347, Dec. 16, 1719.
53. ADM 1/3865, Aug. 16, 1732.
1733 Report, p.87, CH 41/20 Oct. 2, 1733. For earlier
examples of armed gangs on the Suffolk coast, see CUST
97/347, Jan 5, Feb. 12,1719/20
54.CUST 99/2, May 17, July 12, 1729.
55. CUST 97/8, July 16, 1734.
56. T1/279, Sept. 29, 1732. CH 1903, Sept. 29, 1732.
57. CUST 97/8, June 24, 1734.
58. Tl/261, July 19, 1727.
279
59. CUST 99/1, March 13, April 3, June 12, July 1, 1725
OUST 97/6, Jan. 1, 1728/29, CUST 99/2, May 17, July 12,
1729, Jan. 6, 10, 20, 1730/31.
60. CH 41/25,
Ipswich Gazette, Feb. 8, 1735.
61. Tl/288, April 26, 27, 28, 1735, Examinations of James
Goss and William Meadows, evidence of Oliver Newby.
Ipswich Gazette, April 26, May 17, 1735.
62. T1/236/239, Dec. 4, 1721.
63. OUST 97/12, Nov. 16, 1742. For the earlier impressment
of Dyball, see OUST 97/12, Oct. 16, 1742 and E.E.Hoon,
The Organization of the English Customs System, 1696-1786,
(Newton Abbot, 1986), p.233.
64. CUST 97/13, Feb. 28, 1744/45, CUST 97/13, June 13,
July 8, Oct. 23, 1745.
Ipswich Journal, March 9, 16, April 6, 1745.
65. Old Bailey Proceedings, Sept. 8-10, 1748, trial of
Robert Cunningam, pp. 256-59, July 3-6, 1751, trials of
John Pauling and Sam Eager, pp.252-4, Sept.11-l8, 1751,
trials of Edward Brook and John Carbold, pp.264-7.
66. F.McLynn, Crime and Punishment in Eighteenth-Century
England (1989) pp.186.
67. Old Bailey Proceedings, Sept.11-18, 1751, trials of
Edward Brook and John Carbold, pp.264-7.
Ipwsich Journal, July 18, 1748,
London Gazette, July 14-18, 1748,
H.Hatton and H.H.Holland, The King's Customs, Vol. 1, (1908)
p.465.
68. SP 36/106/257, April 16, 20, 1748.
69. T1/342/20-22, John Polhill's petition, July 14, 1750.
70. SP 36/117/118.
71. SP 36/107/293, July 11, 1748, SP 36/107/266,
OUST 97/14, July 6, 1748.
72. British Museum, Add MS. 32718, f.29, May 8, 1748.
73. Add MS 32717, f.575.
74. CUST 99/2 Nov. 1733, CUST 97/9, July 7, 1735,
T1/295, March 1737.
Nicholls 'Honest Thieves'pp.58-60
75. P.R.O High Court of Admiralty, HCA 1/57, Nov.26, 1737,
examination of Nicholas Edsall. The authorities seem to
have been uncertain as to his correct name.
76. ADM 1/4284, July 31, 1734.
77. Ibid.
78. ADM 1/2243, Captain Oliphant's letters, Aug.2, 1734,
OUST 97/9, Feb.2, 1735/6, May, 1736,
Atton and Holland, 'The King's Customs', p.243.
280
79. Typescript, Customs House Library, B.R. Leftwich,
Selections from Customs Outport Records, East Coast, Kings
Lynn, Board to Collector, Dec. 29, 1739.
80. ADM 1/4284, May 26, 1741.
81. Ipswich Journal, July 18, 1741,
Leftwich,	 'Selections' Board to Collector, Coichester,
Aug. 18, Sept. 17, 1741.
82. Sayers TS, July 16, 1743, Tl/3l9, July 10, 1743,
SP 36/62/37, July 18, 1743.
83. ADM 1/4284, Nov. 11, 1743.
84. Ibid.
85. Collier TS, May 5, 1744.
Ipswich Journal, March 31, 1744,
ADM 1/1884, Captain Hardy's letters, March 24, 1744.
86. Collier TS, April 31, 1744.
87. Calendar of Treasury Books and Papers, 142-45, p.679,
March 30, 1745.
CUST 97/13, Nov. 10, 1744, Jan. 1, 1744/5.
88.CUST 97/10, April 29, 1737
89. CUST 97/10, May 21, 1737,
ADM 1/2243, Captain Oates's letters, May-June, 1737,
CH 81/16, Johnathon Pixley's information.
90. CH 41/24, April 4, 1737.
91. Add MS 32697, f. 19, f.289, f.394,
ADM 1/3865, Dec. 15, 1746.
Sayers TS, Aug.l, 1741
CUST 41/42, King V Grayling.
92. Hoh Cheung and Lorna H Mui, 'Trends in Eighteenth-Century
Smuggling Reconsidered', Economic History Review, 28 (1975)
p.39.
93. Commons Journals, XXV (1745-50) p.102.
94. Ibid, p.105.
95. Treasury Letter Book, Customs, Tl1/23 pp.102-3 ' 233
4
96. Ibid.
97. PC 1/6/1 An Act for the further Punishment of Persons
going armed or disguised, in Defiance of the Laws of Customs
or Excise.
98. Winslow, 'Sussex Smugglers', p.135.
99. Add MS 32711, ff. 90-91, May 19, 1747.
100. Add MS f.167, May 29, 1747.
101. Winslow, 'Sussex Smugglers', p.121.
102. Graham Smith, Something to Declare, (1988) p.42.
CUST 99/2. Jan. 6, 10, 20, 1730. The smugglers did not
remain at liberty for long. In 1735 six smugglers in the
Fleet prison and Mann Greetham, in Newgate, petitioned
Admiral Wager for his assistance. Most had been detained
for the past four years. SP 36/34/49.
281
103. McLynn, 'Crime and Punishment', pl9B. McLynn cites
as evidence the single incident at Elmer Sluice, but does
not explain the link with economic hardship. The idea of
a connection was advanced by Walter Shelton, English Hunger
and Industrial Disorders, (1973) pp. 135-6.
104. Edward Vernon, Seasonable Advice, (1757), pp.108-9,
John L Bullion, A Great and Necessary Measure, George
Grenville and the Genesis of the Stamp Act, 1763-65, (1982),
pp.52-8.
105. .Hoh Cheung and Lorna H Mul, 'Smuggling and the British
Tea Trade before 1784', American Historical Review, Vol.
LXXIV, Oct. 1968, p.45.
106. Muskett, 'Deal Smugglers' pp. 49-50,
CH 39/2.
107. St James Chronicle, Oct. 4-6, 1764.
108. ADM 1/4286, Sept. 7, 1764, evidence of Henry Prettie,
ADM 1/4286, August 1764, evidence of William Pounteney,
William Nelson and Evan Thomas.
109. N.S.Tucker, ed. The Jenkinson Papers, (1949), pp.323-
5.
St. James Chronicle, Sept. 18-20, Oct. 4-5, 13-16, 1764,
ADM 1/4286, Sept. 11, 1764, George Litchfield's report,
110.ADM 1/4286, Sept. 15, 1764.
111. St James Chronicle, Aug. 27, Sept. 7, 1764.
112. T1/441/426-8, Nov. 14, Dec. 11, 1765.
113. Ibid.
114. Muskett, 'Deal Smugglers' pp. 54-6.
John Winder was tried at the Kent assizes, and acquitted,
Kentish Gazette, March 28-31, 1772. Claims that juries
were totally hostile to the revenue services need to be
scrutinised.
115. Muskett, 'Deal Smugglers', pp. 54.6.
116. Manx National Heritage Museum, Atholl Papers, AP
58(3rd) 1,
see also, AP X 12-4 and AP X 19-9.
117. M.N.H.M Bridege House Collection, BH 4475, April 16,
1766.
118. David J Starkey, British Privateering Enterprise in
the Eighteenth Century, (Exeter, 1990), pp.161-3.
Paul Muskett, 'The Hastings Pirates, a Cautionary Tale',
Sussex History, No. 26, Autumn, 1988, pp.18-28.
119. Tony Hayter, ed. An Eighteenth-Century Secretaryat-
War. The Papers of William, Viscount Barrington (1988)
Pp. 270-72.
120. Starkey, 'British Privateering Enterprise', pp.169-
70.
Muskett, 'Hastings Pirates.'
121. Historical Manuscripts Commission, Fifteenth Report,
Dartmouth Manuscripts, Vol.111, (1896), p.178.
PRO 30/8/293, July 6, 1784.
282
122. Tl/635, August 31, 1786.
India Office Library, East India Company Records, Home
Miscellaneous, HM 497 (9) pp. 333-367.
123. TI/636, Aug. 11, 31, Oct. 10, 11, 1786,
HM 497(9) pp.333-367.
124. Tl/636, Oct. 24, 1786.
125. PRO 30/8/354
126. PRO 30/8/354.
Mui and Mui ' Smuggling and the British Tea Trade', p.62.
127. M.N.H.M 40(3-3) Report from the Scottish Commissioners
on smuggling from the Isle of Man, 1764. There is evidence
of sophisticated organization in the Manx smuggling trade
as early as the 1730s. See CH 41/64 and CH 2570, May 18,
1736.
128. Atholl Papers, AP 40B-24.
129. T1/434/59, Tl/434/60
130. Tl/380 July 18, 1758. See also, SP36/139/131 and 132.
A Captain Harman commanded one of these privateers reckoned
to be smuggling, probably one of the Harman brothers who
sailed with the Hastings Transports.
131. Paul Muskett, 'The Hastings Pirates, a Cautionary
Tale', Sussex History, No. 26, (Autumn 1987) pp.17-27.
132. Paul Muskett, 'A Case of Rough Justice', Sussex History,
No. 24, (1986) pp. 5-10.
133. SP 37/23/81, June 15, 1777, SP 37/12/274, July 3,
1778.
134. SP 37/24/149, August 4, 1778.
135. SP 37/26/301, Oct. 8, 1781. See also SP 37/15/412
November 20, 1781.
136. D.Arnold-Forster, At War with the Smugglers; the Career
of Dr Arnold's Father (1936), P.36.
137. Frank Pollard,	 'Smuggler Captain: Harry Carter',
Journal of the Royal Institute of Cornwall Vol. 26,
(1965-68) pp. 333-360.
138. ADM 1/3866, June 1, 1780.
139. R.W.Neeson, ed. Letters and Papers Relating to the
Cruises of Gustavus Conyngham a Captain of the Continental
Navy, 1777-79 (New York, 1915) pp. 45-7, 53-56.
Norwich Mercury, May 10, 17, June 7, 21, 26, Aug. 2, 1777.
140. CUST 99/11, March 7, 1781,
Norwich Mercury, July 31, 1780.
141. Norwich Mercury, March 3, 1781,
Norfolk Chronicle, Feb. 24, 1781.
283
142. Norwich Mercury, Feb.17, April 21, June 16, Aug.3,
1781,
CUST 97/24, Aug. 1781,
Muskett, 'Deal Smugglers', p.56.
Kentish Gazette, May 20-23, 1778. In the encounter with
Brown, one officer was shot dead and two injured.
143. CUST 99/8, April 23, 1768.
144. CUST 60/2, March 25, 1765, Collector to Board, Poole.
145. CUST 95/19, March 7, Oct. 3, 1768.
For developments in East Anglia in the 1760s, see
CUST 97/19, July 2, 1765, March 10, 11, 16, Nov. 30,1767,
Jan.2, 1768.
For the killings on Hopton beach, see Chapter Two, pp.140-
-142.
146. Norwich Mercury, Oct. 27, Nov. 10, 1770.
147. KB 32/1, June 8, 1779,
Norwich Mercury, May 21, 1779.
148. CUST 99/10, May 7, 1778.
l49.KB 32/1 Aug. 22, 1772, June 26, Sept. 27, 1777.
Richard Dangerfield was named as commander of the Eclipse
letter of marque in January 1779, another example where
a smuggling career was no bar to authorisation as a
privateer.
Kentish Gazette, Jan 12-15, 1779.
150. Cust 99/10, April 10, 1779.
For the attack on the Bee in the Wallet, see CUST 99/10,
1778.
151. CUST 99/10, Nov. 1, 1778,
Norwich Mercury, Nov. 7, 1778.
152. Hervey Benham, The Smugglers Century (Chelmsford,
1986), p.61.
153. CUST 97/22, Nov. 7, 1777.
154. CUST 97/22, March 5, 1778, and see CUST 97/23,
May 16, 1778, for an attempt by a smuggler to impress a
crewman from the Hunter, intercepted at sea.
155. CUST 97/25, Oct. 11, 1783.
156. P.R.O Privy Council papers, PC 1/12/25, June 17, 1780,
CUST 97/24, Oct 23, 1780.
Stephen Marsh, commander of the Deception, was another
Folkestone privateer, Kentish Gazette, March 6-10, 1779.
157. CUST 97/22, March, 1778,
Norwich Mercury, June 30, 1780 for a joint seizure netting
1000 gallons of spirits. Three smugglers were reported
killed.
158. CUST 97/25 Aug. 14, 27, Sept. 3, 1784.
Norwich Mercury, Aug. 21, 1784.
284
1775.
1777.
War with the Smugglers', pp.35-
159. KB 32/1 Jan. 9, 1778,
CUST 99/11, March 7, 1781,
Norwich Mercury, March 17, 1781,
Kentish Gazette, Jan 20-24, 1786. William Hines was convicted
at the Admiralty Court and executed for piracy, Gentlemen's
Magazine , 1786, p.78.
160. ADM 1/4287, Nov. 18, 1774. A connection was made between
counterfeiting and smuggling. Since the passing of the
Gold Act 'A great many who could not purchase the price
of a pegg.. . are now provided with both money and a horse
at their call which are furnished by those who have
quantities of light money by them, as the smuggling cutters
refuse none.' York Courant, June 14, 1774.
161. CUST 89/5, October 25, 1775, Collector to Board,
Stockton.
162. CUST 89/5, Nov. 10,
163. CUST 89/5, Nov. 17,
164 .Arnold-Forster, 'At
6.
165. ADM 1/4289, MAy 14, 1783.
166. Ibid.
167. ADM 1/1763, Jan. 8, 1784. Letters of Captain Ellis.
168. ADM i/1763, March 1, 9, 1784.
169. ADM 1/1763, May 13, 1784,
Kentish Gazette, May 26, 1784.
170. ADM 1/1763, June 10, July 15, 21, 1784,
HO 42/206, July 23, 1784.
The Times, July 22, 1784, Morning Chronicle, July 22, 1784.
171. A.L.Cross, XVIII Century Documents Relating to the
Royal Forests Sheriffs and Smuggling, (New York, 1928)
p.30.
Kentish Gazette, Sept. 3, 1783, Feb. 28, Oct. 30, 1784,
Feb. 16, April 13, 1785.
Edward Carson, Smugglers and Revenue Officers in the
Portsmouth area in the Eighteenth Century (Portsmouth,1974)
pp. 15-16,
HO 35/5, Jan. 18, 1784.
172. Muskett, 'Deal Smugglers', pp. 60-62.
173. Ibid.
174. ADM 1/2594, Feb. 2, 1788, Captain Thornborough's
letters.
Pollard, 'Smuggler Captain: Harry Carter', pp. 350-360.
l75.Thomas Cornish, 'The Lanisley Letters',
the Royal Institute of Cornwall, Vol.VI,
377-8.
l76.HMC Dartmouth Manuscripts, Vol III, pp.176-7.
177. T1/467/193-198, March 7, 15, April 14, 1768,
CUST 68/6, March 12, April 7, 1768.
Journal of
1878-81, pp.
285
178. Peter Raban, 'Clandestine Tradein the Mid-Eighteenth
Century', Transactions Societe Guernesiaise (1987) p.314.
179.HMC, 10th Report, Appendix VI, Abergavenny MS, l887,p.5.
180. SP 37/9/212, July 17, 1772, CtJST 68/10, Nov. 29, 1777.
181. ADM 1/3866, May 14, 1774.
182. HMC Dartmouth MS, Vol.1, pp.214-216.
183. CUST 68/9, Aug. 18, 1775.
184. Dartmouth MS, Vol.1, pp. 214-6.
185. WO 1/875, March 22, 1770. For the increasing violence,
see, WO 1/875, March 19, Sept. 12, 1770,
CUST 68/7 Dec 9, 1769, March 17, 1770.
186. SP 37/12/212-3, March 4, 1778.
187. Ibid.
188. Cross, 'XVIII Century Documents', p.309.
189. CUST 68/13, Feb. 9, 1788, CUST 68/14, Nov. 11, 1789,
CUST 68/15, Sept.26, Oct.6, 1791, CUST 68/16, Dec.12, 1792.
190. CUST 68/16, Feb. 10, March 1, 2, 1794.
191. PRO 30/8/138.
192. PRO 30/8/179.
193. Ibid.
194. ADM 1/2507, May 29, 1784.
Muskett, 'Deal Smugglers' pp. 63-4.
195. Muskett, 'Deal Smugglers' pp.63-4.
196. Williams, 'Contraband Cargoes', p.153.
CUST 54/14, Nov. 28, 1801
197. SP 37/12/247 and 251, May 30, 3±, 1778.
198. Cust 97/347, Jan 5, Feb. 1720/21.
CUST 97/8, Feb. 27, 1733/4 June 24, 1734.
199. Clive Emsley, Crime and Society in England, 1750-1900,
(1987) pp. 2-4.
286
Chapter Four
The Army as a Police Force
I
The Need for Military Intervention
Mainland Britain has five thousand miles of coastline
while the regular peacetime army stationed in Britain
numbered between ten and fifteen thousand men. In
J.A.Houlding's words, 'Wherever there are coasts there
were smugglers; and we can safely assert that smuggling
was one of the occupations that, next to agriculture,
employed	 the	 greatest	 number	 of	 eighteenth-century
Englishmen.'1 It would have been possible to have stationed
two or three soldiers to guard each mile of the foreshore,
but to little purpose, even in the unlikely event of the
whole of the home army being committed to coastal duties.
Parliamentary Acts passed in Charles II's reign authorised
revenue officials to apply for military assistance against
owlers and smugglers, without first obtaining a magistrate's
warrant, and they showed no reluctance in seeking help.
Armed smuggling gangs were a real threat and the question
was not so much whether the army should be called in, but
how best the soldiers might be used if local commanders
were ready to co-operate. John Strode, Lieutenant Governor
of Dover Castle, was prepared to turn out the garrison,
but they were under constant surveillance by the owlers:
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so that if the gates be opened they take the
alarm and return their wools to the houses, and
pretending to be woolcombers and weavers, it
cannot be seized there, though they hardly make
a piece a year.2
The trade in contraband wool was flourishing all along
the coast from Sandwich to Newhaven, the smugglers grown
so formidable that 'no one dare meddle without five files
of soldiers.'3 As early as 1669 the Dover officers were
proposing that military detachments be stationed in every
village along the coast, with regular patrols by day and
night.4 Detachments were appointed to coastal duty in James
II's reign, but there were claims of collusion between
the soldiers and smugglers.
What assistance they gave was chiefly to the Owlers,
who bribed them to connive at the Exportation of the
Wooll: Nay, there is good ground to believe that they
not only conniv'd at the clandestine Practice, but
left their Stable doors open, upon compact with the
Exporters, to give them an Opportunity of making use
of their Horses in the Night time, for conveying the
Wooll to the Seaside, where the Shallops lay ready
to receive it.4
Henry Baker, Surveyor-General for Kent and Sussex, argued
successfully for an organised landguard in 1698. Riding
Officers had been appointed six years earlier, but they
were seen as provisional, a poor alternative to the cruisers
forced to remain in port by French privateers. Baker wanted
to recruit more Riding Officers, with military detachments
deployed to support them. An Order in Council instructed
the commanding officers at Canterbury and Ashford to respond
to any request from the Surveyor-General or his deputies,
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and parties of dragoons from the Queen's Regiment were
based at Folkestone, Dymchurch, New Romney, Lydd and East
Guildford, a total of twenty men. There were a few occasions
when the soldiers assisted in making seizures, but when
they were withdrawn in 1706 neither the Kent Customs officers
nor the Commissioners called for their reinstatement.5
Illicit trade revived as the war drew to an end and armed
smuggling was a problem again in 1713-14 as revenue officers
came under increasing attacks. Major Saxeby, Baker's
successor as Surveyor-General, reported large gangs on
the south coast in 1716, sending out raw wool and importing
French brandy and silks. The Riding Officers were intimidated
and the smugglers 'living at free quarters wherever they
pleased.' Saxeby drew attention to the smugglers' Jacobite
sympathies and three troops of Gore's Horse were ordered
into Kent and Sussex and the following year 297 officers
and men from Wynn's Dragoons were sent to perform coastal
duty in Sussex alone.6
There were 32 dragoons quartered at Halesworth and
Harleston in 1732, intended to provide support for the
revenue but located some way from the Suffolk coast.7 After
the failure to intercept the smuggling party at Benacre
that year, the Southwold Collector argued that 'had we
had the liberty to remove the Quarters of Ten of the Dragoons
as we desired. . .we might in all probability have had the
greatest part of between Thirty and Forty hundredweight
of Tea.'8 Samuel Jacombe reckoned another 52 soldiers were
needed in the county, based nearer to the Riding Officers
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and John Cornelius, his Ipswich colleague, proposed
detachments be sent to Leiston and Southwold, but in spite
of the 'several gangs of strange and unknown smugglers'
haunting his own port and threatening the officers, Cornelius
did not believe that soldiers would be of service there.9
Four dragoons were quartered in Southwold in 1734, and
took part in some substantial seizures, but there were
still no troops at Yarmouth. Having soldiers on call was
not enough. A careful operation, involving Riding Officers,
the crew from the Customs smack, and the dragoons from
Halesworth, still failed to produce more than 160 lbs of
tea, taken from a pair of smugglers who had become separated
from the main body. Jacombe argued that with more soldiers
on the coast 'we should with more assurance have expected
success,' but there was no prospect of covering the whole
East Anglian shoreline.10
Ninety dragoons from the Queens Own Regiment were sent
into Norfolk in 1735. There were frequent reports of gangs
between 20 and 40 strong, and Valentine Bayles, Inspector
of the Riding Officers, described how he had tracked the
smugglers well inland. Yet some of the detachments saw
little active service. 263 men from the 4th Dragoons were
based in Norfolk and Suffolk, but in 1743 the commissioners
were informed the soldiers at Kings Lynn 'had not been
called out by the officers on the smuggling account for
several years past.'11
Kent was beset by smugglers in the early l740s but
only 39 dragoons were assigned to coastal duties in 1742.12
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There were nine infa:-itry companies, but the revenue officers
doubted their utility. When three regiments of marines
were sent into Romney Marsh early in 1744, Mr Clare, the
Hythe Supervisor, expressed his preference for dragoons,
with at least a hundred of them deployed at Lydd, Romney,
Dymchurch and Hythe:
Unless I have a number at first sufficient to
make head against such numbers as there are,
and so well armed, I should be only the cause
of men coming on the coast to be knocked on the
head, which will make them [the smugglers] more
insolent than they are now.'13
Two more cavalry troops and an infantry company were
quartered in Sussex in 1743, though a year later Battine
was requesting more troops within his survey while Collier
was saying Kent needed at least 200 dragoons. Battine
was told the only way the force in Sussex could be reinforced
would be to deplete the establishments in Norfolk, Suffolk
and Kent.14
The Gentleman's Magazine described the affray at Elmer
Sluice, when Thomas Cole was killed, as 'the first material
resistance' by Sussex smugglers since the Special Commission
at Chichester eight years earlier. 15 There had been a number
of incidents in Kent, though firearms had not been used,
and gangs of smugglers were active on the Hampshire and
Dorset coasts in the later 1750s. 16 Calls for additional
military help, or the restoration of detachments moved
elsewhere, became more frequent over the following decade.
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By the early l770s, the War Office was inundated with letters
from both Customs and Excise officials. In 1769, Richard
Baker, a revenue official in Norfolk, felt 'a few soldiers,'
would suffice to disperse the gangs around Happisburgh.
Two years later he was requiring 50 men to be stationed
at North Waisham, Heacham, Hunstanton, Thornhain and Cley.
The Riding Officers along that stretch of coast were not
even attempting to make seizures, and dared not execute
warants without having a military escort. 17	The officers
in Sussex were pressing for more troops at Rye, Hastings,
Eastbourne and Winchelsea, to round up the Bourners and
their piratical confederates. Yet when a full troop of
Iniskillings was quartered at Hastings, Edward Milwarcl
complained that this was more than were needed by the
revenue. As the dominant figure in Hastings political
life, Milward was probably under pressure to get the
detachment reduced. Richard Hughes proposed a troop of
dragoons at Poole and Christchurch, conducting day and
night patrols to check smuggling on both sides of the
harbour. Four months later, faced with a large gang running
goods out of Purbeck, the Riding Officers were complaining
that the commanding officer at Blandford would not provide
any support, having 'no Orders to let any of his Men go.'
There was little the revenue officers could do 'unless
they could be assisted by a Military Force.'18
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By the end of 1771 the Poole officers were reporting 'great
and desperate Gangs of Smuglers that run vast Quantities
of Goods on our North Shore,' and asking that the dragoons
at Wimborne be given orders to provide assistance, 'which
we are of Opinion will in a great measure put a Stop to
the atrocious & daring Attempts of the Smuglers & enable
the Officers to do their duty with more Security.'19 Soldiers
were sent to the coast, only to removed in the autumn of
1774.	 Customs and Excise officers reported that while
they had not seen the crews of the smuggling cutters bringing
firearms ashore:
we do not see they have any Occasion for
them, the land Gangs being so very numerous
who have all great Sticks or Horse Whips
with Lead or Iron at the Butt End, that it
is very dangerous for a small Party of Officers
to attack them or their Goods and since the
Party of Dragoons that were lately quartered
on this coast have been ordered of f the
Smugglers are become more insolent than ever.20
The problem of large armed gangs was not confined to the
coast. The Excise Commissioners, having collated reports
from different collections, reported that although the
smugglers separated as they moved towards London, they
were still riding in parties 30 and 40 strong. The officers
put their lives at risk if they tried to intercept them,
'and when they apply for the assistance of the Soldiers
quartered in the Neighbourhood, even then they are seldom
a match for the Smugglers.' 21 Revenue officers at Croydon,
East Grinstead, Dartford and Sevenoaks had all asked for
support, one going so far as to specify the need for light
cavalry, 'Mr Tankard having represented that the Heavy
Cavalry are not fit for this service.'22
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The Excise Commissioners asked for 594 cavalry and
infantry to be stationed along the south coast from Kent
to Dorset, but suggested 137 would be enough to cover
Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex.23 The Secretaries of State
and the War Office were unwilling 'to order any Parties
of Dragoons to the Neighbourhood of London for the purposes
of supporting the Officers of the Revenue.'24 Stockwell
was an established smuggling centre, a depository for
contraband due to be sold to London dealers. 'Master
smugglers' maintained stables of horses and a number of
riders who brought goods up from the coast:
These master smugglers do not only bring run
goods on their own account, but they run goods
for various tea dealers, mercers, haberdashers
etc. on commission, that is, they have so much
per cent upon the value for bringing them safe,
and in case of loss, the carrier or master smuggler
pays for the goods.. .so that the Stockwell
smugglers are common carriers of run goods and
from the long practice in this village, of the
smugglers using it, and spending a good deal
of money, all the lower clases of the inhabitants
are become attached to them, and unitedly join
in opposing the officers of the revenue25
The officers could obtain troops to carry out searches
and escort seizures, but the local people could be 'most
amazingly violent,' and the excisemen dared not venture
out after dark; still they could not secure a permanent
military presence.
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In 1772 there were just 552 horse and 104 infantry
assigned to coastal duties from the Wash to Land's End.26
The outbreak of the American War of Independence complicated
the army's role as an anti-smuggling force. There were
far more soldiers, an average of 108,484 for the years
1775-1784, but fewer were available for coastal duties.27
Over those same years the smugglers perfected their tactics,
strengthened their networks and systematically penetrated
the legal market. Smuggling vessels sailed together for
protection and their crews provided armed reinforcements
for the riders and waggon trains carried thousands of pounds
worth of contraband inland. Contraband was stored in
underground caves in Dorset, ready to be tcarried off
gradually as markets offer.' The Poole officers knew where
the goods were, but needed a troop of dragoons to make
any seizures since, 'The proprietors can in a very short
time dispatch messengers into the Forest and other places,
where large gangs of smugglers reside, and raise 200 or
300 men to rescue the goods.' The Collector wanted the
commanding officer at Salisbury to supply 50 men on request,
but only the officers to know the purpose, for the 'private
men' would probably warn the smugglers.28 From Hampshire
there were proposals for 40 light horse at Ringwood and
Fordingbridge on the edge of the New Forest, an area
'Infested with very desperate outlawed smugglers.' Upwards
of 500 men had been seen 'escorting at one time.. .twenty
waggon loads to the houses of capital smugglers.' The 10th
Dragoons had given valuable service when quartered in
Salisbury, but since their move to Dorset the revenue
officers in Hampshire had been without support.29
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Large numbers of men, horses and carts were kept ready
near the Norfolk coast prepared to load up goods and drive
south for London. The waggon trains would run for 30
miles at a time, with fresh horses waiting at the relay
stations; a cargo could be moved '80 miles from the sea
in one night time.'3° In Sussex, gangs of 400 men were
running goods at Shoreham in broad daylight, but the nearest
dragoons were at Lewes, twenty miles away. Riding officers
at Arundel reported smuggling parties between 200 and 300,
and those passing through Horsham were 'so numerous and
so resolute' they terrorised the revenuemen.3'
The Secretary at War was no longer receiving requests
for small detachments. Thomas Clamtree, writing from
Coichester, wanted 70 dragoons for the 30 miles of shore
between the rivers Stour and Come. Clamtree attributed
the increased activity in his area to outsiders 'from
distant parts where Military is stationed, having to avoid
the same, taking the advantage of coming and assembling
on this coast.'32 Richard Powell, Ipswich Collector of
Excise, proposed a minimum of 160 men for Suffolk alone.
Robert Sexton, Supervisor of the Riding officers at
Mundesley, asked first for 35 men to guard the coast from
Caister to Cley, which would have been one man for each
mile, then raised the figure to 80. Sexton maintained
that every officer needed an escort of six soldiers to
effect seizures and that was not always enough. Robert
Bliss had three colleagues and six dragoons with him at
Thornham when he was attacked on the beach by the owners
of some contraband. He was left temporarily blinded as
a result of blows to the head.
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James Lea, the Dereham Excise officer, believed there
were 200 smugglers involved in running goods from the north
Norfolk coast and he wanted eighteen dragoons for his
collection.33 Efforts to check smuggling in Deal could
provoke communal riots. James Heard, a London revenue
officer and his two man military escort were mobbed when
they tried to search premises suspected of harbouring
contraband; Heard had to quit the town accompanied by nine
dragoons. In 1771 the officers were claiming they could
not do their work without military assistance. Requests
for additional men reached the War Office regularly from
both Boards, and by 1781 they were arguing for a full
regiment of horse and supporting infantry to be stationed
on the East Kent coast if the contraband trade was to be
contained. 34 In Suffolk, the riding officers and boatmen
at Southwold dared not carry their weapons when they went
out on duty for fear of the smugglers' reactions. They
were attacked if discovered watching a landing and any
attempt at a boarding was repelled 'with force of hatchets
and firearms.' Any seizures they made were only 'such small
part as the Smugglers shall permit them.'35
Requests for light cavalry to be deployed in full
troops, and up to regimental strength, show the revenue
officials had learned from experience. A military presence
was not an effective deterrent in itself; speed, mobility
and firepower were needed if the gangs were to be checked.
The War Office had to give priority to defence matters
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and threats to the stability of the state. There was a
natural reluctance to commit the army to coastal duties
on any regular basis in wartime, and while it is evident
the revenue officials were anxious for military assistance,
there were several factors limiting the army's effectiveness
as a policing force against smuggling.
II
Practical and Political Problems of Military Policing
The usefulness of small detachments quartered in coastal
towns and villages was questioned by contemporaries, aware
of how the smugglers operated and the difficulties presented
by coastal patrolling. The masters of the cutters and luggers
were accomplished seamen and selected their landing sites
with some ingenuity. Casks, bales and packages were carried
up the steep cliff paths at Folkestone Warren and across
the miles of intersecting dykes on Romney Marsh. Such runs
required nerve, skill and exhausting labour; using different
locations reduced the chances of intervention on the beaches,
when the smugglers were most vulnerable, out in the open
and probably dismounted. Once away from the coast, the
gangs broke up into smaller groups, still able to defend
themselves, but causing confusion among the preventive
forces. 36 Their efforts to move inland quickly did represent
a risk, since it could mean using established routes, where
the riders might be ambushed. Military commanders often
felt there was more to be gained by stationing troops
and half troops along the roads leading to the sea than
to have detachments of two or three men in every coastal
town and village. At least there was then a prospect the
soldiers would not be outnumbered.
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John Girling, an army officer with experience of coastal
duties in Kent and sussex submitted a critical memorandum
in 1716. The main bases at Canterbury Ashford and Lewes
were too far apart for a decisive move against any large
smuggling gang while the coastal detachments were too small.
Quartered in public houses, private soldiers had 'all the
opportunities imaginable of caballing with the smugglers.'
Girling's solution was for the Customs Commissioners to
purchase the inns, denying rendezvous to the smugglers
and providing accommodation for a dozen soldiers under
one roof, and subject to the authority of an officer or
a sergeant on the premises. Overlapping patrols including
soldiers and Riding Officers could be organised, making
it possible to assemble an effective, mobile force at short
notice. Major Saxeby, Baker's successor as Surveyor-General,
did not dispute Girling's claim that collusion was taking
place, instancing examples at Hastings and Eastbourne,
nor that it was unfortunate the soldiers had to be
accommodated in public houses, but doubted there would
be any suitable properties on the market. He also
questioiied the effectiveness of constant patrolling along
a coast broken by headlands, rockfalls, stretches of loose
shingle, rivers and drainage ditches. Quicksands along
the shore and warrens on the cliff slopes were a hazard
for men and horses, while if the smugglers were to be
intercepted or pursued, the revenue would need to establish
control over the river ferries.37
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The framework for the debate on the pragmatic aspects
of coastal duties had been established. Arguments were
to revolve around the deployment of the soldiers, the
maintenance of discipline, and the likelihood of corruption.
The whole of the Sussex coast from Chichester to Rye was
frequented by 'the smugglers, and 'every square foot needed
to be patrolled.' There were 44 dragoons and 77 infantry
stationed in the county in August 1740. The foot were
all based at Lewes, Cliff e and Southover, too close together
to present a serious impediment to the landing and running
of goods on the coast, while the cavalry was distributed
in detachments from two to seven men strong, the biggest
contingent again located in Lewes. There were none on
the coast between Eastbourne and Shoreham, a 30 mile stretch,
and only two at Aifriston, situated on the road down to
Cuckmere Haven, a favoured landing site.38 This was well
short of the number required given the accuracy of Houlding's
description, and two incidents, both in 1740, indicated
the dangers of the coastal duties. In the first week of
September, four Customs officers and four of the 2nd Dragoons
encountered 30 smugglers near Lancing, armed with 'broad
Swords and long Staves who obstructed the Officers and
Dragoons and wounded several of them.' The Commissioners
wanted Battine to investigate the affair:
'particularly how so great a number of
Smuglers could be lurking on the Coast by
the Officers who ought to have exerted
themselves for that purpose and applied to
the Justices of the Peace to get them
apprehended pursuant to the powers given
to them by the late Act of Indemnity 9 Geo.2d.
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Neither the dragoons nor the officers were carrying carbines
or otherwise 'prepared to defend themselves against the
Smugglers' and the Commissioners wanted to know why the
Officers did not provide Horses for the two Dragoons it
being alledged their own were at Grass.'39 Four mouths
later, Thomas Carswell, the Hastings Riding Officer, called
out the detachment stationed in the town and followed up
an information of a landing at Bulverhythe. They tracked
the marks of a number of horses as far as Hurst Green,
where Carswell found 2000 lbs of tea concealed in a barn.
The preventive party loaded the oilskin bags on a cart
and set off for Hastings but had not gone far before they
were surrounded by armed smugglers, who rode in close and
began shooting. Carswell was killed on the spot, Corporal
Finlater received eleven 'bullets or slugs in his head,
shoulder, elbow and right side of his back' and James
Crabtree was hit in the arm. 40 The patrol was then forced
to return the cart to Hurst Green and unload the tea outside
the Bull inn. The authorities were soon aware of the
identities of the smugglers, but the one eyewitness available
at the time 'was either bought off by the gang and sent
out of the way, or otherwise destroyed by them.'41
There were times where the smugglers were routed and
impressive seizures brought back to the King's warehouse,
but military commanders felt the detachments could have
been much better employed. The justices shared responsibility
with the revenue officers for the quartering and use of
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troops in aid of the civil power, but General Hawley blamed
the Riding Officers f or the mismanagement of the landguard.
They withheld information from the military, and when
applying for assistance, they 'don't like and never desire
to have an Officer or non-commission Officer go with them'
for that would have made it more difficult to lead the
detachment away from the smugglers:
These fellows want the Men to be Dispersed in
threes and fours at the Alehouses about the Country
and to be at their disposal for two reasons,
that by Money or Drink they may manage them as
they will, first by getting them to Connive with
them, secondly, if the fellows do take any seizure
they give them Drink till they persuade them
that their Share will come to but a fourth part
of the value, and that their Officers always
Cheat them, so they at last buy their Shares
of them, as the Sailors used to sell their Tickets
for a little money.
Small parties quartered in public houses were also more
susceptible to bribery by the smugglers. Hawley wanted
army officers to have independent authority to seize
suspected contraband, the proceeds from the sale of
confiscated goods to be distributed on a regimental basis,
and more troops based inland, 'at proper passes and passages
of Rivers,' where the smugglers might be more easily -
intercepted. 42 Collier and Battine agreed the Riding Officers
were intimidated by the smugglers, but as to the allegations
of leading soldiers astray, they could not 'trace out
anything material.' As far as the rewards ,
 for seizures
were concerned, these were allocated in accord with the
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Orders in Council issued in 1716, the Act of 1726, and
the rules agreed by the Commissioners and the Secretary
at War.43 Soldiers were sent to assist the revenue officers,
not to assume direction of anti-smuggling operations; the
Surveyors-General noted the implications of any change
in the existing relationship between military and civil
authorities:
we humbly submit to your honours how far such a
procedure will be consistent with our laws and
the nature of our constitution, and are of opinion
if put in practice will occasion great clainours
in this country from persons not concerned in the
detestable practices of owling and smuggling.
Nor could they see that moving detachments away from th
coast would result in any increase in seizures on the roads
to London. Preventive work depended on good information,
local knowledge, and cooperation between the different
bodies involved. Frequent movements of personnel, in an
attempt to check collusion with the smugglers, would mean
fragmentation and a loss of effectiveness.44
Witnesses before the 1745 Committee maintained that the
army presence in Kent and Sussex had resulted in more runs
in East Anglia. 45 Hawley seems to have seen these movements
as fortuitous, but Collier and Battine were well aware
of the true situation:
'the dragoons being quartered but on part of
the sea coast. . .will naturally occasion the owlers
and smugglers to change the places where they
carry on their infamous practices to avoid the
officers of the revenue when they know there
is a military force to assist them.
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Revenue officers and army commanders had different
priorities.	 Hawley was concerned about discipline and
the cost of replacing broken horses, ridden too hard and
too far by drunken troopers in pursuit of phantom smugglers.
The officials were more interested in the threat the
smugglers presented to social order and government revenues.
A War Office memorandum on coastal duties, drawn up
in 1784, did little more than reiterate General Hawley's
criticisms. The soldiers were dispersed over too wide an
area, making it difficult for the officers to maintain
discipline; they were called out every trivial or false
information, and unable from the smallness of the Detachments
to render any effectual assistance on any real occasion
of importance.'46 The War Office proposal was that no
detachment should be smaller than a subaltern's command
and an officer should always accompany them when out on
duty with the revenuemen. The outport officials maintained
that what mattered was the immediacy of any response and
the speed of pursuit. Concentrating the military in fewer
bases, and insisting that officers were always present,
would hinder operations and enable the smugglers to plan
their routes with greater security.
The landing of the Cargo is regulated by Signals
and secured by large Gangs of Men, armed chiefly
with Clubs and heavy Whips, generally inflamed
with Liquor, and assembled in such Numbers as th
reduce the Revenue Officers to be quiet Spectators
of the Proceeding: This is very generally the Case,
except when the Revenue Officers can obtain the
Aid of a large Military Force;- such Assistance,
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in the present Establishment of the Army, must
be extremely partial - it is quite inadequate to
the Purpose of general and effectual Prevention
- the Requisition is often attended both with Delay,
and with some Notoriety:- and even when Aid is
obtained upon an Information, it is generally
frustrated; for the Scouts placed upon the Shore
give Signals to the Vessels at Sea, which instantly
proceeds, according to the settled Signal, to some
other Place of Rendezvous, at 15 or 20 Miles
Distance, and lands the Cargo in the Night Time.47
There was general agreement that given the manpower to
patrol the coasts, watch the roads leading to the main
markets, and track down suspects, the contraband trade
could have been checked. Just how many troops would have
been needed to contain the smugglers is hard to calculate.
80 to 100 smugglers attacked the excisemen bringing a waggon
load of tea and spirits back to Ringwood, leaving John
Critchell 'weltering in his own blood and to all appearaances
dead'; the party of foot accompanying them had made no
resistance. According to John Twentyinan Collector of Excise
for the Southampton district, the situation in the New
Forest was out of control:
Smug1ing is carried forward in this neighbourhood
with an high hand, scarcely to be credited. The
goods are brought from thesea coast, several gangs
united, amounting to 4 or 500 men, escorting at
one time upwards of 20 waggon loads to the houses
of the capital smugglers near this town, it is
then conveyed up the country by their respective
gangs amounting to about six, eight or then men
travelling with firearms: they pay no regard to
the officers here, for they often pass through
Ringwood and its environs in the day time.48
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The pleas from the Southwold Custom house were finally
answered in 1783 when infantry and dragoon detachments
were posted there. The sight of a uniform did not impress
the freetraders, as was clear from this account by Sergeant
Leach. He and three troopers from the 3rd Dtagoon Guards
were escorting the Riding Officers with a seizure of spirits:
In conveying them to the Custom House we were
attacked by a Party of the most resolute Smugglers
I ever saw. We were only 4 in number with 7
Revenue Officers, unarm'd except two, and
surrounded with about 70 Smugglers or upwards,
who first began to offer me Money to withdraw
the Party. On my refusal they assembled together,
and what passed I cannot say, but immediately
after they began to wound the Officers and
ourselves as much as they could, and attempting
to take away our Arms, till at last we were obliged
to fire upon them & retreat to prevent our being
Murdered, in Consequence of which one Smuggler
was killed on the Spot and two Horses wounded.
Faux was wounded in the Head by a Blow he Rec'd
from a Bludgeon & four Revenue Officers very
ill used by Blows Rec'd from the same sort of
weapons. I then got my small Party as close
together as possible and Retreated. The Smugglers
pursued us a Considerable way, with a resolution
to Massacre the whQe Party of Officers and
Soldiers, but we outrode them, which prevented
it.49
Leach made no mention of the smugglers carrying firearms,
but there was little the preventive party could have done
if their adversaries had pressed home their numerical
advantage. A few miles to the south, on Aldeburgh beach,
a Customs officer and three dragoons found themselves
surrounded by 40 or 50 men, 'who finding so few soldiers
there, came up even to the Mouths of their Pistols, bidding
them defiance, and refused to deliver their Goods.'50
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Seven men from the Earl of Albermarle's regiment tried
to seize some brandy and tea from eight smugglers at Lancing.
'On which they began to attack the Soldiers...and James
Mills says that he with a Stick knocked down Henry French,
one of the.. .Soldiers, and repeated his blows several Times.'
The other smugglers joined the attack on French and beat
him to death. His comrades rode away. 51 Reporting on a
number of affrays and rescues, the Commissioners of Excise
indicated that the smuggling gangs were not deterred by
military escorts. The Parliamentary Reports and the
Commissioners described the armed strength of the smugglers
and discussed the question of troop deployments, while
commanding officers accused the Riding Officers of collusion
and failing to make proper use of the military assistance
available to them. The failings of some of the army officers
did not receive the same public exposure. Speaking against
the 1736 Indemnity Act, Philip Yorke gave an account of
the position in France, where the smugglers were:
much more desperate than ours; for they march
in little armies, are well armed and disciplined,
and often engage in battle with the customhouse
officers and their guard of Maltotiers. The
gentlemen of the French army are indeed but seldom
or ever employed in such exploits; they consider
that their proper business is to defend their
country against open and declared enemies; and
therefore they think it below them to engage
against Banditti, or to hunt after and guard
criminals. 52
The European officer corps, drawn from the landed elites,
had much in common, including a certain distaste for the
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mundane work of keeping the peace, even when it offered
the prospect of realistic military training. There were
commanding officers who did not regard coastal duties as
a part of their proper functions, and others worried that
the dispersal of regiments undermined discipline, or that
unfortunate legal consequences might result from the military
using force in aid of the civil power.
A frequent complaint from the revenue officials was
that local commanders would not provide assistance when
called upon. In 1746 the Yarmouth Collector was concerned
that his officers would refuse executing any more writs
against smugglers 'unless they have soldiers to assist
them.' There were eighteen dragoons and a sergeant quartered
in the port at the time 'but they say they have no orders
to assist the officers of the customs on any occasion if
they are called on. . . though the country swarms with
smugglers.' 52 There were general instructions for the
military to respond to requests from revenue officers,
but non-cooperation did not invoke disciplinary action.
This unwillingness to exercise initiative featured at
different levels within the army hierarchy, from a sergeant
at Shoreham to General Parker, commandant of Warley camp
in 1779; a militia officer at Poole would not provide 'a
single man without an order from the War Office.' Regular
patrols were set up in West Sussex in 1780, but they followed
a strict schedule and would not deviate from it, even when
the revenue officers had positive information about landings.
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Commanders in Norwich and Holt refused assistance to
Mundesley and Cley where smuggling cutters were putting
in regularly, while the Norwich Collector of Excise was
told the Board had to submit a memorandum to the War Office
before troops could be used in the city. 53 Asked his opinion
on the use of soldiers at Deal in 1784, Sir George Yonge
repeated the long-standing Order in Council; 'The Military
at Deal, (as at all other places) are ordered to give their
assistance when called upon for that purpose by the Revenue
Officers. '5
It is possible there were military men unfamiliar with
standing orders, but some were deliberately obstructive.
In 1779 Stephen Marsh was running goods on the Suffolk
coast at will; he had a 200 ton cutter carrying fourteen
guns and a crew of 47. None of the revenue cruisers could
stop him, so the Harwich Collector drew up a plan to tackle
the smugglers when they came ashore, using 40 of the soldiers
quartered in the town. When asked to assist, the commanding
officer of the 25th Foot 'informed us that he had particular
orders not to furnish any men to assist any officers of
the revenue nor could he do it without an order from Lord
Amherst•or the Secretary at War.'55
Once in position the military were lfkely to be called
on to perform other duties in aid of the civil power, usually
riot control. The 11th Foot were sent to guard the coasts
of Cornwall and South Devon in 1736, but in May 1737 two
companies were sent into Dorset and quartered at Poole
and Wimborne Minister in expectation of food riots. Protests
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did break out, but among the Cornish tinners, so the regiment
was responsible for coastal and riot duty in three counties
stretched along 175 miles of southern England.56 In 1740,
units stationed at Beccies, Bungay and North Waisham were
transferred to Norwich, Wisbech, Peterborough and Ely to
deal with food riots.57 The revenue officers in Norfolk
and Suffolk made no objection at that time, but the different
demands put on the military gave rise to complaints from
Boston in the early 1770s. Three troops of cavalry had
been sent to Boston in 1768, to deal with the f en enclosure
riots but there was only one left in 1771. According to
Captain Lion, he was faced with competing demands from
the Collector of Customs and the town council, and felt
the security of the town had to be given priority. Requests
for a second troop to be assigned to coastal duties, went
unanswered, and a few months later the commanding officer
was refusing to assist the revenue without specific orders.58
Intelligent deployment and good communications would have
helped reduce the problems arising from lack of numbers
but the army's contribution to the preventive forces depended
on a variety of factors, military and non-military. The
revenue officers wanted army support, but whatever the
requirements of standing orders, and the protection afforded
by the rulings of the Crown's legal officers, the soldiers
had to remain alert to the sensitivities of the civilian
administrators and the anti-militarist rhetoric which
informed the discussion of the army's policing role.
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Houlding describes the army as the object of extreme
jealousy for a significant section of the political nation
in eighteenth-century England, 'a creation of the central
executive and an intrusive agent in the provinces.. .while
among the public at large it was almost universally
reviled.'59 At the same time Britain was developing as
a fiscal-military state and a standing army was a necessary
instrument for the implementation of policy. The depiction
of the provincial governing elites as locked into adversarial
relations with central government and the military, has
been questioned by John Childs. Discussing the late
seventeenth-century Parliamentary debates on the military,
Childs argues the disingenuity of those proposing the
abolition of the professional standing army. 'Both the
Restoration in 1660 and the Glorious Revolution of 1688
marked the recapture of the army by the gentlemen and peers
and the latter event was to prove a permanent captivity.'
The extensive campaigning of the l690s had ensured that
many men, from different sectors of society, had gained
military experience and 'the anti-standing army lobby could
do nothing to demilitarise the gentry and aristocracy.'
At the same time, a 'fairly sophisticated society like
England, with its increasing urban population, had to have
a legalised means of coercion, there was no option.'59
The policing role of the army might be better seen as an
integral aspect of elite hegemony, rather than the
introduction of an external and essentially alien force.
Similarly, the presentation of central government and the
political nation in the provinces as occupying opposing
camps is unconvincing. The concept of a 'political nation'
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rests on a perception of common interests and shared values.
Kinship, friendship and clientage provided the essential
linkages between the different governmental institutions
in society. Army officers were the largest single
professional group in the House of Commons and regimental
colonels were well represented in the Lords. 6 ° Army officers
and the more senior outport officials often served as
justices of the peace, and the various positions held by
John Collier, enabling him to serve the interests of
Hastings, the Duke of Newcastle, and himself, have been
discussed. Griffith Davies and his son Peiham were both
Collectors and mayors at Harwich, where local politics
reflected the conflict of interest between the packet boats
and the preventive service. 61 Constitutional	 principles
could be invoked to screen more practical political
considerations, as when troops were billeted in public
houses and local notables had to deal with complaints.
200 dragoons were sent to Norwich in November 1737, to
await deployment nearer the Norfolk coast. Thomas Vere,
the mayor and an MP for Norwich, was soon asking that the
soldiers be relocated as soon as possible,'for the Number
of Troops that are now hear are a grievous burthen to the
Innkeepers & Inhabitants. And what is still worse the
People in the Opposition Encourage the Innkeepers to Clamour
against Mr Walpole and I as if we had been instrumental
in bringing this Number àf Troops into this Town.'62
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Paul Rock has described the army as 'a perceived threat
to the position of the ruling and propertied class in their
localities.'63 This perception of aid to the civil power
is hard to reconcile with the revenue officers' repeated
calls for assistance, especially when their active
involvement in local politics and administration is taken
into account. What can be said is that government ministers
preferred to distance themselves from some of the
consequences of using the army for policing, evident in
the lack of clear directions concerning the use of force.
The 1716 Order in Council directed commandants to assist
the magistrates and revenue officials in executing legal
processes against smuggling, and in 1721 they were told
to 'generally assist' the Customs officers, but there was
too little precision.64 Soldiers had no independent authority
to search suspects or seize contraband until 1807, and
the need for a deputation from the revenue commissioners
gave some officers a pretext for inaction, insisting Customs
or Excise officers should always accompany military
detachments when an action was planned against the
smugglers.65 Under common law any person was not only legally
empowered to use force in preventing a felony, but was
duty-bound to make the attempt. Soldiers did not shed their
civilian status in that respect, as successive Attorney-
Generals made clear, but a coroner's jury would look at
any unnatural death; if they decided murder had been
committed, and named the culprit, the case would go the
the assize court.
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The Riot Act gave guidance on the use of force to disperse
mobs, but adherence to its terms did not guarantee immunity
from prosecution. Magistrates and army officers seemed
unsure of their powers in employing troops to keep the
peace, their uncertainty stemming from a knowledge of how
the law worked in practice, and the contradictory advice
emanating from the Crown's legal officers and the Secretaries
at War. In 1717 the Attorney-General, Edward Northey, gave
it as his view that soldiers had the authority to use arms
to disperse rioters. Robert Raymond, his successor in 1722,
believed the military might properly assist the civil power
in suppressing riots, but should always be guided by the
magistrates. Philip Yorke, when consulted in 1733, ruled
that the soldiers were 'not to repel force with force,
unless absolutely necessary.' Realising this would leave
the decision to the military commander present, inviting
attacks on the army's role, Sir William Strickland sent
orders to officers commanding troops on riot duty that
force was only to be used if 'required by the civil
magistrates' or more emphatically, 'unless the civil
magistates conceive there is an absolute necessity for
it and not otherwise.' 66 In 1735 Sir William Yonge tried
to obtain a ruling that the local magistrate should take
responsibility in the event of any repercussions from a
clash between soldiers and smugglers. The Attorney-General
would not co-operate and his 1733 memorandum was quite
clear on this point:
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Upon Consideration of the whole Matter, I entirely
concur in Opinion with my Lord Raymond. . .that the
Officers of the Troops and the Soldiers should
be directed not to interpose at all in any of these
Cases, but at such times as they shall be desired
by the Civil Magistrate or Officers, in which
Officers of the Revenue must be included in the
Cases of running Goods.67
Coastal duty could not be performed properly if roops
had been told to requisition a fresh authority to deal
with each new liquor run but the practice of issuing general
orders for special purposes left the military legally
exposed. 68 When General Williamson, commanding the garrison
at the Tower of London, asked for clarification on providing
escorts he was told that force should only be used to repel
force 'if it shall be found absolutely necessary by the
Civil Magistrate that shall be called upon that Occasion
to the Assistance of the Officers of Our Customs.'69 Yonge's
caution was understandable; the Secretary at War was a
junior minister, and the powers of his office depended
upon the Secretaries of State. The law off icers rulings
authorised the use of the army as a police force, and in
practice very few soldiers involved in incidents where
there were deaths or serious injury were convicted of felony,
but each episode was dealt with separately and Philip Yorke
exemplified the ambivalence at the heart of government
when speaking in the debate on the 1736 Indemnity Act in
the Lords. The statute provided greater legal protection
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for revenuemen facing possible felony charges; in future
they were to be granted bail if a smuggler was killed
resisting the officers in the execution of their duty and
as assistants, soldiers would enjoy the same right as the
Customs and Excise personnel. Yorke raised the spectre
of military policing:
I am afraid this new favour may make them sometimes
imagine that clubs, or even fists, are offensive
weapons, and such as may be opposed by powder and
ball; therefore I must think it of dangerous
consequence to the lives of his Majesty's subjects;
for in such a case I think, the proclamation against
riots, ought, at least to be read, in order that
those who are only lookers on, may have time to
retire: And I can see no reason why officers,
in such a case, might not have been left to the
course of the common law.7°
III
The Effectiveness of the Military
Inadequate numbers, diversion to other duties,
reluctant officers, suspect revenuemen, hostile local
communities, and legal controls limiting the application
of military force, all suggest the army would have a limited
impact on the smuggling gangs. However, there were other
ways the soldiers might assist, other than by confronting
the smugglers in the field. Suspects • had to be arrested,
detained, and escorted to the county gaols or to Newgate.
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with proper authority. Charles Eversfield JP took such
a dislike to this 'Wretch whose Original was a Dog Boy
to a Gentleman' that he drove Rogers out with a whip.73
Reprimanded by the Secretary of State, the Horsham
magistrates supported Rogers and Jekyll, and these arrests
served to remove the principal members of the Mayfield
gang.
The 1746 Smuggling Act provided the army with greater
scope. Once a smuggler was proclaimed, and forty days had
elapsed from the date of proclamation, he was outlawed.
There was no need for writs or peace officers in order
to effect arrests. Rewards of £500 a head provided an
incentive for soldiers, revenue officers, informants, and
vigilante groups like the Goudhurst Militia and the Cranbrook
Association. Not all smugglers commanded such high sums,
but whereas the allocation of seizure monies was strictly
regulated, the respective authorities do not seem to have
decided just what was to be done about bounties. William
Lisle, Supervisor of the Colchester Riding Off,icers, offered
his services at a fixed rate, £12 a head for every suspect
brought in, and whatever reward had been posted; that money
went to his informants and military assistants. In one
year Lisle picked up 40 smugglers, a credit to the concept
of entrepreneurial policing.73
Smugglers were being rounded up before the 1746 Act
came into force. Fears of invasion resulted in an increased
military presence along the south coast and smugglers were
regarded as likely collaborators with the French. Six men
were taken to Lewes gaol by a party of Royal Scots in
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February of that year, and eleven were escorted from Hastings
to Portsmouth by a detachment from the Royal Irish
Dragoons. 74 As the number of smugglers listed in the London
Gazette rose, so more outlawed men were taken into custody.
Two Riding Officers and five of Hawley's dragoons arrested
Jeremiah Curteis near Rye in May 1747. Such was his
reputation that reports of smugglers gathered on Blackheath,
preparing for a rescue attempt, were enough for the
authorities to send the Tower garrison south of the river.
Samuel Austen, another Hawkhurst smuggler, killed a sergeant
before he was overpowered, shooting half his head away.75
William Carter and William Jackson, wanted for the Galley
and Chater murders, were brought in by a party of the 42nd
Foot, and Hawleys 1st Royal Dragoons brought in John Cook
and Richard Ashcraft, both 'notorious' smugglers.76
Dragoon and infantry regiments were being put to the
same use in East Anglia. There were occasional confrontations
with armed gangs, when the revenue officers provided the
necessary information to intercept them, but the smuggling
network was being broken down by a series of arrests as
individuals were picked up from their homes. Detachments
from the 3rd and the Inniskilling Dragoons captured a number
of those wanted in connection with the violent rescue of
James Holt from custody. John Doe, Charles Gowan and John
'Giffling Jack' Carbold, all involved in running goods
on the Norfolk and Suffolk coasts, were transferred to
Newgate under military escort. 77 As an additional safeguard,
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some smugglers were sent to London on board the revenue
cruisers, accompanied by soldiers. Sam Wayman was arrested
on an information from a trooper in the 1st Dragoons and
sent to Newgate on the Yarmouth smack with six soldiers
as a guard. His death before the trial provided the
Commissioners with a pretext for withholding the reward
money due.78 A party from the 1st Dragoons was with Peter
Goldsmith and Sam Chapman on the same vessel when Captain
Barnaby:
Saw a boat lying alongside of a vessel, which
put away from them towards the shore with two
men in her, on which we gave chase, and call'd
to the men to come on board, on their refusing,
I ordered the dragoons to fire, which one of
them did, and the boat lay by to be boarded,
and therein we found brandy and other goods to
a considerable value, which I seized and carry'd
to the King's warehouse at London.
Barnaby paid the troopers half a guinea each, 'not
apprehending they had been entitled to any further reward.'79
It was as well Barnaby's order to fire was not tested
in court. Against the many arrests and escort duties carried
out successfully can be set a few examples of incompetence
and corruption. Eight soldiers, closeted in a small room
at a Yarmouth inn with a suspected smuggler could not
stop John Crop escaping through the cellar door when it
was opened by the house servant. When examined by the
Collector, the soldiers claimed they had refused a bribe
from Crop, and one of them blamed the escape on Naomi Wilson,
'a strong lusty woman' who had stopped him going after
the prisoner.80
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Joseph Lanton was another suspect brought in for the
murder of Thomas Carswell. A military escort was provided,
but Lanton was left in the care of a single dragoon at
the George, Battle. Given the freedom of the house and
the negligence of his guard, Lanton simply walked away.
George Walker, the Riding Officer with the detachment,
was responsible for the lack of precautions, but the soldiers
showed litle sense, agreeing not to carry their firearms
and leaving the prisoner to the care of one exhausted
trooper.81
In December 1744 a gang forced their way into the quarters
of a detachment near Hastings, took their weapons, 'and
abused several of them.' The smugglers had ridden in fifty
strong, in daytime 'with colours flying,' yet fourteen
professional soldiers were seemingly taken unawares.82
A marine lieutenant disrupted the work of a revenue party
in Hampshire, trying to search the house of a Captain Gwynn,
commander of HMS Ambuscade. Gwynn had built up a fortune
from prizes, but was not above making further profits
defrauding the revenue. Officers were sent to check Gwynn's
cellars at Upham, where they found a quantity of wines
and spirits. Meeting resistance from Gwynn's servants
and some workmen at the house, they went to Bishops Waltham
to ask for assistance from Captain Imber, the officer
commanding the marines there. Supported by a sergeant,
a corporal and twelve marines, the revenuemen returned
to Upham, but they had to abandon their expedition when
Lieutenant Morse arrived on the scene and ordered the
marines of f the Captain's property.83
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The War Office had to give priority to defence matters
and there was some reluctance to commit the army to anti-
smuggling duties in wartime, unless a threat of invasion
necessitated a strong military presence on the coast.
The militia, 40,000 strong in 1778-9, provided an alternative
source of assistance to the revenue,but was far from ideal.84
Richard Powell cited as one reason for the upsurge in Suffolk
smuggling 'the improper troops that are now stationed on
the coast, as those stationed there are a part of this
county Militia, several of whom have been smugglers, and
many of their relations and friends are still in that
business.' Mr Bell, supervisor at Saxinundham, had seized
thirty waggons loaded with contraband, but his militia
escort, twenty well-armed men, did nothing to prevent a
rescue, going off in company with the smugglers and leaving
the injured excisemen behind.85 Even when they were they
were acting against the smugglers, the militia could prove
a liability as a police force. Thomas Franklin was captured
by a party of peace officers and a press gang at Thornham,
wanted for the assault on Robert Bliss, the Excise
Supervisor. Franklin's associates rescued him:
when he returned to his own house at which a wedding
was celebrating; a party of the West Norfolk militia
were shortly after sent for, who surrounded the
house and demanded him to surrender; a confusion
arose and by some means the word of command was
heard by the militia to be given to fire. . .which
they did, when one Nichols, a tailor, was shot
through the heart and instantly expired; a woman
likewise received a shot in her arm, and another
woman was slightly wounded in the ear.86
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There were militia units who did useful service; Lord
Sheffield, with experience of the Sussex militia, praised
the former smugglers under his command and Captain John
Maney of the 9th Foot, had no reservations in calling on
the militia in Norfolk when he felt the need for
reinforcements. One problem was that militia officers too
often adopted the practices of their regular counterparts,
refusing to assist without specific orders from the War
Office.87
Fencibles were regular army units established in the
1790s for home service in the duration. The revenue office
had little confidence in them. The Ayrshire Light Dragoons
performed service on the Suffolk Coast in the first half
of 1798, and were then replaced by Suffolk Fencibles.88
Jermyn, the Southwold Collector, was not impressed by the
men or Edward Kiliwick, their officer:
amongst the Fencibles here are some very
suspicious Characters that would rather assist
the Smuggler than render the Revenue the least
service, and we are well convinced have been,
and suppose have not yet deserted the Smuggling
business, and ought not to have been admitted
into that Corps, by way of protection or any
account whatever. 89
Two Fencibles were badly beaten and a third thrown into
the sea at Dunwich when they set up a watch on 40 empty
carts, reckoned to be there awaiting delivery of contraband
from some cutters hovering off shore. Jermyn noted Killwick's
convenient absence and pressed for regular soldiers,
suggesting Sergeant Street, 'a Terror to the Smugglers'
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when on the coast in 1784, be given command a special
detachment; 'with only a Sergeant and Eight more, this
Coast would soon be cleared of these Illegal Dealers.'9°
A troop of the 1st Dragoons was sent to Southwold but when
they left Jermyn had to call on the local unit. His worries
were compounded by the presence of some Folkestone Fencibles
aboard a cutter lying out to sea. They had been seen landing
600 tubs of gin and were thought to be 'very dangerous
people.' The Collector feared collaboraton between the
Suffolk and Folkestone men, and felt it to be a great pity
the fencibles were 'so indulged and protected' from the
press gangs.91
Focusing on accusations of corruption and instances
of incompetence can distract attention from the main issues.
'Will Washington take America, or the Smugglers England
first?' asked Lord Pembroke in 1781; 'the bet would be
a fair, even one.'92 Study of the army's actions against
smuggling lends further support to the idea that the violence
associated with the trade was more extensive and better
organised in the 1770s and 1780s than it had been in the
1740s. The army found itself caught up in the complexities
of policing as the smugglers met force with force and
mobilised community support in some towns and villages.
Dispersing riots and conducting a campaign against smuggling
presented different problems. Riots were generally a response
to specific grievances, designed to pressurise the
authorities into remedial action. When armed, protestors
would carry sticks and stones, adding a physical dimension
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to popular demonstrations and dangerous enough in practiced
hands, but someway short of the smugglers' firearms, swords
and loaded whips. Rioters did not usually seek confrontation
with the military, but for the smugglers it was an
occupational hazard. The soldiers represented a threat
to their livelihoods and were subjected to attacks for
that reason. The economy of Deal was dependent on the sea;
fishing, supplying the ships anchored in the Downs, pilotage
through the Dover straits, serving on board privateers,
coastal and cross-channel traders, and working for the
revenue services, were the main forms of legitimate
employment. Most of these occupations could be combined
with, or provide a cover for smuggling. This reached such
proportions in the 1780s that the central government felt
it necessary to provide greater military and naval support
for the revenue services at Deal than anywhere else in
Britain.
The Board of Excise had set up a special unit, made
up 'six of their most active officers.. .to detect and oppose
the smugglers in their illicit trade.' In August 1780,
accompanied by 22 dragoons and 46 infantry, these officers
entered Deal, following up information that there were
hundreds of tea-chests stored in the town, all containing
contraband. 'They were obliged to retreat by reason of
the superior strength of their opponents, with only four
chests of tea.'93 In 1781 it was reported to London that
£70,000 worth of goods had been brought ashore out of an
East Indiaman and placed in the Deal warehouses:
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just before daybreak, four Irish independent companies
and two of the Middlesex Militia arrived from Dover,
conducted by two Customshouse officers armed with
extraordinary powers, who began to break into the
houses. A large quantity of uncustomed goods were
soon found and many waggon loads conducted to Deal
Castle. You will hardly imagine that this was done
with much tranquillity, and lest nine companies should
not be sufficient, above one hundred of Lord
Sheffield's Horse came into town during the affair.
I can not describe the scene, but it gave me the
tolerable idea of the sacking of a town. Some flint
and many stones came out of the windows and many
shots were fired by the soldiers.94
The writer in the Morning Post thought it miraculous that
no one was killed and only one man shot by a militiaman;
he claimed that most of the contraband had been removed
before the troops' arrival, but suggested more such punitive
exercises. The Customs Commissioners had a better grasp
of the situation. The Deal revenuemen faced such opposition
and hostility that partly from that, and partly from the
timidity if not collusion of our officers, the goods were
either carryed off openly in smuggling vessels, or left
to the smugglers under the security of a compromise.'95
The Collector denied charges of complicity lodged by Lord
Sheffield, but admitted the officers were intimidated,'
it being at the utmost hazard of their lives they even
attempt to exert themselves in opposition to the great
number of smugglers here, whose lawless and outrageous
proceedings are incredible.' Mayor Oakley, himself a dealer
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in contraband, 'ordered the military out. . .and engaged
himself for the consequences of their quitting it.'96 In
1782 a second combined operation brought in a haul of
600 casks of spirits, but the dragoons had to return to
their quarters in Dover and half of the seizure disappeared
from the King's warehouse during the night. 97 Another raid
was planned, but the townspeople had ample warning of the
cavalry's approach and prepared an ambush. As they rode
into Deal's narrow streets, ropes were raised to restrict
the horsemen's movements and they came under fire from
behind windows and doors. Their own powder was damp, and
their carbines inoperative.98 In terms of the quantities
of goods seized, the expedition was a waste of time and
effort.
There were troops stationed in Deal, but the revenue
officers preferred to make the journey to Canterbury when
assistance was needed, so minimising the risk of encountering
the smugglers. A much publicised coup against the Deal
smugglers, when a number of boats were destroyed on the
beach, did involve the military, but it was as much a success
for thenavy as for the army. Contemporary reports, appearing
in the London newspapers and repeated in the Annual Register,
were more concerned with promoting William Pitt's reputation
than giving an accurate account of events. The Deal smugglers
soon recovered from the losses suffered in 1785. A letter
from Deal to the Kentish Gazette in October 1786 noted
the change in the garrison:
326
This morning marched in here from Shrewsbury
part of the 55th regiment, in the room of the
38th, removed to Chatham, it being impossible
to do without soldiers, as the smugglers are
more daring and riotous than ever. . .The new
commercial treaty with France is far from being
disliked here, as the smugglers scruple not
to say, that it is all on their side; and that
brandy will now be much better and cheaper,
and easier procured than ever.99
A year later, 43 vessels were reported sailing from Boulogne
in a single week, with shipments between 60 and 1400
half-anchor casks, 'it was understood they had all deliver'd
their cargoes safe, many of them having return'd in three
days.' Most of this contraband was destined for the Downs
and the Deal smugglers were bringing back tobacco as well
as spirits from Dunkirk, Ostend and the Channel isles.-0°
Between October 10, 1784 and July 5, 1786, soldiers
operating within the Dover Collection were involved in
the seizure of 6819 gallons of gin, 3555 gallons of brandy,
198 gallons of rum, 3986 lbs of tobacco and 1354 lbs of
tea. Dozens of casks were taken up at a time but all the
spirits together would only have filled half a dozen tub
boats, and one cutter could have carried all the brandy.
The ports of Deal and Sandwich had their own Collectors
and figures for Dover could be misleading as a guide to
seizures in the rest of the county but the fact remains
that a single seizure at sea could be worth more than all
those on land, made with the help of the military, over
a period of nearly two years.- 01-
In 1783 smuggling was 'carried on with the most open
and daring Violence, in every accessible Part of the Coast'
yet William Yonge's scheme, drawn up in 1784, provided
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only 700 cavalry to cover the coast from Dorset to the
Wash, and left Kent, Sussex and Norfolk With fewer men
than were quartered there at times in the 1740slO2
The effectiveness of the preventive forces cannot be
judged solely by the seizure statistics, or the results
of clashes with the smuggling gangs. The intention of
stationing troops on coastal duties was to disrupt the
contraband trade. Seizures and confiscations were one way
of eroding the profits to be made from smuggling, but there
was much more to this than the straightforward loss of
goods and their means of carriage. As losses rose, so would
insurance premiums, while the accepted practice whereby
customers paid for contraband, delivered or not, could
create tensions within the smuggling networks. Landings
could be rescheduled, ships and riders directed to different
stretches of coast, but it all added to transport and
distribution costs and smugglers seldom carried return
cargoes. If supplies could be interrupted, and the price
of contraband forced up, then wholesalers and retailers
might be persuaded to buy goods from legal suppliers.
The question remains as to why the central government was
not prepared to assign more men to tackle what was
acknowledged to be a significant threat to public order.
Hostility to the use of the army as a police force provides
one line for investigation. Walter Shelton notes tthe
denunciation of military brutality' after the riots linked
to John Wilkes, and contrasts that with the way in which
the landed interest, sensing the 'levelling implications'
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of food riots and industrial protests, showed no qua
over using the army to enforce order in the provinces l03
Tactical problems in deploying troops in London may have
influenced decisions on the use of troops more than elite
perceptions of the nature of the threat to social order
presented by different groups of protesters, but Shelton
does raise questions concerning Hayter's claim that while:
The respect for public order and private property
was great, the distaste for the soldier was greater
still. Whatever judge-law might say, there was
a widespread conviction that the use of military
power in suppressing riots was no part of the English
constitution. '104
The threat to civil liberties if the army was used regularly
for policing, was a recurring theme in political debates.
The fears were genuine; the more experienced and the more
professional the army became as the main agency for
preserving civil order, the less authority the magistrates
would have. The same reasoning informed some of the
opposition to the establishment of a professional police
force. When a Cornish JP could describe with enthusiasm
the use of grape shot to disperse crowds of protesting
tinners, then there is a need for care when assessing
political and social attitudes.105 Houlding sees a standing
army and a reformed police as threatening the 'ancient
social order, rooted in paternalism, by which authority
had ben maintained in the countryside.' But as that social
order waned, so new means of social control were needed;
the law and the judiciary were one agency of elite hegemony,
and 'Come war or peace, the army served as the guardian
of the civil order. That too is one of the great facts
of the eighteenth century.'106 Smuggling was a business,
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driven by the same commercial imperatives as legal
enterprises and co-existing with them. The smuggler's
credentials as proto-revolutionary and defender of the
local economy are suspect, but he was 'part of the turbulence
of the age. . .the extreme precariousness between the forces
of law and order and those of crime and anarchy in
eighteenthcentury England.' Magistrates did not hesitate
to call for military assistance when faced with outbreaks
of popular protest, and senior revenue officers, often
magistrates themselves, regarded army support as essential
for the protection of Customs and Excise personnel and
to deter the smugglers. McLynn's claim that 'the Customs
department was always reluctant to call in the military'
is contradicted by the evidence in the War Office records.107
Iv
Comparisons with the French
In 1778 Lord Sheffield proposed raising a new regiment
of light horse, to be recruited from the Sussex smuggling
gangs:
They are seasoned, hardy, daring, capable of great
fatigue, vigilant, accustomed to bad roads and
night work. . .Their knowledge of the country should
not be forgot and their practice in acquiring that
sort of knowledge. From these circumstances I judge
no kind of soldier would be more useful in case
of invasion)-08
The Customs Commissioners objected to the idea of smugglers
receiving military training and then returning to their
trade more disciplined and more dangerous than before.
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Sheffield formed his regiment, the 22nd Sussex Light Horse,
but where he found the men is not recorded. He was unusual
in recognising the military skills of the English smugglers,
a quality remarked on in their French counterparts, who
had often served in the army. Encamped in the frontier
zones and then returning to winter quarters, the troops
brought their contraband back with them, while internal
tariffs meant that salt and tobacco smuggling were endemic
and the military regarded illicit trade as a legitimate
means of supplementing their pay. Deserters, veterans,
officers on half-pay and soldiers on furlough could find
security, alleviate boredom, and improve their finances
by joining the contrabanders, a course of action generally
approved by the local community. The disdain of the military
elite for police operations was only part of the explanation
for re stricting the use of the army in anti-smuggling
campaigns.lO9 Carrying salt from low-duty and duty-free
regions such as Brittany, into provinces subject to the
full rigours of the gabelle, was a highly profitable
activity. The price at the salt offices in the 'pays des
grandes gabelles,' could be twenty or thirty times higher
than in the 'provinces franches,' providing opportunities
for profit that were hard to resist."° Salt merchants
were responsible for much of the more serious fraud, but
small scale evasion provided a vital source of income for
those on the margins of society, and the extensive movement
of contraband salt gave rise to a form of brigandage. There
was:
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Henri S 'e cited the increasingly draconian penalties
prescribed for smuggling as evidence of the authorities'
failure to curb the trade. If caught and convicted, members
of armed smuggling gangs ran the risk of the galleys, the
gallows, or being broken on the wheel. 114 As in England,
the smugglers' response was to operate in larger parties,
planning and Carrying out incursions over the frontiers
as if they were military campaigns.
The French tax farmers employed their own armed police,
notorious for their brutality and corruption, but no more
able to contain the smuggling gangs than were the English
Riding Officers. Whatever their reservations, the authorities
had to employ the army, and studying their campaign to
bring in Louis Mandrin enables comparisons to be made with
British army units assigned to coastal duties.
Mandrin has been made a folk-hero, a social rebel
championing a popular cause by launching a war against
the tax-farmers. He was in fact already under sentence
of death before he became a smuggler, having killed two
men in a village brawl over the performance of militia
service. 115 His smuggling career began in 1753, when he
joined Jean Beljssard's gang, based in Savoy and operating
in the Dauphine. Mandrin soon became the gang leader and
between January 2 and December 26 1754, he organised six
expeditions across the border into France. His gang has
been estimated as large as 400 men, but only a dozen came
with him on the first venture. He was said to have recruited
ex-soldiers, deserters and officers finding it hard to
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adjust to civilian life, but there were later reports of
his assuming overall leadership of the French smuggling
gangs operating out of Italy, and of discontented peasants
joining him in France.
Mandrin set out to impress the local people and the
employees of the tax farmers; each smuggler carried a
carbine, three brace of double-barrelled pistols, and a
hunting knife. Having commandeered the centre of a town
and conducted a public auction in the market place, Mandrin
would often put on a show of equestrian skills for the
benefit of the community. If he had been content with the
profits to be made from smuggling he might have continued
in business for years, but Mandrin was set on the humiliation
and destruction of the tax farmers and their agents.
Officials were disarmed and shot in cold blood. When Pierre
Mandrin was hung for counterfeiting, Louis tracked down
Jacques Maret, the brigadier whom he held responsible for
his brother's death, and finding him with his two year
old daughter in the church square at St Etienne-de-Saint-
Geoirs, the Mandrin's home village, shot them both dead.
A recri.iiting sergeant, accused of spying for the Farm,
was shot by a firing squad made up of smugglers. When.
Mandrin began to feel himself under increasing pressure
from the military he abandoned the practice of holding
auctions and instead went directly to tax offices and forced
the officials to buy his stocks of contraband. To build
up the strength of the band, prisons were broken into and
recruits raised from those charged with smuggling of fences.
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As the authorities became better organised Mandrin
resorted to the use of greater force. The Captain-General
of the Ferme at Puy-en-Velay fortified the tobacco office
in the town and in the ensuing fighting one smuggler was
shot in the mouth, another lost his left hand and a third
was killed. On the final expedition Mandrin had to fight
his way into Beaune where he then demanded 25,000 livres
from the mayor as compensation for the hostile reception.
The distinction between smuggling and brigandage was clearly
breaking down and Mandrin was having difficulty in sustaining
the myth that his campaigns were directed solely against
the employees of the Farm. Following the events in Beaune,
the town of Autun was on full alert in anticipation of
Mandrin's arrival; entry was secured by rounding up a group
of seminarists outside the town and threatening to massacre
them. The authorities raised 9000 livres to buy of f Mandrin,
less than half the sum demanded, but the military were
on their way and the smugglers wanted to get away. Mandrin
had left it too late; he made good use of the natural
defences in the village of Guennard, and eighteen men held
off the troops while the rest of the gang tried to escape.
Most did, but nine died in a fire in a barn, five were
caught and it was something of an achievement that so many
managed to get back into Savoy. Seven grenadiers, five
hussars, two officers and a quartermaster were killed in
this action. Mandrin's campaigns, spanning a single year,
had cost the lives of between thirty and forty of ficjals,
guards in the employ of the Farm, and regular soldiers.117
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Louis Dermigny flotes the parallels between Mandrin and
the Hawkhurst gang.118 In both cases a direct challenge
was made to the authority of the state, and the response
was to be vigorous, determined, and effective. The French
authorities committed more military personnel to the task
of stopping Louis Mandrin than were ever deployed in the
whole of Britain, and by both French and English standards,
Mandrin's was a modest sized gang, at least to begin with.
The first measure adopted by the Minister of War and
the Controller General of Finances, was to raise a new
corps of light horse, the Dauphine Volunteers, 1500 men,
many of them veterans from the campaigns in northern Italy.
They were based in and around Pont-de-Beauvoisin, a key
point on the route linking France and Savoy. A second corps
was raised, made up of 500 dragoons and 1000 fusiliers.
Again there were many veterans, this time from regiments
which had served in Bohemia and Flanders. Known as the
Flemish Volunteers, they had a reputation for cruelty and
rapine and a number were recruited from French gaols. Besides
these 3000 men, raised with the specific aim of combatting
the smugglers on France's south eastern frontiers, every
commanding officer from the Jura to the Mediterranean had
instructions to assist in tracking down and capturing,
or eliminating Mandrin.1l9 He survived the six expeditions
into France, but the military cordon was closing in, forcing
Mandrin to remain constantly on the move. The last
incursion into France ended with the band severely mauled
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by the army, and Mandrin barely making his escape. With
previous experience of the Savoyard authorities' lack of
co-operation over the suppression of smuggling, the decision
was taken to cross the frontier and bring Mandrin out,
dead or alive. The invading party was made up of 500 Flemish
Volunteers, the argoulets, and guards drawn from the police
employed by the General Farm. Mandrin was known to be
staying in a chateau at Rochefort, only a few hours ride
from Pontde-Beauvoisin, and the troops went in on the night
of May 10-11, 1755. He and a single lieutenant were seized,
tied up, and thrown on the back of a cart. The chateau
was ransacked and the servants tortured. On their way back
to France the argoulets and the gapians carried out a number
of random assaults and killings. None of the soldiers
were wearing proper uniform and their faces were blackened
with charcoal or covered by strips of cloth. 120 There were
certain to be diplomatic repercussions and the French
authorities wanted it believed the raid was not officially
instigated. The case was heard by the the Commission at
Valence, and Mandrin was sentenced to death by breaking
on the .wheel.121 Louis Mandrin had sought to legitimise
his smuggling and brigandage, claiming he was waging a
war against the tax farmers and their agents, detested
by the majority of Frenchmen. As the violence became
indiscriminate, the fiction that Mandrin was a defender
of the people against fiscal oppression was harder to
sustain. Smuggling gangs continued to operate out of Savoy,
but none of Marxdrin's successors were to become folk-heroes.
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To the south, on the Franco-Spanish frontier, smuggling
was integral to the local economies of Roussillon and
Catalonia and the officials of the Farm were barely
tolerated. Over the period 1780-1820 there were forty-
seven violent incidents in Roussillon, involving smugglers
and servants of the revenue. Twenty-eight officials were
seriously wounded, seven or eight fatally.	 Goods were
smuggled both into and out of Spain, the export of tobacco
being especially lucrative. 	 'The size of the bands far
surpassed anything known anywhere else in France. One,
in the region of Banyuls, comprehended 700 men out of a
potential force of 2,000. 1 122 In May 1773 the Spanish town
of Puigcerda was taken over by French smugglers. They put
guards on the gates, the troops quarters, the town-hall
and the customs buildings, and then broke into the prison
to release their associates. A month later a Spanish
official was captured, subjected to a mock trial, and clubbed
to death. On the French side the employees of the Farm
wanted permanent military support. In the 1790s the officials
fled Banyuls and took refuge at Port Vendres. When they
returned it was to face constant harrassment, culminating
in a major riot. Collioure was equally inhospitable territory
for the revenuemen; after arresting a number of suspected
smugglers they came under attack by a furious mob of men
and women, and had to seek sanctuary at the fort. The local
authority blamed the officers for behaving provocatively,
and when they sought assistance from the military the
commandant sent them to the punishment block.l23
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The difficulties at Banyuls were one example of the
general opposition to a re-instatement of revenue officers
after the administrative breakdown in 1789. Roussillon
had become a free-trade area, and the inhabitants wished
it to remain so. In February 1791, concerned by the export
of grain and livestock to Spain, when there were food
shortages at home, the government decided to re-establish
the customs check points, and an advance party of six
officials was sent to Perpignan, the provincial capital.
They had an escort of grenadiers, but the people of the
faubourgs of Notre Dame and the Tunneries had stockpiled
stones in preparation, and as the soldiers took the
revenuemen up towards the walls of the town they were
surrounded by a hostile crowd, armed with clubs, swords
and firearms. The officials were handed over to the
protection of the town's national guard, but the national
guardsmen from the faubourgs were threatening to attack.
Whether their protectors broke ranks under the pressure
of the mob or as part of a preconceived plan, the officials
and grenadiers were left to fend for themselves. Two
soldier.s were injured but managed to escape under musket
fire. Julian Truite was beaten and suffered a deep slash
across his stomach. He was then paraded through the streets
with a cord around his neck, mocked and taunted by small
children in a macabre charivari. Raymond Ferrier, despite
serious sword wounds, broke away from his assailants and
dived into the river, providing a target for small arms
practice until the municipal authorities arrived, and
Hyacinthe Fabre was bludgeoned and bayonetted to deathJ21
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There were a number of parallels between French and English
smuggling: the use of armed force and speed of movement
to combat or frustrate the revenue authorities and their
agents, popular support for the contraband trade, and
communal hostility directed against those appointed to
prevent it. The riot in Perpignan was was particularly
brutal, but no different in kind to those in Deal, Guernsey,
and the Isle of Man, and Captain Porteous suffered a grisly
end in Edinburgh in 1736. The ambiguous part played by
the National Guard was akin to that of the militia and
fencibles on this side of the Channel. Comparing the
respective armies, the British detachments emerge with
some credit. They did not form themselves into smuggling
gangs, they were up against opponents as numerous and well
armed as those in France, yet could operate as a deterrent
force with only a fraction of the manpower devoted to
stopping Mandrin.
V
Soldiers, Smugglers and the Courts.
Acdording to Frank McLynn, eighteenth-century juries
were often 'genuinely sympathetic to smugglers' and 'failed
to convict on the most straightforward evidence.' There
was also 'widespread fear and loathing of soldiers by
civilians. '125
Relating this to John Rule's claim that some forms of
social	 crime,	 including	 smuggling,	 provided popular
legitimation for extreme levels of violence, it would follow
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that securing convictions against smugglers charged with
the murder of soldiers presented considerable difficulties
for the Crown. Conversely, any soldier on coastal duty
who killed a smuggler should have expected scant
consideration in court. Such cases were infrequent, too
few to provide material for firm conclusions, but enough
to raise doubts about the invariable prejudices of juries.
Thomas Carswell, the Hastings Supervisor, went out on
patrol on October 24, 1734, taking with him the rest of
the Riding Officers and six men from the 5th Foot Regiment.
Having information of an intended run, Carswell set an
ambush in a lane leading down to the beach at Hollington.
When a party of horsemen approached, Carswell tried to
stop the lead rider, but when the rest struck out with
their whips, the order to open fire was given. The smugglers
escaped, but afterwards the body of Thomas Peen, a Hawkhurst
carpenter, was discovered, killed by a gunshot. A coroner's
jury brought in a verdict of manslaughter against two of
the soldiers, Thomas Elgood and Robert Biscoe; Collier
prepared the papers for the defence but the case did not
go to the Sussex assizes. It was just as well, since there
was no evidence linking Peen with the gang, though he had
the reputation of working for the smugglers.l26 A year
later the Chichester Riding Officers, again with military
assistance, captured five smugglers and their horses. A
magistrate committed the suspects and the grand jury found
a true indictment, but they were acquitted by the trial
jury. 127 In 1744 Collier had to deal with another incident
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in which a dragoon shot a smuggler. A gang had broken into
the home of Philip Bailey, a Riding Officer at Bexhill,
assaulted his family and ransacked the house. The following
night three cutters landed their goods in Pevensey Bay
and more than 500 horses was reported on the beaches.'28
Dragoons were called out, and while a detachment were
drinking outside a pub at Guildford Sluice 'three smugglers
rode by, their goods under them.' The soldiers opened fire
and one smuggler was killed. Collier was able to get the
coroner's hearing adjourned and transferred to Hastings,
where after three days and hearing evidence from eighteen
witnesses, the jury declared that the soldiers had fired
'in execution of their duty and in defence of the customs
of ficers.'Collier himself admitted the men had acted hastily,
and felt it was his personal standing, that had saved the
dragoons from further proceedings.129
Collier was involved in a different way when Michael
Bath, another dragoon, was murdered at Goring in January
1744. Nine soldiers and the Arundel riding officers had
seized 300 casks of brandy but the smugglers regrouped
and recovered their goods from the small guard left behind.
When the rest of the preventive party tried to regain their
seizure, the smugglers opened fire, injuring two dragoons
and killing Bath. Two more troopers and Thomas Jeffery,
a Riding Officer, were captured and kept on board a smuggling
cutter. The master was Thomas Holman, one of the Hastings
Transports, already wanted for returning early from the
sentence of transportation imposed in 1736. Holman was
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Collier's nephew but when eventually arrested, there was
nothing his uncle could do to save him from a Sussex jury.
At the Lewes summer assizes in 1749, Thomas Holman, William
Trower and Adrian Isaac were all convicted for their
part in Bath's killing. The death penalty was rescinded,
but Holman had to go into permanent exile.130
False information and a dilatory revenue official
contributed to Willam Cam's death. Having made a seizure
of tea at Semer, Oliver Newby, the Woodbridge Collector,
wasted a night waiting for a run along the Coichester road
which never materialised, then carried out further searches
in the neighbouring villages, finding nothing. It took
two Customs officers and four dragoons the whole morning
to collect 400 lbs of Bohea from the Excise office in
Hadleigh and start off towards Ipswich. The smugglers,
given ample time to prepare, rode after the preventive
party and surrounded them, armed with 'blunderbusses, fowling
pieces and other weapons.' Newby ordered the dragoons to
hold their fire unless they were shot at, but:
without the least parleying they immediately
fired upon us and nothing was to be heard but
cursing, swearing and the discharge of smugglers
arms, which they kept firing as fast as possible;
and in such desperate manner there was no
possibility of withstanding them, whereby we
were overpowered and they took from us the tea.'31
All the dragoons were injured, and Cam died from a gunshot
wound the following day. What was unusual in this case
was the speed with which two suspects were brought in;
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The Customs Comnimissioners authorised the publication
of a reward notice in the Ipswich Gazette, of May 17, 1735.
With the evidence of William Meadows and James Goss to
go on, Newby was able to provide the names of a number
of the smugglers concerned in the affray. Those identified
were local men, rural craftsmen and small farmers from
Hadleigh, Eoxford, Hintlesham, Monks Eleigh, Semer and
Bildeston, but the two who were brought in, John Biggs
and John Wilson, known to Meadows as 'Old Yorke' and 'Young
Yorke, originated from Yorkshire and the Essex village
of Bocking, and had been working in London, where they
were taken up. Neither had played a prominent part in
the rescue but when brought to trial at the Suffolk assizes
both were convicted. Sentence was executed on August 2:
They behaved with a great deal of intrepidity
as they had all the time they were in prison.
They said they forgave all the world, in particular
Boughton, who was one of their company, and having
made himself an evidence against them and assisted
in taking them.
Wilson's wife 'took a great deal of pains to save him by
a petition to the Queen', but there is no indication of
the necessary support from local dignitaries.132
The case left a number of questions unanswered. Boughton
was never mentioned in the earlier evidence, while Biggs
and Wilson were never named by Goss or Meadows. Once these
two minor culprits were disposed of, there seems to have
been no atempt to bring in the principals, Henry Clarke,
John Harvey, and William Neale, who continued active
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smuggling careers until the late 1740s. What it did
demonstrate was the willingness of an assize jury in a
maritime county to send smugglers to the gallows.
Thomas Cole was shot dead at Elmer Sluice in 1757 and
though there were no immediate arrests, the authorities
were very persistent in their efforts to secure suspects
and put them on trial for murder. Ambrose Cannon was brought
in by John Bay, a Chichester Riding Officer, fifteen years
after the event. Cannon was remanded in Horsham gaol in
February 1773 to await the East Grinstead assizes. He was
said to be the fourth man charged with the murder, and
the previous three had all been executed. 133 Cannon followed
them to the gallows while Thomas Green, commander of the
smuggling cutter concerned, had to act as a spy for General
Napier before he obtained a pardon in the 1780s.'34
John Harper, a trooper with the 11th Dragoons on coastal
duty in Suffolk, was fatally wounded on Lowestoft beach
in 1777. Sergeant Peterkin and three soldiers had gone
out with Barcham Boidra, a Customs Officer, and seized
40 casks of gin. The smugglers escaped in their boat and
opened fire once they were out of range of the dragoons'
horse pistols. A ball went through both Harper's thighs,
and he died from his wounds a week later. The smugglers
landed a sizeable force from their cutter and retrieved
the gin, inflicting a second gunshot injury in the process,
this time on Boldra. Peterkin recognised Edmund Eastoe
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among the smugglers and when he and two revenue officers
went to the suspects cottage they found 'his breeches wet
with salt water' and his collar torn, caused when he had
broken free of the sergeant's grasp. Eastoe was taken into
custody, tried at the Bury assizes, found guilty, executed,
and his body handed over to the surgeons for anatomy
classes.135 Kent juries were also prepared to convict
smugglers accused of murdering soldiers. In 1780, a
detachment from the 4th Dragoons, quartered in Canterbury,
were sent to assist Joseph Nicholson, an Excise officer,
search properties in Whitstable for contraband. The soldiers
went on foot and by the time they arrived Nicholson had
lost most of the tubs of gin he had found and been left
tied up by 'a Gang of Ruffians.. .whilst a party of Boys
carried of f part of said Tubs out of the Hogstye.' The
remaining casks were loaded on a waggon and the party set
of f for Canterbury, soon to be pursued by the smugglers.
The riders caught up, went right up to the dragoons, and
opened fire; two soldiers were killed on the spot. The
gang sailed to Flushing and Dunkirk soon afterwards but
one seventeen year old was brought in. John Knight was
convicted and executed on Penenden Heath, outside Maidstone.
William Roalfe was arrested for the same offence in May
1780, and he was also sent to the gallows.136
There were occasions when juries acquitted smugglers
accused of being concerned in af frays in which soldiers
died. William Kimbell, aggrieved over the loss of goods
seized on Hunstanton beach, set an ambush for the preventive
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force, made up of Riding Officers and a detachment of the
15th Light Dragoons. As they rode by, Kimbell's crew opened
fire from cover, killing William Green, a Customs officer,
and William Webb, a dragoon. The soldiers reacted quickly
and Kimbell, Henry Gunton and Thomas Williams were captured
and taken to Norwich castle to await trial. The Crown's
case was solid and Williams turned King's evidence,
nevertheless, the jury brought in not guilty verdicts.
The prosecution moved for a second trial with a new jury,
arguing that 'if a Norfolk jury was determined not to convict
persons guilty of the most atrocious crimes, who were
smugglers, there was an end to all justice.' The judge
agreed but the outcome was the same. Two recent deaths,
caused by the excessive zeal of the military in handling
smugglers, might well have alienated local feeling towards
the military. 137 This was not the only instance where
a jury acquitted a smuggler accused of murdering a soldier
aiding the revenue services, but from the few cases there
are, it is not possible to conclude that there was any
deep sympathy for smugglers or detestation of the army.
The willingness with which revenue officers called in
military assistance could be seen as the proper functioning
of the machinery of the central state. Reconciling this
interpretation with the declared aim of keeping the army
under firm civilian control, and the hostility local social
and political elites supposedly felt towards the military,
might lead to some re-evaluation of the attitudes of the
civil powers towards the army. Juries composed of 'the
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middling sort' may well have reflected elite, rather than
popular norms, but the insistence that the army's policing
role was regarded with great suspicion by all sections
of civil society would suggest more of the accused should
have enjoyed the good fortune of Kirnbell and Gunton.
Questions also arise as to smuggling's standing as a form
of social crime. If distinctions between what was and was
not criminal within certain communities were t flot . .based
on inhibitions upon Violence,' then the accused should
have had better prospects. 138 Soldiers, the despised agents
of central government, had been killed when they interfered
in the workings of the local economy. If juries wanted
to demonstrate their opposition to the encroachments of
central government and the expansion of the fiscal-military
state, then these trials provided them with the opportunity.
If it is argued that juries consisted of members of the
propertied classes, or were too dependent on the patronage
of their social superiors to risk exciting their antagonism,
then doubts are raised concerning the totality of communal
support for smuggling and the effectiveness of the smugglers'
intimidatory tactics.
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Chapter Five
Enforcement of the Laws
I
Bringing in the Suspects
Various reasons can be advanced for the length of some
smugglers' careers: too few preventive men to take them
up, limited local co-operation, fear of retaliation and
their quarry's mobility. There was no certainty as to
when and where the cutters would arrive so the land gangs
had to assemble and move quickly and safe houses were
needed for harbouring goods, stabling horses and
accommodating riders. If the vigilance of the preventive
services forced a postponement, or a landing at a different
location, the smugglers had to disperse along the coast
ready to reassemble at short notice. Frequent sea crossings
in search of supplies established useful contacts in the
continental ports, the Channel Isles, the Isle of Man and
Ireland, while familiarity with ships and sailing ensured
that the sea was seen as an escape route, not a barrier.
Reporting on a number of intended prosecutions against
smugglers from Harwich and Poole in the late l720s, the
Customs solicitors noted that the majority were penniless,
had compounded their of fences, or fled abroad; 'in general
they are very mean, being seafaring people and Country
fellows. 1 1
John Pixley, John Carbold and John Doe all took up
residence in Zealand in the later l740s. Jeremiah Curteis,
wanted for smuggling, murder, and breaking out of Newgate,
was thought to have joined the Irish Brigade at Gravelines,
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in the service of Louis XV. Robert and John Henning, named
by Joseph Harding as London tea dealers in 1731, were 'forced
to abscond in Parts beyond the seas' when a watchman was
murdered trying to seize some contraband from them. Robert
later set up in business at Dunkirk and Flushing supplying
tea to the smugglers. 2 Isaac Adrian or 'Little Blue'
suspected of murdering Michael Bath on the Sussex coast
in 1744, escaped capture in 1746 when Captain Dagnett brought
in a smuggling cutter with a crew drawn from Kent and East
Anglia. Four years later, following the efforts of the Duke
of Richmond, Adrian was repatriated from Holland on board
the Harwich packet.4 Thomas Harvey, brought into Harwich
with Adrian in 1746, had been reported living in Boulogne
two years earlier. He and Robert Fuller were under pressure
from the French authorities to act as pilots for a French
invasion. The masters of the Folkestone smuggling cutters
held at Dunkirk were said to be under arrest in March 1744,
but were soon back in Boulogne, 'Where they now live with
their Famillys and have done for sometime; these poor men
with a great many more now at Boulogne are under Prosecution
for having been found guilty of Running of Goods contrary
to Law, and dare not Return back to England.' If granted
pardons, they 'could do good service,' but if obliged to
remain, 'they may become desperate and look on the Country
that gives them Sanctuary as their own and would be very
capable of doing much mischief to that they have deservedly
been forced to quit.' 5 Another source estimated there were
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thirty able-bodied English smugglers resident at Boulogne,
employed by 'six that are leaders.' These were probably
the Transports, the Hasting's men convicted for an assault
on the crew of the Amelia. Their punishment amounted to
little more than the inconvenience of having to operate
their smuggling business out of Boulogne instead of their
home town.6
Thomas Green, following the shootings at Elmer Sluice
in 1757, was by his own account, forced into 'twenty years
of wretched exile.' Living in Dunkirk, his sufferings were
alleviated by the profits from his continued smuggling.
Dunkirk and Flushing were also the destinations of the
gang thought responsible for the deaths of two dragoons
outside Whitstable in 1780. The fact they left their weapons
behind was taken to mean they intended to return, but there
were later reports that they had become privateers.7
The Channel Islands and the Isle of Man also provided
convenient escape routes and refuges for smugglers wanted
for serious crimes. Thomas Wellard, having opened fire
on the Hawke, took the Happy-Go-Lucky over to Guernsey,
where he Governor refused to surrender the smuggling vessel
to Captain Douglas. Three smugglers were brought to trial
for the murder of William Allen, master of the Orestes,
shot at Christchurch in July 1784, but William Parrott
and William May, the commanders of the smuggling luggers
involved, were thought to have escaped to the Channel Isles,
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along with a number of their crews, so James Sarman and
Alexander Ramsay, both revenue officers, went after them
on boardHMS Expedition. The Governor claimed that a warrant
from the Secretary of State had no force on Guernsey and
the Island's Royal Court supported him. Governor Brown
only offered to help when Ramsay stated his intention to
carry out a search with or without assistance. When none
of the wanted men were discovered, Ramsay and Sarman decided
to go over to Alderney. Brown advised against it, 'for
he said at that time there were 300 smugglers on the
Island...and that the inhabitants were all smugglers.'
When this failed to deter the officers, Brown provided
them with a military escort of twenty men. Governor Le
Mesurier refused the soldiers permission to land on Alderney
but went out himself with the local peace officers. Parrott
had been there, but the arrival of HMS Jackal and her
captain's coming ashore caused him to leave quickly, along
with his wife and children. They had sailed for Cherbourg
but were later reported living in Ostend, where William
May had also set up home.8
Smugglers were at risk from the elements and the rigours
of their profession, but the threat from the law and its
agents could be ruinimised. Easy access to ships, useful
contacts overseas, and the limitations of policing at home
all served to assist the free traders. Henry Clarke, Cam's
killer, was organising runs on the Norfolk coast two years
later and Galloway Tom, also present at the shooting, had
transferred his activities from Suffolk to Norfolk. John
Harvey was rescued from custody in 1735, present at Hadleigh,
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and still smuggling in the late 1740s. 9 Wanted for his -
part in the death of John Wood, drowned off the Sussex
coast in 1733, Richard Burleigh was sighted off the east
coast several times over the next few years, including
the incident when he and John Wilson went before a magistrate
to complain they had been robbed by Richard Hobbin the
Yarmouth Riding Officer. Burleigh's mate, Nicholas Ednall,
was also smuggling in the Wash three years later, sailing
as one of Richard Johnson's crew, bringing consignments
of tea over from Flushing. Thomas Drew was with the Roots
brothers in the 1720s, carrying small parcels of tea and
landing them on the Hooe peninsula in Kent. His name
reappeared in the records nine years later when he was
with Pixley and Thomas Brett on board the Slowley running
goods from Tervier for disposal in Norfolk and Suffolk.'°
The Hastings' seamen who combined privateering, piracy
and smuggling in the 1760s, were known to the authorities
some years before they were brought in. The problem facing
the revenue services was demonstrated in 1767 when the
Bourner brothers, rescued from custody by a riotous crowd,
sailed their lugger out of Hastings and committed numerous
acts of piracy before being retaken. None of the revenue
cruisers or the royal naval ships on preventive duty had
been able to intercept them in the Channel. Twenty-three
suspected pirates were eventually arrested and fourteen
held to await trial before the Admiralty court. Edward
Milward, 'apprehended that the remainder of the Pirates
were absconded from the Country.' They were supposed to
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have returned by the early 1770s, when Milward reported
'Several Gangs of Pirates belonging to Hastings, Dover,
Folkestone and other Sea Ports lying on the Coasts of Kent
and Sussex.' 1 '	 -
Thomas Brown, a local smuggler, assaulted the Deal
Customs officers three times in the space of eighteen months,
either resisting seizures or rescuing contraband. Richard
Baxter was lucky to escape serious injury when Brown tried
to brain him with a tiller. The next year, when Baxter
was shot dead in the course of a pursuit after a smuggling
boat, Brown was named as the murderer and a £200 reward
was offered for information leading to his capture. Brown
was later reported operating as a privateer, accompanying
Daniel Faux in his cruises off the east coast, but he
remained at liberty. 12 In fact he was never tried for the
murder; Brown was killed when a boarding party from Gabiel
Bray's cutter, Nimble captured the Juliet lugger in 1784.13
Harry Carter was running cargoes from the Channel Isles
and France from the late 1760s onwards. His record as a
privateer commander during the American War was
undistinguished and the revenue services would not turn
a blind eye to his smuggling now hostilities were overt
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1731, when John Bentley, an Ipswich smuggler, visited him
in Norwich Castle. He was not there long, for in July 1733
Walter was reported breaking out of Chelmsford gaol, in
company with Edward Carbold and Thomas Forgan. He was seen
on board a smuggling cutter in 1735, and two years later
an informant reported that Walter had given up the smuggling
trade)-6
Samuel Jacombe's scheme to set up an auxiliary force
of local men to assist the Yarmouth officers came to nothing
when the Commissioners would only agree to pay reward monies
on the same basis as the military on coastal duties, but
local assistants were concerned in one significant seizure
made before they decided working for the smugglers was
more profitable. Five men were captured at Kimberley and
imprisoned at Norwich, where they were 'heavily ironed.'
After more than a year, detained under an Exchequer process,
the smugglers attacked the turnkeys and walked out of the
Castle. Only Sam Hixen was recaptured and he died in gaol
in 1736.17
A party of smugglers held in the Castle in 1753 were
less successful but very persistent. James Clark, Simon
Fordham and William Rose used an improvised ropeladder
to climb down from the battlements to the roof of a
storehouse and from there escaped the precincts. Rose and
Clark were retaken, but then participated in a mass breakout
in December. Sixteen men seized the turnkey and the
governor's son and overpowered the gatekeeper. Most were
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brought back the same evening but 'Fisher the smuggler'
was believed to have found a passage to Holland. William
Rose was released in 1757 on condition he enlisted in the
the navy for life.18
The escape from the county gaol at Maidstone in 1747
showed just how insecure prisons could be. John Hales,
Francis Marketman, Sam Prior and Richard Blundell were
committed on suspicion of smuggling and though the
authorities were unaware of it at the time of the break
out, Blundell was with the gang who killed Carswell at
Hurst Green in 1740.19 John and Thomas Prior drew up a
plan to free the prisoners, and six smugglers met up in
Maidstone, staying at the house of one March, a turnkey,
bought for £20. Thomas Border visited the gaol on a Sunday
evening, carrying in an assortment of swords and pistols
and telling the four men they would be freed on the Tuesday
when March would be on duty. With his co-operation, and
the advantage of numbers and weapons, the rescue went ahead.
There were horses held ready outside the prison and the
smugglers made their way first to the Dog and Bear in
Maidstone and then to Tom Prior's home in Biddenden where
the landlord from the Three Chimneys provided the tools
needed to strike their fetters.2°
Most of the freed smugglers and their rescuers were
rounded up and returned to Maidstone to await the assizes.
John Hales and John Prior were convicted and sentenced
to transportation, but Thomas Prior and Sam Pritchett were
discharged. 21 The fate of Richard Blundell sheds light
on law administration in the mid-eighteenth century. Blundell
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There were horses held ready outside the prison and the
smugglers made their way first to the Dog and Bear in
Maidstone and then to Tom Prior's home in Biddenden where
the 1andlord from the Three Chimneys provided the tools
needed to strike their fetters.2°
Most of the freed smugglers and their rescuers were
rounded up and returned to Maidstone to await trial. John
Hales and John Prior were sentenced to transportation,
but Thomas Prior and Sam Pritchett were discharged.21 The
fate of Richard Elundell sheds an interesting light on
law administration in the mid-eighteenth century. Blundell
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was taken up by a group styled the Ticehurst Militia and -
held at the Bell public house. Thomas Sheteker and Richard
Holder, acting for William Carey, Governor of the county
gaol, went to bring the captive back to Maidstone, but
before they could get away, four or five men, including
the borshblder of Ticehurst, came to the Bell and removed
Blundell, claiming they were going to the nearest magistrate.
Instead they put him on his own horse and allowed him to
ride off. Nearly a year later Ann Blundell wrote to Carey
informing him that she had been in correspondence with
the Commissioners about her husband's situation and 'was
in very great hopes of getting him admitted an evidence.'
When this expectation was realised the Blundells offered
to compensate the Governor for his suffering and any expenses
incurred as a result of the escape. This was in October
1749; Thomas Drury's information implicating Blundell in
the Carswell murder had been in the hands of the authorities
since April that year yet the Board assured Ann Blundell
that as long as her husband proved 'willing and careful
to act for the future in the interests of the government
all things as to his late misfortunes shall be made easy.'22
Captain Dagnett's incompetence was responsible for
the escape of some of the crew of the Bachelors Adventure
after a seizure in January 1746/47. The smugglers left
on their own vessel overpowered the boarding crew and
and took a boat ashore to Felixstowe. Dagnett, three miles
ahead with the Walpole at the time, brought in the smugglers
transferred to the cruiser and had them committed to Harwich
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gaol. They were out by eleven o'clock that evening but
the gaoler failed to report the escape for another seven
hours; the Collector was convinced that money had changed
hands. A boarding party recognised John Batten, commander
of the Bachelors Adventure, sailing on the John and Rachel
three months later, but were forced to quit the vessel
at knifepoint.23
The lack of effective prison security made for other
problems besides escapes. Potential informants sometimes
needed more than the prospect of a pardon to induce them
to testify. Six smugglers were brought in by the Aldeburgh
smack in 1736; four escaped, but Matthew Jenkins and George
Rae were detained on board HMS Fly. Rae stayed with the
ship while Jenkins was transferred to Norwich Castle. Andrew
Hazey, a merchant from Middleburg, was pressing for the
return of his ship and its cargo, and Jenkins's evidence
was considered essential if the Crown was to prove an
intention to smuggle. He had served on the cutters for
some time and the Collector believed he could provide a
wealth of information concerning the contraband trade.24
The danger was that other smugglers, instigated by Hazey,
would visit the Castle and persuade Jenkins to stay silent.
The gaoler was already suspect after earlier escapes so
the Commissioners sent one of their own officers to check
security. Jeremiah Barton discovered that the Crown's
intended main witness was receiving payments from both
the Customs and the contrabanders. He ensured Jenkins
had no more unofficial contacts:
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and by that means Jenkins was brought over and became
an evidence for the Crown, which as soon as the
smugglers had got knowledge of, they withdrew their
favours and at the same time Andrew Hazey got Jenkins
household goods seized at Middleburgh and his wife
and family turned out of doors, and thereupon she
and her family came over to England and Barton
supported her with her husband in the Castle else
they must have starved.25
Sam Jacombe proposed the Board should meet the costs of
bringing the Jenkins family back to Norfolk. The care taken
to cultivate these witnesses proved worthwhile. Hazey
compounded for the return of his ship and abandoned all
claims to the cargo of tea seized by the revenue patrol.
George Rae returned to Camphere and Matthew Jenkins joined
the Customs service as a crewman aboard the Aldeburgh
sloop.26
Jacob Peake avoided prosecution for smuggling and assault
against the revenue officers by volunteering his services
as a privateer in 1744. His commission was a useful cover
for further illicit trading, and his cutter was brought
into Yarmouth as a suspected smuggler in November 1745.
Learning of this, the Board of Customs secured a warrant
to arrest Peake for his previous offences and he was picked
up when he tried to recover his ship. While Peake was
held in Norwich Castle, 'a great many reputed smugglers
of this neighbourhood were attending there and spent the
evening there.' Peake was supposed to have stood trial
at Rochester for the assault on Cadman, but there is no
record of his appearing at the assizes.27
368
Under the terms of the 1736 and 1746 Acts, armed smugglers
could be prosecuted for felony outside of the county where
the offence was committed. The Commissioners felt the Old
Bailey juries were likely to be less sympathetic than those
in the principal smuggling areas. The inadequacy of the
local gaols was sometimes given as the reason for moving
prisoners to London, but Newgate was far from being a model
prison. An attempt was made to rescue William Jeffrys,
Robert Salmon and William Denny Fox from Ipswich gaol the
night before their removal to London. That effort failed,
but Salmon broke out of Newgate along with John Peters
and Robert Clarke, fellow-smugglers, using a ladder
constructed from materials in their cell. William Gray
was in Newgate with Thomas Kemp, awaiting trial for running
goods on the Kent coast. They escaped in April 1748, assisted
by Thomas Potter and Thomas Border, who seems to have
specialised in rescues from prisons. They had agreed 'to
shoot the Turnkey and the Assistant within the Press-yard
if they could not facilitate their wicked Purposes
without.'28 When Jeremiah Curteis was arrested near Rye
in May •l747, the newspapers reported that he had been taken
twice before, but was rescued on both occasions. The
Commissioners intended prosecuting him for running goods
at Folkestone Warren in 1744, but his record went back
to 1736 and he was another of those supposed to have been
at the scene of Carswell's killing. A 'great interest'
was runioured to be campaigning on Curteis's behalf, and
there were well-founded fears that he would never face
trial. He managed his own escape, along with the two Bibbies,
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wanted for robbing the Chester mail, and William Crosly,
forger and bigamist.29 A plan for a break-out from the
press-yard, considered the safest part of the prison,
involved sawing through fetters with a watchspring saw,
a duplicate key to gain access to the record room, and
cutting through the bars of one of the windows 'which looked
into the new open passage leading from the. . .Gaol to the
Session House at the Old Bailey.' Rather than join the
escape, Samuel Hager disclosed the details to the prison
officers refusing to be party to the likely killing of
two of the keepers. Hager saved himself from execution,
while Edward Dixon and John Catchpole, the two Suffolk
smugglers who had devised the escape, were hanged at
Tyburn.30
Official connivance in criminal activities was a part
of the process of law enforcement. Informants played a
crucial role in capturing and convicting suspects, and
they had to be afforded some leeway if they were to remain
useful. William Shorten was described as a smuggler when
he came forward and admitted the theft of two horses.
His servant James Miller had been tried and convicted for
the offence, and faced possible execution. Miller was
released and Shorten took his place in Norwich Castle,
only to join in a break-out with ten other prisoners.
He was brought back two months later, but fractured the
skull of one of the peace officers during his arrest.3'
As a confessed horse-thief, a known smuggler, and an escaper,
Shorten's prospects did not look promising, but instead
of being punished, he received a full pardon. Shorten
was leading a double life, combining crime and informing
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and extracting profit from both. While he was in Norwich
Castle awaiting transportation, James Lea, Supervisor of
Excise at Dereham, wrote to the Home Secretary on Shorten's
behalf. Apart from his one lapse into horse stealing he
had been, 'in some respects a useful member of society
and of late years of great service to government and fair
traders, by giving to me and other revenue officers many
informations of large quantities of smuggled goods which
have been seized to the use of government.'32 One such
information had enabled Lea to bring in James Thompson,
concerned with breaking into Thomas Diggins's inn at Rainham
and demanding compensation for a cartload of tea and gin
seized on the premises by the excisemen. This incident
had occurred in November 1780, so Shorten must have been
working as an informer for at least six years before his
arrest for horse stealing.33
James Hedding was turned by the promise that charges
of horse stealing would be dropped if he agreed to be
a King's evidence. With this assurance from a magistrate
at King's Lynn, Hedding was:
set upon his parole and at his own expense
travelled into different counties to collect
evidence and furnish materials for apprehending
and breaking up a gang of most desperate broken
smugglers who had betaken themselves to horse
stealing and highway robberies on a great scale.34
Judge Gould proved 'severe and inflexible' when Hedding's
case came to trial, and sentence was passed without any
recommendation for mercy. The 'gentlemen of the county'
felt it essential that something be done for Hedding, partly
371
because of his youth and good family, but more importantly,
to safeguard the standing of the magistracy within the
local community. 'The vulgar' had to be 'impressed with
an idea of our possessing powers to which we can in truth
lay no claim.'35 This could be supporting evidence of a
ruling class conspiracy where the elite entered into, 'extra-
legal dealings among themselves to bend the statute and
common law to their own purposes.'36 But Judge Gould had
frustrated this attempt to interfere with the proper process
by refusing to condone the arrangements entered into by
those more directly concerned in the tasks of policing.
Mr Rishton, the Kings Lynn magistrate, pointed out that
if potential informants came to believe that the justices
of the peace lacked the authority to make good their
promises:
An opinion unfavourable to our weight might
prevail, at a time when the County swarms with
villains of every description beyond any former
period in our remembrance. A Judge of Assize
can never be acquainted with all the local
circumstances that may render it good polity
to pardon even an atrocious offender.
Noting a number of convicted felons' death sentences had
been commuted to transportation, Rishton wondered whether
this was 'perhaps from an idea that sending them to the
coast of Africa is a more severe punishment than that death
to which they were sentenced.'37
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Contemporaries were aware of the divide between the
ideal of law and the realities of social control. John
Fielding objected to the way criminals used the system
of informing to remove and replace rivals while Edward
Sayer questioned 'the ruling principle of.. .employing mostly
thieves to take Thieves.' The practice of using King's
evidences removed the certainty of punishment and instead:
we see an asylum opening itself for the reception
of offenders in the bosom of Justice herself, to
which, after a short life of youthful wildness,
they may safely return and in good old age enjoy
their otium cum dignitate, good pay, and an extensive
patronage. 38
The revenue authorities were probably closer in their
thinking to Samuel Phillips and John Chitty, who regarded
informing as a blight on the administration of justice
but the only means of obtaining convictions in some cases,
in particular when dealing with criminal gangs. The prospect
of betrayal served to undermine trust and induced the gang
members to impeach one another. Winslow suggests that 'The
greatest threat to the individual smuggler, apart from
reduced tariffs, appears to have been neither the revenue
officers nor the Army and Fleet, but rather the informer.'39
He could have added that the most useful informants were
often a smuggler's associates. The distinction between
Sussex in the late 1740s, when the Duke of Richmond was
pursuing his anti-smuggling campaign, and 'normal
circumstances' when 'the solidarity of the smuggling
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Collier acted for the Customs in a number of successful
prosecutions at the Sussex assizes in 1737, but shortly
before the trials began, Thomas Gilbert, a principa]. Crown
witness, had died, leaving the prosecution with Robert
Pope and William Weston,. both King's evidences. The
Solicitor-General advised that it was quite proper to proceed
on their testimony alone, but Thomas Gurr's counsel objected
to Pope as an accessory. 'The judge allowed the Objection
good and set him aside, but by greatest fortune in the
world he never hit upon Weston's being in the same
condition.'41 Pope and Weston between them could identify
sixteen members of the Groombridge gang, and were able
to provide details of a number of landings along the Kent
and Sussex coasts. The names included Pope's brother Isaac,
John MacDonald, Jeremiah Curteis and Thomas Powell.
After a few weeks in Norwich Castle Jonathan Pixley
was prepared to divulge the names of crews, customers,
and the 'master smugglers' he had dealings with. Pixley
was hoping to benefit from the terms of the 1736 Indemnity
Act, but George Medcalfe, the Customs Solicitor, argued
against leniency:
Upon the whole I beg leave to say that (for the
Sake of the Lives of your Officers which are always
more or less endangered by every Resistance, And
also in Consideration of the Legislatures' having
lately exprest its particular Abhorrence to this
Offence, by Rendering the Lawes made to prevent
it more Secure) I am humbly of Opinion that this
is a Crime that should very seldom meet with
forgiveness 42
374
Medcalfe considered 	 assaulting a revenue officer, 'AS
a publick Open Defiance of Government, is of more dangerous
Consequence & more Example than a private Defrauding it
through evasion of duties.'43 Pixley was imprisoned with
John Ranford, John Burridge, John Wallis and Joseph Harding.
Besides incriminating one another, they managed between
them to name thirty persons concerned in the smuggling
trade, a number of whom were later put on trial and sentenced
to transportation. 44
III
Courts, Culprits and Customs Officers
Douglas Hay maintains that 'the ideology of the law
was crucial in sustaining the hegemony of the English ruling
class.' Yet there were divisions of interest within the
elite and different priorities. 45 The workings of the legal
system can sometimes illustrate these internal tensions.
When Rishton referred to 'local circumstances that may
render it good policy to pardon even an atrocious offender,'
he was not thinking solely of the case of James Hedding.46
Magistrates and other local officials had to live with
the consequences of decisions made by itinerant judges
and bureaucratic superiors ensconced in London. Social
crime can be presented as the outcome of the legislature's
efforts to criminalize long accepted custom and usage,
but the ways in which communities respond to legislation
intended to bring established practices under administrative
control also depends on how the laws are implemented. Those
responsible for applying the various anti-smuggling statutes
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often felt themselves trapped between the demands of central
government, the expectations of the local elite, and the
hostility of the contraband interest.
The revenue officers' refrain was that all their efforts
to bring smugglers to book were thwarted by - the corruption
and contumacy of juries and the deviousness of culprits
and their counsel. Reluctant to convict for offences against
the revenue laws, juries were quite ready to believe the
worst of those whose task it was to check illicit trading
and fraudulent practices.
Edward Davies, the Southwold Collector, and his
colleagues were taken to court in 1721, charged with
trespass, having taken a mare from Charles Waddington,
forfeit for carrying contraband brandy. The officers had
the backing of the Customs Solicitor, their own attorney
and 'most Learned Sergts and Council.' The judge directed
the jury to find for the defendants, but:
One juryrnan would not, & after near 12 hours
abstinence and the Assizes being then ended &
ready to be adjourned to Norwich, the rest of
them for want of Sustenance (as it is denied
in those cases) & through fear of being carried
to give their verdict at Norwich) he forced them
to submit to his obstinate humour & so they gave
a verdict & 40 shillings damages to the Plaintiff.
I may hence observe that a common Jury in Maritime
Counties is not to be depended upon in causes
for the King, a great many of such Juries Jurymen
being Smuglers & since this scandalous verdict
its the direction of the Judges that went the
Norfolk Circuit that whenever the like actions
are to be tryed again that the Court be moved
for a good Jury who probably may have regard
to their Oaths and Consciences.47
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Davies expected juries to be selected in accord with the
interests of government. Peter King has established that
'a broad spectrum of social groups used the law and made
discretionary decisions within it,' while acknowledging
'this does not necessarily invalidate the view that the
law was ultimately controlled by a small gentry elite.'48
Study of cases arising under the statutes aimed against
smuggling indicates that while the laws and the legal system
sustained the interests of a propertied ruling class,
the state was autonomous and its legitimacy derived from
a confusion of tradition, heredity, and elections. The
priorities of central government and its administrative
bodies did not always coincide with those of county society,
while juries, both grand and petty, were far more ambivalent
in their attitudes towards smugglers than when required
to try other felonies involving offences against property
and persons.
Revenue officers often complained of the difficulties
of getting offenders into court and seeing them convicted.
In August 1726, Sam Jacombe was sure he had enough witnesses
and informations to embark on a successful prosecution
against John Tiffen and John Newell for their part in an
assault at Burnham Norton on two crew from the Yarmouth
smack. Robert Dexter had gone before a magistrate and
provided a deposition which could be use as the basis
for a charge of incitement to riot. The evidence of the
Customs men and one independent witness should have been
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sufficient, but then a second witness, Thomas Reynolds,
disclosed the identities of several of those concerned
but there was no mention of Tiffen or Newell in his
testimony. As the time of the trial approached, Jacombe
found the prosecution case was disintegrating.
So that when I expected to have Reynolds and
Dexter as evidence.. .1 found Dexter was secreted,
having been sent out of the way by Newell as
it is supposed. And Reynold's would not acknowledge
that Tiffen and Newell were in the assault. So
I could only move the Court to continue Tiffen
and Newell on their recognizance in hopes to
find Dexter against the next Assizes.49
There were plenty of suspects for the killing of Thomas
Carswell. John MacDonald was arrested early on, but Collier,
entrusted with preparing the case against him, identified
the main problem for the Crown:
There was but one witness, Bartholemew Cross,
who positively swore to the prisoner being armed
and in the gang of smugglers when the murder
was committed, and soon after the Assizes at
which the indictment was found, he was either
bought off by the gang and sent out of the way
or otherwise destroyed by them for he has never
since been heard of though all possible endeavours
were used.
The four dragoons present at Hurst Green were then in
Flanders, and even if they were brought back for the trial,
they could not swear to the identity of any individual
smuggler. Collier thought it possible a conviction might
be obtained under the 1736 Act, the jury preferring to
see MacDonald transported rather than hanged. Joseph Lanton,
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another suspect taken up soon after the shooting, made
his escape from a public house in Battle, greatly assisted
by the complicity or incompetence of his escort.5° Michael
Bath, the dragoon killed in 1744, was the victim of a
reprisal for the soldiers' interference, but it proved
impossible to find witnesses ready to stand up in court
and give evidence in a murder trial. There were men prepared
to testify, but, 'they say their consciences will not let
them appear against persons to take away their lives who
do not deserve death.' -They were willing to come forward
if the charge was reduced and the accused would only face 	 -
transportation. 51
The revenue officers were themselves reluctant witnesses,
either declining the opportunity to appear in court or
affording the prosecution minimal assistance. Collier
expressed a strong desire to see Arthur Gray hanged at
Tyburn, but anticipated serious difficulties in finding
witnesses to his having been with the gangs active along
the Kent and Sussex coasts. The reports sent to him of
smuggling activities in 1743 and 1744 confirmed that both
Arthur and William Gray had taken part in a number of runs.
John Darby and Freebody Dray had sighted them six times
in all and their colleagues patrolling Romney Marsh certainly
witnessed the same trains of pack-horses passing by, even
if they were more cautious in recording the smugglers'
identities.52 In fact John Darby had more reason to be
careful than most, being forced to leave his home at Lydd
when his life was threatened, and had later to be transferred
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to the north Kent coast. The threats had been made by Trip
Stanford, Robert and Thomas Fuller, Thomas Powell, and
both William and Arthur Grey. The Customs authorities
would have liked to have linked the brothers with Carswell's
death, but though Arthur was arrested there was not
sufficient evidence to convince a grand jury. In December
1747 Henry Simon, Solicitor to the Customs, wrote to Collier
to tell him 'he had not the least scrap of information
against that fellow except that upon which he now stands
indicted,viz. for robbing John Bolton upon the highway
in Kent.' That offence could only be dealt with at the
county assizes and Simon feared Gray would escape justice:
The man has been very barbarous, outrageous
and assiduous in smuggling with firearms
and is become extremely formidable and
obnoxious to the counties of Kent and Sussex.
I think therefore that such a man would very
deservedly suffer at Tyburn and that if
evidence could be had to convict him capitally
as a smuggler, and to bring him to receive
his punishment there,it would be a great
service to the community.53
Arthur Gray was eventually tried and convicted for his
part in running goods near Lydd in August 1746. Prosecuting
counsel stressed the need to try smugglers outside their
Own counties, so 'that the magistrates and other juries
might not be afraid of putting the laws in execution.'
Gray was presented as 'principal leader' of the Hawkhurst
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gang, and 'a terror to the neighbourhood.' The only
revenueman called by the prosecution was John Polhill
the Lydd Riding Officer, who admitted to having seen a
smuggling gang passing through the town on. the day in
question, but would not identify Gray.The Crown had to
rely on John Peiham and Humphrey Hadden for identification,
both dismissed as unreliable in a later case, but testifying
for the first time at Gray's trial. 54 Simon wrote to Collier
telling him that there were many witnesses appearing for
the defence, and 'what I am sure you will think very strange,
many are custom house officers. The taking off so brutal
a creature I hope will be attended with good consequences.'55
Simon's antipathy towards smugglers was so great he advocated
their being hunted down like beasts of the chase, and the
brutal reality of outlawry was shown in the way some
proscribed men were pursued by parties of bounty hunters.56
In 1752, John Rich and Thomas Cock were tracked down by
a hunting party and discovered at Beck Row, just outside
Mildenhall. Cock ran off into the f en, but Rich, having
disarmed one man and knocked out two of his teeth, 'received
two balls in his body and after that they fractured his
skull with their pistols and then tied him hand and foot
and brought him to the Cock at Mildenhall where he died
next morning.'57
Juries were the main cause for complaint when prosecutions
failed, but judges could also frustrate the intentions
of the revenue services. James 'Trip' Stanford was another
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'master smuggler' named by Darby and Dray, and he was
also implicated in Carswell's murder, having alerted other
rnmbers of the Hawkhurst gang to the seizure of their goods
and played a full part in the rescue. When Stanford was
brought in, Collier anticipated his trial and punishment
would strike 'a deadly blow and entirely destroy this nest
of vermin.'58
Stanford's three counsel submitted that the indictment
was incorrectly drawn; their client could not be an accessory
to murder, 'For he Hired the Hawkhurst men to Rescue the
Goods and not to murder Carswell.' The prosecution argued
the manifest probability that the enterprise would lead
to violence and possibly death, but the judge would not
allow the point of law to be referred to the King's Bench,
and Stanford was free to go.59 The decision could be seen
as an example of the 'extreme solicitude of judges for
the rights of the accused' noted by Douglas Hay, but the
presence of three counsel for the defence raises the question
whether the judge's intervention was necessary 'to mitigate
the prohibition against legal counsel in felonies.'60 The
record for smuggling cases in the l730s and l740s, when
the accused were facing felony charges, suggests the practice
of employing lawyers for the defence was already accepted.
Peter King describes the criminal law as 'a flexible
and highly selective system. . . a private and negotiable
process involving personal confrontation rather than
bureaucratic procedure.' The system's flexibility, or
inconsistency, can be shown using as examples a number
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of smugglers t
 trials; the 'basic principles' underlying
the decisions of the courts are not always easily discerned.
Young offenders were seen as more corrigible, likely to
have been led astray by bad company; healthy indentured
servants were needed in the colonies, making commutation
of the death penalty a practical step, and juries were
well aware of the extra burden placed on the Poor Rate
when a family lost its breadwinner. 'Apart from a general
bias against pardoning highway robbers and burglars, the
main factors that persuaded the judge to lean against the
prisoner were excessive violence, breaches of trust, and
the need for a public example against a particular kind
of crime.'6'
'Excessive violence,' like 'reasonable force,' allows
for a measure of interpretation and individual discretion.
The outcomes of a number of cases, some of them involving
murderous violence connected with the contraband trade,
support the claim that, 'individuals and communities were
highly selective in their approach to the law and its
institutions.' Juries can be regarded as both part of the
machinery of the law and as representatives of the community.
Five men were arrested and tried for the murder of
Richard Hill on St Margaret's beach in 1732. Richard Graves,
John Woding and William Dearing were acquitted on that
count, but found guilty of smuggling and sentenced to seven
years transportation. 'One Woolet, an alehousekeeper, who
kept the arms for the smugglers, was fined 20 marks and
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to suffer two years imprisonment and to find security for
his good behaviour for seven years.' Stephen French was
fined five marks and sentenced to two years in prison and
one Pattingdon 'who committed the murder, was ordered to
be outlawed.' Under the terms of the 1721 Act anyone
resisting a Customs officer in the execution of his duties
risked a sentence of seven years transportation, yet here
the lesser offence of smuggling was punished, rather than
the capital crime of murder.62 By way of contrast, the
Suffolk jury sent two men to the gallows for the killing
of William Cam when the available evidence indicated they
had played only secondary roles in the affray. William
Clarke, John Harvey and William Neale were reported to
have started the shooting, and Clarke was thought to have
fired the fatal shot. Proscribed and brought in more than
ten years later, none of these men was ever tried for Cam's
death.63
John Beattie argues there was a marked move away from
'the high tolerance in the middle of the eighteenth century
of physical violence itself.'64 The difficulties in reaching
firm conclusions with respect to communal attitudes toward
violence have been explored with reference to John Rule's
idea that certain social crimes in themselves legitimised
extremes of violence. Juries were more sympathetic toward
smugglers who attacked and murdered revenue officers than
they were when soldiers had been the victims, and it is
hard to make out any great advance in public sensibilities
in these eighteenth-century smuggling cases.
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William Odgers, the Penzance officer, was murdered in
March 1768, in the process of removing a seizure to the
King's warehouse. Melchisdeck Kinsman, the main culprit,
was at first thought to have escaped to the Channel Isles
or America, but he had never left Cornwall. Such was the
protection provided by their fellow tin miners, 'The
Murderers are seen publickly in their Neighbourhood & its
thought at night sleep in their usual habitations.' 65 Captain
Buck, commanding officer at Penzance, was asked to send
out a party of soldiers to bring in the culprits but he
'thought a High Constable with a Warrant from a Justice
of the Peace cannot to him be sufficient Authority for
repelling Force with Force should a Rescue be attempted.'66
The chief prosecution witness, Alexander Hampton, had been
approached by 'an Agent for the Murderers' and offered
£50 to quit the country and stay away for two years. There
was a fear that the wanted men would surrender on the eve
of the assizes, so catching the prosecution unawares. In
the event, Kinsman's confederates handed him over 'in
order to save their own lives.'67 They were still put on
trial so there were four prisoners before the court, and
the Board was determined on securing a conviction. 	 'Mr
Sergt Davy, Mr Sergt Burland, Mr Thurlow & Mr Mansfield
had Briefs on behalf of the Crown and all attended during
the whole Tryal. Mr Sergt Plynn, Mr Hodgekin & Mr Impey
were for the Prisoners.' The Penzance Collector observed
that the smugglers had money, and this legal representation
would have been expensive.
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The Tryal lasted upwards of eleven hours when
the Facts were fully & clearly proved,
particularly against Kinsman in the most flagrant
Manner, notwithstanding which the Jury (contrary
to the Opinion of the whole Court) found them
severally not Guilty. '68
The Collector suspected the jury, named some days in advance,
had been suborned by 'the Prisoners & their Friends which
were numerous about them & had great plenty of Money.'
Mansfield assured the Customs officials that the smugglers'
guilt had been proved beyond any reasonable doubt and 'it
was one of the clearest cases in favour of the Prosecution
that was ever brought before a Court and he was amazed
at the verdict.' The county was convinced the jury had
been 'corrupted with Money.'69
A decade later Edward Giddy a Cornish magistrate, stated
there was little point in the Revenue bringing cases to
court. 'I fear a criminal prosecution would have been useless
for the reason which it shocks me to mention, that a Cornish
jury would certainly acquit the smugglers. t The Collector,
asked to comment on Giddy's remarks, felt the magistrate
had been 'too severe On his Country Men the Cornish Jury,
we hope there are many honest men in the County tho too
many Smugglers.' Giddy had also questioned some of the
practices of the Customs service.70
The acquittal of Kimbell and Gunton after the killings
at Snettisham showed juries did not need to be bribed before
freeing murderous smugglers, whatever the evidence presented.
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In that case, the jurors may have expressed local feeling,
outraged by the death of an innocent bystander when the
West Norfolk Militia went to arrest Thomas Franklin at
Thornham. 71-
William Owen was initially wanted by the Customs service
for firing on a cruiser off the Welsh coast. When he
put into Cardigan the Collector sent a boarding party to
Owen's cutter in order to arrest him. After a brief
conversation, Owen made it clear he was not going to
surrender peacefully and shot James Phillips dead through
the window of the captain t s cabin. In a subsequent exchange
of fire, three more men were killed and Owen was able to
leave the port, escaping to the Isle of Man. After some
months moving between Man, Ireland and Wales, Owen was
forced to give himself up to the Manx authorities. His
wife had been arrested, cutting him off the regular food
supplies to his hiding place in the hills. With two of
his crew he was brought over to Liverpool in October 1744
and then taken to Hereford.72 The assumption was that
an English jury from an inland county would be less
sympathetic towards a smuggler than one from Cardiganshire.
Owen and two of his crew, John Callowe and William Carron,
were charged with the murders of James Phillips and Domingo
St Sebastian. The jury acquitted them on that charge, but
found them guilty of the lesser offence of manslaughter,
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for which the penalty was burning in the hand. Owen was
free to return to his various nefarious activities until
arrested for burglary and indicted for another murder.
He and John Lily had broken into a house and robbed it,
shooting a servant in the process. Then, trying to escape
a posse, Lily and Owen between them brought down and then
shot dead one of their pursuers. Finally Owen killed his
associate and that was the offence for which he was hanged
after a trial at the Carmarthen assizes in April 1747.
Owen had been responsible for six deaths in Wales, and
by his own account he had dispatched 25 Spanish guardacosta
during an encounter in the Caribbean.73 Why the Hereford
jury decided to convict for manslaughter rather than murder
is difficult to understand except as a demonstration of
sympathy for his profession, even when it involved extreme
violence.
Tomkin escaped conviction for Gerard Reeves's murder
and won a pardon for his early return from New Providence
when he gave information to Sir John Cope's committee.
His later involvement with the Hawkhurst gang laid him
open to proclamation in the London Gazette but he went
on escaping retribution until brought to court accused
of robbing the Chester mail. A Bedfordshire jury found
him guilty and Tomkin was hanged at Hockcliffe in l75O.
A number of smugglers were put on trial at the county
assizes in the late l740s and early 1750s; many of them
were convicted and punished, but not for running contraband
or assaults against the preventive forces; they were indicted
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for house-breaking and robbery on the highway. Contemporaries
attributed this diversification to the difficulties created
by the reduction in the excise duty on tea, and the effects
of the 1746 Act. The smugglers had lost their trade, could
not follow any honest employ, their lives being forfeit,
and while they did live they would not starve.'75
At the East Grinstead assizes in 1749, John Brown was
convicted for highway robbery and Lawrence and Thomas Kemp
were found guilty of housebreaking. Stephen Rose was
convicted of horse stealing, and Richard Savage for stealing
wrecked goods from the Lewes waggon. All were described
as smugglers and the main prosecution witnesses, Francis
Doe, Thomas 'Coachman' Winter and Thomas Dixon were former
smuggling associates of the accused. John 'Smoaker' Mills,
involved with the Kemps, was sentenced to death for his
part in the murder of Richard Hawkins, killed on the orders
of Jeremiah Curteis. Robert Fuller was charged with theft,
but he was brought to Sussex from the Surrey county gaol,
where he was detained for smuggling offences. Jacob Pring
testified to Fuller's involvement in a number of highway
robberies while the report on the trials maintained he
had been present when Carswell was shot, along with the
Kemps, Thomas Potter, William Priggs, James Bartlet and
Stephen Diprose. The last three were tried at the Rochester
assizes for robbery, and Potter was convicted as a horse
thief 76
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John Nodes, the Ipswich Riding Officer, had a warrant
for the arrest of suspected housebreakers and used it to
bring in known smugglers. Thomas Catchpole was taken to
London, tried at the Old Bailey and executed at Tyburn.
Thomas 'White Eyes' Fidgett, wanted for the murder of John
Mills at Felixstowe in 1742, was convicted at Chelmsford
in 1752, one of the few smugglers to hang for killing a
revenue officer.77 James Cunningham, Thomas Brooks and
Francis Mayhew were held in Newgate, charged with smuggling
offences, but were then brought back to Suffolk to face
trial for robbery at a house in Blakenham. All three were
convicted and executed, as was Robert Clarke, another
smuggler turned housebreaker.78
Having surveyed the situation in the later 1740s, Frank
McLynn concludes that 'The ease with which smugglers were
able to diversify into other felonies argues against their
status as primitive rebels and makes them appear more as
professional criminals.'79 Many of the practices linked
with smuggling were anti-social crimes of a very recognizable
kind, but any generalisation needs testing against the
evidence. Jack Fuller was a gunfounder, plantation owner
and Sussex magaistrate with little liking for either
smugglers or revenue officers. In July 1747 Fuller's brother
arrived home and told of an encounter with a pair of
highwaymen on Darwell Hill, a few miles to the south of
Hawkhurst. Fuller proclaimed a hue and cry and 'ordered
out two Parties of my late Soldiers arm'd to search every
House in a Circle of Five Miles in the Night.' Another
party, made up of Fuller's servants, tracked down one suspect
and he led them to his companion. 'Malcolm' a former army
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sergeant, managed to seize one man, but could not risk
shooting the other without being sure these were the
culprits. The man taken was William Pierce, who named
his associate as William Marchant, 'one of the Hawkhurst
Heros that attacked Goudhurst.' Nevertheless, soon after
Pierce's removal to Horsham gaol, another Hawkhurst man
came to Fuller and swore that if Marchant was still in
Kent, the smugglers would deliver him up to the authorities.
When one of the search parties rode into Hawkhurst, a number
of smugglers approached 'and asked their business their
[Sic] arm'd, & said if they only came after the Highwaymen
t'was very well'.81 In an earlier incident Pierce and
Marchant had tried to extract £30 from 'young Chester'
holding him up on the road and claiming an unpaid debt:
the Demand was made on the Kings high Road & after
they had putt him in Fear for several Hours, he,
Chester, jumped off his Horse & claim'd Will Gray's
Protection, who thrash'd WM very severely & next
Day saw Chester safe Home.82
Neither of the Grays had taken part in the raid on Goudhurst,
and the willingness to hand over Marchant and Pierce could
have semmed from an internal feud. Alternatively, the
smugglers were trying to maintain a distinction between
criminal practices and their own activities, just as when
they broke into the King's warehouses they took care to
remove only their own confiscated goods.
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Jack Fuller's concern was that Marchant would be rescued
by Trip Stanford, who had employed him shortly before.
The Duke of Newcastle was advised that Stanford and Gray
were so 'imensly [Sic] rich' they could afford to corrupt
any number of soldiers and Marchant managed his escape
with another prisoner as they were escorted from Maidstone
to Lewes to await trial. The dragoons were dismounted,
the deputy keeper of the gaol had removed one man's fetters,
and the horse they were on was walking free. 83 Fuller took
the opportunity to attack the agencies of central government:
Tis with the most melancholy Reflections we observe
that when a lawless & abandoned Sett of Men have render'd
themselves powerfull & triumph'd over the Civil Power,
that when the Legislature have shewn their Intentions
to suppress them by the most vigorous Law that ever
was made; the Sting of the Law & the Vigilance of the
Magistrate is frustrated by the Negligence of the Persons
to whom Criminals are committed; the active Constables
& other inferior Officers who at the Perill of their
Lives execute the Orders of their Superiors, the
Witnesses who at the same Perill enter into Recognizances
to prosecute at their own Expence Offenders, see all
their Endeavours fruitless & their Time & Money thrown
away, We the Magistrates despair when all our Power
is defeated & cannot bear any longer to have the Cry,
the Reproach & the Censure of the whole Nation thrown
upon this County when we have endeavour'd by every
Means & Method to Putt the Laws in Execution.84
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Faced with the threat of resignation en masse from the
commission of the peace, George II intervened, assuring
Fuller that the efforts of the Sussex magistrates were
much appreciated, and pressing Newcastle to take action.85
The years following the American War of Independence
saw rising crime figures and 'a particularly high hanging
rate on the home circuit.' Convicts could no longer be
sent to the former American colonies and the prisons were
becoming overcrowded; 'a generally harsher policy towards
certain capital offences (notably highway robbery and
burglary) was pursued.' 86 Belief that criminal activity
is on the increase promoted demands for more exemplary
punishments and harsher treatment of offenders though
sentencing policy in the 1780s rested on practical as well
as retributive considerations. The fate of some Norfolk
and Suffolk offenders at that time supports the argument
that smugglers engaging in other crimes could not rely
on friendly juries.
John Euston and John Love carried out a series of
highway robberies around Diss and Scole in November 1780.
Following further hold-ups on the turnpike road between
Hockering and Easton the Norwich Mercury identified one
of the culprits and suggested the highwaymen, 'from their
appearances and speeches,' belonged to 'a large smuggling
party.' Both men were arrested at Swaffham and committed
to Norwich Castle, where they admitted they belonged to
a gang of smugglers,'who have so long and more particularly
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of late infested the County.' Details of other offences
emerged once they were in gaol, and it was thought the
intention behind the robberies was to acquire capital to
invest in the contraband trade. William Smith, a third
suspect was brought to the Castle and all three were
convicted of highway robbery at the Norwich assizes. John
Love, and William Smith were hanged but Euston remained
in gaol until the next assizes, when he was again remanded
in custody. Finally a pardon was granted on condition
he entered the service of the East India Company, but Euston
was re-arrested nine months later, he he claimed the surgeons
had turned him down on medical grounds.87 John Crome was
executed at Norwich in August 1787. The event was
impressively staged; Crome processed slowly round the
prison yard, his coffin carried behind him, before addressing
his fellow prisoners:
beseeching them to pay a proper regard to the
duties of the sabbath, and avoid the pernicious
and fatal conduct of smuggling, fatal to him
as being the chief cause of his untimely end.88
Crome had been tried and convicted for highway robbery,
but the authorities were keen to use him as part of a
campaign against the evils of the contraband trade. William
Sampson and Joseph Lambert were sentenced to death at
the Suffolk assizes in March 1784. Their offence was
burglary, but before sentence was executed on Rushmere
Heath, 'they particularly reminded' the onlookers 'to abstain
from smuggling, declaring that to be their first approach
to greater crimes.'89 Thomas Clarke, John Deane and Thomas
Carty were tried and convicted at Bury St Edmunds in 1785
for attacking Thomas Marsh and robbing him of 183 dollars
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assizes two months later he noted how 'Our honest country
men the Sussex jury continue to do their duty, having
capitally convicted six notorious smugglers' at East
Grinstead.96
Four more smugglers were executed for horse stealing
and robbery at the Kent assizes that summer, while James
Toby was the first man to suffer under a new statute, passed
in 1744, making the owling of wool a capital offence.
John Green, another small scale smuggler charged under
the 1746 Act, had a trial lasting five hours while the
jury deliberated for another five before bringing in a
guilty verdict at three o'clock in the morning. William
Potter, John Hales and John Prior were all transported
for armed smuggling, but Thomas Prior and Sam Pritchett,
charged with assisting in the escape from Maidstone gaol,
were discharged. William Wells was convicted for running
half a hundredweight of tea, and rescuing it after seizure.97
Congratulating Richmond on the results achieved at
Chichester, Henry Simon contrasted the outcome with the
failure to bring a successful prosecution against anyone
concerned in Carswell's murder; 'the best endeavours of
the Board of Revenue on prosecutions of this sort must
fall short unless they are seconded and supported by the
spirit and exertion of the country.'98 The leaders of county
society had to provide a clear indication of their personal
support if the law was to be used effectively against
smugglers, the point made more forcefully by Jack Fuller.
These divisions within the propertied elite do not
automatically nullify the notion of a ruling class interest
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in the administration of the law, but there is a need to
trace the intricate networks linking different elites,
and structuring the relationships between governors and
governed. These contributed greatly to the effective working
of the legal system and helped legitimise the exercise
of power.
Juries did acquit in the face of the evidence but they
were not invariably on the side of the free traders. John
'Giffling Jack' Carbold's efforts to win a pardon came
to nothing and he returned to the contraband trade until
his arrest and trial at the Old Bailey in 1750. Prior
to his execution, Carbold admitted 'he was a great smuggler,
but said little did he think that it would have cost him
his life.' John Doe, hanged at the same time as Carbold,
confessed to being a smuggler, but 'was never a man that
was riotous and troublesome to his neighbours' conducting
his business 'quietly and without interruption.' Charles
'Papist' Gowan, a third victim, said that 'If being a
smuggler deserved death, he had his due,' but it was clear
all three men felt caught up in a legal process which had
more to do with expressing governmental disapproval of
an established way of life than with the punishment of
specific crimes.99
Iv
Smugglers at the Old Bailey
The 1736 and 1746 Acts provided for cases involving armed
smuggling and assaults on revenue officers to be heard
at assizes outside the county where the offence was
committed. The revenue authorities took advantage of this
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and a number of smugglers from East Anglia, Kent and Sussex,
were tried at the Old Bailey. Smugglers who offered
resistance to the waterguard ran the risk of being brought
before the High Court of Admiralty, which also sat at the
Old Bailey. George Coombes and his co-defendents appeared
there,	 accused of the murder of William Allen,	 in
Christchurch harbour in 1784, and so did the Ruxley gangJ00
The Hastings privateers who took out commissions during
the Seven Years War were more interested in piracy and
smuggling than legitimate prizes. Edward Milward, working
with the Excise officers and the Royal Navy commanders
assisting the Revenue, wanted to arrest and prosecute as
many of the culprits as possible. Taken up and shipped
to London in 1768, they were charged with piracy, not
smuggling, and tried before e the Admiralty judges. Twenty-
three men were arrested, but several died in custody.
Thirteen were put on trial for boarding a single Dutch
vessel and stealing a quantity of hats; for this, five
men were sentenced to death. A deliberate campaign of
disinformation after the trials created the impression
that the Hastings pirates had been vicious murderers but
there was no evidence that they ever killed anyone.101
The 1746 Act stated that the provision for trials to
be held outside the county where the offence was committedwas
intended to ensure impartiality. Taking cases to the Old
Bailey was supposed to reduce the prospect that juries
would be intimidated or corrupted by associates of the
accused, but this was to underestimate the smugglers'
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resources. Nor is it self-evident that London juries would
be more sympathetic to the requirements of government than
their compeers in the counties, where the trial juries
were drawn from 'the middling groups: farmers, tradesmen
and artisans', and though the property qualification for
jury service in London and Middlesex did not depend on
the possession of freehold property or landholding, petty
jurymen were still drawn from the same social sector.102
Thomas Green maintains that following the changes made
to the property qualifications in 1730, 'Jury service became
a more respectable activity . . .the Crown relied on fewer,
hence more experienced persons, individuals drawn from
the higher ranks of the very large class of persons that
remained the target of summons for trial jury service."03
Green is suggesting such juries were predisposed in favour
of government and good order. Peter Linebaugh also sees
the Old Bailey juries as likely to favour Crown prosecutions,
in that they were alert to the instructions and predilictions
of the judges, who were themselves part of the ruling elite,
with a vested interest in maintaining the established order
in society, and who would look on organized banditry with
scant sympathy:
Recent studies of income stratification of
eighteenth-century London show that two-thirds
of the inhabitants were too poor to even pay
taxes, much less own freehold lands or tenements.
'Middle class' or 'middle rank' actually refers
to the weakest part of the powerful minority
of the propertied. It was precisely this rank
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• that was most susceptible to the crippling
ties of clientage and dependency characterizing
municipal politics. Such people had more face-
to-f ace dealings and neighbourly ties with
the 'loose and disorderly' than their richer
brethren. The social class of the juror will
also have been the social class of the creditor,
the landlord, the masters, the employers, the
constables and the overseers of the defendants.
That social class too, will have provided many
of the victims of thefts and misappropriations.
Besides the jurymen identifying with the property owning
classes, there were more pressing reasons for them wishing
to accommodate the judges. It took 'an extraordinarily
courageous, conscientious juror to defy the judge's
directions as to the law and the evidence' since not only
did the staging of the trial give the bench an advantage,
but the judges 'could dispense small favours and payments
to jurors, excuse them from panels or allow them to serve
again, and keep them from their dinners.'104
Linebaugh seems determined to present the Old Bailey
juries as the agents of the ruling class, whether composed
of men of substance, perceiving themselves as part of the
propertied elite, or acting under subtle forms of duress.
The smugglers who appeared in the dock at the Old Bailey
presented something of an obstacle to this social
determinism. The accused were from Kent, Sussex and East
Anglia, and did not pose a direct threat to London's
'middling sort'; in fact, apothecaries, spirit dealers,
innkeepers and grocers were quite likely to be among the
smugglers' customers.
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The smuggling cases heard at the Old Bailey between
1746 and 1753, the initial period of operation for the
1746 statute, provide a valuable source for both the study
of the contraband trade and the workings of the law.
J.S.Cockburn has noted that from at least the l730s:
Kent and the adjoining county of Sussex were the
scene of widespread smuggling. Clashes between
the excise officers and bands of smugglers
transporting or attempting to recapture consignments
of tea and spirits were extremely violent and
involved the use of swords and firearms on both
sides. Inexplicably, the fierce battles of the
1740s which left at least two smugglers dead at
Goudhurst in 1747 have left no trace in the assize
records.105
The affray at Goudhurst was unusual for the lack of official
reports; other incidents were reported and offenders tried
at the county assizes, but the majority of East Anglian
and Kent and Sussex smuggling cases, brought under the
new legislation, were heard in London, which explains
the lack of documentation in the records of the circuit
judges. Whatever their reasons, class solidarity, a belief
that smuggling threatened the proper social order, or a
desire to please the administrators of the law, the Old
Bailey juries were more disposed to convict than acquit
those charged under the 1736 and 1746 Acts. Out of the
60 men brought to court, 40 were found guilty, 12 were
acquitted, six pleaded guilty and two were released when
the Crown failed to produce any evidence.
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The Attorney-General and Solicitor-General conducted
the earlier prosecutions and used their opening addresses
to explain and justify the anti-smuggling statutes.The
revenue had to be safeguarded, the fair trader protected,
and a menace to public order contained:
Smugglers are grown to that Pass that they are
too big for the Law itself; everybody knows what
Riots and Tumults and open Violence in Contempt
of the Laws of the Country and indeed setting
the civil Magistrates at Defiance.106
Smuggling was so prevalent in some counties, and conducted
with such force, 'the Inhabitants know not how to lie safe
in their Beds for fear of them.' The practice had developed
into 'a kind of rebellion.. .no Magistrate or officer where
they reign. . .can put any laws in execution against them. . .tis
now a struggle between •
 government and this banditti which
shall get the better.'1-°7 Aware of the objections to
prosecutions dependent on the testimony of King's evidences,
the Crown side argued it was impossible for anyone else
to get near enough to the gangs to recognise individuals,
or to say for certain what weapons they had or what goods
they were carrying.l08
Looked at separately, the trials suggest considerable
care on the part of the prosecution, but when the cases
are compared it is apparent that the same witnesses were
being paraded time after time identifying different
smugglers, all supposed to have been engaged in the one
landing and informants were given credence when they listed
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precisely which of their associates had been present at
various runs over a period of weeks or months. Having
to repeat accounts in the witness box, and respond to cross
examination, made for inconsistencies and contradictions.
Abraham Bailey described himself as a 'sometime customs
watchman and keeper of a Yarmouth coffee house"° 9 His
unwelcome arrival at Horsey in March 1747 had all the marks
of a would-be informant intent on earning some reward money.
As a witness he proved both serviceable and inventive;
at Robert Cunningham's trial Bailey maintained that he
could only swear to the identity of James Holt among the
smugglers who assaulted him. Bailey had been dragged from
his lodgings in a Horsey inn, beaten, threatened with a
case-knife placed against his throat, half-strangled, and
tied up to a tree all night. When it came to the trial
of James Smith, Bailey straightaway recognised him as one
of those concerned in the attack. 'They put me across a
stick and made me what they call their member of parliament.'
Smith stood out because his face had been blackened, and
'the old smugglers' had fuddled him with drink and 'dressed
him up with pistols in an odd manner.' Bailey's memory
improved as further cases came to court. John Peters and
John 'Cockeye' Carbold were also among his assailants.
By this time the stick he had been made to ride had become
a gun, he had been flayed with whips, rather than beaten
With a thong, and the caseknjfe had grown 'as long as a
hanger. '110.
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The other main prosecution witness identifying the
smugglers at Horsey was John Leader, a King's evidence
who testified to the identities of a number of smugglers
concerned in different runs on the Suffolk coast. 'Reasonable
doubt' was no reason for acquittal at this time. James
Watling was convicted of running goods at Benacre in
September 1746 but the jury did recommend transportation
rather than the death penalty, 'Upon Account of some
Difficulty which they said they were under in Relation
to his being Guilty of this particular Fact as charged
upon him by Leader's Evidence." 11 Leader was charged
with swearing to the identities of men he had never seen
before, and of recruiting prosecution witnesses in the
local taverns and coffee houses.Both prosecution and defence
relied on professional evidences, plying for hire about
the Old Bailey, and John Carr, recruited by Leader, admitted
to knowing a Mr Kelly, an Irish Catholic, more usually
engaged to look after the smugglers interests:
He has his assurance from his country and his
principles from his religion or from hell
itself. . .he has 40 or 50 fellows of his own country
and religion at his command who are ever ready
to swear whatever he cares to dictate.' 112 -
John Collier and Henry Simon complained of the difficulty
in finding witnesses against the Grays and other smugglers
from the Weald. Thomas Clare and John Polhill, Riding
Officers at Hythe and Lydd, were able to produce a pair
of witnesses, John Peiham and Humphrey Hatton, accurately
described by Arthur Gray; 'These fellows, before they would
go to work, would swear away a man's life for anything.'113•
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Hatton had worked as an ostler at the George Inn, Lydd,
where the smugglers often stopped on their way to and from
the sea shore and he claimed to have seen Gray and James
Sandiland among a party of smugglers near Lydd in August
1746. Both the prisoners were convicted on the eye-witness
accounts of Hatton and Peiham. James Shepherd, accused
of taking part in a separate run near Lydd the same year,
presented a very well organized defence. Witnesses and
documentation were produced to show he was in Winchester
at the time of the alleged offence, and the characters
of the prosecution witnesses came under scrutiny. William
Temple and John Lee, magistrates from Lydd, came into the
court to give their assessments of Peiham and Hatton.
They led 'idle sort • of lives and their oaths would not
be credited where they came from. . . these people are reputed
to get their living no other way but by attending at this
place.' 114 Embarrassed by these revelations, the Crown
decided not, to proceed with the case. Gray had been disposed
of, and a couple of corruptible evidences had served their
main purpose.
Chriátopher Barrett's informing career began in 1747.
According to Barrett, he was present when landings occurred
at places as far apart as Reculver and Folkestone Warren
on the Kent coast and was able to name several participants.
There was no corroborative detail and the process of
identification was highly questionable. Thomas Puryour
was committed for a breach of the peace, but his carrying
a brace of pistols led the arresting officers to suspect
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he was a smuggler and place an advertisement in the East
Kent Post. The Folkestone Customs officers had Barrett
and Robert
Worthington 'take an Inspection of the Prisoner' in
Canterbury gaol where they 'immediately knew him and said
that he was one of the Hawkhurst Gang. . . and that he went
by the name of Blacktooth and was one of the foremost and
most desperate of the gang.'115 Puryour was certainly
a Hawkhurst smuggler, but his name is not among those
proclaimed in the London Gazette for running contraband
at Sandgate, Folkestone, Reculver and Chislet in February
and March 1747. In court, the Attorney-General described
Puryour as:
a frequent Companion of these Smugglers who have
upon all occasion appeared in Arms at the Sea Side
upon the News of any Smuggling Cutters that were
ready to land uncustomed Goods, he has been from
time to time employed in taking these Goods from
the Ship, in assisting and carrying them off and
of conierting the Benefit and Share of them to
his own proper use116
From this account, Puryour was one of the many casual
assistants taken on as loaders and porters and paid with
a tub of spirits or a few pounds of tea. It is doubtful
a London jury would have appreciated the extent to which
the Attorney-General's speech contradicted Barrett's version
that the acccused was a major figure in the Hawkhurst gang.
The objective was to see smugglers executed or transported,
and other offenders identified by Barrett were well known
figures; Thomas Kemp, Richard Mapesden and tjriah Creed
were brought to trial on the strength of his evidence,
and the latter pair convicted. No revenuemen would admit
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to knowing of any of the men engaged in these East Kent
operations, and whatever criticisms might be made of the
use of compliant informants, they were an integral part
of the policing process. Ruth Paley's study of the London
thief-takers in the mid-century years argues that the judges
were aware that the legal system was being corrupted, and
that the officers of the law were a part of the process:
As the man who authorized the distribution of
rewards, the Recorder was in a position to know
just how often thief takers stood to profit from
a conviction. He more than anyone else was best
placed to note the distinctive and repetitive
patterns of conspiratorial prosecutions. At best
the conduct of successive Recorders amounts to
malicious complacaency; at worst one is led to
suspect outright corruption.3-l7
The judges, lawyers, and more experienced jurors must have
been equally aware of what was happening in the prosecutions
brought against the smugglers. The Old Bailey was both
a court of law and a theatre; these smuggling trials
developed a distinct format with which jurors must have
become familiar. The prosecution prologue would portray
a scene of depredation and intimidation in the coastal
counties serious enough to endanger social and political
order. Next would appear the Crown witnessses, well
rehearsed to begin with and gaining in confidence with
repeat performances unless subject to determined cross
examination.	 Then, if the prisoners	 could afford it,
the defence witnesses would provide alibis, give testimony
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to character, or try to discredit the prosecution side.
Conviction or acquittal rested as much on the jury's
judgement of the performance as on any objective assessment
of the evidence presented. John Shepherd's defence was
particularly thorough, but when John Carbolt and Edward
Brooke adopted similar tactics, they failed to convince
the jury. The mistake made by Sam Austin's defence was
over-elaboration; Thomas Cook, who supplied Austin's alibi,
was his stepson, a fact concealed from the jury. Henry
Simon believed that the prosecution eliciting the truth
on this point decided the verdict. Edmund Henley, indicted
for running goods at North Foreland in April 1746, was
able to produce a dozen witnesses to establish an alibi
and provide character references. The Crown had only the
one witness, Richard Smith, one of the leaders of the
smuggling gangs working on Romney Marsh in the 1740s. Aware
of Smith's background, the defence was able to discredit
him and secure an acquittal, but in an unrelated perjury
case Mary Swindon testified to having once employed Edward
Dixon, 'who was also in the pay of one Ned Henley a
Smugg1r.'118 Many of those tried at the Old Bailey had
well documented smuggling careers and could not complain
they were the victims of an arbitrary administrative machine
system, yet attempts to correlate the evidence presented
in court with the verdicts reached confirm Green's conclusion
that 'the development of a formal law of evidence in criminal
cases is difficult to discern before the late eighteenth
century. '119
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The 1746 Act removed the requirement for a jury to
decide whether or not an accused smuggler had committed
the offence of which he was accused. Any smuggler who failed
to surrender forty days after proclamation in the London
Gazette and in the two market towns closest to his supposed
crime, was guilty of a capital offence. At William Rowland's
trial this provision in the statute was justified on the
grounds that it was difficult to get witnesses to appear
in open court and magistrates were sometimes reluctant
to take informations. Prosecuting counsel told the jury,
'Gentlemen, you have nothing to do whether the prisoner
is guilty of this offence, you are only to try whether
he is guilty of the several facts stated by the Attorney
General.' As long as every step in the proclamation process
had been properly executed then the accused could be
sentenced.. The jury wanted to know 'whether it should
not be proved that this is the man meant in the order
published in the Gazette 'but were assured it was for the
prisoner to prove he was not the William Rowland intended;
they fàund him guilty and he was sentenced to death.12°
Some smugglers successfully invoked legal technicalities
in their defence. Robert Cunningham's counsel challenged
the description of Dunwich as a market town, drawing a
comparison with Old Sarum, another decayed parliamentary
constituency, and pointed out that there were three Robert
Cunninghams in Wingfield, his client's domicile. No witness
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could be produced at Richard Mapesden's first trial to
affirm he was proclaimed at Canterbury and Sandwich, and
John Harvey, prominent in the party which rescued a seizure
at Hadleigh and killed William Cam a decade earlier, was
able to convince one jury there was a possibility of mistaken
identity when he was proscribed for a later smuggling
offence. John Baker brought witnesses along to show there
were three men of that name living in Hadleigh and he had
no way of knowing he was the one intended. Others were
less fortunate; Francis Andrews and Benjamin Watts, John
Carbold, Charles Gowan and John Doe were hanged on the
untested accusations of informants.'21
V
tjncoinnion Criminals: Smugglers, Authority and the Law
It is very hard to find figures worthy of romance,
even social romance, among the shoplifters,
pickpockets, pilferring housemaids and dishonest
apprentices who populated the Old Bailey dock.. .To
turn these little crooks into class warriors
one must wear rose coloured glasses of the deepest
hue 122
This was John Langbein's conclusion,	 having considered
the miscreants appearing at the Old Bailey.	 Smuggling
was a matter of commercial calculation, hard physical labour,
skilled seamanship, and violent confrontations.
	
It was
not romantic but it did provide more stimulation than many
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other occupations. Langbein's analysis of the Old Bailey
proceedings does not address the issue of smuggling as
a social crime; his selection of period for study omits
the seven years during which the 1746 Act was effective.
Since it is Cal Winslow's 'Sussex Smugglers,' more than
any other law breakers in 'Albions Fatal Tree' who are
presented as social rebels fighting against the forces
of commercial capitalism, Langbein's argument would have
greater impact if his assessment had been extended to include
these offenders rather than establishing the mundaneness
of many prisoners appearing at the Old Bailey. Langbein
suggests the criminal justice system may have occupied:
a place not much more central than the garbage
collection system. True, if the garbage is not
collected the society cannot operate and ruling class
goals will be frustrated, but that does not turn
garbage collection into a ruling class conspiracy.'-23
The criminal code had wide scope, ranging from political
offences such as seditious libel to interfering with fish
ponds under the Black Act. 'Garbage collection' is a feeble
metaphor when trying to assess the role of the law and
its institutions in securing a measure of social order.
Identifying the proper functioning of that society with
the attainment of 'ruling class goals' gives tacit approval
to the propertied elite's dominance of the major social
institutions and nullifies the concept of social crime
when it is clear there were different perceptions respecting
the legitimacy of the laws and the means of their
enforcement.
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Douglas Hay sees the eighteenth-century criminal trial
as part of the process of asserting and reinforcing the
dominance of the ruling class, but it was:
an elaborate ritual of the irrational. The power
of light and darkness were summoned into court
with the black cap which was donned to pronounce
sentence of death, and the spotless white gloves
worn at the end of a 'maiden assize' when no
prisoners were to be left for execution.124
A process which could end with death by slow strangulation
followed by dissection or gibbeting needed the dignity
of ritual. To reduce the administration of the law to
the removal of refuse is to simplify a complex social
process and, according to T.H.Green:
The legal system as it was in fact devised, with
its superabundant claims upon the lives of men,
would have been intolerable had it not in practice
accommodated the realities of contemporary social
life, had it not reflected how far England's
rulers, both in their brutality and their leniency,
had adopted the standards and approaches to law
enforcement of those they ruled.125
This picture of legal administration as a series of
interlocks helping sustain social coherence, can be supported
by evidence drawn from the petitions submitted by and on
behalf of smugglers facing lengthy imprisonment,
transportation, or execution. The wording of these appeals,
the selection of intermediaries, and the communications
between magnates, ministers, judges and local dignitaries,
indicate an understanding of the subtleties of government
and the networks sustaining elite authority.
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There were offenders who could do little more than
plead youthful indiscretion and the consequences of keeping
bad company. John Catt was only eighteen when he was injured
and captured during a run on the Sussex coast. His cousin,
Jane Smith, approached the Duke of Newcastle through his
wife, noting that Catt was likely to 'suffer Death for
the first Fact, which Housebreakers and common fellons
seldom do.'126 Thomas Tickner made the same comparison
in the case of his brother Peter, 'had he been a Thefe
or Highway Man.. .1 would not have Troubled any Noble
Person."27 The Tuckers drew attention to their anti-Jacobite
services as grounds for a pardon, and Jacob Pring pointed
out that he had brought the first news of the Young Pretender
sailing from France. They also maintained that they had
never been concerned in any murders or robberies, a recurrent
theme in the smugglers' petitions. The preface to Albion's
Fatal Tree maintains that distinctions between what was,
and was no.t criminal, were 'not based on inhibitions upon
violence.'128 But there was a belief that a reputation
for non
-violence, and good standing in the community, were
strong rnitigating factors. Robert Davey made the mistake
of relying on errors in the drafting of the proclamation
in the London Gazette as an adequate defence and failed
to surrender. The prosecution ensured their informant was
in court to identify Davey, and the jury would not accept
a mistake in the spelling of his name as a valid reason
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for failing to turn himself in. William Windham and Zachary
Fonnereau, Aldeburgh's NP5, the bailiffs and burgesses,
James Benett, a local clergyman, and two revenue officers,
all appealed on Davey's behalf. Not only was he a peaceable
man, but he had 'at all times been the Protector and
Defender of the Lives and Persons of the Officers of the
Revenue.' John Say, once a Riding Officer at Dunwich, owed
his life to Davey, who rescued him from a gang 'who had
carried him bound with a Halter about his Neck for several
Miles towards a Gallows where they proposed to hang him.'
Say was 'so sensible of the Obligation that a few hours
before his death at receiving the Holy Sacrament' he desired
that James Bennett do all he could for Davey if he ever
'fell into the hands of justice.' But for the fact that
he had been a smuggler, 'no man would have deserved a better
Character.'129
The difficulty with these petitions is that while they
may well have reflected local sentiments, and popular
understandings of the concept of justice, those in authority
might have been more concerned with exemplary punishments
than the circumstances of individual cases. When the
'Transports' were convicted and sentenced at the Sussex
assizes, the Hastings jurats submitted a petition to
Newcastle, stressing how William Harman had saved one of
the boarding crew from drowning)-30 Yet writing to the
Duke in his private capacity, Collier described the rest
of the smugglers as 'vile, lechering fellows that really
413
deserve no compassion', and whose punishment would serve
as a deterrent to other Hastings men with an inclination
to take up the contraband trade.131 Both of the letters
to Newcastle pointed out that Harman was a freeholder 'and
voted in your Graces Interest at the last Election •for
the County.' The parents and relatives of the other convicts
had either supported Newcastle's candidates in the past,
or were ready to do so in the future. 132 William Stephens
was described as a civil, good humoured smuggler, a man
of some substance wishing to set up in Rodmell as a butcher.
The local inhabitants wanted him set at liberty and Newcastle
was advised that 'as yr Graces interest is new amongst
these people and as they were hearty and disposed to a
Man to attend Ld Middlesex,' it might be well to meet their
wishes 133
There was also a competitive element in securing pardons,
once men of influence took up the cause of the condemned.
John Jarmyn was a Norfolk smuggler active in the 1740s,
convicted for his part in the rescue of James Holt from
custody. George Townshend, MP for Norfolk, made strenuous
efforts to save Jarmyn from the gallows. He argued the
unreliability of the informants at the trial, the
questionable efforts of the Excise in securing fresh evidence
from a renegade smuggler once the campaign for a pardon
was underway, the strength of Jarmyn's alibi, the curious
disappearance of a key defence witness, probably bought
off by the prosecution, and Jarmyn's good standing in the
locality. Townshend provided Newcastle with an explanation
for his vigorous campaigning:
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I do not espouse my Lord, this poor Mans cause as
an opportunity whereby I may convince this County
and my Constituents of the Interest I have with your
Grace. I really do it because I am convinced that
if he had the good fortune to have the facts thus
attested in these Papers thoroughly - considered, he
would have a good Chance to appear Innocent. I sued
for this favour as for an Innocent Man; not that
I would ever wish to exert what little Interest I
may have to obtain a pardon for one I really thought
Guilty.
If my Lord, your Grace sees any opportunity of
obtaining a reprieve for this unfortunate Man that
he may be transported, I shall ever acknowledge the
obligation, but my Lord, I shall be really concerned
to think that my Constituents will naturally conclude
from the same Sessions Papers that Jarrnyn suffer'd
innocent as they think him because not having so
good an Advocate as Brookes)-34
Edward Brook and John Carbold were convicted at the Old
Bailey in September 1751, charged with running goods at
Felixstowe in 1747. The 'advocacy' referred to by Townshend
could not have been that of Brook's counsel, and was probably
a political rival who had secured a pardon for him.135
When Thomas Holman was convicted of murdering Michael
Bath, Charles Eversfield, the Horsham magistrate, decided
to take up the case. Eversfield was concerned that Richmond
was giving credence to the story that Holman had shipped
some of the killers of Galley and Chater over to France.
Holinan's case, along with the others convicted at the Lewes
assizes, was discussed by a Cabinet council, attended by
George II, the Dukes of Bedford, Richmond, and Newcastle,
the Lord Chancellor, Sir Henry Pelham, and the trial judges;
it was clearly felt to be a matter of some significance.
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There was no pardon forthcoming at the time, Newcastle
declining the opportunity to speak on Holman's behalf and
Richmond adamant he should suffer the full penalty prescribed
by law. Richmond was set on his campaign of smuggler
extirpation, and Holman could expect no mercy from that
quarter, but the long history of animosity between the
Duke and Charles Eversfield made him an unsuitable
advocate. 136 Richmond's illness and Collier's connections
probably saved Holman, and the case illustrates the
interlocking of the legal and political domains. Government
is too complex a process to be analysed effectively using
a framework limited to a study of the institutional aspects
of legislation and implementation of the laws. Authority
rests on legitimacy, often best established through co-
operation between groups and interests working to secure
both particular and shared objectives and recognising their
interdependence and different powers. If a governing class
is to remain dominant, without resort to long-term
repression, then the governed must incorporate some elite
values and perceptions into their own modes of thought,
and vice versa. Competent administrators will be alert
for signs of dissent arising from new measures or changes
in the way the laws are being applied. Adjustments have
to be made in accordance with circumstances and the state
of public opinion. Local notables played a crucial role
in the day-to-day management of public affairs, but their
various roles created individual dilemmas. Collier often
recorded his disapproval of the smugglers, and at one stage
felt personally threatened, but he seemed incapable of
adopting a consistent approach to the problem.
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As Surveyor-General of the Kent Riding Officers, he was
well aware of the humiliations and injuries inflicted on
the men under his supervision, and was anxious to see the
worst offenders brought to justice, but as mayor of Hastings
and Newcastle's political agent he felt some obligation
towards local men who had run foul of the law in following
a practice conimon in the maritime counties. When the
'Transports' were convicted, he supported the petition
for Harman, but condemned the rest.. 137 When John Grayling
'was taken in 1744, Collier urged Newcastle to intervene:
There's some plea for him in favour of Mercy that he
was no Judge how far the Words of the Proclamation
Extended. His Original Crime was no Murder, or indeed
beating any Officer of the Revenue or rescuing Goods.
I really abominate the Smuggling practices, but in
this case, as Circumstanced, its absolutely necessary
to be made a point of.138
Two suspect vessels were brought into Sandwich in 1745,
belonging to George Harrison and Zebulon Morphet, both
Hastings men. They were 'notorious and reputed smugglers,'
according to the Collector, and just before the seizure
there had been 100 horses on the beach, carrying away goods.
Yet when Collier was asked for information he claimed
ignorance of Morphet's illicit trading activities, and
insisted that, 'not one single boat or person had been
over to France or any other place on the smuggling account,'
in recent weeks:
I solemnly declare that no person can have greater
abhorrence of this clandestine trade than myself
yet don't think but if mild terms will avail, it
will be attended with better consequences than
making them desperate, of which we have too many
instances 139
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He recommended Harrison and his cutter as naval auxiliaries
both in 1745 and again in 1748, but when William Day, another
local ship's master, applied for a privateering commission,
Collier dismissed him as 'a notorious Smugler, no good
Character, and the whole Complement a set of Smuglers and
abandon'd wretches.'14° Since Milward, Collier's son-in-
law, had supported Day's application, personal issues could
have influenced his decision. He exemplifies the need to
bring in local perspectives, personal motivations, and
individual views on social order and how best to preserve
it, when discussing how the authorities dealt with
smuggling. When prosecutions were brought by private
individuals, the courts exercised considerable discretion.
A prosecutor might use the threat of legal proceedings
to extract a confession and offer of restitution from the
culprit. Instances of theft enabled both prosecutors and
juries to be merciful since the value of the stolen item
determined .whether or not the offence was capital. Faced
with the rigours of the criminal code, juries need not
have felt morally compelled to acquit the guilty to save
them	 from	 execution	 for	 venial	 offences.	 Their
recommendations for mercy were noted, transmitted to the
Secretary of State, and generally acted upon if the judges
concurred.
It can be argued that the role of the state in these
transactions was to establish and maintain the machinery
for the administration of justice. To the extent that even
Langbein's 'little crooks' were an embarrassment to the
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authorities, criminal activity, and the efforts to check
it, were part of the policy agenda for eighteenth-century
administrations. State involvement was more obvious in
smuggling cases, shown by the frequent appearances of the
Crown's legal officers in court. There was concern for
the revenues, and the established order was perceived
as under threat as patterns of social deference and ties
of economic dependence were eroded. The contraband trade
was	 too much of an entrepreneurial pursuit for its
practitioners to be convincingly depicted as a
proto-proletariat in revolt against the dictates of
commercial capitalism but as major economic changes were
undermining the old certainties, so the traditional elite
found itself being challenged in diverse ways. Smuggling
was an area of economic activity more obviously outside
effective government control and it offered the prospect
of escape from the stultifying effects of unremmitting
manual work and constant poverty. The courts did not treat
smugglers as generously as the revenue officials maintained,
but juries were composed of the more comfortably
circumstanced, those with sufficient wealth to have felt
threatened by a 'lawless banditti' bidding defiance to
properly constituted authority. Yet these respectable
farmers, professional men, tradesmen and master craftsmen
delivered verdicts in favour of known smugglers. Political
and social stability rested on interlocking networks of
interests, and a general acceptance of the rule of law.
Large gangs of armed smugglers exposed the limitations
of the state's coercive apparatus, and when prosecutions
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failed, it is possible the jury was taking the opportunity
to express the view that government was pursuing policies
and adopting strategies unacceptable to a section of society.
This is at some remove from the notion of smuggling as
an activity criminalised by the law but sanctioned by the
community. As John Rule says, 'there is an obvious problem
in determining the reference group by which such actions
are regarded as acceptable.'141 There is no axiomatic case
for accepting 'the lower orders, 'the people' as the
reference group. Whatever the advantages for incisive
social analysis, individuals, groups and communities fail
to conform to their social class stereotypes and a range
of attitudes and behaviours can be found crossing the divides
of class and position. Smuggling was a multifaceted
activity: an international commercial operation, a means
of advancement available to the entrepreneurially minded,
a cover for those with a predilection f or thuggery. It
can also be interpreted as a challenge to the established
social order, but there was too much diversity, too great
an awareness of the subtleties of social relations and
the complexities of government, for analysis of the
smugglers' enterprise to be confined to a model of class
war which posits a simple divide between rebellious smugglers
and capitalist merchants intent on extending their
monopolies, working through the administrative, military
and legal apparatus of the state.
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Conclusions.
The intention has been to examine existing accounts and
analyses of eighteenth-century smuggling, in particular,
the validity of the arguments for designating it as a form
of social crime, and the claim that there was a significant
development in the organization of the contraband trade
in the period 1760-1780, as the volume of traffic increased,
illicit imports infiltrated legitimate markets and
distribution networks, and the typical smuggler became
more of a capitalist entrepreneur than a pirate or a bandit.
The question of violence needed to be addressed when looking
at both social crime and organizational changes. If the
contraband trade came under the control of 'the large
scale importer and wholesale distributor', businessmen,
insuring against seizure at Lloyds, then it would seem
reasonable to expect some reduction in armed confrontations
with the authorities, in an effort to keep down preiniums.The
Muis cite, evidence to support their case for smuggling
becoming more systematic and expanding 'in the direction
of monopoly',1 but they make no references to the Customs
outport records, the Treasury material, or the War Office
and Admiralty papers, sources which demonstrate that
smuggling remained a significant policing issue.
Smuggling changed over time, acquiring the attributes
of more legitimate commercial enterprises. Population
growth, and increased per capita consumption in Britain
provided the smuggler with greater opportunities, encouraging
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the continental East India companies to send more ships
to Canton in search of tea, and the setting up of new
distilleries in the Netherlands, catering for English tastes.
The contraband entrepots flourished, and when the Revestment
Act made for more effective regulation of the Isle of Man,
Port Rush and Roscoff provided alternative bases. Greater
quantities of contraband were being acquired, transported,
stored and distributed, and the increasing scale of
operations included greater reliance on financial
institutions, esssential as sources of credit and for the
handling of remittances.
There were predictions that the 1784 Commutation Act,
by ending the profitability of tea smuggling, would bring
about the general destruction of the contraband trade.
The East India Company's rivals would not be able to compete
on level terms, and denied their most lucrative business,
the smugglers would soon fall into decline. Securing capital
for constructing and fitting out the cutters would prove
difficult, and merchant houses were less likely to allow
credit as profits dwindled and shippers were forced into
taking greater risks, driving up insurance costs in the
process.2 The forecasts did not make sufficient allowance
for the smugglers' adaptability and anticipated an extended
peace. As it was, the Eden treaty, negotiated with France
in 1786, was only in force for six years, and sales of
contraband spirits continued during that period. 3 Brandy
and gin were staples at Dunkirk, and in this later period
rum was becoming an important item in sales to the English
smugglers frequenting the port. 4 - James Armstrong, a
passenger returning from the West Indies, described how
the spirit was brought into Europe:
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I took my passage on board a Vessell of about
300 Ton burthen that cleared from thence for
Dunkirk but when we got to Sea the Captain informed
me he was not going to Dunkirk but to the Island
of Guernsey and that the Rum (of which the Cargo
entirely consisted and was smuggled from St
Christopher's) belonged to a Merchant there:
and I was Witness to its being landed on the
said Island of Guernsey, and to the re-shipping
of one hundred and sixty punchions for Dunkirk,
to supply the Smugglers there, and the rest was
deposited in the Merchants Stores either to be
consumed in the Island or to be illicitly disposed
of at another opportunity.
Much of Guernsey's trade was illicit, and the merchants
sent considerable quantities of brandy and gin to the Dutch
island of St Eustatius, 'and Smuggle the Cargo from thence
to St Christophers and Barter it for Rums.' In addition,
ships were despatched to Grenada, where they took on rum
cleared for Quebec, 'and then return directly for Guernsey.'5
As tea lost its attractions for the smugglers, so they
turned to tobacco, another highly taxed commodity available
at the established entrepots, and easily stored among the
casks of spirits being brought back to Britain. Many of
the vessels concerned were open boats, from 8 to 14 tons,
and sloops up to 35 tons, 'which can run into the Creeks,
Rivers and Coves and land their Cargoes', but there were
larger carriers, some displacing 300 tons, 'which lay off
at a Distance at Sea, the Cargoes of which are discharged
by Boats':
431
Ships of 100 to 200 Tons Burthen with Men in
proportion are employed between Dungeness & Beachy
Head, and as far down as Lands end, and from the
Coast of Scotland, in bringing over Tobacco from
Dunkirk, Ostend, Guernsey, the Isle of Man and
other places;and some Ships of these Burthens are
kept on Freight by Companies of wealthy Smugglers,
to bring Cargoes from Virginia to Dunkirk, Guernsey
etc., with design to run the same into this Channel.6
The reports on the illicit tobacco trade indicate that
there were different levels of participation, from the
substantial merchants sending ships to Virginia to purchase
supplies for the contraband warehouses, to the boatmen
unable to afford insurance and bringing over a few bales
at a time. The scale and organization of these other branches
of smuggling, could be used as evidence to support the
Muis's argument; as with the tea trade, illicit importation
was under the effective control of wealthy investors and
consortia .with the necessary capital and credit. But as
Winslow points out, this omits 'any mention of the bloody
conflict which was at the bottom of this aspect of British
commerial development.'7 Concealment, evasion, deception
and subornation were all practised by the smugglers; the
legal market was penetrated by illicit dealers, but the
goods had to be brought into Britain in the first place.
A blunderbuss could be as persuasive as a bribe and the
cannon-carrying smuggling cutter is a more representative
image than the forged permit. Legitimate merchants and
retailers dealing in contraband teas and spirits, and the
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manufacturing operations set up as a cover for imported
tobacco, were one way in which legal and illegal operations
interlocked., 8 Another such combination was the privateering
business, when smugglers applied for commissions and letters
of marque, either to diversify their activities or to provide
a useful cover for clandestine trade.
Distancing the contraband business in the second half
of the eighteenth century from the force and violence which
accompanied it, creates an artificial distinction between
the earlier and later periods. Conversely, Winslow's
concentration on the Wealden gangs of the 1740s, and his
paradigm in which 'The protection of smuggling was in part
a defence of the local economy as against the development
of commercial capitalism',9 obscures the extent to which
smuggling was already an international concern, making
the Ostend Company and its Scandinavian successors viable
commercial undertakings in the period 1720-1750. The
Directors of the East India Company estimated that while
consumption in Britain was rising, the proportion of legally
imported teas being sold was in decline as foreign
competitors found buyers among the merchants who supplied
the English smugglers. The government was losing revenue,
and while the 'Clandestine Traders' prospered, the fair
traders faced ruin:
This evil is become so great and so diffusive that
it is conceived not the Civil Power, nor even such
Military Force as the Administration would choose
to employ on such an occasion will be sufficient
to suppress it.1°
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Competition from foreign companies, and the lack of effective
policing were perceived as related problems. Groups and
interests within the contraband trade do need to be
identified and described, but linkages between agents
within the smuggling networks are equally important for
an understanding of their operation.
Establishing the 'plebeian social origins of the Sussex
smugglers of the 1740s' is integral to Winslow's thesis
that smuggling was part of 'the traditions of resistance,
carried on by the poor, to the laws and institutions of
their rulers', and 'an aspect of the class struggle of
the eighteenth century,'11 but he is aware of the diverse
social and occupational backgrounds of his protagonists,
and the hierarchical control implicit in contemporary
references to 'master smugglers', and the directing influence
of the London merchants. The inaccuracies of contemporary
ascriptions are noted, and Charles Fleet's claim that 'a
"lower class" of smuggler had come to predominate' in the
1730s and 1740s is subjected to some scrutiny. Yet Winslow
adopts a similar determinism, inferring a connection between
violence and social class. When smuggling involved riot
and the mob, this 'inevitably led to the association of
smuggling with the "lower class", and the crimes were usually
attributed to the poor'.1-2 The 'crimes' are unspecified
and the attributions anonymous, but a causal connnection
between poverty and brigandage is implied, and the
retribution exacted in the late l740s had more to do with
the assertion of ruling class hegemony than the repression
of crime.
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Widening the scope of investigation to include earlier
and later periods and other regions, showed the need for
caution when making connections between the use of violence
and the social origins of its perpetrators. It was the
merchants at Calais and Boulogne who paid the smuggling
crews in brandy and dismissed any man not prepared to fight
the revenue forces. If it is accepted that there were
substantial financial and commercial interests behind the
large armed cutters active in the l770s and 1780s, then
responsibility for the smugglers' use of firepower lay
with those putting up the capital to furnish the ships.
Tracing the interlocking commercial interests of privateers,
smugglers and legitimate shippers on the Isle of Man and
the Channel Isles, brings out the limitations of Winslow's
class-based analysis. Accounts of smuggling on Man, written
in the l730s, suggest it was a significant business
enterprise rather than a way out for the poor or 'an escape
for those.who refused to submit.'13 Before the legislation
banning the export of non-indigenous produce from the
Island, merchants had used Manx warehouses and cellars
for the low cost storage facility they provided:
but they Can now Dispose of whole Cargoes at once
in the Island, to the Smuglers thereupon - paying
a Trifling Acknowledgement in the Island; for the
Smuglers [sic] there are now grown Rich, & are
able to purchase whole Cargoes, And having now
Settled all their Correspondents upon the
Neighbouring Coasts, and Drawn in Numbers to assist
them, they are under no apprehension of having
their goods Seiz'd upon Landing, tho' Discover'd
by the officers, if they are now Discover'd they
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give Battle to the officers, Seize & Bind them,
And if any of their goods are Seiz'd & Secur'd,
Even go the Length of Attacking them in Houses,
& Setting fire to them th Impunity, And Without
fear of a Discovery; And When they are Prosecuted,
in Some places, find the way to Brand the Informers
th Infamy, in order to give a Countenance to Juries
to bring them of f)-4
There was no suggestion that smugglers could be divided
into peaceful entrepreneurs and aggressive proletarians.
Bulk buying from the merchantinen, a network of agents based
on the ntainlands, the ability to discredit officials and
corrupt juries, and the calculated use of violence to defend
their interests and intimidate the revenuemen, point to
a sophisticated operation in place. The Muis describe the
'traditional form of smuggling' in the eighteenth century
as ' a diffuse, informal and more or less personal trade'.
Informality and business dealings based on personal contacts
and successful repeated transactions 	 are attributes of
commercialS
 networks, but these are not necessarily small
scale. Much of their assessment of smuggling before 1760
is based on the notion that major enterprises need central
direction, and that after the Seven Years War, 'wealthy
British merchants with far flung interests largely replaced
the many relatively small-scale local smugglers.'15 Outport
Collectors naturally focused on the local dimension, and
it was the boatmen and horsemen, the carters and tubmen,
who were likely to appear before the magistrates, not the
large scale importer and wholesale distributor. The Muis
present a dichotomy; smuggling was either small-scale and
locally based, or it was dominated by central capitalists,
the 'real men of substance', the London merchants.' 6 Closer
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attention to the mechanics of importation and
distribution demonstrates the limitations of this division.
The contraband trade is better understood as a network,
made up of interdependent sectors, and within which
individuals could aspire to wealth and standing. The Muis
and	 Winslow provide frameworks for coherent analysis,
and Dermigny draws attention to the complexity of the
international market in contraband, as smugglers adjusted
to alterations in duties, fluctuations in supply and demand,
changes in legitimate trade patterns and outbreaks of war.
The use of force can be incorporated within this
representation of the smuggler as astute entrepreneur.
The profitability of illicit intercourse should be put
in perspective, rather than focusing on the price reductions
made possible through the evasion of duties. Processing
and packing tobacco, storing tea in oilskin bags, employing
coopers to manufacture half-anchor casks, all incurred
additional costs. Smugglers had to pay well above the
normal rates for crews, porters, and land carriage, while
having to land cargoes on open beaches meant a higher level
of risk than that entered into by legitimate traders.
Commentators in the 1780s maintained that the tea smugglers
could lose one ship in three and still operate at a profit,
but such estimates failed to take into account the effects
of losing capable commanders and disappointing customersJ7
Letters from the cruiser captains and outport officials
show how determined the smugglers were to retain their
goods at sea and on land. Cannons and small arms, and
the employment of armed guards through the country, were
as much a form of insurance as the premiums paid at Lloyds.
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This analogy has its limitations; deaths and injuries
suffered in clashes between smugglers and preventive forces
could lead to reprisals and vendettas. There was perceived
self-interest informing the violence, but most of those
directly involved would not have been calculating profit
margins under fire. Even so, the distinct pattern of
intimidation and confrontation suggests that the smugglers'
actions are best considered as integral to the contraband
trade. There were vicious and sadistic individuals among
the gangs, and some of the Wealden men were behaving in
a way likely to provoke central government into using the
power at its disposal, but McLynn's assertion that the
Sussex smugglers were atypical 'in their purposive violence,
social composition, and their rhetoric' 18 reduces historical
explanation to pseudo-psychoanalysis. Without some rationale
for the use of violence, what is left is speculation about
the mental states of long-dead villains. McLynn tells
us that 'Much of the exaggeration of the social role of
smuggling comes from extrapolating from the special case
of the Sussex smugglers.'19 His targets for criticism are
most probably Winslow and Rule, and there is a strong case
for locating the Wealden gangs within a broader social
and economic context, accumulating the evidence for valid
comparative studies. McLynn does not do this, preferring
to cite individual instances of elite involvement rather
than addressing the question of how the smuggling trade
was organised.
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John Beattie argues that there were significant changes
in social perceptions towards the end of the century:
Attitudes towards violence and the character of
violence itself both appear to have changed in some
significant ways in the later eighteenth century,
each no doubt encouraged by the other...it seems
to me that the evidence both of prosecutions and
of contemporary opinion supports the view that there
were indeed changes in violent behaviour in the late
eighteenth century, that there was some shifting
of the line dividing acceptable from unacceptable
conduct and a strengthening of feelings of shame,
guilt and repugnance about acts that had once raised
no eyebrows.2°
The extraction of obedience by physical coercion' was
increasingly under question, but the Beattie also draws
atention to 'the huge number of hangings, particularly
from 1783 to 1786 in Surrey and across the Thames at Tyburn
and at Newgate'.2" Whatever changes were taking place
within the family, or in relationships at work, changing
approaches •
 to the treatment of offenders were inspired
by a growing awareness that harsh treatment was less of
a deterrent than the certainty of arrest and conviction.
The army and navy remained an essential part of the
government's campaigns to suppress the smuggling trade
while the employment of 'bush officers' by the Excise
marked a further shift away from the civil magistrates'
control of policing. A law abiding society is one where
both police and populace accept the need for rules and
procedures. The use of the army as a law enforcing body
had long been a source of disquiet, but the workings of
the Excise in the later eighteenth century raise questions
about the government's commitment to a more ordered police.
A fierce clash between smugglers and revenuemen was reported
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in theIpswich Journal in May, 1784. A party of five
excisemen and their seven assistants had seized 57 half-
-anchor casks of spirits, and were taking them from
Kettleburgh to Woodbridge. About two o'clock in the
afternoon they were attacked near Easton by a gang of 30
smugglers:
who with horrid imprecations and expressions
of Murder! Murder! fell upon them in a most
inhuman manner, with an intent to rescue the
seizure: however, the officers made a noble stand
and a bloody engagement ensued, which lasted
nearly an hour, when the officers put the smugglers
to flight, pursued them several miles, and
maintained the seizure.22
According to the press report, most of the smugglers were
hurt, either shot or cut with broadswords, and five or
six excisemen 'slightly wounded'. The officers report gave
more details. The party was made up of John Pope, the Ipswich
Supervisor, William Mason from Wickham Market, William
Engall from Saxrnundham, two more men from the Suffolk
Collection, and George Cartwright from the London Excise
office. They were following up an information when they
searched a field near Kettleburgh and discovered the gin
and brandy. Their assailants were armed with 'large bludgeons
and sticks capped with spikes and iron'. Two officers and
three assistants had suffered cuts and bruises, and one
of them, Richard Pitcher, was thought to be in danger of
his life. In his report to the Board, Richard Powell,
the Ipswich Collecteor, noted that 'four or five' of the
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smugglers were rumoured to be dead, and included the
information that all the assistants were riding with
Cartwright, the London officer. So was this just another
confrontation, where the smugglers, armed only with sticks,
were so foolhardy as to take on 13 exciseinen, equipped
with 'carbines, pistols and broadswords', or were the
officers seizing an opportunity to retaliate? Powell
described George Culham, the smugglers' leader, as 'the
most noted Smuggler in my Collection, and has frequently
displayed his, cruelty on the officers.'23
	
Mr Magow, an
Excise solicitor, conducted an investigation in Suffolk:
I went to Ipswich where after a Minute Inquiry, I could
get no certain information of what No. of Smugglers
were shot in the Affray (except one who is said to
have died since of his Wounds, but this is only the
Report of the Country). The whole of this Affair is
kept so close and secret by the surviving Smugglers
(for fear no Doubt of being themselves discovered)
that there is every reason to believe no proceedings
will ever be had against the Officers for Murder, nor
can I find any Coroner has sat on the body of them.24
Assessing levels of violence by reference to the murder
rate alone is debatable in itself, but in the light of
this report, what credence can be given to the totals derived
from the assize records and the coroners returns?
The 1736 and 1746 Acts, enabling the revenue authorities
to prosecute smugglers away from their own areas, reflected
concerns that juries in maritime counties were too
sympathetic towards the accused and exposed to bribery
and intimidation. The record of convictions and acquittals
up to the mid-century period does not support John Rule's
claim that 'smuggling.. .and related activities were not
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held to be crimes in the popular view, no matter by whom
committed or in what circumstances'. 25 Smuggling, as the
most extensive form of organized crime, should be brought
into the debate on changing attitudes, but jury verdicts
do not substantiate the argument for a developing
sensibility. The objection can be made that juries were
not representative of 'the popular view' but if that is
a valid point, then this study has served to cast doubt
on the notion that smugglers could go into court confident
of acquittal, irrespective of what crimes they had committed.
The concept of social crime has its merits, directing
attention to the ways in which the laws and the machinery
of law enforcement can be the means of promoting sectional
interests and legitirnising a governing elite's recourse
to coercive measures whenever it perceives a challenge
to its authority. There were activities defined as criminal
by the legislature and punished as felonies, which were
quite acceptable to large sections of the community.
Wrecking is a good example of such a social crime; storms
were seen to be acts of God, and the ships cast up on the
coasts .as part of the bounty of the sea. For hard-pressed
boatmen and fishermen the cables, rigging, canvas, and
anchors recovered from wrecks were a vital resource, and
the wider community of rural workers could find a use for
salvaged timbers and nails; a cargo which could be consumed
or sold was a bonus. Contemporary reports estimated the
numbers descending on the beaches in thousands, and it
was evident that those involved did not see themselves
as criminals. John Styles describes smuggling, poaching
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and wrecking as 'forms of illegal appropriation which were
redefined as legitimate, both by men of middling rank and
by the poor.'26 But 'wrecking' encompassed a •variety of
forms of wealth redistribution. John Rule notes instances
when the wreckers stripped survivors of their clothes as
they staggered ashore, careless of their survival. While
such behaviour may have been exceptional, it raises the
issue of what was included under the protective umbrella
of social crime.27 When the same question is asked of
smuggling, similar doubts arise. Wrecking was occasional
and spontaneous, a communal response to a fortunate accident.
Smuggling was practised by casual opportunists and by
professionals conducting a commercial business operation;
it was organized and calculated, including the use of
violence to deter and intimidate. Eighteenth-century
governments were disturbed by the smugglers' Jacobite
connections, and the way the gangs exposed the authorities'
limited policing capacity. There was also unease that
smuggling provided an escape from servitude and dependency
for farm labourers and rural artisans. To the extent that
the smugglers escaped the restraints of employment and
authority, they can be described as social rebels, but
what is wanting is evidence of some awareness that their
activities constituted a threat to the established order.
When their careers can be traced over a lengthy period,
'freetraders' can be seen to have been driven by financial
imperatives and the instinct for self-preservation. There
were individuals like William Owen and Jeremiah Curteis,
enamoured of violence and risk, but smugglers intent on
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redressing imbalances in society, or defending their local
economies against the incursions of central capitalists,
are difficult to identify within the networks of acquisiton
and accuxnmulation which sustained the contraband trade.
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